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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the role, both actual and potential, of the European Community
in the development of effective minority language policy. The study is confined to
indigenous or autochthonous minority languages spoken in the EC Member States
and focuses on the use of language in official or public domains. The involvement of
the Community in language, and particularly minority language, issues is justified
on a number of grounds, primarily on the basis that the dynamic of European
integration has disrupted patterns of language use throughout the Member States.
The reciprocal role of the Community is presented as a fundamental responsibility
rather than a gesture of goodwill. The present official languages policy of the EC is
outlined briefly, followed by a more extensive discussion on measures initiated by the
institutions that deal with minority languages specifically and on relevant decisions
of the European Court ofJustice.
The respective competence of the Community and the Member States in this policy
domain is explored, with particular emphasis on the application of the principle of
subsidiarity. It is established that subsidiarity does not always preclude action by the
Community and may, in fact, require the implementation of EC measures in certain
circumstances. Initiatives in favour of minority languages are proposed in the
context of the promotion of diversity, grounded in cultural policy, the protection of
fundamental rights and the realisation of effective European citizenship. The
expansion of these policy domains to encompass such measures is justified, within
the contemporary political culture of non-harmonisation, respect for national and
regional identity, and the development of minimum standards. Objections to this
evolution of Community policy are shown to contradict the fundamental ethos of
pluralism and diversity, and to exist in the political rather than in the legal realm.
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Modern life is supposed to tend to break down all the barriers of
nationality, of race and even of language, and to weld the nations of
the earth into one mighty mass. That something like this may not be
witnessed in a future stage of the world's history I am not prepared
to deny....However...side by side with the levelling tendency which
annihilates distinctions and which would have one law, one
language, one cosmopolitan character throughout...there is a
counter tendency of a natural and involuntary character constantly
emphasising distinctions and building up local differences, tending
to make languages.
J.E. Southall
Wales and her Language
1893
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1980s, the European Parliament called on the Member States of the
European Community to recognise and provide for the rights of linguistic minorities
that resided within their territories. The European Court of Justice recognised that
national linguistic policy could, under certain circumstances, restrict the Community
right of the free movement of workers. The Community began to finance cultural
and educational projects related specifically to the maintenance of minority
languages. The preservation and promotion of linguistic diversity was thus emerging
as a legitimate constraint on the forces of economic and political integration. But the
Community institutions had to rely on the intrinsic value of linguistic diversity per
se, rather than on any explicit or justiciable competence, to establish and develop
their stance in favour of minority languages. The Treaty of Rome referred to
language only in so far as it provided that all official versions of the Treaty were to
be considered equally authentic. The principle of the equality of all official
Community languages, in respect of the administration of the Community more
generally, evolved from this vague declaration. But the position of non-official
languages was not addressed, in either the Treaty itself or related secondary
legislation. As with a number of other policy domains, EC action on minority
language issues was assumed to have been legitimated retrospectively, by the
additional Community competences outlined in the Treaty on European Union.
Article 128 EC, in particular, reflects the cultural diversity of the Member States and
sub-national regions and, therefore, of the Community itself. It further provides for a
Community 'contribution' to the preservation and promotion of this diversity.
Action taken in favour of minority languages is usually considered in this broader
context of cultural policy rather than as a separate, evolving domain within the
ongoing delimitation of Community and Member State competence. To date,
limitations on the legal basis for Community action, even within the remit of cultural
policy, have been assumed rather than established. Similarly, the relatively recent
insistence by the Commission that, because of the principle of subsidiarity, the
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Community is debarred from taking any action in the cultural context that would
have political consequences in the Member States, has been neither substantiated nor
challenged. In essence, two questions must be addressed. First, in a general sense,
which level of government, Community or Member State, can do what, in the context
of shared competence? Second, and more specifically, what are the boundaries of
constraint to which the Community is subject in respect of its initiated but incoherent
policy on minority languages?
This thesis thus explores a central question of European law using the specific
example of minority language policy, an ostensibly peripheral, but widely applicable,
theoretical framework. In this context, it will be shown that minority language issues
relate just as much to fundamental rights and citizenship as to culture. This brings
minority language policy firmly within the realm of contentious, contemporary
questions faced by the Community, as it strives to redress the so-called democratic
deficit within its structures of government and administration. The recognition of
linguistic rights for speakers of minority languages is a highly controversial question
in its own right, generating fierce political debate, and resistance, at both national and
international levels. In this sense, the promotion of minority language rights by the
Community has considerable implications for its relations with the Member States as
well as for the implementation of its responsibilities as a governing entity. Should the
Community grapple with or avoid potentially divisive quandaries that are not related
centrally to its economic policies? Does the placidity of the Member States or the
inclusion of European citizens take precedence where these values come into
conflict?
In Chapter 1, background principles and terminology are outlined and explained.
Basic tenets of sociolinguistic theory are introduced, to establish the legitimacy and
value of minority languages in the first instance and to justify the recognition of
minority language rights by all levels of government. The framework of the official
languages policy of the European Community is detailed, with emphasis placed on
the need and potential for reform of the existing arrangements. The emergence of a
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Community policy relating specifically to minority languages is traced in Chapter 2,
which analyses resolutions of the institutions and decisions of the Court of Justice
that were issued before the adoption of the Treaty on European Union. Chapter 3
discusses the ongoing debate on the division of Community and Member State
competence, addressing legal and political arguments to establish both the scope of
and limitations on EC action in the shared policy domains. Chapters 4 and 5 focus
specifically on changes introduced by the Treaty on European Union and proposed by
the Amsterdam Treaty, in the fields of cultural policy, and fundamental rights and
citizenship respectively. Both chapters focus directly on the implications of the
amended provisions for the evolving Community stance on minority languages.
Finally, the actual development of Community policy since the introduction of the
Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties is evaluated, to ascertain how the Community
itself has interpreted the changes introduced.
As stated earlier, the conclusions drawn relate to both general and specific aspects of
European law. The establishment of legitimate bases for policy implementation is
one of the central concerns of any governing entity but is one of the most contentious
questions within European Community relations in particular. By focusing on the
specific and inherently controversial domain of minority language policy, this
question is addressed and answered from a pragmatic as well as theoretical




GENERAL REVIEW OF EC LANGUAGE POLICY
1. INTRODUCTION
The evolution from European Community to European Union demonstrates the
commitment of the Member States to increased economic, social and political
integration. As Community law continues to penetrate and harmonise numerous
spheres of contemporary life, the diversity displayed by the distinct languages spoken
in the Member States stands in marked contrast. Coulmas identifies this fact as
somewhat of a mixed blessing, outlining two prevailing, but opposing, views:
linguistic diversity is often praised as a 'celebration', as an invaluable cultural asset;
but it has also been denounced as a divisive obstacle, thwarting the achievement of
true European unity.1 While European policies that deal specifically with language
issues are not particularly numerous, the dynamic of Community law generally has a
definite impact on language use patterns throughout the Member States.2 The
European Commission has declared that no-one should be penalised, either socially
or economically, for using his/her vernacular language, despite the demands of an
increasingly multilingual world. While the potentially corrosive influence of
European integration on the security of national languages and cultures cannot be
underestimated, the consequences for speakers of regional, minority and non-official
languages are particularly acute and, as such, merit specific consideration.
' Florian Coulmas, "European integration and the idea of the national language", in Coulmas (ed.), A
Language Policy for the European Community: Prospects and Quandaries, (Berlin; New York:
Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 1-44 at 2.
2
Padraig O Riagain, "National and international dimensions of language policy when the minority
language is a national language: The case of Irish in Ireland", in Coulmas (ed.), supra note 1, 225-278
at 255.
3
European Commission, "Language engineering in the European Community", (1992) vol. 16:3
Language Problems and Language Planning, 249-252 at 250;
Joshua A. Fishman, a sociolinguist, writes in a similar manner, discussing the value of cultural
protection at the micro-level, in conjunction with economies of scale at the macro-level; cf. Language
and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective, (Clevedon, Avon: Multilingual Matters Ltd.,
1989), p. 3.
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Debate on European linguistic diversity is usually poised as a conflict between
sentiment and efficiency, yet neither extreme premise, when considered in isolation,
is convincing or pragmatic. This Chapter first places the thesis in the context of
contemporary sociolinguistic and philosophical theory on linguistic diversity. In
particular, the significance of diversity within the evolving European polity is
established and justified. The present language policy regime of the Community is
then outlined: the focus at this stage is on the official languages of the Community. A
coherent policy on minority languages does not yet exist at EC level: examining the
official languages policy will, however, identify the Community ethos on language
issues more generally. Any reforms recommended for the accommodation of
minority languages can then be assessed against this broader context. It will become
apparent that reform of the EC languages regime generally is advocated, but from the
standpoint of diversity rather than the more usually professed doctrine of
homogeneity.
It must also be noted at the outset that there is no widely accepted definition of a
'minority language' in international law. Neither can generally assumed
characteristics of minority languages be taken for granted. For example, it is often
thought that a language cannot be recognised officially, particularly as a national
language, to qualify as a minority language. But a significant number of minority
languages are recognised in national constitutions or by legislation. Some languages,
such as Irish and Luxembourgish, are even recognised as the national languages of
their respective states. These difficulties of definition and interpretation are discussed
at various stages throughout the thesis. It is particularly important to note that this
study is limited in application to indigenous or autochthonous minority languages
spoken within the territories of the EC Member States.
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2. THE VALUE OF LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY
If linguistic repression is the norm, then none ofus should long for normality.4
This section introduces the terminology, concepts and controversies related to
philosophical and sociolinguistic theory on linguistic diversity. The principles
introduced at this stage will later be applied to language questions that arise
specifically in the context of the European Community.
A. Diversity v. Homogeneity
Concepts such as 'diversity', 'identity', 'ethnicity' and 'inclusion' have become the
cornerstones of contemporary social theory: in particular, the emergence of the
discipline of sociolinguistics has engendered widespread, interdisciplinary study of
the role of language in society, rather than viewing language solely as an abstract or
aesthetic concept. The evolving focus on inherently human - and often controversial -
ideas, such as ethnicity, has evoked criticism that social scientists who promote the
ideal of diversity are sentimentalists rather than objective realists. This has been
confounded by negative, inferior associations with even the terminology used.5 What
is often overlooked, however, is that ethnicity is as much a feature of more
widespread, even dominant, groups as it is of minorities.6 Essentially, ethnicity is
about difference; not superiority and not inferiority. Roche observes that the richness
of linguistic diversity is often overlooked since its advantages "...don't show up on a
balance sheet...."7 Appreciation of diversity must instead be based on an acceptance
4 Leslie Green, "Are language rights fundamental?", (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 639-669.
5
cf. Fishman, supra note 3, pp. 11, 474, 561, 685 et seq. He outlines, for example, the "...confusion of
ethnicity with politically troublesome collectivities, with rambunctious minorities, with 'difficult'
peripheral and vestigial populations...." (p. 11).
6
cf. Hilary Tovey, Damian Hannan and Hal Abramson, Why Irish? Irish Identity and the Irish
Language, (Dublin: Bord na Gaeilge, 1989), pp. 7-8.
cf. also European Commission, Euromosaic: The Production and Reproduction ofMinority Language
Groups in the European Union, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 1996), pp. 2-4.
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of the link between human dignity and freedom of identity, as expressed by
McDougal, Lasswell and Chen:
The conception of human dignity is fundamentally linked to the life of the mind
which in turn is closely linked to language as a basic means of communication.
Language is a rudiment of consciousness and close to the core of personality;
deprivations in relation to language deeply affect identity.8
Certainly, many commentators experience discomfort when dealing with these
concepts. They argue for efficiency and economy over sentiment. Furthermore,
opinion is split on whether true unity and integration should overcome any
sentimental attachment to identity. These questions are central to the ongoing debate
on European integration and are considered in more detail infra.
B. The Idea of 'Planning' Language
Haarmann outlines the general philosophy of planning for linguistic diversity as
follows:
[Llanguage politics has to do with the regulation of languages, their status and
social functions on a national level. Language politics incorporates the ideas
and conceptual framework of the envisaged regulation, while language policies
implement such ideas.9
Language planning can, therefore, can be described as a deliberate policy attempt to
accommodate, and often to encourage or promote, the fact of linguistic diversity.
Comprehensive and systematic language planning is often advocated as a preferable
alternative to the inadequacy of an ad hoc approach. A distinction may be noted at
the outset between 'corpus planning', which refers to the planning of vocabulary,
grammar, etc. and 'status planning', which deals with official recognition of
languages and with measures designed to deliberately influence language use in
various domains. Status planning generally merits attention with the occurrence of
'language shift', i.e. "...the breakdown of a previously established societal allocation
7 Nick Roche, "Multilingualism in European Community meetings: A pragmatic approach", in
Coulmas (ed.), supra note 1, 139-146 at 140.
8
Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Lung-Chu Chen, "Freedom from discrimination in
choice of language and international human rights", (1976) 1 Southern Illinois University Law
Journal, 151-174 at 151.
9 Harald Haarmann, "Language politics and the new European identity", in Coulmas (ed.), supra note
1, 103-120 at 103.
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of functions; the alteration of previously recognised role-relationships, situations and
domains, so that these no longer imply or call for the language with which they were
previously associated."10 There is a danger, however, that planning for the survival
or revival of a language can overemphasise the value of the language itself, without
paying sufficient attention to its speakers, from the perspective of language choice
and fundamental rights: this idea is discussed further in Chapter 5 infra, in the
context of policies based on linguistic survival (language-based) versus those
grounded in linguistic security (speaker-oriented).
The European Community is a multilingual, multicultural phenomenon. Questions of
language planning are acutely pertinent, from those that seek to reduce the number of
languages used within the institutions, thus striving towards increased linguistic
uniformity, to those advocating interventionist protection of the numerous minority
languages spoken within the Community realm. In the context of compromise, it is
sometimes suggested that the adoption of a non-interventionist laissez-faire, or
'survival of the fittest', approach should be encouraged, accompanied by the
concurrent promotion of 'linguistic freedom'.11 But can such freedom, a balance
between the cultural value of languages that are weak and those which are
considerably stronger, be generated in the abstract, independently of deliberate
Community or national government strategies?12 It is difficult to envisage the
'promotion of linguistic freedom' without some degree of intervention. Fishman
categorises the alternative 'survival of the fittest' mindset as the law of the jungle
and advocates that it is for this very reason we should leave it behind.13
10
Fishman, supra note 3, p. 212.
"
cf Giulio Lepschy, "How many languages does Europe need?", in M.M. Parry, W.V. Davies and
R.A.M. Temple, The Changing Voices of Europe: Social and Political Changes and their Linguistic
Repercussions, Past, Present and Future, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1994), 1-21 at 12.
12
cf. Elisabetta Zuanelli, "Italian in the European Community: An educational perspective on the
national language and new language minorities", in Coulmas (ed.), supra note 1, 291-300 at 297.
13 Fishman, supra note 3, pp. 392-3.
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Quite apart from questions of Community competence in the sphere of language
planning, there is considerable divergence of opinion on the appropriate theoretical
basis for language planning intervention at any level of government. Essentially,
claims can hinge on either the moral or political order. Green, for example, argues
that language claims are fundamental rights grounded in the moral order, since it can
be shown that the protection of language rights is a sufficient interest to generate a
corresponding duty.14 He is relatively pessimistic in respect of language claims that
are not seen as moral rights, since their implementation would then rest on the
precarious discretionary will of the political order. In contrast, Rubin, while critical
of systems of implementation that leave inordinate discretion to the implementing
body or state, argues that "...much effort has been spent trying to invoke legal results
from argumentation in the moral order that could have been better spent trying to
achieve political results directly."15 This viewpoint does not, however, address
Green's assertion that political bases are inherently susceptible to discretionary
trends. These arguments are examined in detail in Chapter 5 infra, which focuses on
the classification of language rights as legitimate fundamental rights. It is important
to stress at this stage, however, that language planning alone will not redress
sufficiently the broader causes of, or trends within, language shift in the first place.
Edwards notes that "[a] logical approach to language maintenance, and the halting of
decline and shift, is to unpick the social fabric that has evolved and then reweave it
in a new pattern."16 Examples of the broader societal concerns at issue in this context
include economic conditions, and the nature and implementation of citizenship and
fundamental rights.
Finally, in the context of language shift, generally associated with non-official and/or
minority languages, it is not often appreciated that both the institutional framework
14
cf Green, supra note 4.
15 Alfred P. Rubin, "Are human rights legal?", in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds.), The
Protection ofMinorities and Human Rights, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 33-58 at 49.
16 John Edwards, "Language minorities and language maintenance", (1997) 17 Annual Review of
Applied Linguistics, 30-42 at 35.
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of the Community and increased intra-EC trade have also placed smaller national
languages, such as Danish or Greek, in extremely vulnerable positions, given the
spread of the languages of wider communication (lwc's), English and French in the
Community context.17 This idea is discussed separately in a subsequent section but is
mentioned at this stage to further highlight the widespread potency of the language
planning dilemma at EC level.
3, THE PARTICULAR VALUE OF MINORITY LANGUAGES
The preceding section introduced the principles of diversity, language shift and
language planning in a general context. The following paragraphs set out the
heightened relevance of these concepts when the languages in question are minority
languages. The European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL) has classified
the minority languages spoken within the EC into five main groups:
1. the national languages of two Member States which are not official working
languages of the EU {i.e. Irish and Luxembourgish);
2. languages of communities residing in a single Member State {e.g. Breton in
France; Welsh in the United Kingdom);
3. languages of communities residing in two or more Member States {e.g. Basque in
France/Spain; Occitan in France/Italy/Spain);
17
cf. Fishman, supra note 3, pp. 368-375; Fran§ois Grin, "European economic integration and the fate
of lesser used languages", (1993) vol. 17:2 Language Problems and Language Planning, 101-116;
Andree Tabouret-Keller outlines historical, political and economic constraints on the maintenance of
smaller national languages: in "Factors of constraints and freedom in setting a language policy for the
European Community: A sociolinguistic perspective", in Coulmas (ed.) supra note 1, pp. 45-58; 52-5.
Fishman (pp. 374-5) summarises the subtle undercurrents of the smaller national languages question as
follows:
It is the special burden of small national languages that they have 'almost made it' into the
big leagues...The lives ofmost small national languages are actually far more precarious, if
not beleaguered, than is commonly acknowledged or recognised...However, their frailties do
not elicit pity or sympathy, as do those of subnational languages...On the surface, they are
full members of the 'gentleman's club' of standardised, national languages. They grace the
letterheads of their chiefs of state, the philatelic and ceremonial paperwork of their state
apparatuses. But below the surface, there is discontent, some protesting openly that they are
used too little and too carelessly and others protesting more discreetly that they are little
better than frivolous, expensive and self-deluding games.
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4. languages of communities which are minorities in the state in which they live but
are the majority languages of other Member States (e.g. German in Belgium;
Finnish in Sweden);
5. non-territorial languages (e.g. Romani, Yiddish).18
It is estimated that over fifty million, from an approximate total of 365 million
European citizens, speak one of these minority languages.
It is also important to establish the context within which minority language issues are
being considered throughout this thesis. In summary, it is the perspective of the
speakers rather than the survival of the languages per se that is prioritised. In
addition, the Euromosaic Study, undertaken on behalf of the Commission, provides
the clearest explanation of the sociological aspect of minority languages:
The concept of minority by reference to language groups does not refer to
empirical measures, but rather, to issues of power. That is, they are language
groups, conceived of as social groups, marked by a specific language and
culture, that exist within wider societies and states but which lack the political,
institutional and ideological structures which can guarantee the relevance of
those languages for the everyday life of members of such groups. It is this
understanding of language by reference to its relationship to the social that
allows us to consider the study of minority language groups as a sociological
endeavour.19
This construct, in turn, indicates how minority language issues are affected by the
Community's own choices on the structures of its governance, given the impact of
the EC on the politics, institutions and ideologies of its constituent Member States.
A. The Principle ofCultural Democracy
Any espousal of the value of linguistic diversity must necessarily include an
appreciation of minority languages, in the overall context of cultural democracy.
These languages have often persisted in the face of overwhelming assimilative
trends. But minority languages, or more specifically their speakers, have also paid a
heavy price to regimes of intolerance and injustice, both deliberate and covert.20
18
European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, Unity in Diversity, 2nd ed., (Dublin: EBLUL, 1996).
19 Euromosaic, supra note 6, p. 1.
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Walters notes that the suppression of minorities, including linguistic minorities, can
produce grave political and constitutional consequences.21 This fact has been
somewhat forced onto the agenda of both international and regional political
organisations in recent years.22
The traditional response to minority claims has been the blanket guarantee of non¬
discrimination. This means that a speaker of a minority or non-official language, for
example, should not be discriminated against because of the language s/he speaks.
The principle of non-discrimination on linguistic grounds is a feature of the broad
non-discrimination clauses of most major international human rights instruments.23
Gromacki describes the non-discrimination thesis as an example of a negative right,
but he argues that true equality cannot be implemented without a commitment to
positive action, so that inequalities may be remedied on a more proactive footing.24
Albanese has argued that the application of non-discrimination policy on its own
propagates an indifference which he terms "hidden assimilation".25 In addition to
claims addressed to domestic governments and international human rights
organisations, language groups also focus on the European Community, to seek the
positive implementation of a genuine cultural democracy. The legitimacy of these
claims - from both the minority and Community perspectives - is analysed in
20
cf. Fishman, supra note 3, pp. 562-563.
21 David B. Walters, "The legal recognition and protection of language pluralism", (1975) Acta
Juridica, 305-326 at 305.
22
cf. Patrick Thornberry, "UN support for linguistic minorities", (1993) vol. 10:1 Contact 1-2.
23e.g. Article 14 - European Convention on Human Rights (1953); Article 2.1 - International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (1976); Article 2.2 - International Covenant on Economic and Social
Rights (1976); Article 2.1 - United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989).
24
Joseph Gromacki, "The Protection of language rights in international human rights law: A proposed
draft declaration of linguistic rights", (1992) 32 Virginia Journal of International Law, 515-579; cf.
also Francesco Capotorti (UN Special Rapporteur) Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (New York: United Nations, 1979); J.A. Sigler, Minority
Rights: A Comparative Analysis, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983); Patrick
Thornberry, International Law and the Rights ofMinorities, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
25 Ferdinando Albanese, "Ethnic and linguistic minorities in Europe", (1991) 11 Yearbook of
European Law, 313-338 at 320; Will Kymlicka, a liberal theorist, also identifies the insufficiency of
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subsequent sections of this Chapter. The negative versus positive rights debate is
addressed in more detail in Chapter 5 infra.
B. The 'Conflict' Focus
As noted earlier, negative connotations have often tainted the perception of minority
groups. One particular aspect of this misconception is the presumed causal link
between minority groups and conflict. Nelde, for example, argues that ethnic group
contact is inevitably tense and inharmonious and will, under certain conditions, result
9f\
in intense conflict and, possibly, violence. Similar views can be detected in the
writings of American commentators who fear that granting rights to linguistic
minorities would disturb national unity and result in bitter conflict.27 It is also
generally assumed that minority-based conflict will lead to claims for independence
and secession.28 Nelde applies the conflict reasoning to linguistic groups as follows:
[A] dominant language group...controls power in the areas of administration,
politics and economy, and gives employment preference to those applicants
who have command of the dominant language. The disadvantaged language
group is then left with the choice of renouncing social ambition, assimilating or
resisting. While numerically weak or psychologically weakened language
groups tend towards assimilation, in modern societies numerically stronger,
more homogenous language groups having traditional values, such as their own
history and culture, prefer political resistance, the usual form of organised
language conflict this century.29
Yet Nelde does not address the evidence so glaringly apparent in his own description
of the reasons why conflict can occur in linguistic-oriented situations. He states
clearly that the dominant language group in this scenario has absolute control over
prestigious domains for language use: autonomous language groups, forced into an
the non-discrimination attitude, referring to it as 'benign neglect': cf. Multicultural Citizenship: A
Liberal Theory ofMinority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Chapters 4 and 6.
26 Peter Hans Nelde, "Language conflicts in multilingual Europe: Prospects for 1993", in Coulmas
(ed.) supra note 1, 59-74.
21
e.g. Anon, "Language rights and the legal status of English-only laws in the public and private
sector", (1992) 20 North Carolina Central Law Journal 65-91; Frank Lowrey, "Through the looking
glass: Linguistic separatism and national unity", (1992) 41 Emory Law Journal 223-319.
28 In this context, Mark Fettes suggests that states might seek "...protective legitimacy within the
European Community against internal secessionist tendencies.": cf. "Europe's Babylon: Towards a
single European language?", (1991) vol. 31:3 History ofEuropean Ideas, 201-213 at 202.
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involuntary alternative of assimilation, are being denied basic, legitimate rights. If
conditions were favourable and basic language rights had been granted to the
speakers of the minority language, only then could conflict be deemed
unreasonable.30 In reality, the very fact of developing a minority rights regime in the
first instance indicates a desire to preserve rather than deny existing territorial
integrity: fairness within existing structures is what is almost invariably proposed.
On the contrary, Nelde appears to accept the assimilative climate of unilingualism as
a given, without stopping to question its legitimacy. He proceeds to create a very
negative impression of the behaviour of members of minority groups when it has
been shown empirically, for both historical and contemporary minority situations,
that while a diversity-conflict link can certainly develop, it is by no means a causal
phenomenon.31 Thus, while not denying that language related issues can indeed lead
to conflict, it must be stressed that focusing on extreme cases and presenting them as
the 'norm' is a grossly exaggerated outlook. Finally, Fishman, writing in the context
of the USA, argues that it is in fact insecurity which lies at the heart of the conflict
thesis. He refers to the "...often groundless fears of majorities that constantly see
'separationists' and 'seditionists' under their beds and in their closets, without
appreciating the contribution to pluralism that is dependent upon them and upon
them more than upon 'others'."32 Freeman also points to empirical grounds to
support the argument that "...well-judged collective-rights policies are conducive to
peace."33
29
Nelde, supra note 26, pp. 60-61.
30 This view has been expressed by the following commentators: Albanese, supra note 25, p.318, who
argues that minority groups in this situation feel that only conflict-centred measures can secure their
dignity and cultural identity; Richard J. Watts, "Linguistic minorities and language conflict in Europe:
Learning from the Swiss experience", in Coulmas (ed.) supra note 1, 75-102 at 94; Gregory R. Guy,
"International perspectives on linguistic diversity and language rights", (1989) 13 Language Problems
and Language Planning, 45-53.
31 Robert Phillipson and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, "Linguistic rights and wrongs", (1995) Applied
Linguistics, 483-504 at 496, quoting Hettne - "The problem is not that ethnic groups are different but
rather the problem arises when they are no longer allowed to be different."
32 Fishman, supra note 3, p. 180.
33 Michael Freeman, "Are there collective human rights?", (1995) 43 Political Studies, 25-40 at 37,
referring to T.R. Gurr, Minorities at risk: A Global View ofEthnopolitical Conflicts, (Washington DC:
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), (emphasis added).
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4. THE LANGUAGE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A. Introduction34
The existing arrangements for language use within the Community institutions are
outlined in the following paragraphs: analysis of the practical elements of the official
languages policy in this manner reveals the underlying Community ethos on
linguistic diversity more generally. There are eleven official and working languages
in the European Community: Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German,
Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. This language grouping includes at
least one of the official languages of each Member State. It is presumed that these
eleven languages are also the official and working languages of the European Union,
since no provision of the Treaty on European Union deals specifically with language.
Tabory outlines the complex procedures, in the linguistic sense, behind the drafting
of the Dutch, German and Italian versions from the French original of the Treaty of
Rome.35 The co-ordination of terminology required was further complicated by the
very innovativeness of the concepts outlined in the Treaties. In addition, differences
in domestic legal systems and traditions had to be overcome. The challenge posed by
the harmonisation of the translations was, however, a necessary one, because of one
crucial phrase in Article 248 EEC: "[t]his Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the
Dutch, French, German and Italian languages, all four texts being equally authentic,
shall be deposited etc." (emphasis added). It is from this relatively obscure reference
that the "...federalist, non-hegemonial language formula..."36 of the Community
originates, i.e. the doctrine of the equality of all of the Community's official
34 For general information and discussion on Community language policy, cf. Coulmas, supra note 1;
Antoni Milian-Massana, "Le regime linguistique de l'union europeene: Le regime des institutions et
l'incidence du droit communautaire sur la mosaique linguistique europeene", (1995) 3 Rivista di
Dirritto Europeo, 485-512; John A. Usher, "Languages and the European Union", in Malcolm
Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds.), The Frontiers ofEurope, (London: Pinter, 1998), 222-234 .
35 Mala Tabory, Multilingualism in International Law and Institutions, (Alphen aan den Rijn;
Rockville MA: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980), p. 114 et seq.
36 Gerhard Leitner, "Europe 1992: A language perspective", (1991) 15 Language Problems and
Language Planning, 282-296 at 290.
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languages. This innovation remains a unique feature of contemporary EC language
policy, which cannot be compared to the linguistic practice of any other international
organisation.37 Subsequent enlargements of the European Community have resulted
in a corresponding increase in the number of official/working languages, in
accordance with the doctrine of linguistic equality.38 The initial Community focus on
economic integration, quite restricted in comparison with the contemporary range of
European policies, did not provoke any consideration of the linguistic implications of
further Community growth, either in terms of Member States or new Community
competences. In a Community of six Member States, based upon structures grounded
in a new and unique dimension of international law, linguistic issues were not a
priority.
Article 217 of the Treaty of Rome allocates responsibility for the linguistic regime of
the institutions to the Council: the very first regulation issued by the Council fulfilled
that responsibility.39 Article 1 of the Regulation distinguished explicitly between the
terms 'working' and 'official' languages, but neither explained this distinction nor
provided for its implementation in practice. The Regulation set out guidelines for
communications between Member States and Community institutions (Articles 2 and
3); it provided that regulations and other documents of general application must be
drafted in all of the official languages (Article 4): each language version is
considered equally authoritative. Article 5 required the publication of the Official
Journal of the Communities in all of the official languages.
37 For example, English and French are the sole official languages of the Council of Europe; Arabic,
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish are the official and working languages of the United
Nations. Brown notes that the ECSC Treaty had assumed that the French language version only was to
be authentic, but that the six Member States established the equality of their four languages {i.e. Dutch,
French, German and Italian) by a separate Protocol: cf. L. Neville Brown, "The European Community:
Some problems of interpretation and drafting of plurilingual law", (1988) vol. 13:1 Holdsworth Law
Review, 16-45 at 16.
38
cf. infra, however, on the status of Irish and Luxembourgish.
39
i.e. Regulation No. 1/58, 15 April 1958.
For a comprehensive list of all language-related Community legislation, cf. Normand Labrie, "La
dynamique du fran^ais dans la construction europeene", in Claude Truchot (ed.), La Plurilinguisme
Europeene: Theories et Pratiques en Politique Linguistique, (Paris: Honore Champion, 1994), 245-
264.
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Article 6 stipulated that the Community institutions may determine internal language
regulations in respect of specific administrative practices. The Regulation itself does
not elaborate on the compatibility of this procedure with the doctrine of equality of
the official languages but it has been provided elsewhere that any internal guidelines
introduced by the institutions must comply with the linguistic equality formula.40
B. Language Policy of the Community Institutions
The everyday use of language within the institutions of the EC is one of the primary
manifestations of the linguistic equality doctrine in practice. The following sections
outline the internal language practices of each of the principal institutions. The
thematic policies of these institutions on external language issues are not detailed at
this stage: this aspect of language policy is assessed in Chapters 2 and 6 infra.
Furthermore, this section deals only with use of the official Community languages:
the use of minority languages is considered separately infra. The particular
difficulties posed for the translation and interpretation services of the Community are
also considered in a separate section, since they apply in a cross-institutional sense.
(i) European Court of Justice 41
The Court is subject to the general linguistic guidelines set out in Regulation 1/58
but, according to Article 7 of the Regulation, it may develop autonomous rules in
respect of language use for proceedings. Articles 29-31 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Court42 confirm that the languages of procedure are all of the official EC
languages, as well as Irish. Generally, the language of proceedings is selected by the
applicant, unless the defendant is a Member State, or a natural or legal person of
Member State nationality. In respect of Article 177 EC referrals, the language used in
40
cf Doc. A 3-169/90.
41
cf. John A. Usher, "Language and the European Court of Justice", (1981) The International
Contract: Law and Finance Review, 277-286.
It should be noted that the language policy of the European Court of Justice applies to the Court of
First Instance also.
42 19 June 1991.
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the European Court will be that of the domestic court making the reference. If the
domestic proceedings are being heard in a language that is not an official EC
language, however, the reference must first be translated into one of the official
languages before it is sent to the Court of Justice. Judgments issued by the Court are
of legal effect in the language of the case only, but are subsequently translated into
and published in the other official languages (except Irish).43 As an illustration of the
Court's pragmatic approach to multilingualism, Usher notes that the Court has not
applied the maxim that 'ignorance of the law is no defence' where there have been
delays in the translation of Community legislation.44 Similarly, Tabory notes that
violation of the language rules will not necessarily invalidate proceedings.45
In contrast, the character of judicial deliberations illustrates the divergence between
linguistic policy and practice in the day-to-day running of the Community
institutions. Since it is required that these deliberations be held in private, the use of
interpreters is prohibited, thus requiring the judges to communicate in a common
language. The language usually adopted for judicial deliberations is French.
Huntington notes that this fact often influences parties when selecting the language
of the case, based on the premise that since the judges are likely to understand
arguments delivered in French, interpreters would not be needed, thus increasing
effectiveness and reducing costs. 46 In light of the secret nature of judicial
deliberations, it is difficult to propose any alternative solution to the internal
adoption of a common language. But this practice may operate in a discriminatory
manner against judges whose expression in the French language might be somewhat
43
Usher, supra note 34, notes, however, that some judgments are published only in the language in
which the case was heard: pp. 225-6.
44
Usher, ibid., p. 225, referring to Case 160/84 Oryzomyli Kavallas [1986] ECR 1633.
45
Tabory, supra note 35, p. 27, referring to Case No. 1/60 Acciaieria Ferriera di Roma v. High
Authority, 10-5-1960, 6 Rec 351 and Case No. 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma N.V. v. Commission, 17-7-
1970, 16 Rec 661.
46 Robert Huntington, "European unity and the Tower of Babel", (1991) 9 Boston University
International Law Journal, 321-346 at 332.
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limited, resulting in a possible loss of potency from their arguments.47 This may be
exacerbated in the future, due to the rampant spread of the English language as a
second language across Europe. In any event, the de facto distinction between
official and working languages within the Community calls the absolutism of the
doctrine of language equality into question, discussed infra in the context of
doctrinal reform.
(ii) The Council and the Commission
These institutions are bound generally by the guidelines established in Regulation
1/58. In reality, the Council and Commission use French and English as languages of
daily communication. German is also used on occasion. The Commission has
devised an internal translation and authentication scheme to reflect this pattern of
language use, in accordance with Article 6 of the Regulation.48 This means that
business is often carried out in a reduced number of languages, but the resulting texts
are translated into all the official languages and duly authenticated.49 This divergence
between language policy and language use in the institutions was challenged in Kik
v. Council and Commission, which related to the language procedure adopted
regarding applications for Community trade marks.50 Only English, French and
German are recognised as official languages in respect of applications made for
European patents.51 But if a European patent is granted, it is then translated into the
language of each Member State designated in the application. Kik was dismissed on
admissibility grounds, because the measure challenged was a general legislative one
and, therefore, it was not open to challenge by an individual before the Court of
47 See Tabory, supra note 35, p. 26.
48
cf. Commission Decision, 17 February 1993; Milian-Massana, supra note 34, pp. 492-3.
49 Note, however, that the Court of Justice has annulled a Commission decision on the grounds that the
Commission did not adhere to this established authentication procedure in respect of certain texts, and
thus infringed the Community's language policy: cf. Milian-Massana, ibid.
50 Case T-107/94, [1995] ECR 11-1717; Case C-270/95, [1996] ECR 1-1987.
51 The European patent system does not grant a single patent for all of the EU Member States but
grants individual, national patents through a consolidated application procedure: cf. "Translations:
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Justice. But, as with the character of judicial deliberations, this case highlights yet
another instance within the administrative structure of the Community where a
pragmatic adjustment to the absolute equality of languages has been employed.
Fishman describes the equality of languages doctrine as a heavy price paid within the
internal organisation of the Community, "...a price which its own bureaucrats attempt
to escape from 'unofficially' for internal and closed EC operations, but for which
there is no public 'official' relief."52 He acknowledges the need for limitations on
language policy at sub-state level and argues that limitations at supra-state level are
even more necessary. The main difficulty, however, lies in the association between
sovereignty and language, discussed further infra.
(iii) The Parliament
Coulmas outlines the special significance of adhering to multilingualism in the
European Parliament.53 First, since proceedings of the Parliament are held in public,
it provides a unique forum for public discussion on proposals for Community
legislation. It is thus imperative that the debates be mutually comprehensible.
Second, the Parliament is a democratic, directly-elected body whose members are
entitled, on democratic principles, to understand proceedings within the institution. In
line with this principle, the Parliament sometimes authorises, in special
circumstances, the use and interpretation of languages other than the official
Community languages in its forum. Advance notice of an intention to use other
languages, which may include minority languages where appropriate, must be given,
to enable the appointment of interpretation staff competent in the selected
language(s). The Parliament, then, must be considered in a somewhat different light
to the other institutions, whose representatives are not directly elected by Member
State citizens and who, by their choice of function, are deemed to constitute
something of an elite group relative to the Members of the European Parliament. The
implications of this construction are discussed infra.
Costs and compromise", (1996) vol. 25:3 Chartered Institute of Patent Agents Journal, 177-190 at
177.
32 Fishman, supra note 3, p. 53
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C. The Status ofMinority Languages in the Community
This section outlines the provision, if any, made for the inclusion of minority
languages within the Community's official languages policy, notwithstanding the
absence of any provision made in Regulation 1/58 itself. The status of two of the
languages, Irish and Luxembourgish, is somewhat different from the other minority
languages spoken in the Member States and is examined separately.
(i) The Position of Irish and Luxembourgish
Irish and Luxembourgish are both national languages in their respective Member
States but neither has been accorded full status as an official Community language.
The Irish language is the national and first official language of Ireland but is not an
official language of the European Community.54 It does have a quasi-official
function, however, in that the texts of all Community treaties have been made
available in Irish. It is a working language of the European Court of Justice and the
Court of First Instance although it has not been used in proceedings to date. As
noted, however, there is no legal obligation on either Court to publish judgments in
Irish. The Official Journal has, on occasion, been published in Irish, where texts
have been of particular importance generally or of special relevance to Irish interests.
Irish has also been included in Community language-education programmes, such as
LINGUA and SOCRATES. In addition, documentation issued in Irish, e.g. passports
and driving licences, is accepted as valid within the Community.
Luxembourgish is the national language, but not an official language, of
Luxembourg. It has not been endorsed as a quasi-official language within the
Community institutions to a similar extent. It has, however, been included in
Community language-education programmes and is mentioned in a number of
Community documents as the national language of Luxembourg. Significantly, the
53 Coulmas, supra note 1, p. 7.
54 The actual decision by the Irish government not to seek official status for Irish on accession to the
Community was somewhat controversial: cf. M. O Ruairc, O Chomhmhargadh go hAontas, (Dublin:
Comhar Teoranta, 1994), pp. 95-97; (1994) 12 CNAG (Dublin: Conradh na Gaeilge), pp. 4-5.
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Court has recognised the value of Luxembourgish as an element of national identity
and has confirmed the legitimacy of related state policy.55
(ii) The Status ofMinority Languages Generally
Over fifty million European citizens speak a language other than the primary
vernacular of the Member State in which they live. These minority languages enjoy
varying degrees of recognition and support domestically, from full legal recognition
accompanied by practical implementation, to hostility and denial.56 They do not
enjoy either working or official status in the European Community. Special
provisions may be made in court proceedings, however, for speakers of certain
minority languages who feel unable to express themselves adequately in any of the
official languages.57 It is arguable that the Community's virtual dismissal of minority
languages from its official language policy contradicts its proclaimed commitment to
multilingualism and to the equality of languages. It would not, of course, be practical
to include all languages in the language equality policy as it is implemented
presently. A reformed Community language policy could, however, take the special
position of minority languages and their speakers into account. This argument is
developed on moral, political and economic grounds in this Chapter and is tested
against the competence of the EC in cultural matters, and in fundamental rights and
citizenship, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.
D. Implications ofExisting Policy for Translation and Interpretation
The general principles governing language use in the institutions have already been
outlined. This section looks at the implications, in a cross-institutional sense, for the
core services essential to any experiment in multilingualism, those of translation and
interpretation. A multinational organisation functioning on the premise of
55 Case C-473/93 Commission v. Luxembourg [1995] ECR 1-3207; this case is discussed in Chapter 6
infra.
56
cf. Appendix I, which sets out the constitutional provisions of the Member States that relate to
minority language recognition.
57
cf. Leitner, supra note 36, p. 286.
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multilingualism will necessarily have to make arrangements for both the translation
of texts and documents and the interpretation of oral speech. The practical demands
placed on these services in the EC context are exacerbated by the sheer number of
official/working languages involved.
(i) Practical Impact on the Translation and Interpretation Services
As noted in the context of the translation of the Treaties, the co-ordination of several
language versions of legal texts is a tremendously difficult process, producing a
ro
considerable quantity of printed documents. The Community translation service
has its own Terminology Office, established to harmonise the translation of legal and
other subject-specific vocabulary. It has also created a multilingual terminology data¬
bank.59 Furthermore, a major Community research programme on the potential of
electronic translation is ongoing.60 Interpretation services currently operate on a
'relay system' that necessitates groups or teams of interpreters working together, thus
requiring high staff numbers.
Translation and interpretation staff are required to be competent in at least two
Community languages. Difficulties often arise, however, due to the highly
specialised nature of subject matter involved. The translation of documents in court
proceedings is generally the responsibility of the parties involved, but the Court's
translation service translates the judgments delivered from the language of the case
into the other official languages. The Court does not, however, have its own
interpretation staff. Usher observes that 'borrowing' staff from the European
Parliament can be problematic, since these interpreters do not usually have legal
training.61 Milian-Massana remarks that the rotating presidency of the EU puts
58 The specific problems raised by the interpretation of equally authoritative multilingual legal
provisions is examined separately.
59
i.e. EUROD1CAUTOM. .
60 i.e. EUROTRA; Usher, supra note 34, outlines the difficulties associated with the project to date, pp.
222-3; cf. also, Truchot (ed.), supra note 39, pp. 389-408.
61
Usher, supra note 41, pp. 281-2.
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particular interpretation pressure on smaller Member States.62 But perhaps the most
controversial aspect of translation and interpretation requirements is the
corresponding drain on Community finances. Many critics point out that these
services consume approximately 40% of the EC administrative budget, an
unacceptable figure which renders impracticable an originally well-intentioned
linguistic formula. Huntington argues that a Community in which economy and
efficiency are the 'first values' is paying too high a price for linguistic peace.64 Few
acknowledge, however, that the administrative budget of the EC amounts to just 2%
of total Community expenditure.
(ii) Interpretation of Multilingual Texts
Interpreting several different language versions of a legislative text has serious
implications for the uniform application of Community law. Textual discrepancies
have to be considered carefully by the European courts, since opting for one
interpretation over another can seriously affect the proceedings at hand. The Court
has thus been faced with the interpretation of two or more equally authentic but
wholly different provisions.65 In response to these challenges, the Court has adopted
a "...purposive rather than a literal approach to the interpretation of Community
legislation."66 This means that the Court will attempt to discern the intention behind
the legislation in question, so that the most likely interpretation of the disputed term
or phrase becomes evident. Though pragmatic in inspiration, some commentators
remain sceptical of this practice, arguing that the Court may thus determine that
words, in certain instances, cannot be accorded their usual meaning.
62 Milian-Massana, supra note 34, p. 500.
63
Coulmas, supra note 1, argues that additional funding allocated to various minority language
projects, such as that given to the EBLUL, should be included in this general figure.
64
Huntington, supra note 46, p. 325.
65
cf. Usher, supra note 34, pp. 224-232; that all language versions of EC legislation are equally
authentic was confirmed by the Court in Case 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415 at 3430.
66 ibid., p. 228; the Court has confirmed the application of this approach: cf. Case 61/72 Mij. PPW
International v. Hoofdproduktschap voor Akkerbouwprodukten [1973] ECR 301.
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In her study on multilingual international organisations, Tabory acknowledges that,
despite problems of interpretation, the multilingual drafting and interpretation
/TO
process also has certain advantages. Both drafting and subsequent translation can
require more careful contemplation of the terminology used, resulting in a more
considered text than might otherwise have been possible. Moreover, a provision that
seems difficult or unclear may be clarified by comparison to another language
version, as practised in the European Court. But most importantly, Tabory observes
that despite the volume and specialised nature of official texts produced, "...the
relatively small number of recorded instances of linguistic discrepancies of
significant practical or legal consequence is perhaps surprising and encouraging."69
Finally, Brown notes that the actual composition of the Court lends itself to solving
potential problems associated with multilingual texts: each Member State is
represented by a judge who brings "...knowledge of their own language and law...", a
fact reinforced by the employment of advocates general.70
(iii) Conclusion
It is obvious that translation and interpretation services in the EC have an enormous
workload and are often strained. Indeed, many calls for reform come from those
directly involved in the operation of these services. But the introduction of reform
should not hinge primarily on the costs aspect. Reducing the number of official
languages would certainly reduce costs but would necessarily transfer the translation
of Community documents and other publications to the individual Member States.
This procedure would have serious implications for the uniform application of
Community law, given that even the centralised translation of legislation is itself
plagued with harmonisation difficulties. In addition, the value of 'linguistic peace'
should not be dismissed quite so readily. The EC Member States are diverse. This is
67
cf. for example, Huntington, supra note 46, pp. 334-340.
68
Tabory, supra note 35, pp. 227-230.
69 ibid., p. 227.
70
Brown, supra note 33, p. 40.
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an enduring truth that the abolition of tariffs and customs duties can not and should
not overcome. As discussed above, unnecessary conflict can be avoided by ensuring
that diversity is both accommodated and respected. The doctrine of equality of
Community languages may well have indirectly alleviated potential political crises,
since it marks a recognition by the EC of the diversity of the Member States.
Roche, a member of the Commision's interpretation service, advocates a more
pragmatic application of the doctrine of linguistic equality.71 He does not suggest
that the present theoretical structure be altered very radically and reaffirms the right
to choice of language:
One hears constantly about the handicap suffered by Europe as a result of the
language barriers that have to be negotiated within its borders. Envious
comparisons are drawn with the situation enjoyed by the Americans and the
Japanese. This envy, mainly expressed by people who view the world from a
narrow perspective...in turn engenders fear on the part of those who cherish our
linguistic diversity that, in an attempt to offset the undoubted economic
disadvantage this constitutes, Europe will be tempted to adopt an "if you can't
beat 'em, join 'em" attitude and place some kind of restrictions on people's
freedom to use the language of their choice....72
Roche proposes instead that those working within the EC institutions, while having
full and free choice of language, should recognise the advantages of using a common
language where possible, to reduce interpretation requirements. In this way, speakers
who are comfortable using another language would do so where this would be
advantageous in terms of efficiency. Equally, however, no-one should feel obliged to
compromise his/her linguistic expression by being obliged to speak another
language. This idea is considered further infra, when possibilities for an effective
overhaul of the present language policy of the Community are examined.
5. THE LANGUAGE DIMENSION OF FUNDAMENTAL COMMUNITY
FREEDOMS
71 Roche, supra note 7.
72 ibid., p. 140.
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The use of language in the institutions of the EC has been described as the primary
manifestation in practice of the official languages policy gleaned from Article 248
EEC. Quite apart from this direct association between language and the EC, there is
a linguistic dimension to virtually any policy initiated at Community level. Thus, as
has already been observed, the rippling effect of Community law has innumerable
consequences for languages and for their speakers. The converse of this argument is
that far more spheres of life are affected by language issues than is usually
acknowledged. To illustrate both points, the following paragraphs outline the
implications for language use of the implementation of fundamental Community
freedoms.
A. Free Movement ofPersons
The EC Treaty guarantees the right of all European citizens to move freely among
and seek employment within the Member States. It is probable that a worker who has
moved from his/her native country to another Member State will also cross language
boundaries. The Community has addressed this aspect of free movement from two
perspectives: first, by implementing preparatory education programmes to facilitate
inter-state movement (e.g. ERASMUS, LINGUA and SOCRATES) and second, by
dealing with the difficulties that may arise after the citizen has resettled in a new
country.
Various language programmes have been established to promote the learning of the
official Community languages, LINGUA being the most comprehensive.73 Language
education is not confined to school and college curricula, however: it has also been
promoted in the context of continuing adult education. The philosophy behind
European Community involvement in language education can be interpreted in two
different ways. First, it is arguable that, by ensuring that all the official languages,
along with Irish and Luxembourgish, are included in the various education
programmes, the Community is confirming its commitment to linguistic diversity
73
cf. Jean-Claude Corbeil, "L'Amenagement linguistique en Europe", in Truchot (ed.), supra note 39,
409-413.
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and to the doctrine of the equality of all the official languages. Alternatively, the
promotion of language education can be attributed solely to the functional
requirement that free movement of workers be facilitated by widespread linguistic
training. It is probable, however, that both philosophies have influenced Community
action in this field. As a Community policy, the promotion of bilingualism and
multilingualism through comprehensive language education receives virtually
unanimous support. But whether time and money should be allocated to the
promotion of smaller national and minority languages as well as to the. languages of
wider communication, or in what proportion this allocation should occur, remains a
contentious issue.
In the overall context of facilitating the free movement of workers within the EC,
particular attention has been directed towards the position of migrant workers, from
the perspective of integration into the host state, as well as the facilitation of workers
and their families when resettling in their countries of origin.74 Cullen traces the
evolution of Community policy on the education of children of migrant workers from
one of passive assimilation towards the view that mother-tongue education should be
provided on cultural and identity grounds; preparation for the eventual reintegration
of migrants in their countries of origin has also featured where relevant.75 She notes
in particular that, while many problems and difficulties still exist in practice, there is
"...an orientation much more toward the language of human rights and citizenship..."
in the more recent policy measures that have emanated from the EC institutions.76
The language rights of migrant workers, through related to language rights generally,
are essentially a distinct category requiring a separate approach and are not,
therefore, dealt with extensively in this study, which focuses on autochthonous or
indigenous language minorities, as noted supra.
74 For additional reading on the linguistic aspect of EC migration generally, cf. Guus Extra and Ton
Vallen, "Migration and multilingualism in Western Europe: A case study of the Netherlands", (1997)
17 Annual Review ofApplied Linguistics, 151-169.
75
Holly Cullen, "From migrants to citizens? European Community policy on intercultural education",
(1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 109-129.
76 ibid., p. 125.
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It has been accepted by the European Court of Justice that a foreign national may be
susceptible to the language policy requirements of the host state so long as the basic
principles of freedom of movement, including proportionality and non¬
discrimination, have not been breached.77 By recognising that a Member State may
pursue domestic language planning policies within the limits of fundamental
Community principles, the Court has acknowledged the inherent value of linguistic
diversity. Moreover, the Court adopted this position before the Community was
required to respect the cultural diversity of the Member States by Article 128 EC,
no
introduced by the Treaty on European Union. In Ministere Public v. Mutsch, the
Court decided that minority language rights granted by a Member State to its
nationals must be extended to all Community workers resident in that State. The
implications for Community language policy that can be derived from Mutsch are
discussed in Chapter 2, but this case does not require Member States to introduce a
minority rights regime per se: rather, it demands uniform application where such
rights have already been granted. In certain limited circumstances, however, the
principle of free movement may result in the granting of linguistic rights to non-
nationals over and above those provided for nationals of a Member State.79
B. Right ofEstablishment and Freedom to Provide Services
As with freedom of movement, the implementation of the right of establishment
prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination against non-nationals. Essentially,
Member States may still impose various linguistic conditions on the exercise of
trades and professions, but these requirements must apply equally to both nationals
and non-nationals. Language policies are necessarily less relevant to the freedom to
77
cf Case 379/87 Anita Groener v. Minister for Education and the Dublin Vocational Education
Committee [1989] ECR 3967; [1990] ILRM 335; this case, which centred on requirements of
linguistic competence as a precondition to employment, is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 infra.
78 Case 137/84, [1985] ECR 2681.
79
cf. Usher, supra note 34, pp. 232-3, re\ Case 55/77, Maris v. Rijksdienst voor
Werknemerspensioenen, [1977] ECR 2327; cf. also the recent decision in Bickel and Franz, (24
November 1998), discussed in Chapter 6 infra.
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provide services, since the linguistic competence of the provider is usually assessed
at the time of qualification or establishment.
C. Free Movement ofGoods
Language considerations have also affected the free movement of goods within the
EC. Attention has been focused primarily on the principles of consumer protection,
regarding the language used on product labels etc.m The jurisprudence of the Court
has been based on languages that are 'understood', rather than on the official
language(s) of the area under consideration in any particular case. Usher has,
o 1
however, identified several difficulties with this Community criterion. The Court
has reached seemingly contradictory results where it has determined the language(s)
89
appropriate for adequate consumer notification. This confusion serves to highlight
rather than negate the need for a more cohesive Community policy on language
issues and language rights.83 It is arguable, however, that the Court has addressed the
issue from the perspective of consumer protection, emphasising that consumers
should easily understand whatever language is used on labels. This stance focuses on
the rights of individuals, over and above more abstract requirements. It is similar,
rather than at odds with, the decision of the Court in Bickel and Franz, discussed in
chapter 6 infra, where the Court focused on speakers of the minority language in
question rather than on the language itself. In this context, the approach adopted to
language and labels does not seem quite so dismissive.
80
cf. Usher, supra note 34, pp. 233-4; see also Milian-Massana, supra note 34, pp. 508-509; Case C-
51/93 Meyhui NV v. Schott Ziesel Glaswerke AG [1994] ECR 1-3879, esp. paras. 24-26 of the
Advocate General's Opinion.
81 Usher, supra note 34, p. 233.
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cf. Christine Boch, "Language protection and free trade: The triumph of the Homo Mac DonaldusT',
(1998) vol. 4:3 European Public Law 379-402; the present position is that consumers do not have a
right to be informed about products in their own language(s); a 'language easily understood' will
suffice: cf. Case C-85/94 Peeters II, [1995] ECR 1-2955, esp. para. 15 of the judgment.
83 In a related question, McCarthy and Mercer consider the potential impact on intra-Community trade
of domestic laws that impose strict requirements in favour of a national language: cf. Niamh McCarthy
and Hugh Mercer, "Languages as a barrier to trade: The loi Toubon", (1996) vol. 17:5 European
Competition Law Review, 308-314.
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6. THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ON LANGUAGE USE
PATTERNS
The assumption that language policy should be a priority in a political entity
comprised of diverse Member States is far from realised in the context of the
European Community. But it is difficult to see how the Community can side-step its
influence on and, therefore, responsibility towards, the linguistic heritage of Europe.
Despite the formal equality of the official languages, just one or two languages
function as day-to-day vernaculars within the Community institutions. This growth
in language unification has inestimable consequences for those languages not
generally used. Corbeil has predicted that non-intervention by the Community will
OA
promote a European language crisis. The alternative, he argues, must be conscious
oc
language planning at both national and European level.
Arguments that the Community did not have competence to formulate language
policies were seemingly dispelled by the introduction of Article 128 EC, which
provides that "[t]he Community shall contribute to the flowering of cultures of
Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity and, at the same
time, bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore." Philip argues that Article
128 EC provides a legal foundation for Community involvement in cultural affairs,
at least at a level of shared competence: this means that Community policy would
supplement national initiatives in accordance with the 'litmus test' of subsidiarity.86
In any event, de Witte points out that the Community has developed along a
functionalist framework, extending its field of influence into numerous policy areas
on
that were not necessarily mentioned in the Treaty of Rome. The legal bases for
84 Corbeil, supra note 73, pp. 411-415.
85 Brackeniers, Director General of the Commission's Translation Service, has suggested that
European industry should also be involved in language planning: cf. Eduard Brackeniers. "Europe
without frontiers and the language challenge", (1991) 3 Target 92, 1-2.
86 A.B. Philip, "Old policies, new competencies", in A. Duff, J. Pinder and R. Pryce, Maastricht and
Beyond, (London: Routeledge, 1994), 123-139 at 123.
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Community language policy is detailed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 infra: in the following
paragraphs, the impact of the EC on language use, within its own institutions and
throughout the Member States, is outlined. In particular, the responsibility of the
Community to formulate counteractive policies is analysed from political, moral and
economic perspectives.
A. The Specific Nature ofEC Law
European Community law is unique by international standards in that Regulations
are directly applicable in each Member State without a requirement of separate
domestic implementation. This fact provides strong justification for the translation of
all EC legislation into the official Community languages, primarily because it is
unacceptable that a citizen is not able to understand the laws by which s/he is bound.
Furthermore, it is imperative that the lawmakers themselves understand fully the
terminology of the legislation enacted. Finally, as already argued, delegating the
translation of Community law to each individual Member State creates the risk of
non-uniform application, since there would be increased potential for textual
divergence within a non-centralised translation process. Coulmas argues that the
need for both accountability and precision justifies the present translation regime for
all legislation and official documents and not just for regulations alone.88 In respect
of international organisations more generally, obligations are initially imposed on the
state parties only. The consequences for individual citizens are thus wholly different.
The more limited language policies of other international organisations, such as the
United Nations, cannot, then, be highlighted in comparison with the EC. It is
noteworthy that, originally, the UN had two working and five official languages: this
number was gradually expanded to the current total of six working and official
languages. The increase was not supported unanimously. Several delegates despaired
the introduction of additional languages into what had been designated as a forum for
greater understanding. Tabory has argued that the increases were grounded more in
87 Bruno de Witte, "The impact of European Community rules on linguistic policies of the Member
States", in Coulmas (ed.), supra note 1, 163-178 at 164-165, and "Surviving in Babel? Language
rights and European integration", in Dinstein and Tabory (eds.), supra note 15, 277-300 at 288-289.
88
Coulmas, supra note 1, pp. 5-6.
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the political than the functional.89 But whatever the impetus or ensuing reaction, the
fact remains that a minimalist official languages policy did not suffice to meet either
the linguistic or political needs of the UN Member States. The Council of Europe
does proceed effectively using just two working and official languages but it has far
more Member States than the EU: it would thus be impractical for the Council to
operate a language policy similar to that of the Community. Moreover, the vastly
different nature of the obligations arising from membership of both organisations
must be borne in mind.
Overall, the distinct nature of European Community law is one of the most
compelling justifications for the doctrine of linguistic equality. The ensuing costs
and difficulties of maintaining a complex translation system have necessarily been
subordinated to the realisation of an innovative development in international law.
The maintenance of linguistic equality for all languages in the sense of working
languages is, however, quite another matter, discussed infra. Furthermore, the
imminent expansion of the European Union will undoubtedly call into question the
translation at central level of each and every official document, notwithstanding the
relative impact on the citizens affected. The translation of official documents into the
official languages of the Community does not, however, cater for citizens who do not
understand those languages: this issue is also discussed infra, in the context of the
special position ofminority languages.
B. Is Linguistic Uniformity Necessary for 'True' European Unity?
The European Union is based on economic, political and social integration, eroding
many distinctions between inherently diverse Member States. Interpreting diversity
as the antithesis of unity, it is arguable that a truly united Europe would speak one
language, breaking down communicative barriers and eliminating potential
misunderstandings. The effects of adopting of a one-language policy, or even a
reduced-number language policy, would not be confined to the Community
institutions, but would penetrate the everyday lives of all EU citizens, beginning with
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mass education programmes promoting the selected language(s). It is doubtful that
many vernacular languages could withstand the pressure of 'the' European language,
which would inevitably proceed to become associated with economic, political and
social advancement. Most commentators who favour this approach advocate that
English should become the language of European communication, given its existing
position as the second language of the majority of bilingual and multilingual
Europeans, its growing role in the Community institutions and its ever-increasing
employment as a language of wider communication on a world-wide scale.
But is a monolingual Europe necessarily the key to a united Europe? It is far more
likely that the link between uniformity and solidarity is overstated. The adverse
consequences of a monolingual Europe far outweigh its dubious potential as a
vehicle for greater unity. Language and diversity are contentious issues. Requiring a
forced or involuntary linguistic assimilation would in fact threaten rather than fortify
European unity. It is doubtful that advocates of a monolingual Europe have
considered the consequences of their proposals in terms of what amounts in reality to
cultural genocide. It is unacceptable that European citizens be required to pay such a
price, depriving Europe of "...all the advantages that its multilingualism and the
corresponding cultural diversity have afforded it for millennia."90 Instead of
simplifying mutual comprehension, unilingual planning would restrict the linguistic
expression of European citizens for, at the very least, an entire generation. Those
who formulate policies at EC level are themselves bilingual or multilingual and
travel abroad frequently, constituting an elite group by any standards. While this may
be the life experience of a growing number of Europeans, it is not the typical one.
Moreover, policy formulators have chosen their occupations and accepted the
resulting linguistic conditions. Reforming the EC language policy without serious
consideration of the implications for speakers of languages other than those of wider
communication may be justifiable, in economic and pragmatic terms, for the
89
Tabory, supra note 35, pp. 39-40.
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Coulmas (ed.), supra note 1, 121-138 at 130; cf. also, Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism", (1994) Dissent
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bilingual Community policy maker, but the situation appears quite differently to
speakers of Greek or Welsh.
As an alternative to absolute monolingualism, the concept of selective
multilingualism or 'diglossia' is sometimes proposed as an alternative.91 Diglossia
refers to an organised distribution or hierarchy of languages. Vernacular languages
are retained for traditional 'home and hearth' functions i.e. for personal interaction
between family and friends and for limited local functions. The languages of wider
communication are then allocated for specifically defined 'outside' functions in the
political and economic domains. More specifically in the present context, the
selected language(s) of wider communication would be assigned to any domain of
language use related to Community activity. Fishman argues strongly that, from a
sociolinguistic perspective, diglossia can be a completely stable condition, referring
to the example of the control of Dutch/English functions in The Netherlands. He also
surmises that English is an ideologically neutral choice as a language of wider of
communication. But several of the arguments advancing diglossia are fundamentally
flawed, particularly in the context of multilingual Europe. First, it is generally argued
that diglossia works where the allocation of functions is specific and, in particular,
cushioned by the protection of national boundaries.92 The explicit regulation or
covert promotion of unilingual policies at supra-national level means, however, that
the allocation of language functions is beyond the control of the language group
concerned. Furthermore, the very nature of the European Union seeks to diminish the
validity of national boundaries. It is naive to assume that the dynamics of language
can be neatly allocated and controlled: the rampant spread of English throughout an
originally Irish-speaking Ireland is illustrative of how a socially prestigious language
of wider communication can virtually displace a vernacular language.93 Fishman's
91
cf. Fishman, supra note 3, especially p. 177 et seq.\ Haarmann supra note 9; also Haarmann,
"Monolingualism vs. selective multilingualism: On the alternatives for Europe as it integrates in the
1990s", (1991) 5 Sociolinguistica 7-23.
92 Fishman, ibid., pp. 225-226.
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association with Bord na Gaeilge, 1985); Brian O Cufv, (ed.), A View of the Irish Language, (Dublin:
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reference to the Dutch situation is somewhat confusing in terms of language
functions. He notes that exposure to English is widespread in schools and the mass
media, yet states also that control of popular culture is an essential element of the
stability of diglossia. Surely contemporary popular culture is largely
indistinguishable from the mass media? The argument that English is ideologically
neutral is contradicted by Fishman himself, where he alludes subsequently to its
associations with imperialism.94 Fishman does concede that under certain conditions,
diglossia can go wrong, where it marks the first stage of language shift. In these
circumstances, the increased status and utility of the language of wider
communication first competes with but subsequently erodes the functions allocated
originally to the vernacular.95 But it is misleading to consider this development as the
exception rather than the rule. The acute concern felt by speakers of minority
languages and smaller national languages confirms this truth and dispels the notion
that the citizens of Europe are prepared to simply give up their languages. Unity has
a far better chance of being realised if this fact is accepted and accommodated rather
than challenged. Stable diglossic bilingualism must be desired, not imposed or
perceived as a burden.96
The relevance of uniformity to effective integration is also linked to discussions on
ethnicity and the influence of nationalism. An assessment of the impact of
nationalism on the Member States' capacity to unite successfully in a genuine union
reveals once again a sharp divergence of viewpoint between the 'realists' and the
'sentimentalists'. There is a strong body of opinion that suggests an irreconcilable
conflict between nationalism, particularly the potent variant of linguistic nationalism,
and integration. The degree of intensity with which this view is expressed is similarly
Stationery Office, 1969) and J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, (Cambridge:
University Press, 1989).
94 Fishman, supra note 3, pp. 242-254.
95 ibid., p. 392.
96
cf. JA Laponce, "Reducing the tensions resulting from language contacts: Personal or territorial
solutions?", in David Schneiderman (ed.), Language and the State: The Law and Politic of Identity,
(Quebec: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1989), 173-9.
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varied. Describing the Canadian experience of federalism, Strain writes that ethnic
or nationalist attachment poses difficulties for political and economic integration.97
He thus reasons that the heightened sense of national loyalty exhibited by most
Europeans inhibits true European unity. Haarmann argues that any debate on
pragmatic reforms of European language policy is usually hindered by the prevalence
of nostalgic, language-related national identities, since it is realised by most
participants that renunciation of national identity in the European forum would be
"...tantamount to political suicide."98 Contempt for nationalism per se provokes a
more hostile tone. For example, Coulmas advocates the rejection of linguistic
nationalism, which he terms "...the ideological dead-weight of the nineteenth
century...", so that a European identity might be forged.99 But defining nationalism as
a concept by its extreme, fundamentalist form only is an exaggeration and a
misleading exercise. To relegate nationalism to the past is to succumb to a basic
pitfall of definition, since nationalist theory does not usually advocate a return to the
past. Instead, the essence of nationalism promotes a confident approach to the future
that harnesses positive ideology, generated in the past but adapted to contemporary
reality. It is abuse and distortion of this essence that leads to extreme, outdated
manifestations of nationalism. The notion that the nation-state might one day
'wither-away' has not been realised despite the deepening force of European
integration. De Witte observes that the European Union has proceeded "...not so
much against the existing states, but on their initiative and with their active
support."100 In fact, Fishman argues that there is a causal link between economic
development and heightened nationalism, since modern nationalism represents "...a
tendency to emphasise differences in the midst of a common movement toward
similar institutions and modes of existence."101 Like language attachments,
97 J. Frank Strain, Integration, Federalism and Cohesion in the EC: Lessons from Canada, (Dublin:
The Economic and Social Research Institute, 1993).
98 Haarmann, supra note 9, pp. 109-110.
99 Coulmas, supra note 1, p. 27.
100 de Witte in Coulmas (ed.), supra note 87, p. 277.
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nationalist feelings cannot be explained rationally and are thus ridiculed by those
who cannot contemplate concepts that defy orderly scientific categorisation.102
Ironically, "...little of the past decade's 'rebirth of ethnicity' has involved nation-
1 fH
ism...", in the sense that "...nationalism and the drive to preserve identities are
strong forces and they apply in equal measure...to minorities."104 This truth requires a
reassessment of the presumed link between nationalist sentiment and territorial
ambition. In the context of smaller national and minority languages, linguistic
nationalism is often an ideological defence in the absence of comprehensive,
effective language policies within an existing polity and has nothing whatsoever to
do with the establishment of a separate state.
Nationalist and linguistic attachments affect human experience in a profound way
which, in turn, affects the structure of both national and European society. Southall
recognised this truth in 1893, but his observations remain surprisingly accurate
today:
Modern life is supposed to tend to break down all the barriers of nationality, of
race and even of language, and to weld the nations of the earth into one mighty
mass. That something like this may not be witnessed in a future stage of the
world's history I am not prepared to deny....However...side by side with the
levelling tendency which annihilates distinctions and which would have one
law, one language, one cosmopolitan character throughout...there is a counter
tendency of a natural and involuntary character constantly emphasising
distinctions and building up local differences, tending to make languages.105
The arguments advanced against the promotion of unilingualism, the stability of
selected multilingualism (diglossia) and the automatic disregard of 'sentimental'
attachments have one common basis i.e. that language choices should never be
imposed from the top-down against the will of individual speakers. Rather, a
101 Fishman, supra note 3, p. 152.
102
cf. David Miller, "In defence of nationality", (1993) vol. 10:1 Journal ofApplied Philosophy, 3-16;
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penchant for demystification..." (pp. 699-700).
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governing polity, at whatever level, must accommodate the language choices of its
citizens. This position is, essentially, the central theme of this thesis. It veers away
from the traditional focus on the status of languages per se and is directed towards
the fundamental rights of language speakers. It is fully recognised that language
policy must always be injected with a healthy dose of pragmatism, but never at the
expense of effectiveness. The practical manifestation of this argument is set out more
clearly at the end of this Chapter, where reforms of the present EC language policy
are proposed, and throughout the thesis in the contexts of legal competence, culture
and fundamental rights. What must be stressed at this stage, however, is that supra¬
national government has as much a role to play in the reorganisation of diglossic
structures as national government, as explained by the Commission, in the
Euromosaic study:
[W]hat is at stake is the relationship between the state and civil society. The
family and community are located in civil society whereas the legitimation
forces, education and the media, tend to be state controlled. Without the
integration of both levels it is difficult to envisage a future for minority
language groups. However, history tells us that the goal of the state has nearly
always involved the integration of civil society through the homogenisation of
cultural and linguistic elements. It is our claim that the future, in contrast, must
involve a reorientation of that integration within the context of diversity and
that the emergence of the supra-state affords an important opportunity to realise
this goal.106
Another argument often advanced for the promotion of one language or a reduced
number of languages is that of the limited contemporary utility of minority
languages, in terms of evolution of vocabulary: these languages simply cannot, for
example, cope with technological innovations. But the origin of this reasoning is
rooted firmly in historical attitudes and not in linguistic fact:
The link to language rested on an argument which claimed that some languages
were the languages of reason whereas others, somehow, lay outside of reason.
Thus, the languages of reason, that is, the state languages, the 'modern'
languages, were to be deployed in pursuing 'modern' activities demanding the
essence of reason - administration, education, science. The other languages
could be deployed for the emotive context of the 'traditional'.107
105 J.E. Southall, Wales and her Language, (1893), quoted by Fishman, supra note 3, pp. 314-315.




In this historical context lie the roots of diglossia. But if sociolinguistics as a
discipline has taught us anything, "[it] has been to eliminate the idea...that some
languages or dialects are inherently 'better than others'."108 Accordingly, there is no
linguistic reason why corpus planning cannot secure the evolution of any language.
C. The Sovereignty Dimension
Closely linked to the issue of nationalism from, in a sense, a parallel perspective, this
section assesses the impact of state sovereignty on the EC official languages
policy.109 Modern international law has eroded the traditional concept of state
sovereignty to a remarkable extent. States have gradually become more accepting of
the external role played by international organisations in certain areas of their
domestic affairs. But alongside the cession of sovereignty, a counter tendency to
maintain distinct internal characteristics is much in evidence. The degree of political
sensitivity surrounding the equality of the Community languages is illustrative of this
dynamic. It is sometimes argued that the political sanctification of the present EC
language policy is, however, counterproductive. This stance is usually adopted by
those seeking a reduction in the number of official Community languages, based on
considerations of economics and efficiency. They argue that politics should not
hinder pragmatism. Certainly, where promotion of national differences masquerades
as chauvinism, the resulting abuse of Community language arrangements cannot be
excused. But in the absence of bad faith, respect for diversity must sometimes
transcend the requirements of economic efficiency.
Alternatively, it is arguable that resisting a change in language policy for political
reasons perpetuates the inequality of the Community languages, and hinders
especially the development of a comprehensive Community perspective on non-
108 R.A. Hudson, Sociolinguistics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 191.
109 For further reading on the question of national identity v. European unity more generally, cf.
Anthony D. Smith, "National identity and the idea of European unity", (1992) vol. 68:1 International
Affairs 55-76; Richard Munch, "Between nation-state, regionalism and world society: The European
integration process", (1996) vol. 34:3 Journal of Common Market Studies 379-401; cf. also Chapter 3
infra, on legal competence and the principle of subsidiarity.
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official European languages. At a practical level, some official languages are more
equal than others, since just one or two often fulfil communicative requirements
within the institutions. An abstract commitment to the equality of the official
languages has not been enough to secure their equality in real terms. Contemplation
of real equality must first, therefore, be based on an appreciation of the different
status positions of the languages of Europe, both official and non-official: this
philosophy informs the paragraphs on language policy reform at the end of this
Chapter.
Ironically, it is strict deference to sovereignty in language matters that can sometimes
operate to exclude from the principle of multilingualism those languages not
officially recognised by the EC. Member State attachment to national languages
propagates the Community's respect for multilingualism. Yet Coulmas argues that it
is precisely the fervour with which the national or official language of a country is
promoted that often precludes domestic recognition of minority languages.110
Haarmann uses this fact to further deplore the national language/identity link, since
Community multilingualism has, therefore, been conceived from the suppression of
minority languages.111 But, as shown in Chapters 2 and 6 infra, Community
multilingualism has taken on a direction of its own, clearly distinguishable from the
various approaches of the Member States and with promising signs that the EC may
yet be prepared to tackle minority language issues. Smith describes the location of
the 'European project' in this context as lying "...between national revival and global
cultural aspirations."112 Furthermore, while state sovereignty may have been more
problematic in the absence of Community competence in cultural issues, Article 128
EC, as well as other legal bases examined at a later stage, may yet transcend these
110 Coulmas, supra note 1, p. 14; the non-recognition of minority languages in France {e.g. Breton,
Occitan) taken together with the existence of stringent legislative provisions to promote the French
language is illustrative of this point: cf. Appendix I.
111
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112
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concerns: the respective competence of the EC and the Member States in this regard
is analysed in Chapter 3.
Overall, given the current socio-political climate and the recent backlash against
over-ambitious plans for enhanced European integration, unity will be achieved far
more effectively by accommodating national differences, at least in linguistic terms,
since "[p]eople from different national groups will only share an allegiance to the
larger polity if they see it as the context within which their national identity is
nurtured rather than subordinated."113 Howe puts forward a relatively naive thesis,
arguing that nationalist groupings will succumb to integrative forces in two main
stages. First, in the belief that European unity does not require the surrender of
separate identity, he argues that such groups will attach, somewhat conversely, a
sense of security to the idea of 'Europeanness' (e.g. more favourable to be 'Basque
in Europe' than 'Basque in Spain'). He then argues that "...despite the undeniable
strength of old nations, despite a vigilant public unwilling to allow governments to
follow their own integration agendas...these national communities themselves may,
after weighing the costs and benefits, not be averse to the idea of further
integration."114 Howe has failed to establish, however, an inherent link between
further integration, to whatever extent or extreme, and the surrender of identities.
Neither has he shown how a change in the fundamental character of the first stage
could still evolve to the second stage: the predicted acquiescence towards more
intensified integration would probably not occur where any perceived threat to
identity became apparent, a crucial factor in the first stage of Howe's thesis; it is far
from certain that any grouping would be prepared to let go of the very guarantees that
generated the aforementioned sense of security in the first place. The reality is that
shared national/European loyalties is a far more realistic expectation than an outright
European solidarity with no room for any other group or characteristic-based (e.g.
113
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language) sense of identity.115 In short, "...[conceptions of 'us' and 'them' will
remain, the issue is one of harnessing them within a new sense of integration."116
D. Issues ofDemocracy and Citizenship
As noted, one of the most compelling arguments for the maintenance of the equality
of the Community languages is that European citizens should be able to understand
legislation enacted at EC level. This is a key feature of the Community's
appreciation of and respect for democracy, strengthened by the introduction of EU
citizenship via the Treaty on European Union. Habermas notes that to ensure the
implementation of these rights in real terms, recognition of citizens must encompass
the integrity of their varied identity-forming contexts.117 Language has already been
presented as a potent constituent of human identity. The implications of European
citizenship for the development of an EC language policy are, therefore, considerable
and are discussed in detail in Chapter 5 infra in the context of fundamental rights: at
this stage, however, some preliminary observations can be made.
The recognition of language rights as fundamental rights, as well as the
Community's intensifying involvement in human rights issues generally, strengthens
the argument that EC language policy will have to be influenced by the needs of its
citizens. Zuanelli sees a somewhat secondary role for the Community in this context:
she argues that international intervention in language issues should establish a
threshold for language rights, which should then be implemented by the individual
Member States in accordance with their domestic language policies.118 This approach
conforms with the role envisaged for the Community in accordance with both the
115
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principle of subsidiarity (cf. Chapter 3) and the restricted powers of the EC in
cultural affairs (cf. Chapter 4). But it is unlikely that confining the Community's
capacity to act as co-ordinator alone will fulfil all of its obligations in the context of
citizens' rights, as discussed in Chapter 5 infra.
The situation of minority rights within liberal democratic theory raises a particular
and inherent irony, in that it is more often than not the majoritarian aspect of
democratic rule that causes marginalisation of minority groups in the first instance.
Arington has documented an especially injurious trend in the USA, relating to
referenda initiated to introduce 'English-only' amendments in certain states, which
have succeeded on the 'majority rules' tenet.119 The accommodation of justice for
minorities into liberal democratic theory is a fundamental development in
contemporary jurisprudence, fuelling the construction of various models for liberal
1 90
multiculturalism, such as those put forward by Kymlicka and Raz. Raz
reconstructs the outdated majority-minority thesis as follows:
There is no room for talk of a minority problem or of a majority tolerating the
minorities. A political society...consists - if it is multicultural - of diverse
communities and belongs to none of them. Although the relative size of the
different communities affects the solutions to conflicts over resources and
public spaces among them, none of them should be allowed to see the [polity]
as its own, or to think that the others enjoy their standing on sufferance.121
By addressing the minorities issue in the context of its own governance, the EC is
participating in one of the primary jurisprudential challenges of modern times, a
theoretical dilemma with immense practical implications, whether viewed from the
perspective of Utopian idealism or the prevention of outright conflict, or from any
point in between these extremities.
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E. Economic Considerations
119 Michele Arington, "English-only laws and direct legislation: The battle in the States over language
minority rights", (1991) 7 Journal ofLaw and Politics, 325-352.
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Quite apart from the costs of multilingualism per se, already discussed, the economic
aspects of language are frequently debated in the European context. Language choice
can be portrayed within a metaphorical marketplace, where different languages
compete with each other in terms of usage and where consumption of minority
languages is far more costly than that of languages of wider communication. But
choice of language can also affect, and be affected by, actual economic variables.
Grin argues that increased intra-EC trade will accentuate the status of the de facto
working languages within the Community, thus reducing the viability of maintaining
smaller national and non-official languages.123 This process will surely accelerate
with monetary union and is one of the most obvious and potent examples of how the
EC impacts on language use patterns throughout the Member States. De Witte
analyses these arguments in the context of EC rules on trade and competition.124
Given the diminished competitiveness of smaller, more peripheral languages on the
cultural market, de Witte considers whether it would be appropriate for the
Community to rectify the situation in the form of subsidies, introducing the idea that
the Community should intervene in order to remedy or compensate for linguistic
damage caused by the dynamics of the EC itself. While not ruling out compensatory
intervention under other guises, de Witte doubts the feasibility of actual linguistic
subsidies, since there is no grounding framework in the Treaties; in fact, he argues
that such measures might actually contradict EC competition principles. It is far from
clear, however, what exactly de Witte means by the term 'linguistic subsidies',
which makes it difficult to assess the legitimacy of his dismissing their incorporation
into EC language policy more generally. De Witte goes on, in any event, to consider
instead whether support given to languages by individual Member States is
permissible under competition rules. Given the wording of Article 92 of the Treaty of
Rome, which provides that impermissible state aid affects trade between Member
122
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123 Grin, supra note 17; cf. also M. Mourik, "European cultural co-operation", in A. Rijksbaron, W.H.
Roobol and M. Weisglas, Europe from a Cultural Perspective: Historiography and Perspective, (The
Hague: Nijgh en von Ditmar Universitair, 1987), 19-21.
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States, it is unlikely that language support would be seen as inherently suspect. His
prediction was in fact confirmed by the introduction of Article 92(3)(d) EC by the
Treaty on European Union, which provides that "...aid to promote culture and
heritage conservation where such aid does not affect trading conditions and
competition in the Community to an extent that is contrary to the common interest..."
is compatible with the common market. The ethos behind EC intervention against
unfair competition practices can also be extended to language issues, in that
"...arbitrariness of power must be opposed in the ethnolinguistic arena just as it must
be opposed in the political and economic realms of which the EC is apparently more
aware."125 The related issue of extending regional policy to cover minority language
issues is discussed separately below.
In another perspective on corrective intervention, Coulmas advocates that the
perception of language issues in the Community should be "...ridded of ideological
i
cobwebs..." and understood in a purely economic sense. Although the tone of this
argument is similar to criticisms of the 'human' dimension of what is nevertheless an
inherently human issue, Coulmas makes a valid observation by highlighting the
considerable economic advantages enjoyed when Member States promote instruction
in their languages of wider communication, citing the huge economic benefits gained
by the United Kingdom from the 'English as a Foreign Language' (EFL)
programmes. He contrasts this with the negligible economic value of the smaller
national languages and, in this way, outlines once again the idea of compensatory or
redistributive policies. Overall, he considers that viewing language within a strictly
economic framework is far more in keeping with the objectives of the EC. He does
not allude, however, to the ever-evolving nature of those objectives. Nicoll and
Salmon affirm that the "...motivation of [the EC founding fathers] was not the price
of eggs, bacon or steel, but rather a revolution in international behaviour."127
125 Fishman, "On the limits of ethnolinguistic democracy", in Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert
Phillipson (eds.), Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination, (Berlin; New
York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1994), 49-61 at 61.
126 Coulmas, supra note 1, pp. 22-26.
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Excessive reliance on economic objectives is both artificial and prohibitive in the
context of Community evolution.
The contribution that multilingualism can potentially make to the prosperity of the
EC in economic terms is regularly overlooked, if not dismissed. The traditional
assumptions that monolingualism is preferable for the encouragement of economic
growth and that multilingualism is linked causally to poverty have been empirically
disproved.128 The Euromosaic Report, initiated by the European Commission, is the
first study to investigate the economic dimension of minority language situations
within the EC.129 In that study, the empirical findings link diversity clearly to
economic development rather than disadvantage.
F. The Special Position ofMinority Languages
Roche interprets the contemporary situation of European minority languages as
follows:
[I]n an EC context, practical convenience should be the major priority and, as
such, would normally preclude the addition of...minority languages to our
services' client list. Such artificial means of support are surely not needed for
languages which are generally considered to be thriving and are doing so
because they fulfil a need on the part of their practitioners. Since they are
clearly not in need of a life-support machine at an EC level, there is no point
clogging up the arteries of the EC body politic unnecessarily through their
inclusion...Two minority languages...Irish and Welsh, are currently flourishing
because there is spontaneous demand and provision for their use which has no
130
coercive associations.
This diagnosis is, however, overly-optimistic. Roche is confusing a 'flourishing'
awareness of the urgent need to implement language rights with the actual state of
the minority languages: his naive assumption that 'all is well' contradicts most other
127 W. Nicoll and T.L. Salmon, Understanding the New European Community, (New York; London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), p. 318.
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cf. Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, supra note 31, p. 495, who refer to an empirical study of over
120 states undertaken by Fishman.
129 Euromosaic, supra note 19.
130 Roche, supra note 7, pp. 144-145.
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opinion on the subject, detailed throughout this chapter, and cannot be considered
authoritative.
Analysis of EC involvement in minority language issues can be approached from two
perspectives. First, notwithstanding the cultural significance of linguistic diversity
per se and, in particular, the distinct contribution of minority languages, why should
minority concerns feature specifically in Community language policy? Second, given
that, to date, EC intervention in minority language concerns has been largely
peripheral and not legally binding, why do minority language groups continue to
attach great significance to the potential of the Community in this area? For example,
speakers of minority languages tend to place considerable faith in the formulation of
EC language policy over and above any human rights developments under the
auspices of the Council of Europe.131
The present Community regime of official languages has not stabilised the position
of smaller official languages against the increasing strength of French and English as
languages of wider communication, even though these languages are, in theory at
least, full participants in that regime. It thus follows that the non-official, minority
languages spoken within the Community are in a far more precarious position. The
EC's commitment to the promotion to linguistic diversity should, in itself, require
that minority languages must feature in any development of current policy. This
reasoning is strengthened by consideration of the following arguments.
The idea that 'languages will take care of themselves' has already been discounted in
the Community context. Open market forces in the linguistic sense threaten cultural
diversity to an unacceptable extent. This truth is even more relevant for minority
languages: they are subject to varying degrees of domestic protection, or indeed
131 The Council of Europe introduced the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in
1993; it places emphasis on state duty in respect of minority languages rather than on the rights of the
speakers themselves, and commentators are divided on its potential effectiveness for this reason: cf.
Albanese, supra note 25, pp. 326-338; Niamh Nic Shuibhne, "The impact of European law on
linguistic diversity", (1996) vol. 5:1 Irish Journal of European Law 62-80; the provisions of the
Charter are discussed in Chapter 5 infra.
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rejection, in the internal policies of the Member States and have not yet been placed
within a co-ordinated legal framework at EC level. Where language is considered in
'market' terms, it should be remembered that since a state or other governing entity
endorses a particular language or languages in so many ways, from its administrative
system to road signs, "[t]he supposition of a linguistic free market is patently
mythical."132 Watts argues that the "...crass differences in economic strength..."
between official and minority languages require far more than an ad hoc or laissez-
faire approach.133 The allocation of resources as 'compensation', discussed above, is
certainly applicable to minority languages. In fact, the granting of subsidies by
Member States in the minority language context is already more widespread than in
respect of languages generally and is more justifiable in the moral sense. De Witte
argues that the allocation of funds to minority language publishing, for example, is
extremely unlikely to affect the balance of trade between Member States, since it is
essentially a domestic market.134 These subsidies are not likely, therefore, to infringe
Article 92(3)(e) EC.
The compensation thesis takes on yet another dimension in the domain of minority
languages: it is often argued that minority language claims have particular relevance
in light of EC regional policy. De Witte describes support in this context as
"[positive] incentives...to give [minority] languages a fair chance on the 'cultural
market'."135 He observes that such incentives amount to EC acceptance of the
legitimacy of domestic support for minority languages under Article 92 EC, as well
as constituting direct support from the Community budget. But there are certain
difficulties with a minority languages framework grounded entirely on regional
policy. In a report commissioned by the EC Commission, the Istituto della
Enciclopedia Italiana warns against viewing regional-based policies as mere
132 Nathan Brett, "Language laws and collective rights", (1991) vol. 4:2 Canadian Journal ofLaw and
Jurisprudence, 347-360 at 349 (emphasis added).
133 Watts, supra note 30, p. 78.
134 De Witte, in Coulmas (ed.), supra note 87, p. 173.
135 ibid., p. 174
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concessionary measures, thus not appreciating their independent justification.136
Furthermore, it has already been argued that language policy which is not grounded
in moral argument is necessarily dependent on political discretion for its existence
and thus also for its continuance. Placing minority language policy within the
framework of EC regional policy would leave it open to amendment or even
annulment at the political level. It should also be remembered that not all minority
1 T-7
language groups are concentrated in geographical regions. Strict application of
regional criteria could thus exclude legitimate minority language groups from
support derived on the regional policy basis. O Riagain remains sceptical of the
extended application of regional policy to date, arguing that this "...rhetoric of
another EC tendency...which seeks to compensate against the inevitable centripetal
processes of the common market itself..." falls well short of the development of a
1 ^R
comprehensive, independent policy on minority languages. But what remains
essential is that it must be within rather than outside the structure of the EC that
solutions to the 'problem of peripheralism' are sought:
While there have been numerous attempts to resolve the problem of
peripheralism, current thinking along these lines has to come to terms with the
political and economic context by reference to which that resolution must
conform. The Single Market exists and it is within that context that the solution
139
must be found.
Questions on the legal competence of the EC in language issues have been relieved
but not dispelled by the introduction of Article 128 EC, as discussed in Chapter 4
infra. Difficulties may ensue from the ambiguous wording of Article 128 itself, as
well as in the potential application of the principle of subsidiarity. But minority
languages are an equal contributor to the cultural diversity of the Member States and,
136 Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Linguistic Minorities in Countries belonging to the EC,
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1986), p. 234.
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Speakers of the Irish language, for example, are dispersed throughout the country; certain
geographical areas, known as 'Gaeltachtaf and located primarily in the West of Ireland, are
concentrated in terms of speakers, but the increasing strength of the language in more widespread,
particularly urban, areas must also be taken into consideration in any language policy.
138 O Riagain, supra note 2, p. 271.
139 Euromosaic, supra note 6, p. 49.
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as such, ought to come within the ambit of EC competence as much as their official
counterparts. McCarthy and Mercer have interpreted Article 128 somewhat
differently, however, arguing that since the EC must respect the national and regional
diversity of the Member States, cultural protection policies are in the domain of
domestic competence alone.140 This construction is somewhat contrived, however,
and goes against the plain words of the Article. A provision that requires the EC to
bring the 'cultural heritage of Europe to the fore' must surely necessitate respect for
diversity in that context itself: diversity is as much, if not more so, an element of
European cultural heritage as it is of domestic cultural heritage. The correct
interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity, set out in detail in Chapter 3 infra, is
also relevant. Meade proposes the following pragmatic interpretation: "...in the
ascending hierarchy of authorities...anything which can be done well at a lower level
should be left to that level and only those things which cannot be done well at the
lower level should be assigned to decision and administration by a higher level of
authority."141 National policy on minority languages is extremely varied across the
Community. Often, speakers of minority languages are denied basic language rights
because of the absence of effective domestic provisions. It is thus arguable that
Community action on these issues is justifiable because of, rather than despite, the
application of subsidiarity. Interpreting subsidiarity as a virtually arbitrary devolution
of power to the Member States might actually inhibit the feasibility of some minority
claims where the Member State government is not sympathetic to the language(s) in
question. Moreover, an EC language policy based on rectifying the linguistic
inequality that results from the Community's official languages regime necessarily
demands action at the supra-national level.
The principles of citizenship and fundamental rights already introduced apply equally
to speakers of minority languages. It has been noted, however, that aspects of liberal
democracy can actually operate against members of minority groups. The application
140
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of human rights norms might, therefore, demand special accommodation in the
minority context. Coulmas outlines potential difficulties in this respect:
The demands of linguistic minorities are largely based on the ideals embodied
in the human rights to which the EC as well as the Member States in principle
proudly subscribe. If the minorities have not been able to realise all of their
objectives, it is because the Member States have differing traditions of
understanding the human rights and laws bearing on minority concerns. Except
in those areas where the Member States have through the signing of treaties
transferred their sovereign rights to the EC, they do not accept any interference
by the Community. For reasons of political prudence the EC must, therefore,
avoid giving the impression of attempting to encroach upon the prerogatives of
Member States.142
This paragraph was written, however, before the Treaty on European Union came
into effect. The provisions therein on human rights (Article F(2) TEU) and cultural
affairs (Article 128 EC) alleviate many of the fears expressed by Coulmas.
Furthermore, even before any formal, treaty-based confirmation, the Court of Justice
had already accepted that principles of human rights could restrict EC legislative
competence. This view was endorsed by a Joint Declaration of the Parliament,
Council and Commission issued on 5 April 1977.143 The implications of the evolving
EC fundamental rights jurisprudence for the claims of minority language speakers
are discussed in Chapter 5 infra. It may be noted at this stage that language rights
have not yet been considered comprehensively at EC level and it is difficult to
predict Community receptiveness to such claims. Significantly, however, the EC did
develop an independent policy framework for minority languages, discussed in
Chapter 2 infra.
Milian-Massana advocates that the EC should not differentiate between its official
and non-official languages to the extent practised at present. He recommends that
minority languages be included in EC language education programmes, that the
alleviation of linguistic discrimination should be promoted, at least in terms of
discrimination caused by the application of Community law, that corrective
economic aid should be permitted and that all minority languages should be given a
142
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quasi-official status within the Community, similar to that already granted to the
Irish language.144 The feasibility of these proposals is discussed at the end of this
chapter, but it is clear that comprehensive EC policy on minority languages is both
desirable and possible.
From the perspective of minority groups themselves, the ambiguous nature of EC
language policy to date has done little to displace the optimism with which speakers
of minority languages view potential Community intervention. This can be explained
by the interaction of several distinct factors. There are certain practical advantages
pertaining to minority language protection at EC level, in conjunction with domestic
action, that cannot be attributed to a national regime on its own. Standards of
protection developed at Community level are international, thus promoting co¬
operation and, therefore, increased unity. EC protection would override domestic
provisions in cases of conflict, providing another forum for adjudication in disputes
between speakers and national authorities. Any provisions developed would
supplement legal protection where national policy has been ineffective or even
completely absent. Speakers of minority languages have also been encouraged to
persevere in their attempts to have measures enacted at EC level by past
receptiveness to their claims in the institutions (discussed in Chapter 2). It is not
proposed that the EC should usurp completely the role of the Member States in the
formulation of minority language policy; but appropriate guidelines implemented at
EC level have a far better chance of changing ineffectual regimes than national
initiatives alone. In particular, the collective, combined strength of the European
minority language groups is far more influential than piecemeal, individual
campaigns. In contemporary European society, language issues relate just as much to
access to economic and social advancement as to grammar and syntax. Speakers of
minority languages are perhaps more aware of this fact than most others; they have
shown, through intense lobbying at EC level, that European society must restructure
its access systems to encompass equal opportunity in the linguistic as well as any
other sense. Formal equality of languages has not achieved this; neither will the
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continued exclusion of fifty million European citizens who choose to speak a
minority language.
G. Conclusion: Language Policy in European Civil Society
Debate on language issues is not usually identified as a contentious or even relevant
facet of European Community policy. Yet the acrimonious nature of recorded
opinion, the real fears of many language groups, the diversity of the concerns raised
and the degree of political sensitivity pertaining to national and linguistic sovereignty
defy this omission. The EC is not merely a union of policy makers, it is a union of
millions of diverse, individual people. Language choice affects both the policy¬
maker and the individual. It is not surprising, therefore, that linguistic concerns, at
both supra-national and national levels, should feature on the Community agenda;
rather, it is incredulous that they do not appear to feature to the extent that has
become critically necessary.
Mackey argues that ignorance of the contemporary languages of wider
communication will carry grave consequences for modern developing polities and
must be countered, irrespective of the price to be paid by their smaller languages.145
It is difficult to support this contention, since he is championing the cause of an
already overwhelming majority force. Breton promotes a more balanced approach,
calling for 'linguistic management' within the context of respect for the equality of
all languages.146 In today's world, additive learning of the languages of wider
communication is not just advisable, it is absolutely necessary. But subtractive
language promotion, which replaces knowledge of all other languages, cannot be
condoned. The European Community must give serious consideration to the
questions outlined above in light of its particular influence on all the European
languages, both official and non-official, and on their continuing utility. Nothing less
can be expected if our evolving European society is truly a civil one.
144 Milian-Massana, supra note 34, pp. 510-511.
145 William F. Mackey, "Language diversity, language policy and the sovereign state", (1991) vol.
13:1-2 History ofEuropean Ideas 51-61.
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7. A REFORMED LANGUAGE POLICY FOR THE EC?
A number of arguments have been advanced in favour of the accommodation of
minority languages in the language policy of the European Community. What has
also emerged, however, is that the present 'equality of official languages' regime
does not assure de facto equality for even its constituent languages; it has also been
shown that the rigidity of the doctrine is often circumvented in EC administrative
practice. It must be asked, then, whether retaining an absolutist approach to linguistic
'equality' benefits either the Community or the languages themselves. The adoption
of just one or a reduced number of official Community languages to the exclusion of
all others has already been discounted; a droll answer often rendered in response to
suggestions that just one or two languages should be used is that no-one, then, should
be allowed to use his/her own first language, for even distribution of the inevitable
linguistic handicap. But a more appropriate alternative may lie between the
absolutism of both the existing and discounted arrangements.
An obvious starting point is the actually practised, though not formally
acknowledged, division between working and official Community languages.
Regulation 1/58 makes an explicit reference to both 'working' and 'official'
languages, but this distinction has never been implemented legislatively. In reality,
just one or two of the official languages are used as de facto working languages in
the institutions. As discussed earlier, Roche has argued that the employment of
pragmatism in this context would alleviate pressure on the interpretation services
without trespassing on political sensitivities: he advocates the adoption of one or two
working languages in the institutions, with the proviso that any individual who is
unable to express him/herself in, or understand, the selected language(s) could avail
of translation and interpretation services where required. This solution makes a great
deal of sense, since it amounts, in effect, to the formalisation of what occurs already
in practice.
146 Roland Breton, "L'Approche geographique", in Truchot (ed.), supra note 39, 41-68 at 59.
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But because of the nature of EC law, the need for an assured status for all languages
spoken in the Member States, because of the rights resulting from citizenship
generally, and European citizenship in particular, and because of persisting political
tensions and uncertainties among Member States and citizens, the present system of
centralised translation of EC legislation and other official documents would have to
remain operative in the form of an official, as opposed to working, languages regime.
In the context of European patents, discussed earlier, the Chartered Institute of Patent
Agents explored some of the alternatives to providing a translation of every patent
granted into the official languages of each of the designated Member States.147 It
examined but rejected the possibilities of a deferred translation filing system,
translation only when demanded and translation of abstracts. The principal arguments
against any one of these compromises were based on objections to the diminution of
citizens rights and on the limited legal value, for national courts, of any of the
proposed alternatives. The Institute concluded that "[cjompromises abound but none
14R
is satisfactory."
Green argues that a regime of official/working languages can work where speakers of
the languages of limited function can be shown to be no worse off in linguistic terms
than they would otherwise have been. But he acknowledges that non-official
languages are, therefore, at a particular disadvantage.149 This proposition echoes the
debate on the stability of diglossia, discussed supra. It is unlikely that the Member
States would be prepared to support formal expression of the working/official
distinction, in light of the already precarious position of even the smaller national
languages, unless the functions accorded to each language class were delineated
clearly and were implemented as part of a far broader treatment of contemporary
linguistic concerns throughout the Community. Viewed in this context, an overall
reformation of EC language policy would have to include the development of a
147 C.I.P.A., supra note 51, pp. 184-188.
148 ibid., p. 189.
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Community strategy to accommodate non-official and other minority languages. This
truth is indisputable. Whether the Community should consider its policies in terms of
cultural affairs or fundamental rights, or both, is explored in Chapters 4 and 5 infra.
8. CONCLUSION
The issues highlighted in this chapter illustrate acute divisiveness of opinion on the
optimum future development of EC language arrangements. But one truth is
unanimously clear: the present language policy arrangements cannot continue
without comprehensive revision. Not only are the smaller national languages being
gradually excluded from the institutions in a covert but real sense, the position of
non-official languages rests on an extremely fragile premise, which urgently needs to
be assessed and strengthened. Considerations of monetary costs and efficiency are
obviously relevant but cannot be allowed to subordinate the inherent value of
linguistic diversity, primarily for language speakers but also for language evolution
and, not least, for the Community itself, in terms of successful integration and
economic development. The EC must review objectively the efficacy of its existing
policy and ensure that its recent pledges to linguistic and cultural diversity go beyond
an empty formulation. Should it fail to do so, the successful integration of the
Member States could be sacrificed, since true unity will only be achieved through
respect and provision for diversity. A framework for developing a reformed EC
language policy has been outlined, which could, and should, encapsulate minority
languages also. But even if the present language policy persists indefinitely, the
Community must acknowledge its policy shortcomings, in respect of languages left
outside the official regime, and begin to redress the resulting deficits. In Chapter 2
infra, the evolving awareness within Community institutions that minority languages
matter, prior to the changes in EC structure brought about by the Treaty on European
Union, is outlined, showing that the foundation for reformulation of the present
language regime is already established.
149
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CHAPTER 2
DEVELOPMENT OF EC MINORITY LANGUAGE POLICY:
PRE-MAASTRICHT/AMSTERDAM
1. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 1, a number of arguments - economic, sociological and political - were
presented in favour of reforming EC language policy, including the adoption of
measures oriented specifically towards minority languages. It was pointed out,
however, that policy development must be grounded in appropriate legal bases. Both
the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties have enhanced Community competences,
particularly in the fields of culture, and fundamental rights and citizenship, discussed
in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. Whether this diffusion of competence has had any
practical effect is considered in Chapter 6. But, as with many Community policies,
the first manifestations of EC involvement in minority language issues can be traced
back to more than a decade before the ratification of the Treaty on European Union.
This Chapter focuses on developments in both the European Parliament and the
Court of Justice that related specifically to minority language initiatives.1 The
attitudes and reactions of the Court and, more particularly, the Parliament were
responsible for the piecemeal evolution of a Community perspective on minority
languages. This chapter focuses on the identification of first, emerging trends in
institutional reaction, whether hostile or supportive, towards minority language
claims and, second, the various sources of legal competence derived by the
institutions, in light of the absence, at that time, of directly relevant Treaty
provisions.
2. INITIATIVES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
' Measures that affect minority language policy in an incidental or secondary manner are outlined in
Chapter 4 infra, which deals with cultural policy in a broader sense.
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The European Parliament is often regarded as the champion of minority language
concerns within the EC. This reflects its function as a representative body, in that it
brings to the fore the: concerns of citizens throughout the Community far more
effectively than any of the other institutions. This section outlines the initiatives
introduced by the Parliament in the 1980s, analysed particularly from the
perspectives of motivation and legal basis. The texts of the Resolutions discussed are
contained in Appendix H
A. Arfe Resolution (1981)
Resolution on a Community Charter ofRegional Languages and Cultures and on
a Charter ofRights ofEthnic Minorities.
(i) Background
The genesis of the Arfe Resolution can be traced to calls within the Parliament in the
late 1970s for a report on the feasibility of a Community charter on minority cultures,
such as that tabled by John Hume MEP on 26 October 1979.3 This corresponds with
the increasing momentum in favour of European union that permeated the
Community at that time, which had culminated in the preparation of the Tindemans
Report. In this pro-integration political climate, reconciliation of the seemingly
conflicting values of unity and diversity became a corollary, albeit lesser, item on the
Community agenda. Mr. Hume's motion was directed primarily towards the
Parliamentary Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and Sport, and
the Committee on Regional Policy and Regional Planning. On 19 December 1979,
the former Committee appointed M. Arfe as rapporteur, instructing him, on 15
February 1980, to draw up a report on the feasibility of a Community charter on
regional languages and cultures, and on the rights of ethnic minorities. The resulting
Resolution was adopted on 16 March 1981.
2
European Parliament, 16 October 1981, [1984] OJ C-287/106.
3 Doc. 1-436/79.
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The Preamble to the Resolution provides further insight into the motivations behind
its adoption. The Parliament was clearly aware that minority rights had become an
issue of increasing importance as well as controversy. The reference to 'the most
recent political, legal and anthropological theories' probably relates to the growing
corpus of writings on sociolinguistics, as well as to the preparatory report for the
Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and Sport, drawn up by M.
Arfe. The Preamble reflects the view that the diversity of cultural identities
throughout the Member States is an essential element of the cultural heritage of
Europe. By focusing on diversity, the Parliament was rejecting the notion of enforced
linguistic conformity, which is sometimes considered a linchpin of 'true' political
unity. The Preamble also recognises the fundamental rights dimension of language
choice, referring to 'declarations of principle' already made by the United Nations
and Council of Europe in this context. More specifically, the Parliament
acknowledged that all Member State governments had recognised the right of ethnic
and linguistic minority groups to freedom of expression 'in principle' and noted that
'most' had initiated legislative programmes to ensure the implementation of that
principle. The pragmatic link between the preservation of linguistic diversity and
prevailing economic conditions, particularly in the case of regional languages, was
stated expressly. What is most notable by its absence, however, is any attempt to
derive a Treaty-based competence for Community action in this policy area.
Language rights were placed within a vague context of culture and heritage and
viewed as an inherently 'human' issue: this latter aspect is demonstrated by the
reference to cultural identity as one of the most important contemporary 'non-
material, psychological needs'. To assess the implications of the absence of legal
basis, it is first necessary to consider the nature of the measures proposed in the
Resolution.
(ii) Content and commentary
The Arfe Resolution sought primarily to encourage national, regional and local
authorities to promote the use of minority languages in the fields of education, media
and public life. The Commission was called upon to provide funding for appropriate
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projects, to collect information on the minority languages of Europe and 'to review
all Community legislation or practices which discriminate against minority
languages' (Article 6). The latter clause has considerable potential; it demonstrates
that language use is affected by a broad spectrum of policy initiatives and that, in the
particular context of EC policy-making, Community law affects a number of
peripheral domains. The Parliament acknowledged the 'wide differences' in the
situations of minority language groups across the Community but called for the
implementation of certain common objectives in the traditional language-planning
domains of education, communications and public life. Given that the Resolution
was the first significant institutional proclamation on the value ofminority languages,
the provisions are understandably cautious but they also contain some progressive
innovations. The Parliament stressed, for example, the role of regional and local as
well as national and international government in the field of language policy, while
also highlighting the potential for co-operation between these various levels of
authority. The request that the EEC Regional Fund should contribute to 'the
financing of regional economic projects' draws this philosophy to a practical
conclusion. Another innovation is that the Resolution focuses not only on minority
language education in the primary school sector, but looks at its provision right up to,
and including, university level. Also in the domain of education, the Parliament
called for the incorporation of minority languages into existing multilingual
education programmes. The Parliament envisaged a coordinating role for the
Commission in respect of the collection of data and the funding of research and pilot
studies. By encouraging communication between linguistic groups and the
Community institutions, the cross-border dimension of language issues was
emphasised, thus implicitly substantiating the need for Community intervention in
this field.
The phraseology employed suggests a more proactive role for the Member States,
however, asking that they 'provide for', 'promote' and 'take steps to ensure', in
addition to 'allowing', the realisation of the initiatives proposed. This illustrates
recognition by the Parliament that positive government action is necessary to ensure
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effective implementation of language rights. It is also clear that, from the outset,
different roles were envisaged for the Community and the Member States in the
promotion of linguistic diversity. The primary responsibility for policy
implementation was placed clearly on the Member States themselves, with the
Community acting more as coordinator. The Resolution (which is not, of course,
legally binding in any event) can thus be interpreted as a purely declaratory
instrument. This interpretation does not render the absence of legal competence quite
as damning as might otherwise be anticipated. It is clear, however, that the
Parliament identified both a standard for language rights, measures below which
were not acceptable, as well as a number of specific language-use domains requiring
attention at both national and Community levels. Considerable support for the
effective recognition of minority language rights can be gleaned from the Resolution;
it is equally clear that the Parliament envisaged a role for the Community in this
context. Given the nature of Resolutions in general terms, as well as the absence of
Treaty-based competence at that time, the Arfe Resolution can not be interpreted as
an attempt to place legally binding duties on the institutions or the Member States.
But a clear policy stance was adopted, confirming, at least, the desirability of such
measures. The Parliament thus created a definite role for the Community in this field
out of very little indeed.
(iii) Impact of the Resolution
The Resolution did generate some activity in favour of minority language promotion
at Community level. In the immediate aftermath, the European Bureau for Lesser
Used Languages (EBLUL) was founded (October 1981), to preserve and promote
minority and regional languages in the Member States of the Community.4 It is
funded by subventions from the Community and from the governments of certain
4 The phrase 'lesser used language' was adopted in an attempt to avoid the negative connotations of
the word 'minority'; some commentators have, however, been critical of this wordplay: "I use my
language just as much as any speaker of a majority language [so] the problem of comparison is still
there: lesser used than what?...I think that we must accept the term 'minority language' in spite of its
connotations, the way forward is to give it higher status and better connotations." (Michael Reuter,
"Summing up", in Gearoid Mac Eoin, Anders Ahlqvist and Donncha O hAodha (eds.) Third
International Conference on Minority Languages: General Papers, (Clevedon, Avon: Multilingual
Matters, 1987), 213-218 at 216.
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Member States. It publishes the inter-group Contact Bulletin, coordinates research
projects, and collects and organises relevant data. In 1986, the Committee on Youth,
Culture, Education, Information and Sport commissioned the Istituto della
Enciclopedia Italiana to produce a report on Linguistic Minorities in Countries
belonging to the European Community, based on questionnaires that had been
dispatched to the Member States.5 Having analysed the responses received, the
Commission recommended constitutional recognition of minority languages in the
Member States, implementation of that status in a real sense, the formation of a
Minorities Commission and the provision of appropriate economic aid for research
and study programmes. Significantly, the Report considered that "...the treatment of
linguistic minorities is by its very nature a political problem, and secondarily a
problem of language policy."6 Action undertaken as a direct result of the Arfe
Resolution focused essentially, therefore, on gathering information about the various
minority language groups across the Community. Some of the corresponding
recommendations made, such as the constitutional recognition of linguistic
minorities, were quite far-reaching from the perspective of their potential impact on
national governance. Given that the Resolution marks the very early stages of the
Community's foray into minority language protection, its subsequent impact on the
EC institutions is at once both superficial and extensive; superficial as regards the
actual measures and projects undertaken, which stopped short of investigating legal
competence in this domain and were framed in a suggestive rather than imperative
format; but extensive in that neither the Commission nor the Parliament hesitated
when placing responsibility for minority language groups on the Member State
governments, notwithstanding the lack of a substantive Treaty provision upon which
they could ground this 'interference' into domestic political practice.
It is more difficult to assess the impact of the Arfe Resolution from the perspective of
minority language speakers. It is true that it is widely referred to in contemporary
5 Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana/European Commission, Linguistic Minorities in Countries
belonging to the EC, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities,
1986).
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language rights campaigns but it is probable that awareness of the Resolution has
only come about after the fact, in light of the subsequent formation of the EBLUL
which would have undertaken a publicising function. Furthermore, promotion of the
European Parliament measures has been relatively recent, so that Arfe is usually
considered collectively, along with subsequent measures, rather than individually.
That public awareness of the Resolution developed over time rather than at the outset
is substantiated by Temple: she refers to a survey undertaken among Breton speakers
which posed questions on the impact of Arfe specifically, but it was found that most
*7
respondents had not known that the Resolution even existed.
B. Arfe Resolution (2) (1983)
o
Resolution in favour ofMinority Languages and Cultures
The tone of the Preamble to the second Arfe Resolution, adopted on 11 February
1983, indicated some impatience within the Parliament, since its initiatives had not
been followed through to any great extent by the other Community institutions. The
original recommendations were, therefore, restated in this Resolution, more intensely
in some instances. For example, the proposed review of Community legislation,
called for in Article 6 of Arfe (1), was replaced by the statement that 'all Community
and national legislation and practices' that discriminate against minority languages
should be reviewed by the Community (emphasis added). Moreover, the Parliament
called upon the Commission to 'prepare appropriate Community instruments for
ending such discrimination'. This is a particularly striking provision, since it implies
that the Community should not only tackle discriminatory EC measures, but also
those enacted by the Member States. Even more surprising in this context is that,
once again, the Parliament did not establish or even address whether the Community
had legal competence to introduce such measures. The Resolution confirmed the role
6 ibid., p. 232.
7 Rosalind M. Temple, "Great expectations? Hopes and fears about the implications of political
developments in Western Europe for the future of France's regional languages" in M.M. Parry, W.V.
Davies and R.A.M. Temple, The Changing Voice of Europe, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press,
1994), 191-211 at 202-4.
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of both local and regional government in minority language protection, but also
anticipated a continuing and more intense function for all of the Community
institutions. Arfe (2) required the Commission to report to the Parliament by the end
of 1983, on progress made with the implementation of the Resolution, but this did
not materialise in practice.
C. Kuijpers Resolution (1987)
Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities in
the European Community.9
(i) Introduction
This Resolution was adopted on 30 October 1987, more than four years after the
adoption of Arfe (2). The lengthy preamble indicates that Community interest in
minority language issues had strengthened rather than declined in the interim period.
But still, no Treaty provision was identified as a legal basis for any of the measures
proposed in the Resolution. The extensive list of national and international
instruments cited in the preamble can, therefore, be interpreted as an alternative
attempt to buttress the legitimacy of Community action in the field.
(ii) Content and commentary
The Kuijpers Resolution reiterates and elaborates on the principles outlined in the
Arfe Reports. Language rights are placed firmly within the ambit of international
human rights, with stronger references to the work of both the United Nations and the
Council of Europe. Relevant international instruments had been referred to as
'declarations of principle' in the previous Resolutions but are cited in Kuijpers as
'basic principles regarding the rights of minorities formulated and approved'. In
particular, the Council, of Europe's Charter on Regional and Minority languages, in
preparation at that time, was supported expressly. It was also acknowledged that the
8 11 February 1983, [1983] OJ C-68/103; cf. Appendix II for text.
9 30 October 1987, Doc. A 2-150/87; cf. Appendix II for text.
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implementation of minority language rights constitutes an element of the prevention
of discrimination.
The Parliament alluded to strengthening the autonomy of the regions and yet creating
a 'more politically unified European Community', reflecting the viewpoint that unity
can only be attained through the encouragement rather than suppression of diversity.
It advocated the need to support the improvement of economic conditions at regional
level, as a corollary of the development of localised cultures and languages. The
Parliament expressed 'regret' that the Commission had failed to 'deal
comprehensively' with the rights of minorities since the adoption of Arfe (1). But this
admonition overlooks the Parliament's own failure to derive a legal competence upon
which comprehensive action could actually be based. Notwithstanding this oversight,
the Kuijpers Resolution calls expressly for the full implementation of both Arfe
Resolutions and proceeds to restate and expand the principles endorsed originally
therein.
At the outset, the Resolution recognises the need for and value of legal recognition
for minority languages at Member State level, describing it as 'the basic condition for
the preservation of regional and minority cultures and languages' (Article 2). The
phraseology used in this context is relatively cautious. The Parliament 'points out'
the need for constitutional recognition but does not demand or require it. In Article 3,
however, the Parliament 'calls on the Member States whose Constitutions already
contain general principles on the rights of minorities to make timely provision on the
basis of organic laws, for the implementation of those principles'. As shown in
Appendix I, the majority of Member States have made some provision for minority
languages; but formal recognition in its own, without any commitment to effective
implementation, is a hollow political exercise. The Parliament identified correctly
that enactment of a coordinated, usually legislative, enforcement programme is a
necessary corollary to constitutional recognition. It is arguable that this apparently
strong demand is weakened by the fact that it is directed only towards those Member
States who have already taken some steps towards the protection of linguistic
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minorities and have, therefore, displayed a sympathetic predisposition to these
concerns. But is must be remembered that the Community has called upon Member
States to act on national, constitutional provisions: this casts the Resolution in a
more radical light, accentuated by the fact that recognition and implementation of
minority rights in any governmental forum is a highly contentious political issue.
While focusing on the traditional domains of language use - education, law and
administration, media, cultural events, and social and economic measures - the
Kuijpers Resolution goes further than its predecessors. It contains both general,
sweeping principles and more specific calls for action. The provision of adequate
staff and other resources was deemed essential for the promotion of education
through the medium of a minority language (Article 5). The use of minority
languages for administrative and legal purposes (Article 6) was associated with local
authorities 'in the first instance'. This does not, however, preclude the adoption of
broader provisions by national authorities where speakers of a minority language are
not contained geographically in a specific region or where local authorities do not
have the requisite legislative autonomy to design linguistic policies in the first place.
Under the administrative/legal heading, the Parliament called for a review of
'national provisions and practices' that discriminate against minority languages. This
specification that 'practices' as well as 'provisions' be checked echoes the emphasis
placed on the implementation, and not just formulation, of linguistic policy.
The Resolution advocates that the languages through which decentralised
government services are provided should be determined by the linguistic structure of
the geographical area covered. It is arguable, however, that minority languages must
also be incorporated into services provided by centralised government authorities, so
that a basic level of service, at least, can be provided through the minority language
where requested. This practice ensures equal treatment of all citizens and respect for
language rights.10 It can also be adapted to supra-national authorities; it is argued in
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Chapter 5 infra, for example, that the EC should incorporate minority languages into
its policy of dealing with Community citizens in the official language of their choice.
Article 7 deals with the mass media. It contains general principles on recognition of
and respect for minority languages in broadcasting and on access to the media for
minority language groups. More specific opportunities for direct action in this
domain are also outlined, such as supporting the training of journalists and technical
staff who work through the medium of a minority language, as well as ensuring that
the latest broadcasting technology is available to them. The cultural infrastructure is
addressed in Article 8. The Parliament recommended the foundation of institutes to
undertake studies, to co-ordinate and gather information, and to provide and
supervise education through the medium of minority languages. The inclusion of the
banking and consumer sectors (Article 9) has potentially far-reaching consequences,
in that it relates to sectors outside the ambit of government services. This is
significant because of the trend towards the privatisation of utilities formerly
controlled by governments {e.g. telecommunications, power supply), which has
removed more and more services from the protective realm of 'official' use of
language.
The remaining paragraphs deal largely with the role of the Community institutions.
The long-expressed ideal that the Commission should place minority languages in a
broader context, by considering the impact of all legislative initiatives on culture and
language, is reaffirmed. The Parliament recommends strongly that the institutions
and the Member States support the work of EBLUL, particularly in terms of financial
assistance. It is significant that, in Article 12, the Parliament calls on the Commission
to take every action to implement the Resolution 'within its terms of reference', yet
the Parliament itself did not attempted to grapple with identifying what those
constraints might be. Interestingly, the Parliament places minority languages within
the ambit of 'cultural and educational policy' but it is debatable whether this
10 In Ireland, for example, in preparation for the drafting of imminent language legislation, all central
and local government departments were required to draw up a customised language plan, based on
demand for services through Irish experienced by each individual department.
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Community competence existed at the time. Article 128 EC, dealing with cultural
policy, only came into effect after the ratification of the Treaty on European Union;
the original Article 128 EEC, dealing with vocational training, had been extended by
the Court to apply to education in a broader sense, but this development was still
fairly controversial in 1987."
In Article 15, the Parliament '[s]tresses categorically that the recommendations
contained in this Resolution are not to be interpreted or implemented in such a way
as to jeopardise the territorial integrity or public order of the Member States'. This is
undoubtedly a reference to the extremities discussed in Chapter 1 supra, such as the
secession of minority groups from their governing states. It is reaffirmed, however,
that this aspect of minority rights is neither a universal nor inevitable phenomenon.
Secession represents the least common but most publicised consequence of minority
rights recognition. It was shown that extreme reactions are far more likely to result
from the repression rather than recognition and implementation of minority rights.
Finally, it should be noted that the Parliament recognised that migrant workers and
overseas minorities have specific but different needs as minority groups, which
should be addressed separately by the European Community.
D. General Comments on the Resolutions of the European Parliament
The Parliament has clearly displayed an ongoing commitment to minority language
issues, despite the fact that it could not draw upon any recognised Community
competence to bolster its calls for action. The range of issues covered in the texts,
particularly in the Kuijpers Resolution, demonstrates an awareness of most of the
central concerns of minority language speakers, as well as a commendable
comprehension of both the potential and limits of language planning policies. It is
clear from the tone of the later texts, however, that the Parliament had not been able
to influence the other Community institutions as much as it had intended. A number
of reasons traditionally associated with resistance to the granting of minority rights
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may be relevant here. Minority rights, in any context, are one of the most contentious
aspects of the contemporary fundamental rights debate. The Commission may,
therefore, have evaded the adoption of a definite policy stance to avoid trespassing on
the undoubtedly diverse political sensitivities of the Member States. National policies
on minority language rights vary greatly throughout the Community, as demonstrated
in Appendix I . The fact that the Parliament was not acting in accordance with any
discernible Community competence provides another fundamental explanation as to
why Parliamentary initiative was not, and indeed could not, be translated into
concrete programmes of action, above and beyond the coordination of funding and
data collection that did result. Given the unease expressed over the broad
interpretation of Article 128 EEC (vocational training) around the same time, the
Commission was unlikely to land itself knowingly in the midst of yet another
Community versus Member State competence contest. It must be remembered that in
the 1980s, the European political climate was characterised by strong movements
both in favour of and against intensified European unity. The ratification of the
Single European Act was not achieved without resistance, but the build-up to the
Maastricht negotiations in particular revealed even further the deep-rooted
insecurities and objections of an increasing number of European citizens. In one
sense, it is surprising that the Resolutions on minority languages did not really
generate much controversy within the Parliament itself, on grounds of national
sovereignty for example; but, on the other hand, resolutions have no legal effect. The
latter interpretation reflects the cynical truth that policy makers are far more willing
to declare principles than policy actors are to implement them in turn. Thus,
supporting a relatively innocuous resolution would not cause too many political
ripples and may gain favourable publicity, and, in turn, sympathy from those
affected, yet would not require any substantive action to be undertaken. This analysis
does not detract from the work of the Parliament; rather, it sheds light on why the
recommendations made were not subsequently acted upon. Albanese asserts that the
resolutions "...are based on the idea that European union should be more than a
common market, and that unity is possible only if the present cultural pluralism is
11 The position was later clarified in Case 24/86 Blaizot v. University ofLiege [1988] ECR 355.
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respected. These texts represent a political choice for the future...."12 He
acknowledges, however, that it would not have been possible to adopt legally binding
texts on the protection of minorities. That argument has been stressed throughout this
chapter and is reflected even more acutely in the following consideration of the
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice during the same time period.
3. JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
It was observed in Chapter 1 that language choices are affected by a myriad of direct
and indirect factors which, on the surface, seem otherwise unrelated. It was also
noted that, in the Pre-Maastricht Community era, the Treaty did not authorise the EC
to determine language policy beyond structuring its own official languages regime.
This did not, however, thwart the European Parliament in its policy formulation
activities throughout the 1980s. But the European Court of Justice is bound by the
parameters of the Treaties in quite a different way, or is it? The interpretative
developments in respect of vocational training, referred to supra, illustrate that the
Court of Justice is not immune to the employment of judicial activism. Against this
background, the cases in which the Court was obliged expressly to consider the
Community position on minority languages are analysed infra.
v 13
A. Ministere Public v. Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch
(i) Facts
The applicant, a Luxembourg national, resided in a German-speaking municipality in
Belgium. In 1981, he was charged with a criminal offence, related to a late-night
dispute with members of the Belgian police force. He was questioned by the police
through the medium of German; all forms and records relating to the charge were
also completed in German. The trial summons was issued in French, but it was
accompanied by a German translation. Initially, the applicant was convicted and
12 Ferdinando Albanese, "Ethnic and linguistic minorities in Europe", (1991) 11 Yearbook of
European Law, 313-338 at 323.
13 Case 137/84, [1985] ECR 2681.
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fined in abstentia, but he appealed to have that judgment set aside. He also requested
that the proceedings take place in German. Both requests were granted by the Belgian
court.
The Public Prosecutor's office appealed against the latter part of the decision,
however, maintaining that since the accused was a Luxembourg national, he did not
have the right to be tried through German. Article 17(3) of the Belgian Law provides
that an accused person of Belgian nationality residing in a German-speaking
municipality is entitled to request that court proceedings be conducted through
German. Although the accused in this case asserted that he spoke only German, or at
least expressed himself more easily in that language, the Prosecutor argued that only
Belgian nationals could avail of the rights granted by Article 17(3). The Belgian
Court of Appeal was unsure whether this restriction was compatible with EC law and
thus referred the following question for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 EEC:
Does the third paragraph of Article 17 of the [Belgian Law] on the use of
language in the courts...comply with the principles referred to in Article 220 of
the Treaty, which is intended to secure the protection of persons and the
enjoyment and protection of rights under the same conditions as those accorded
by each Member State to its own nationals, that is to say, in the case in point, is
it or is it not necessary, in a criminal case, to grant a German-speaking EEC
national, and in particular a Luxembourg national residing in...a German-
speaking municipality, the right to require that the proceedings take place in
German?14
Article 220 EEC set out that "[mjember states shall, so far as is necessary, enter into
negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals
the protection of persons and the enjoyment and protection of rights under the same
conditions as those accorded by each State to own nationals...." In this context, the
Commission observed that "...a Member State is not obliged to grant the nationals of
other Member States the rights referred to in Article 220 so long as the Member
States have not entered into an agreement as referred to in that article."15 The
Commission did suggest, however, that other provisions of the EEC Treaty, in
respect of free movement of workers and the right of establishment, might be
14 ibid., p. 2683.
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relevant. In particular, the Commission concluded that the legal status of the
applicant as a migrant worker from another Member State ensured his right to be
tried in German, in accordance with the rights granted to Belgian nationals in similar
circumstances.
Significantly, the submission made by the Italian Government placed the case in the
context of minority language rights, but argued for a restrictive interpretation, as
follows:
[NJational legislation for the benefit of language minorities applies only to
members of the minority in question and to the area where the language is
spoken. A member of a recognised language minority can not therefore require
the use of his language in legal proceedings outside the area where his language
is spoken. Nor can a national of another Member State require that the minority
language be used on the grounds that he speaks the minority language (which is
not the national language of the State in which he lives) and lives in the area
where the minority language is spoken. In such proceedings, interpreters must
be used.16
It was noted that the employment of interpreters in these circumstances fulfilled the
requirements for criminal proceedings set out in the European Convention on Human
Rights.
(ii) Judgment of the Court
The Court of Justice adopted the approach put forward by the Commission in respect
of Article 220 EEC i.e. given that an agreement on the mutual recognition of
language rights did not exist between Belgium and Luxembourg, it was not possible
for the applicant to employ that provision in the present case. However, the Court
also applied the broader reasoning suggested by the Commission, based on the rights
of migrant workers. It classified the right to use a particular language in the courts of
another Member State, under the same conditions as nationals of that State, as a
'social advantage', within the meaning of Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68.
Specifically, the Court referred to its decision in Ministere Public v. Even, where it
defined 'social advantages' as "...all advantages 'which, whether or not linked to a
15 ibid., p. 2684.
16 ibid.; cf. Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz (24 November 1998), Chapter 6 infra.
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contract of employment, are generally granted to national workers primarily because
of their objective status or by virtue of the mere fact of their residence on the national
territory'."17 Applying this interpretation to the present case, the Court stated that
"[t]he right to use his own language in proceedings before the courts of the Member
State in which he resides, under the same conditions as national workers, plays an
important role in the integration of a migrant worker and his family into the host
country, and thus in achieving the objective of free movement of workers."18
Furthermore, the Court cited Article 7 EEC, which prevented discrimination on
grounds of nationality.
In a terse but significant statement, the Court declared that "[i]n the context of a
Community based on the principles of free movement of persons and freedom of
establishment the protection of the linguistic rights and privileges of individuals is of
particular importance."19
(iii) Commentary
While the Court did not address directly whether a policy on minority language rights
existed in Community law, an implicitly supportive attitude can be gleaned from its
decision. Advocate General Lenz tackled this aspect more overtly in his Opinion on
the case, discussed infra. It is significant, for example, that the only barrier to the
application of Article 220 EEC ('enjoyment and protection of rights') was the
absence of an appropriate inter-state agreement on language rights. It can be
concluded, from the fact that Article 220 EEC was even considered, that the Court
did view the use of a particular language in criminal proceedings as a right and not
just a privilege.
Advocate General Lenz discussed the nature of 'social advantages', to which
Community workers are entitled without discrimination, in some depth. He argued
17 ibid., referring to Case 207/78, [1979] ECR 2019.
18 ibid., p. 2696.
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that there existed two specific categories of rights and duties: first, those involving a
'special relationship of allegiance' to the state in question and, second, social rights
that must be guaranteed to all workers without discrimination. In the context of the
present case, he stated that "[cjriminal proceedings certainly do not involve a 'special
relationship of allegiance', so safeguarding the rights of the defence, which includes
choice of language of the proceedings, cannot be made dependent on nationality."20
He did not elaborate further on the nature of a 'special relationship of allegiance',
however, so it is not certain that all language issues are exempt from this criterion.
One language more than any other is often deeply connected with a particular state or
regional identity: taken to extremes, a state could conceivably argue that because of
this close association, there cannot be a role for any other languages due to threats of
non-uniformity, which would impinge on the notion of 'special allegiance'. Traces of
this philosophy can be identified in the French government's language policies,
outlined in Appendix I, which have had a detrimental effect on the recognition of
language rights for French citizens who speak a language other than the national
language e.g. Breton. The Court has never been called upon to consider this
hypothetical argument but it would certainly present a tough political decision for the
Court, bringing national sovereignty and the multicultural ethos of the Community
into direct conflict.
In a statement that reflects developments in the European Parliament at that time, the
Advocate General stressed that linguistic discrimination based on nationality "...is
certainly not in keeping with the establishment of a 'Citizen's Europe'. Nor does it
contribute to the integration of the worker in the host country, in particular in the
linguistic region in which he lives."21 In the context of non-discrimination and equal
treatment, Advocate General Lenz, referring to established case-law, pointed out that
the Court has always adopted a broad approach to the interpretation of these concepts
19 ibid., p. 2695.
20 ibid., Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, pp. 2685-6.
21 ibid., p. 2689; it was noted in Chapter 1 supra that motivation for Community protection of the
language rights of migrant workers could be attributed to a desire to ensure the successful integration
of workers and their families, rather than to the promotion of linguistic diversity per se.
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and noted that while equal treatment is based on an individual's status as a
Community worker, the principle can also be applied to situations outside the
employment relationship.22 Applying this precedent to the present case, he concluded
that:
...it cannot be assumed that [social] advantages...are inapplicable merely
because they are granted in order to protect minority rights...The requirement of
equal treatment...applies in areas which are not primarily governed by
Community law but on which Community law may have indirect effects...[The
possible application of Article 7(2) EEC] cannot be dismissed with the simple
statement that matters concerning the organisation of the courts or the use of
languages in criminal proceedings are not governed by Community law.23
The last sentence in this passage reflects the idea of 'spillover' in respect of
Community competence. The Advocate General has recognised that because the
effects of EC law cannot be contained precisely, its impact is often wider than the
achievement of the specific goals or objectives outlined in the Treaties or in
secondary legislation. He thus laid the jurisdictional foundation for the Court to
examine national language policy in respect of its compliance with Community law,
confirmed in the Groener case, discussed infra.
The Advocate General did refer interchangeably to language/minority rights. It may
be recalled that the Italian Government submitted a number of arguments based on
minority rights criteria but, although referred to in the opening stages, these
arguments were not addressed by the Court. Somewhat paradoxically, the Advocate
General asserted that minority rights criteria could not apply in this case, since the
languages referred to in the Belgian legislation - Dutch, French and German - are not
classified as minority languages therein: "[expressions such as national language,
native language, linguistic minority and so on are not to be found in it. I therefore do
not consider it correct...to rely on general principles of law regarding the protection
of linguistic minorities, as was done by [the Italian Government]."24 This is an
22 ibid., pp. 2688-9; cf. Case 15/69 Siidmilch v. Ugliola [1969] ECR 363; Case 9/74 Casagrande v.
Landeshaupstadt Miinchen [1974] ECR 773; Case 32/75 Cristini v. SNCF [1975] ECR 1085 and Case
65/81 Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden-Wiirttemberg [1982] ECR 33.
23 ibid., p. 2689.
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extremely disappointing interpretation, relying as it does on domestic classification
of languages as a precondition to the application of international standards. This
literal approach has, in fact, been rejected by even the more conservative minority
rights theorists.25 Under the Advocate General's interpretation, the protection of
language rights by an international entity is wholly dependent on the classification of
languages adopted by that state, which defeats the very purpose of international
intervention in the first place. This automatic deference to the Member State might
appear to doom any attempt to discern an effective EC minority language policy from
the outset. But the remainder of the Advocate General's comments on language
rights simply do not fit with this pessimistic interpretation. Although within the
framework of national rules on the use of languages, the Advocate General
recognised the principle of language choice, where he stated that "[i]t would be
inconsistent and incompatible with the principle that workers from other Member
States must be treated in the same manner as national workers if [the applicant] were
suddenly to find that in criminal proceedings he could no longer use the language
which he can use in everyday life and in which workers who are Belgian nationals
9 f\
may, if they wish, be tried." This interpretation presupposes the existence of a
domestic language choice regime, but it nonetheless determines that language rights
come into play well before the criteria outlined in the European Convention on
Human Rights. These criteria are discussed in detail in Chapter 5 infra but it may be
noted at this stage that an accused must be unable to understand the language of
court proceedings before interpreters will be appointed. This is a much weaker
standard, from the perspective of language rights, than that of choosing a language
'used in everyday life'. The Advocate General expressly rejected, therefore, the
24 ibid., p. 2690.
25
cf. Chapter 5 infra, on international fundamental rights standards; the United Nations Report on
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, for example, concludes the exact opposite to Advocate
General Lenz, stressing that the absence of domestic recognition of minority languages does not
prevent the application of international protection mechanisms; this interpretation is absolutely
necessary given that it is often due to the very fact of domestic non-recognition that international
redress is actually sought.
26
supra note 13, p. 2689 (emphasis added).
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argument put forward by the Italian Government that the use of interpreters would
suffice in the present case. In a remarkable passage,
he clarified the relationship between the EC and the Council of Europe:
In the area of fundamental rights, the Court has certainly drawn from the
Convention, in the sense that it has treated the Convention as supplying
common minimum standards. It is not contrary to the European Convention on
Human Rights for Community law to grant more extensive protection to
individual rights. Indeed, the Court has held that Community law takes
precedence over other agreements concluded within the Framework of the
Council of Europe in so far as it is more favourable for individuals.27
This interpretation has immense implications for Community fundamental rights
policy and for language rights in particular, as the Council of Europe has not yet
established an effective, legally enforceable framework for the rights of minority
language speakers, discussed in Chapter 5 infra. The Advocate General's remarks
must be appraised in terms of potential rather than effect, however, since, as he was
careful to point out in the closing paragraphs of his Opinion, "..there is no question of
requiring the Member State to permit the use of other languages in addition to those
already available [under its language policy regime]. In this case the question is
whether a worker from another Member State can rely on a legal provision regarding
language use which exists in the Member State concerned and is available to its own
nationals."28
What conclusions, then, can be drawn from the Advocate General's opinion and from
the judgment of the Court? In first instance, both the Advocate General and the Court
were decidedly more reluctant to issue any pronouncements on minority language
rights than the European Parliament was at that time. This demonstrates the
fundamental differences between the two institutions, in terms of both function and
impact. The decision of the Court would become a binding precedent, applicable to
numerous potential situations throughout the Member States; this contrasts sharply
27 ibid., p. 2690; cf. Case 187/73 Callemeyn v. Belgium [1974] ECR 553; Opinion of Advocate
General Lenz in Case 157/84 Frascogna v. Caisse des Depots et Consignations [1985] ECR 1740.
In the present case, Advocate General Lenz pointed out that, prior to the intervention by the Public
Prosecutor, the Belgian Court had been quite happy to proceed with the case through German; the
introduction of an interpreter would have added needless cost and inconvenience.
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with a non-binding European Parliament resolution. The determination of a legal
basis for Community competence is, therefore, far more problematic for the Court
than for the Parliament. In this case, the Court chose to avoid the minority language
issue altogether, which it could easily do, given the questions of European law
actually referred, and the fact that Belgium already had an official languages regime
in place. All that the Court needed to decide was whether non-Belgian nationals
could benefit from the pre-existing regime; it did not have to examine the substance
of the Belgian policies. The inconsistencies within the Advocate General's opinion
suggest, however, that because minority language rights had been introduced into the
Court's jurisprudence without a substantive legal basis, he was unable to deliver a
coherent assessment of any corresponding EC approach. His willingness to use
minority rights terminology and his far-reaching statements on the limitations of the
European Convention are in complete contrast with his conclusive reliance on the
domestic classification of languages, which has been virtually disregarded in
international law more generally. Furthermore, there are no references in the Opinion
to the work of the Parliament, which had already adopted both Arfe Resolutions at
this time. It is likely that the Advocate General was prepared to address the case from
a language rights perspective but was constrained by the ambit of EC law at that
time; he may also have been conscious of offending Member State sensibilities, by
pronouncing on what were seen as internal issues.
The overall impression, then, is one of vague sympathy within the Court for claims
based on minority language rights, which was not, for the reasons outlined above,
translated into justiciable effect. In any event, the Court was able to reach the
conclusion that vindicated the language rights of the applicant without having to
explore language rights per se. But the Opinion of the Advocate General must be
noted for his broad interpretation of language rights, not based on language
competence but on language choice, and for significant comments on the jurisdiction
of the Court of Justice to grant more extensive protection for fundamental rights than
28 ibid., p. 2690.
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that provided for in the European Convention, on the basis that an individual should
benefit from the most extensive protection available.
B. Anita Groener v. Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational
2q
Education Committee
McMahon observes that the decision in Groener reflects the tension between a
number of competing interests, cultural and economic, national and supra-national,
individual and Community.30 The Court of Justice had the potential to formulate its
first substantive interpretation of the Community's role, if any, in the language
policies of the Member States. The Court did not, however, avail of this opportunity;
rather, it delivered a brief and, on an initial interpretation at least, disappointing
judgment of limited application.
(i) Facts
The applicant was a Dutch national, residing in Ireland since 1982. She was
employed as a part-time art teacher at the Dublin College of Marketing and Design,
which was under the authority of the Dublin Vocational Education Committee (the
second respondents), a state-subsidised body charged with the administration of
vocational education in the Dublin area. In 1984, the applicant applied for a
permanent, full-time lecturing post at the College. Her application was successful
but, in accordance with procedures established by the Minister for Justice,31 her
appointment was conditional on her passing an oral Irish language examination. The
29 Case C-379/87, [1989] ECR 3967.
10
Bryan McMahon, (casenote) (1990) 27 Common Market Law Review, 129-139 at 130.
31 Two administrative measures had been adopted in accordance with the powers granted to the
Minister by the Vocational Education Act, 1930:
[1] Memorandum V7 (1 September 1974) required that a person could not be appointed to a
permanent, full-time post in certain areas of teaching, including art, unless that person held a Ceard
Teastas Gaeilge (a certificate of competence in the Irish language) or had an equivalent qualification
recognised by the Minister. Candidates from outside Ireland could be exempted from the Irish
language requirement provided that there were no other fully qualified candidates for the post;
[2] On 26 June 1979, the Minister issued Circular Letter (No. 28/79), which provided that appointees
for permanent, full-time posts could be required to undergo a special oral Irish examination. The
appointment would not be made unless the selected candidate passed the Irish examination but, once
again, the Minister reserved the right to exempt candidates from this requirement where there were no
other fully qualified candidates for the position.
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Irish language is the national and first official language of the State, according to
Article 8 of the Irish Constitution; the English language is recognised as a second
official language.
The applicant first requested that the linguistic competence requirement be waived in
her case, on the grounds that she would not be required to teach any courses through
the medium of the Irish language after her appointment, but her petition was refused.
She then followed a four week beginners' Irish course, proceeding to take, but fail,
the oral Irish examination. At this point, she wrote directly to the first respondent,
asking once again that the language requirement be waived. The Minister replied that
this was not possible in her case since other fully qualified candidates had applied for
the position. The applicant initiated proceedings for judicial review of the Minister's
decision in the Irish High Court, asserting that the administrative procedures enacted
were contrary to the principle of the free movement of workers under EC law (Article
48 EEC) and, in particular, to Regulation 1612/68, Article 3(1) of which provides as
follows:
Under this Regulation, provisions laid down by law, regulation or
administrative action or administrative practices of a Member State shall not
apply:
(i) where they limit application for and offers of employment, or the right of
foreign nationals to take up and pursue employment or subject these to
conditions not applicable to their own nationals; or
(ii) where, though applicable irrespective of nationality, their exclusive or
principal aim or effect is to keep nationals of other Member States away from
the employment offered.
This provision shall not apply to conditions relating to linguistic knowledge
required by reason of the nature of the post to be filled.
The High Court, in turn, referred the following questions to the European Court of
Justice, for preliminary ruling under Article 177 EEC:
1. Where provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action make
employment in a particular post in a Member State conditional upon the
applicant having a competent knowledge of one of the two official languages of
that Member State, being a language which nationals of other Member States
would not normally know but would have to learn for the sole purpose of
complying with the condition, should Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No.
1612/68 of the Council be construed as applying to such provisions on the
ground that their exclusive or principal effect is to keep nationals of other
Member States away from the employment offered?
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2. In considering the meaning of the phrase "the nature of the post to be filled"
in Article 3 of [the Regulation], is regard to be had to a policy of the Irish State
that persons holding the post should have a competent knowledge of the Irish
language where such knowledge is not required to discharge the duties attached
to the post?
3. (1) Is the term "public policy" in Article 48(3) of the EEC Treaty to be
construed as applying to the policy of the Irish State to support and foster the
position of the Irish language as the first official language?
(2) If it is, is the requirement that persons seeking appointment to posts
as lecturer in vocational educational institutions in Ireland, who do not possess
"An Ceard Teastas Gaeilge, shall undergo a special examination in Irish with
the view to satisfying the Department of Education of their competency in Irish,
a limitation justified on the grounds of such policy?32
The applicant argued that while the exclusion of non-nationals from lecturing
positions was not the exclusive or principal aim of the national measures, it was, in
reality, their principal effect. She also stressed that the phrase 'nature of the post to
be filled' amounted to a derogation from Article 48 EEC; as such, it should be
interpreted narrowly to apply only to cases where linguistic competence related
directly to the exercise of duties after the appointment. While not opposed to the
cultural and linguistic policies of the Irish State per se, the applicant argued that these
policies could not be used to justify the negation of Article 48 EEC and Regulation
1612/68.
The Irish Government sought primarily to establish that the linguistic requirement in
question could be justified 'by reason of the nature of the post to be filled'. No
attempt was made to exhibit an illusory status for the Irish language: it was
acknowledged openly that Irish is not spoken by all Irish people. The submissions
focused on the more abstract properties of language; it was argued in particular that
the Irish language "...is central to the identity of the Irish State."33 The policies of
successive governments to preserve and promote the Irish language were interpreted
as a corollary of its constitutional status. The education system had been and
remained the principal domain affected. It was argued that, in consequence,
competence in the Irish language was central to teaching appointments. This
32
supra note 29, pp. 3969-3970.
33 ibid., p. 3971.
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argument was further developed, somewhat creatively, to justify the language
requirement in a situation such as that faced by the applicant, where instruction was
not actually provided through the medium of Irish. The Government submitted that
"...Irish will never become a living language if it is treated simply as a school subject.
It would be an abandonment of its policy if the State did not attempt to create a
supportive environment for the use of Irish outside formal classes. In [this respect]
the requirement that all teachers have a knowledge of Irish is fair and reasonable."34
It was stressed that the direct and indirect influence of teachers on their students
cannot be distinguished in this context. As regards the applicant's assertion of
indirect discrimination, the Irish Government argued that competence in Irish was
required for both nationals and non-nationals.
The Irish Government never claimed that EEC rules simply did not apply to its
domestic language policy. This is somewhat unusual, as it is usually observed that
"[w]herever it is alleged that a measure taken by a Member State is contrary to one of
the basic prohibitions of the Treaty...[the] first line of defence should be to assert that
the measure under attack does not fall within the scope of the Treaty."35 In this case,
the Government accepted that the applicant's rights under Article 48 EEC and
Regulation 1612/68 were relevant, but argued that these rights had not been
infringed. In support of this contention, it was stressed that "...the exclusive or
principal effect of the circular letter is not to exclude non-Irish nationals from full-
time posts but rather to ensure that the persons engaged are suited for those posts."36
Moreover, competence, not fluency, was the required standard and other non-Irish
nationals had already passed the oral examination.37 It was also argued that even if
34 ibid., p. 3972.
35 AnneMarie Loman, Kamiel Mortelmans, Harry Post and Stewart Watson, Culture and Community
Law: Before andAfterMaastricht, (Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1992), p. 23.
36
supra note 29, p. 3973.
37 It was noted that from a total of six non-Irish nationals (including the applicant) who had taken the
oral Irish examination, four had passed at the first attempt and another on the second attempt; the
applicant was, at that time, the only non-national who had failed the examination.
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the Court found discriminatory treatment in this case, the language requirement fell
within the public policy exception in Article 48(3) EEC. As a final statement, the
Government argued as follows:
[A] condition requiring knowledge of the national language of the host country,
applied in a manner proportionate to the intended objective and without
discrimination as regards nationality, is in the public interest since it is pursuing
an objective (the maintenance of cultural diversity in the Community and
respect for linguistic pluralism) which is worthy of being recognised and
furthered by the Community authorities...The Community institutions must
respect a Member State's choice of its national language or languages and the
measures suited to giving effect to that choice.38
In one respect, it is surprising that this latter theme was tacked on as an addendum
since it encapsulates the pivotal issues of this case. But it should be remembered that,
apart from covert references in Mutsch, the Court of Justice had never pronounced on
the compatibility of Member State language policies with Community law. The Irish
government could not have predicted whether the ECJ would be receptive to such
arguments and, thus, avoided forcing an unfavourable determination of the issue. The
strongly-worded submission of the French Government, in contrast, highlights the
political sensitivity of language questions:
[A] condition requiring a knowledge of the national language of the host
country is legitimate. Ireland is entitled to adopt measures to ensure that Irish is
respected and used in conformity with its constitution...No provision of
Community law can preclude those rights...The desire to achieve plurilingual
communities is an imperative reason which must justify a language requirement
of the kind at issue. The maintenance of cultural diversity in the Community
and respect for linguistic pluralism enrich both the Community and the Member
States. Those fundamental principles have been clearly affirmed by the
Community, both in the Parliament and in the Council.39
In light of France's rigorous language policy, outlined in Appendix I, it is not
surprising that the French Government sought to defend national competence in
language policy formulation. But it does not necessarily follow that autonomous
control of domestic language policy corresponds with the promotion of linguistic
diversity. It is ironic, for example, that the French Government, which had refused
It was also noted that there were 1723 Irish nationals teaching in vocational education establishments,
compared with 189 nationals from other Member States.
38
supra note 29, p. 3974.
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consistently to recognise minority languages such as Breton and Occitan, referred to
the work of the European Parliament, which, as seen supra, has been concerned
primarily with languages that do not have official status at national level.
(ii) Judgment of the Court
In line with the approach adopted by the Irish Government, the Court first addressed
the second question referred i.e. whether the 'nature of the post' in question justified
the imposition of an Irish language competence requirement. The Court reasoned that
if this question was answered in the affirmative, the outstanding issues of
discrimination (question one) and public policy (question three) would not be
relevant.
The Court confirmed that while the applicant's position as an art teacher did not
require her to give instruction through Irish, "...that finding is not in itself sufficient
to enable the national court to decide whether the linguistic requirement in question
is justified 'by reason of the nature of the post to be filled'...."40 The Court placed
particular emphasis on the constitutional status of the Irish language and on the
continuing policies of successive governments to maintain and promote the language.
In a key statement, the Court declared that "[t]he EEC Treaty does not prohibit the
adoption of a policy for the protection and promotion of a language of a Member
State which is both the national language and first official language. However, the
implementation of such a policy must not encroach upon a fundamental freedom such
as that of the free movement of workers."41 Several aspects of the Court's decision
hinge on this brief paragraph. First, the Court confirmed that language policies were,
in general, a matter of Member State competence. Second, particular emphasis was
placed on the constitutional status of Irish, as national and first official language of
the State, to justify the implementation of language policies. But most remarkably, in
contrast to the non-interventionist arguments put forward by the French Government,
39 Observations of the French Government, 1 April 1988, ibid. p. 3973; see also McMahon, supra note
30.
40
Judgment of the Court, ibid., p. 3992, para. 16.
86
the Court clearly envisaged a role for the Community in this field, to ensure that
domestic polices did not negate rights gained under Community law. To this end, it
was held that requirements imposed by national language policies "...must not in any
circumstances be disproportionate in relation to the aim pursued and the manner in
which they are applied must not bring about discrimination against nationals of other
Member States."42 The Court did not apply these tests to the facts of the present case
in any great detail; it was satisfied, however, that the language requirement
challenged was legitimate. The decision was based on an understanding that teachers
fulfill both direct and indirect teaching roles. It was also stressed that the level of
linguistic knowledge required was proportionate to the language restoration objective
pursued by the Irish Government.43
The second question referred to the Court was, therefore, answered in the affirmative,
i.e. the linguistic requirement was justified by reason of the nature of the post to be
filled. The Court did provide examples of situations that would amount to
discriminatory treatment, such as the Government's insisting that the linguistic
knowledge be acquired in Ireland only or preventing non-nationals from re-taking the
examination.
(iii) Commentary
McMahon summarises the reasons behind the Court's decision that the Irish language
requirement was neither disproportionate nor discriminatory as follows:
• the standard required was competence in the language, not fluency;
• other non-Irish nationals had taken and passed the examination;
• non-Irish nationals could re-take the examination when applying for another
permanent teaching position;
41 ibid. p. 3993, para. 19.
42 ibid.
43 The Court did not discuss explicitly the competence/fluency distinction: this argument is examined
infra in the context of the Advocate General's Opinion.
87
• Irish language competence was a necessary requirement for both nationals and
non-nationals and did not, therefore, constitute discrimination;
• non-nationals could learn Irish in other Member States as well as in Ireland;
• non-nationals could be exempted from the examination where there were no other
fully qualified candidates for the position.44
The Court did not analyse these factors in any detail but asserted instead that their
absence would render a language requirement disproportionate and/or discriminatory.
In particular, the Court did not rely expressly on the competence/fluency distinction
at any point in its judgment: in this context, the submission of the Commission and
the opinion of Advocate General Darmon contain the more detailed analyses often
attributed incorrectly to the Court. It referred only to the fact the level of knowledge
demanded should not be disproportionate in relation to the objective pursued.45
Significantly, the Court linked the requisite language standard to the aims of national
policy rather than to the position of employment itself. The implications of the case
for minority language policy are considered in the following paragraphs.
(a) The 'nature' of the teachingposition
The Court's decision in Groener rested entirely on its interpretation of teaching
functions yet the conclusion it reached on this point is one of the most questionable
aspects of the judgment. The applicant had argued that if she was appointed on a
permanent, full-time basis, her duties would not differ substantively from those she
was already carrying out as a part-time teacher. In particular, she stressed that she
would not be required to actually use the Irish language in her new position. Thus,
her appointment had been made conditional on knowledge of a language that was not
used in the fulfillment of her duties. This apparent paradox was addressed directly by
Advocate General Darmon:
44 McMahon, supra note 30, p. 134.
The District Magistrate's Court in Bolzano, Italy, has recently referred a question to the Court of
Justice, concerning a legislative requirement that language competence tests can only be taken in that
region. The applicant has argued that this is contrary to EC law (Case C-281/98 Angonese v. Cassa di
Risparmio, reference lodged in the Court of Justice on 23 July 1998); this interpretation would appear
correct in light of the Court's decision in Groener.
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[I]t does not seem to me necessary to embark upon a complex analysis to
ascertain whether lack of knowledge of the Irish language may in fact create
difficulties in the efficient teaching of the subject concerned for - and we are
now at the heart of the matter - it is a question of drawing a line between the
powers of the Community and those of the Member States and of considering
whether or not a policy of preserving and fostering a language may be
pursued, having regard to the requirements ofCommunity law. The Regulation
attempted to reconcile those apparently conflicting requirements by excluding
conditions relating to linguistic knowledge from the scope of the principle of
non-discrimination when the nature of the post to be filled requires such
knowledge.46
This interpretation relates the particular facts of Groener to its broader context. But it
is clear that, in any event, the wording of the Regulation ('the nature of the post to be
filled') was open to a liberal construction, put forward by the Irish Government and
accepted ultimately by the Court. Stricter wording could have specified that the
language(s) must be actually used during the course of the employment but this
cannot be derived from the actual phrase in the Regulation. As the Court reasoned,
determining that a language is not required for the performance of the duties of a
post is not the same as determining that knowledge of the language cannot be
justified by the nature of the post.47 In this context, Advocate General Darmon
identified two conditions that must be present before the 'nature of a post' exception
can apply: "[fjirst, the language requirement must meet an aim and, secondly, it must
be strictly necessary in order to achieve that aim." Irish language policy was
subsequently adjudged to fulfill both criteria, the latter condition being related to the
concept of proportionality.
Alternative examination structures were considered e.g. acquisition of the language
after appointment, but the Advocate General was not convinced that this option
would be effective: "[fjirst, the learning of the language would not be immediate and
secondly, the teachers involved would undoubtedly be less conscious of the necessity
45
Judgment of the Court, supra note 29, p. 3982, para. 21.
46 ibid. p. 3980, para. 11 (emphasis added).
47 ibid., p. 3981, paras. 15, 16.
48 ibid. p. 3983, para. 26.
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of having a knowledge of the Irish language."49 This reasoning is not, however,
persuasive. Even where a non-national studies a language prior to appointment,
acquisition of the language could not be considered 'immediate': language
acquisition is an ongoing process and never immediate. Second, the Advocate
General does not address the possibility of retaining the examination structure, but
allowing the examination to be taken after appointment; if any appointment remains
ultimately contingent on proof of language competence, then it hardly matters
whether the examination is taken before or during that employment, particularly in
cases such as Groener, where an appointee is not necessarily required to carry out
their duties through the language studied. An employee whose continued
appointment depends on passing an examination is not going to be any 'less
conscious' of acquiring the relevant language(s).
The Advocate General contemplated education in an even broader sense in the
following key paragraph, introducing the terminology of language rights. This extract
also elaborates on why performance of teaching duties through Irish was not
necessary in order to justify language competence as a precondition of appointment:
Once a constitution...recognises the existence of two official languages without
limiting their use to specific parts of the national territory or to certain matters,
each citizen has the right to be taught in those two languages. The fact that only
33.6% of Irish citizens use the Irish language is no justification for sweeping
away that right altogether, for its importance is measured not only by its use but
also by the possibility of preserving its use in the future..To limit the
requirement of a knowledge of Irish to posts involving the actual teaching of
Irish would be to treat it as a dead language like ancient Greek or Latin and as
a language incapable of further development...Every Irishman has the right -
enshrined as we have seen in the Irish State's most fundamental legal
instrument - to be taught any subject at all, including painting, in Irish if he so
desires. Whatever the official language used in educational institutions, a State
is entitled to ensure that any citizen can express himself and be understood in
another language, which is also an official language and which is also a
repository of and a means of transmitting a common cultural heritage.50
This is a remarkable passage. The Advocate General identified the right of a citizen
to be educated through a minority language and based his reasoning not only on the
49 ibid.
50 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, supra note 29, pp. 3982-3, paras. 21-24 (emphasis added).
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fact that the language was recognised constitutionally, but also that it was a means of
cultural transmission. He has assumed a correlative state duty to provide education
through Irish where this is sought. The delineation of state duty in respect of
language groups is a controversial issue, both internationally and nationally: in
Ireland itself, for example, the extent of state duty generated by the constitutional
protection of Irish is by no means settled internally.51
The Court of Justice did not follow this line of analysis and did not, therefore, have
to address the issue from the perspective of citizens' rights. McMahon remarks that
"[t]o base it on the citizen's right might have opened up too many possibilities and
created too great a loophole for self-regulation by national governments."52 But it is
equally arguable that while too many possibilities would indeed have been created,
they would have been in the context of removing absolute self-regulation from the
Member State governments, based on an objective declaration of citizens' language
rights according to international rather than national standards. In Groener, the Court
of Justice focused more on state powers than on state duties, but the idea of
citizenship in a European context had not yet been incorporated into EC law.
Furthermore, the concept of Community-based fundamental rights more generally,
discussed in Chapter 5 infra, had not yet fully evolved. In this political context, the
idea of taking self-regulation away from the Member States would have been
unthinkable, despite the seemingly radical dicta in Mutsch on the role of the
Community in the furtherance of individual rights.
McMahon notes yet another implication of the Court's approach to teaching
functions, arguing that "[i]t is by no means certain whether a similar requirement
would be justified in the case of nurses, doctors, postmen, lawyers, or others."53
51
cf. Niamh Nic Shuibhne, "The Constitution, the courts and the Irish language" in Tim Murphy and
Patrick Twomey (eds.), Ireland's Evolving Constitution 1937-1997: Collected Essays, (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 1998), 253-263.
52 McMahon, supra note 30., p. 137.
53 McMahon, supra note 30, p. 136.
91
In summary, the Advocate General relied heavily on the phrase 'nature of the post' to
construe a broad interpretation of the functions carried out by teachers. This was tied
into a philosophy of language education rights. Once the possibility that a citizen had
a right to be taught any subject through the medium of Irish was established, by
referring to Irish constitutional law and government cultural policy more generally,
the State could justifiably require teachers to demonstrate Irish language competence,
even those who did not teach through Irish on an ongoing basis. The mere
potentiality of the citizen's right being taken up was deemed sufficient to justify the
broader policy measure. It is clear that the Court was influenced by this analysis in its
construction of direct and indirect teaching duties, but it did not discuss or even
mention language rights and correlative state duties. In a sense, this omission makes
the Court's reasoning incomplete, as it appears to have condoned a broad policy
measure that was arguably disproportionate in terms of the aim to be achieved. The
Advocate General developed a more coherent model for justifying the otherwise
disproportionate policy, on the basis of language rights. The Court would have
entered murky political waters had it openly adopted his reasoning. But the opinion
of the Advocate General must be taken into account to understand the intention
behind the Court's otherwise unsatisfactory interpretation of teaching duties. This
interpretation is affirmed in the section dealing with the legal status of Irish, infra,
particularly in respect of the submission made by the Commission.
(b) The legal status of the language
[This] case relates to one of the most sensitive aspects of cultural identity. The
importance of the Court's reply and its consequences for the Member States
and for the diversity of the Community as a whole are so evident that I need not
dwell upon them, for at issue here is the power of a State to protect and foster
the use of a national language.54
Both the Advocate General and the Court relied heavily on the constitutional status
of Irish as the national and first official language of the State. Interestingly, neither
54 Advocate General Darmon, supra note 29, p. 3979, para. 1.
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commented on the status of Irish within the Community's official language regime.55
The de facto status of Irish as a minority language was also ignored. Aside from an
acknowledgment that Irish was not spoken by the whole population, the Court took
the constitutional position of the language at face value, without any examination of
the factual language situation in contemporary Ireland. By classifying Irish as a
constitutionally protected national language, the Court was spared from having to
consider the particular position of regional and minority languages. In this sense, it is
misleading to regard Groener as a landmark decision on minority language
protection within the Community. McMahon has written that while "[t]hose who
favour cultural diversity and national autonomy in these matters were undoubtedly
pleased with the [judgment]...[t]heir initial euphoria...might be modified when they
note the limits of the Court's decision."56 But while the Court does not refer
explicitly to minority rights principles, the gist of its decision reflects the implicit
influence of this ideology. For example, the Court was aware of the importance of
the education system in the implementation of language policy, a central tenet of
minority language theory. More generally, the Court acknowledged the validity of
language planning as a government objective. The Court did not establish an
absolute link between cultural diversity and national autonomy; it is possible, for
example, that it may have reacted differently in a situation where the national
language was being endorsed in a discriminatory manner, at the expense of minority
languages spoken by citizens of that Member State. Finally, while the Court did not
articulate a Community policy on minority languages in Groener, it is not precluded
from doing so in the future.
Minority rights ideology is even more evident in both the submission of the
Commission and the opinion of the Advocate General. The Commission did regard
55 Irish is a Treaty but not an official language of the EC: cf. Chapter 1 supra.
56 McMahon, supra note 30„ p. 135.
57 McMahon, ibid., points out that the Court failed to address non-linguistic heritage issues, such as the
sale/export of national archaeological artifacts, but the limited scope of the questions referred by the
national court must be borne in mind in this context.
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the language requirement in question as discriminatory, discussed infra, but accepted
that its imposition could be justified using the 'nature of the post' clause. It
considered that three criteria were relevant to establish whether linguistic knowledge
could be required in this context: first, where knowledge of the language was
required as a practical necessity, irrespective of the language's legal status; second,
where the language is generally spoken in the work environment, even though not
necessarily for carrying out the job itself; third, on the basis of the language policy of
the relevant national authority. The applicant had established that neither the first nor
second criterion applied in this case. The Commission focused, therefore, on official
language policies and stated that "[ajdynamic policy of fostering and protecting a
minority language might justify the obligation in question, even if knowledge of that
language is not widespread in the relevant Member State."58 Thus, the Commission
dealt with the actual as well as the legal status of the Irish language. It further
consolidated this approach, referring to:
...the importance of Irish as the historical language of the Irish people and the
constant policy pursued by the Irish State to re-establish it as a generally spoken
language in the face of real threats to its survival. The education system
occupies a central role in this policy. Even if the level of knowledge required
and the ubiquity of the English language make it unlikely that Irish students can
be instructed entirely in Irish, it remains worthwhile to ensure that
communication can take place, at least on a one-to-one basis, in the native
tongue of the minority language student. The Community has a general interest
in protecting minority languages....59
This paragraph is firmly rooted in minority rights philosophy. The Commission
condoned state intervention in situations where a language not spoken by the
majority of the population faces 'real threats to its survival'. Moreover, the
Commission not only approved of language planning at national level but declared a
Community interest. It is surprising to note, then, that the Commission, when
forwarding its concluding recommendations, refers only to "...the policy of a
Member State to promote an official language..."; it did not mention the minority-
based arguments from which it derived its conclusions. This omission reinforces the
argument that the Court itself must have been influenced by the status of Irish as a de
58 Submission of the Commission, supra note 29, p. 3975 (emphasis added).
94
facto minority language, notwithstanding the absence of any direct references to
minority rights theory in its judgment.
The antithesis of this position is, of course, that the Court would not have issued a
decision in favour of the language requirement but for the constitutional recognition
of Irish as national and first official language, and that the de facto status of Irish as a
minority language is entirely irrelevant. On this basis, it is arguable that the Court
would have reached a similar decision in respect of any national or official language,
such as French in France or English in the United Kingdom. But the Court's reliance
on the role of the education system in language policy, which promotes Irish as an
expression of culture and identity, has little to do with its constitutional status. This
was outlined more explicitly by the Advocate General, who referred to the Arfe and
Kuijpers Resolutions to illustrate institutional awareness of minority language issues.
In fact, he went further than either the Commission or the Court, in order to reconcile
minority-based concepts with the status of Irish as a national language:
Certainly, Irish cannot be described as a regional language. Indeed, the Irish
Constitution gives it the status of a national language. However, since it is a
minority language, such a language cannot be preserved without the adoption of
voluntary and obligatory measures. Any minority phenomenon, in whatever
field, cannot usually survive if appropriate measures are not taken.60
The Advocate General identified the need to look behind the official status granted to
a language, acknowledging that official status per se does not necessarily imply
linguistic security. By comparison with both the Commission and Court, the
Advocate General's opinion is the clearest indication that the legitimacy of Member
State language policy is not dependent on whether the language has legal status at
domestic level. This clarifies further why the measures adopted by the Irish
Government were adjudged against the criterion of language preservation, in
addition to proportionality and non-discrimination. It is also consistent with the
Advocate General's remarks on language policy as a constituent of the preservation
of cultural heritage. Finally, it marks a welcome theoretical advance from the
59 ibid., p. 3976 (emphasis added).
60 ibid., p. 3982, para. 18.
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contrasting remarks made in the Mutsch decision, on the domestic classification of
languages, which are criticised supra.
In summary, the Court's acceptance of the 'paper' status of the Irish language was
misplaced. It relied considerably on the constitutional status of Irish without any
assessment of its limited status as a contemporary vernacular, which would have
revealed it to be a de facto minority language. The regurgitation of jaded state
policies has not yet translated the constitutional status of Irish into successful
practice, to the extent that citizens who wish to transact legal and official business
through Irish, for example, often do so under considerable disadvantage.61 But
whether satisfactory or not, this constitutional recognition may well have saved the
language policies challenged in Groener, since an unfortunate consequence of the
Court's approach is that minority languages which have been denied similar
recognition appear to be excluded from the ambit of its decision. This does not
correspond with approach adopted by the Advocate General, who examined the
situation of Irish in a real, and not just 'official', sense.
(c) Competence versus fluency
McMahon argues that "...the Court in Groener was happy to allow the linguistic
requirement because the standard required was not too demanding. Competence, not
fluency, was the requirement which was sanctioned by the Court."62 But as noted
earlier, the Court did not refer expressly to either standard and did not, therefore, use
this distinction to illustrate what it considered a proportionate language requirement.
The difference between competence and fluency was raised by the respondents and
was picked up by the Advocate General only. He suggested that "...the level of
knowledge required is not so high as to make it impossible for a foreigner to pass the
examination."63 Criticism has been leveled at this aspect of the decision, however:
61 Nic Shuibhne, supra note 51; the Irish Government has finally initiated the preparation of language
legislation to implement Article 8 of the Constitution, more that sixty years after its enactment.
62 McMahon, supra note 30, p. 137.
63
Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, supra note 29, p. 3983, para. 25.
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Without challenging the Court's finding that the Member States have a
legitimate interest in pursuing a policy aimed at maintaining and promoting
national identity and culture, the outcome [of Groener] is not entirely
satisfactory from the point of view of the free movement of workers. [The]
regulation only allows requirements as to language proficiency to be set where
there is afunctional relationship between knowledge of the language and the
function to be fulfilled. In the case of Groener, it was in confesso that
knowledge of Irish was not at all necessary for the performance of the duties
concerned...According to the Court, for the national measure...to be compatible
with [Community law], the level of knowledge required for this purpose must
not be disproportionate to that objective. It is submitted that, given the fact that
knowledge of...Irish in this case bore no functional relationship to the post
concerned, the Court should have applied the proportionality test, not to the
level of knowledge required but to the fact that this knowledge was set as an
entry requirement as such...This...would have been a solution which was in
better proportion to the objective of the Irish Government, at least [for] non-
Irish Community nationals. After all, it is not unreasonable to require Irish
nationals to learn their language in order to preserve their national cultural
heritage, to require Community workers with a completely different cultural
heritage to do the same or otherwise refuse them employment is a wholly
different matter.64
Legitimate concerns have been raised in this extract, but while the Court did not
address these issues in the context of level of knowledge required, it had already
interpreted teaching functions broadly in respect of 'the nature of the post' criterion.
It is not, as discussed supra, the acquisition of the language by the teachers
themselves that contributes to the preservation of Irish cultural heritage. But the
judgment of the Court does not reveal the influence of minority-based ideology on its
decision: this omission, though politically necessary at that time, suggests a far more
arbitrary and inadequate decision than has been given in reality. Shaw points out that
"...measures had been put in place by the Irish Government to facilitate non-nationals
surmounting the barrier posed by the Irish proficiency condition [making] it difficult
to argue that the principal aim of the provision was truly protectionist...."65 Overall,
Shaw considers that the Court has identified an implied limitation to the free
movement of workers, namely policies promoting cultural diversity and national
identity, in addition to the express derogations on grounds of public policy, security
and health set out in the Treaty itself.66 She cautions, however, against a broad
64 Loman et al, supra note 35, pp. 57-8.
65
Josephine Shaw, "Equality of treatment for teachers under European Community law", (1991) vol.
3:1 Education and the Law, 35-38 at 36.
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interpretation of the implied derogation, in keeping with the narrow interpretation
more usually applied to the express limitations in Article 48 EEC. She thus regards
the broad interpretation in Groener as "...a most unusual position for the Court to
take."67 Certainly, the Court's approach contrasts sharply with its earlier stance in
Leclerc v. Au Ble Vert,' where it confirmed that derogations from fundamental Treaty
rules "...must be interpreted strictly and cannot be extended to cover objectives not
z-o
expressly enumerated therein." The Court stated expressly that 'the protection of
creativity and cultural diversity' was not mentioned in Article 36 EEC and could not,
therefore, be considered as an additional derogation from Community law. Shaw
acknowledges that the decision in Groener rested on policy grounds, but she does not
elaborate on this assertion. It is probable that the Court's emphasis on the validity of
policies to preserve and promote constitutionally protected languages applies here. A
similar instance of express/implied derogation can be gleaned from the more recent
opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven in Fedicine v. Spanish State 69 This case
involved a dispute over the distribution of films in Spain; legislation imposed certain
conditions on film distributors in respect of dubbing licences, which meant
effectively that films in the official languages of Spain, as opposed to those from
third countries, were required to be favoured. The applicants claimed that this
infringed their freedom to provide services under Community law. When considering
whether the Spanish legislation constituted a legitimate derogation from Community
law, the Advocate General noted that "[t]he Court has consistently held that national
rules involving discriminatory treatment as regards provision of services from
another Member State can be compatible with Community law only if they can be
brought within the scope of an express derogation of the Treaty."70 He then
considered whether Spain could avail of the public policy derogation in Article 66
EEC. Having concluded that this provision did not vindicate the Spanish
66 ibid., p. 37.
67 ibid.
68 Case 229/83, [1985] ECR 1, at 35.
69 Case C-17/92, [1993] ECR 1-2239.
70 ibid., pp. 2257-8, para. 15.
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Government, the Advocate General went on to consider "...whether...it is not
possible to find in Community law some other ground of justification than public
policy, in particular reference to an overriding reason of general importance
connected with the protection of the cultural heritage."71 This approach contrasts
directly with the general rule that only express, Treaty-based derogations would be
considered. The Advocate General was clearly influenced by the increasing
importance attached to cultural heritage in the Treaty on European Union, by then
adopted but not yet in force. He quoted from Article 128 EC, in respect of the
Community's expected contribution to the 'flowering of the cultures of the Member
States' and referred to the new Article 92(3)d EC, on state aid in the cultural domain.
He went on to observe that, even before the Treaty on European Union, "[m]any
judgments show that the Court too is not insensitive to [cultural] diversity and the
specific requirements of policy which the effort to preserve cultural individuality
involves."72 He then listed a number of instances, including Groener, where national
cultural policy was deemed to constitute an overriding requirement of general
interest that justified the restriction of Community freedoms, once the general tests
of proportionality and non-discrimination were satisfied.73 Thus, while the
interpretative approach adopted by the Court in Groener might well be deemed 'most
unusual', it has since been enshrined as a legitimate canon of interpretation in the
evolving jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.
(d) The existence ofdiscrimination
Although the Court did not go on to consider whether the Irish language requirement
was a discriminatory measure, "[i]t is clear that national measures must always pass
71 ibid., p. 2259, para. 22.
72 ibid., p. 2260, para. 23.
73 Advocate General Van Gerven did not, however, agree that this overriding requirement applied in
the present case, "...since it has not been shown that the contested [legislation] seeks in the first place
to preserve and promote Spain's own culture." (ibid., p. 2264, para. 28)
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muster on this score...."74 This confirms further that national language policies are
not entirely autonomous and are subject to review by the European Court in respect
of their compatibility with EC law, even where the European dimension of the
national policy measures is not readily apparent.
The Commission, prior to the initiation of the High Court proceedings and acting
under Article 169 EEC, had written to the Irish authorities for information and
observations on the applicant's particular situation. The Commission concluded at
that time that the linguistic requirement was contrary to certain provisions of the
EEC Treaty on grounds of discrimination. The Irish Government had argued that the
language test presented difficulties for Irish nationals as well as for non-nationals,
since the majority of the population does not speak Irish fluently. The Commission
stated, however, that most Irish people had studied the language at school for several
years and, while they may not have acquired fluency, this placed them at a clear
advantage over non-nationals. Despite accepting that Irish could be studied in Paris,
Bonn, Rennes, Brest and Aberystwyth, the Commission concluded that while the aim
of the measures was "...to ensure a certain level of competence in the national
language, the principal effect is to create a greater obstacle for non-Irish nationals,
likely to keep them away from the employment in question."75 This echoes the
Court's decision in Seco SA and Desquenne Giral SA v. Etablissement d'assurance
contre la viellesse et I'invalidite, which confirmed that Community law
"...prohibit[s] not only overt discrimination based on the nationality of the
person...but also all forms of covert discrimination which, although based on criteria
which appeared to be neutral, in practice lead to the same result."76 But an important
fact, emphasised by McMahon, supports the opposite conclusion in the Groener
case: "[t]he national rules pre-date by some decades Ireland's accession to the
European Community and this clearly indicates that the rules had a rationale other
74
McMahon, supra note 30, p. 137.
75
supra note 29, p. 3975.
76 Cases 62 and 63/81, [1982] ECR 223 at 235, para. 8.
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than keeping non-nationals away from this employment."77 This point was also
stressed by the Advocate General, but Shaw has cast doubt on his reliance on the
absence of intention to discriminate as being conclusive in instances of indirect
discrimination.78 But, in the particular context of Groener, statistics submitted by the
Irish Government at the request of the Court show that, from a total of one hundred
and eighty nine nationals of Member States other than Ireland teaching in the
vocational education sector, one hundred and eighty three had been exempted from
the language requirement. It is not reasonable to argue, then, that the language
requirement has had a dissuasive effect on the employment of non-nationals. The
European Court had already held, in Robert Fearon & Co. Ltd. v. Irish Land
Commission, that "...it is not enough, in order to establish that a particular measure is
discriminatory, to show that it has had a greater impact on non-nationals than on
nationals, if the measure in question is intended to achieve certain important policy
objectives."79 Ironically, it was the Commission that relied on this decision in its
own submission in Groener, notwithstanding its earlier conclusions on
discrimination. Both the Advocate General and the Court pointed out, however, that
non-recognition of competence in the Irish language where the language had been
studied in another Member State would amount to discrimination based on
nationality and would not, therefore, be acceptable under Community law. The Court
will have the opportunity to clarify this position when it hears the Angonese case,
referred to supra.
(e) The public policy exception
Article 48(4) EEC stipulates that "[t]he provisions of [Article 48] shall not apply to
employment in the public service." This proviso only applies to certain public
77 McMahon, supra note 30, pp. 137-8.
78
Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, supra note 29, p. 3981, para. 15; Shaw, supra note 65, p. 36.
79 Case 182/83, [1984] ECR 3677.
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service positions: in Commission v. Belgium, the Court of Justice held that the
safeguards outlined in Article 48 do not apply to:
...a series of posts which involve direct or indirect participation in the exercise
of powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general
interests of the state or of other public authorities. Such posts in fact presume
on the part of those occupying them the existence of a special relationship of
allegiance to the state and reciprocity of rights and duties which form the
foundation of the bond of nationality.80
On these criteria, it is unlikely that the public service exception could apply to
teaching posts. In any event, the Commission pointed out that the Court was never
likely to accept the public policy argument, since it would only be relevant where
discrimination was shown to exist and where the measures could not be justified by
the 'nature of the post' clause. Moreover, the public policy exception, as a derogation
from Community law, must be interpreted strictly, "...[presupposing] 'the
existence...of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public
o 1
policy affecting one of the fundamental interests of society'." The Commission
went on to argue that a Member State policy designed to promote an official
language was unlikely to fulfill the criterion of a 'fundamental interest of society' in
the Community law sense. But this aspect of its submission is questionable, given
that the Court relied heavily on the existence of such a policy to justify the language
requirement by the 'nature of the post'.
(iv) Conclusion
The Groener decision is to be welcomed as recognising the desirability of
having a multilingual society in Europe and in allowing Member States a
reasonable measure of autonomy in these matters. Cynics might say that the
Court recognised the political necessity for such a decision and realised the
80 Case 149/79, No. 1, [1980] ECR 3881.
81 Groener judgment, supra note 29, p. 3976, referring to Case 30/77 Boucherau [1977] ECR 1999.
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cultural backlash which would have been inevitable if it had refused to
recognise the legality of the Irish measures. In this connection, such critics
might point to the narrow approach of the Court in its decision as an indication
of the Court's reluctance. A more gracious and generous view, however, might
be that we are here witnessing a real recognition of the legitimacy of national
concerns in relation to national cultural heritage and a tentative move by the
Court towards Community elaborated demarcation guidelines. The bureaucrats
and the economists will have to recognise that cultural diversity cannot be
indiscriminately swamped in the name of economic unity.82
This paragraph has been extracted from McMahon's concluding remarks on the
Groener decision. The first perspective, dubbed the cynical view, implies that any
positive implications derived from the decision resulted more by accident than by
design. The latter approach suggests quite the opposite. Both views display the
constraints that existed; the Court was adjudicating on a policy area that it had not
previously addressed directly, in the absence of any guidelines from either primary or
secondary Community law. The resulting judgment appears incomplete and devoid
of reasoning, but it has already been shown that both the submission of the
Commission and the opinion of the Advocate General more than remedy this deficit.
The Court was undoubtedly aware of the political consequences of its decision in
Groener. But it did not succumb to the view that language policy remained entirely
within the realm of exclusive domestic competence, as had been advocated by the
French Government. Boch has reasserted this argument, arguing that Groener
"...established] that the Community 'hands off policy is over."83 It is far from clear,
however, that a 'hands off policy could be implied in this domain, since Groener
marked the first conflict between national language laws and fundamental
Community law principles to be resolved by the Court. The 'narrow' approach
adopted by the Court can be justified to a certain extent by the limitations of the
Article 177 procedure itself, as well as by absence of Community law provisions on
which the Court could have based a more general decision on language policies.
From the more liberal perspective, McMahon argues that the decision has been 'a
real recognition of national concerns in relation to cultural heritage'. Member State
82 McMahon, supra note 30, p. 139.
83 Christine Boch, "Language protection and free trade: The triumph of the Homo MacDonaldusT,
(1998) vol. 4:3 European Public Law, 379-402 at 391.
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language polices must be checked against Community law, but it is the idea of
relative national autonomy that prevails in Groener. Moreover, the principles of non¬
discrimination and proportionality are widely applied, on the premise of the
protection of fundamental rights, in both national and international law.
As well as being a national and official language, Irish is also a minority language
and in most instances, minority language rights are sought against the state. The
Court's examination of Ireland's language policy would have been more complete
had it included a parallel consideration of minority language rights, particularly since
this ideology informed the analysis of both the Commission and Advocate General.
The Court's reticence to delve further into the substantive content of Member State
language policies is explained by de Burca, in the context of abortion law:
Once the Court of Justice has accepted that the State's aim is a legitimate one of
national constitutional importance, that the measure challenged is helpful in
pursuit of that aim, that the restrictive effect on the Community interest is small
and that that interest is not of the same nature or importance, it would
effectively be assuming a legislative role if it conducted a thorough enquiry into
what alternative means the state might have chosen to pursue its aim.84
The Court deferred considerably to the constitutional status of Irish and
acknowledged the pivotal role played by the education system; whether cultural
interests surpass economic ones in the Community context is debatable but it could
certainly be conceded that the interests are 'not of the same nature', slotting Groener
into the category described by de Burca. The consequent functional and jurisdictional
limitations on the Court identified by her are thus applicable to this case.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the Court's decision, de Witte has observed that,
at the very least, it has "...corrected] the impression that, from the point of view of
market integration, linguistic diversity is not so much a cultural asset as an obstacle
to effective communication."85 Boch goes further, writing that:
84 Grainne de Burca, "Fundamental rights and the reach of European Community law", (1993) 13
Oxford Journal ofLegal Studies, 283-319 at 295-6.
85 Bruno de Witte, "Surviving in Babel? Language rights and European integration", in Yoram
Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds.), The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights, (Dordrecht:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 277-300 at 295.
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[T]he ECJ was prepared to go out of its way to accommodate cultural diversity.
In its eagerness to promote linguistic diversity as a valued cultural asset, as
opposed to an obstacle to mobility, the Court was willing to forego fundamental
principle of interpretation. In view of the symbolic importance of its judgment
for the promotion of linguistic diversity, the Court is also prepared to endorse
the arbitrary character of the national linguistic policy. Ms Groener can be
refused a job, because she does not speak a language, which she does not need
to speak to do the job. Neither Ms Groener's individual rights nor the needs of
market integration require abandoning national linguistic policies. The
judgment is all the more remarkable as no reference to national identity or
86
cultural diversity was then included in the Treaty.
C. General Comments on the Jurisprudence of the Court ofJustice
The decisions in Groener and Mutsch have established that Member States are
relatively free to determine their linguistic policies; but these polices are subject to
review by the Court of Justice in terms of their compatibility with basic Community
law. The Court has been careful not to pronounce openly on national language
policies, largely because of political sensitivities, but it does appear sympathetic
towards minority language rights, albeit more covertly than the European Parliament
has been. The Court ensured the exercise of individual minority rights in Mutsch and
condoned Member State measures in favour of a minority language in Groener.
Neither decision could be said, however, to demonstrate a coherent EC minority
language policy. The Belgian legislative arrangements were not open to assessment
in Mutsch; in Groener, a de facto minority language was shielded by its arguably
unrepresentative but legally enforceable constitutional status. In both decisions,
however, the Advocates General deliberated more openly on the role of the
Community in both the cultural and fundamental rights aspects of language issues.
This further reflects the awareness within the Community institutions of the value of
cultural pluralism but it also highlights the lack of justiciable legal basis, which
might have secured the translation of these sympathetic viewpoints into law. Loman,
Mortelmans, Post and Stewart draw the following conclusions from the judgment of
the Court in Groener, despite their reservations, discussed supra, on the
compatibility of the decision with the free movement of workers:
...Groener is remarkable for the approach adopted by the Court in the given
legal context. Even though the outcome is open to criticism...the Court did
make it clear that it is willing to take account of legitimate interests of the
86 Boch, supra note 81, p. 392.
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Member States concerning their national identity and culture. It is not clear,
however, what future or wider implications this judgment will have. The case
was decided on a very narrow basis and was wholly concerned with the
particular situation of the Irish language. The question thus arises as to whether
the Court will be willing to exonerate similar measures [for] other languages of
the Community or only to certain languages e.g. national languages which can
be considered to be minority languages within the Community (Danish, Dutch,
Greek or Portuguese) or regional languages (Catalan, Basque, Frisian or Welsh)
or only languages which have an official (constitutional) status, such as Irish. It
would seem reasonable that the exception admitted by the Court will only be
available to lesser used, more peripheral languages, which need a certain
87
amount of protection in order to prevent their becoming extinct.
This paragraph reflects arguments introduced in Chapter 1 supra\ the Danish and
Greek languages might not be seen as 'under threat' when viewed from a national
perspective but could well be classified as peripheral in the EC context. Minority
languages such as Catalan and Frisian, on the other hand, are peripheral even at
national level. But both categories merit consideration in language policies at
national and supra-national level. If the jurisprudence of the Court is to be applied
only to languages having constitutional status, then those most in need of protection
are effectively excluded; in this sense, the decision in Groener goes against its own
underlying spirit.
4. CONCLUSION
In general terms, EC Competence has evolved dramatically since the mid 1980s,
when the judgments analysed in this Chapter were delivered and when the European
Parliament drafted its first minority language resolutions. The following chapters
look at three issues in particular - the boundaries of Member State/Community
competence, EC cultural policy, and fundamental rights and citizenship - in light of
changes introduced by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. The most recent
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and the continuing work of the Community
institutions is then assessed, to see whether the initial Community leanings towards
securing effective justice for minority language speakers, evident throughout this
87 Loman et al, supra note 35, p. 66.
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THE DIVISION OF POWERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
1. INTRODUCTION
In any organisation based on a system of shared powers, one of the fundamental
issues to be determined is the allocation of competence. As well as the obvious
consideration of deciding which level of authority does what, the division of
competence also sets limits to the actual and potential powers of the respective
authorities. This concept must be formalised to some extent to avoid excessive
conflict over alleged ultra vires actions. In federal unions, for example, competence
is usually delimited explicitly in a written constitution.
Allocation of competence within the European Community is not quite so clear-cut.
The objectives of the Community are set out in the amended Treaty of Rome but
respective EC/Member State obligations are not listed expressly in the form of a
federal constitution. Treaty objectives are not pursued by the Community alone: the
Member States must sometimes take action, although, more usually, refrain from
taking action, in certain policy areas. This division of powers has become
increasingly complicated, as the impact of EC law has widened gradually from the
economic objectives set out in the original Treaty. It is arguable that the founding
fathers of the European Economic Community never intended to confine its scope to
economic issues alone. But it must be conceded that the express assignment of
additional EC competence sparked contentious opposition that almost prevented the
ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
Trends towards intensified European centralisation contrast directly with the renewed
promotion of national identities within the Community context. Developments such
as the increased use of majority voting in the Council have been likened to the
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'silencing' of individual Member States.1 One of the perplexing challenges facing the
Community is the accommodation of national diversity in the context of common
goals and a shared institutional framework. This concern is reflected in Article F(l)
TEU, which provides that the Union is obliged to respect the national identities of the
Member States.2 Brittan argues that the Community must draw strength from the
positive aspects of national identity, such as diversity of history, culture, language
and tradition, while challenging the destructive forces of trade barriers, aggressive
nationalism and mutual suspicion.3
An additional response to the tensions associated with the division of powers has
been the formal introduction of the principle of subsidiarity into Community law.4
While the principle may have been adopted to simplify the allocation of competence,
two preliminary observations can be made. First, in light of the political discord
surrounding its introduction as well as subsequent, and continuing, academic debate,
subsidiarity has accentuated rather than alleviated the division of powers conflict.
Second, it is difficult to assess whether subsidiarity has had any impact on a practical
level. In any event, the principle of subsidiarity and the division of powers more
generally have a definite effect on any minority language policy introduced by the
Community. To establish a legal basis for action, Community measures will have to
be justified in terms of subsidiarity. From the Member State perspective, language is
1
cf. Thedor Schilling, "A new dimension of subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a rule and a principle",
(1994) 14 Yearbook ofEuropean Law 203-256 at 207.
Dashwood employs a more extreme analogy, where he likens the Community to "...a Triffid, quietly
gaining strength in order to gobble up everything that gives substance to our sense of having separate
national identities." (Alan Dashwood, "The limits of European Community powers", (1996) 21
European Law Review 113-128 at 113.)
2 The reference to national identity in Article F(l) TEU may cause some problems for the protection
of linguistic minorities and is discussed infra.
3 Leon Brittan, "Institutional development of the European Community", (1992) Public Law 567-579
at 567.
4 The distinction between the competences of the Community and the Union must always be borne in
mind: generally, the former are subject to the rules of Community law and to the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice, while the latter are based on an intergovernmental framework: cf. generally Robert
Lane, "New Community competences under the Maastricht Treaty", (1993) 30 Common Market Law
Review, 939-979 at 941-2; Ulrich Everling, "Reflections on the structure of the European Union",
(1992) vol. 29:6 Common Market Law Review 1053-1077.
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a politically contentious issue which is closely bound up with national identity; any
resistance to the development of Community policy on minority languages would
involve reliance on the principle by either or both levels of authority. This chapter
summarises the history and ideology of subsidiarity generally and in the Community
context, and then outlines and analyses the principle as ratified by the Maastricht
Treaty. The practical implications of the division of powers for projected language
policies are assessed in Chapter 4.
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUBSIDIARITY
A. General History
It may seem unlikely that the origins of a principle of Community law are usually
traced to Roman Catholic doctrine. Beale and Geary, however, identify traces of the
concept of subsidiarity in the writings of Aristotle, based on his ideal of 'civic
existence'.5 Aristotle sought to maximise the autonomy of the individual, advocating
that, where appropriate, the state should devolve its functions to authorities acting as
closely as possible to the citizen. These ideas were adapted to Catholic teaching by St
Thomas Acquinas in the Middle Ages. But the most concrete expression of the
principle can be found in the 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, written by Pope
Pius XI in response to the autocratic political regimes of the 1930s and 1940s. The
encyclical argues that while certain functions can only be performed by powerful
political entities, "...it would be unjust and socially harmful to withdraw from the
lower groupings and confer on a larger entity those functions which the former can
well perform themselves."6 In addition to censuring higher level entities for
arrogating the powers of lower societies, in terms of injustice and 'evil', the
encyclical introduces the idea of efficiency, arguing that by dividing functions
between levels of authority in a just manner, each level can perform its allocated
5 Andrew Beale and Roger Geary, "Subsidiarity comes of age?", (1994) 144 New Law Journal 12-14.
6 From Quadragesimo Anno, quoted by Vlad Constantinesco, "Who's afraid of subsidiarity?" (1991)
11 Yearbook of European Law, 33-55 at 34-5; subsidiarity has also been identified in 19th century
Protestant socio-political theory: cf. Anne Marie Loman, Kamiel Mortelmans, Harry Post and Stewart
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tasks to optimum effectiveness. These basic principles were reiterated in the 1961
encyclical, Mater et Magistra. Significantly, this document emphasised the converse
idea that larger or higher authorities can perform some functions more effectively.
Overall, "...intervention of public authorities that encourages, stimulates, regulates,
supplements and complements is based on the principle [of subsidiarity]."7 Three
fundamental characteristics of subsidiarity can be determined from its elaboration in
Catholic doctrine. First, it is essentially a principle to be drawn upon to ascertain the
just division of competence in a power-sharing organisation or system. Second,
justice requires that decisions and actions must be taken, where possible, at the level
of authority closest to individual citizens. Finally, subsidiarity can also justify action
at higher levels of authority.
B. History ofSubsidiarity in the European Community
The principle of subsidiarity has had a dual significance throughout its evolution,
since it can justify action taken at both higher and lower levels of authority. This
anomaly explains why the formal introduction of the doctrine into Community law
has been supported by those who seek to justify the enlargement of Community
powers, as well as by those who are determined to curtail this tendency.8
Commentators are divided on the prevalence of subsidiarity in the history of
Community law. In 1990, the Common Market Law Review remarked that the term
was "....until recently almost unknown."9 Similarly, Toth argues that the structure for
competence allocation in the Community before the TEU would have precluded the
operation of subsidiarity.10 In contrast, it has also been argued that subsidiarity has
Watson, Culture and Community Law: Before and After Maastricht, (Boston: Kluwer Law and
Taxation Publishers, 1992), pp. 202-3.
7 Mater et Magistra (Pope John XXIII, 1961), quoted in (1967) 13 New Catholic Encyclopaedia 762.
8
cf. Constantinesco, supra note 6, p. 35; Deborah Z. Cass, "The word that saves Maastricht? The
principle of subsidiarity and the division of powers within the European Community", (1992) vol. 26:6
Common Market Law Review, 1107-1136 at 1112.
9Editorial Comments, (1990) vol. 27:2 Common Market Law Review, 181-184 at 181.
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been a guiding, if implicit, principle throughout the evolution of Community law."
This view is summarised by Berman, who notes that "...while the rhetoric of
subsidiarity is unprecedented in the community, the practice of subsidiarity is not."12
It is submitted, however, that the converse of this argument is more correct. Debates
on European integration throughout the history of the Community have incorporated
references to subsidiarity to some extent but most of these documents were never
enacted. The Single European Act did employ the principle in the context of
environmental protection (Article 130r(4) EC), but references to subsidiarity prior to
Maastricht were usually confined to ideologically loaded rhetoric, subsisting on the
political rather than the practical level.
Although it has been argued that there are tacit references to subsidiarity in the Treaty
1 -J
of Rome, the first express reference can be found in the Commission's Report on
European Union, in 1975.14 The Report is one of the first blueprints for the creation
of 'an ever closer union' among the peoples of Europe, as anticipated by the
Preamble to the Treaty of Rome. Van Kersbergen and Verbeek note that subsidiarity
was promoted as a mechanism for widening the competences of the European
Economic Community at this stage.15 This can be better appreciated against the
background of the prevailing Christian Democratic ideology which, adapting the
tenets of Catholic philosophy, focused on the assisting role of higher authorities in
the specific context of the welfare state. One of the primary characteristics of the
Christian Democratic view of subsidiarity was the temporary duration of its
legitimate application. It was stressed that Community intervention was a dynamic
10 A.G. Toth, "The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty", (1992) vol. 29:6 Common
Market Law Review 1079-1105; this idea is discussed infra in the context of exclusive and concurrent
powers.
"• cf. for example, Cass, supra note 8, pp. 1110-1128; Constantinesco, supra note 6, pp. 42-49.
12 G.A. Berman, "Taking subsidiarity seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the
United States", (1994) 94 Columbia Law Review, 331-456 at 342.
13 See note 11 supra.
14 Submitted to the Council, 26 June 1975; Supplement 5/75 Bull.EC, especially pp. 10-11.
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concept, valid but ephemeral. In terms of taking decisions close to the citizen,
Christian Democratic ideology focuses on assisting the weaker groups in society. It is
especially significant that this interpretation of subsidiarity focused on the
achievement and maintenance of a pluralist or diverse society.
The 1975 Report outlined the competence of an envisaged new entity, a 'European
Union', in terms of the principe de subsidiarite. The union would act as lawmaker
only where individual Member State action would not yield optimum efficiency, or
where centralised policies were necessary to ensure cohesion. But the architecture of
the proposed union differed from Christian Democratic theory in one crucial respect:
subsidiarity, as outlined in the Report, was not a dynamic concept but was presented
as a static formula, applicable only at the initial allocation of union/Member State
competence. This divergence reflects the influence of federal theory, particularly
German federalism. The German approach to subsidiarity is more acutely concerned
with the idea that decisions be taken at lower levels of authority where appropriate.
More specifically, the German Lander feared that the autonomy of sub-national
authorities would not respected in any new European developments.16 As noted, the
division of competence is outlined expressly in federal constitutions: subsidiarity is
not, therefore, a dynamic, guiding principle to be invoked on a continuing basis. A
strict application of this theory would not have been appropriate, given the inherently
dynamic character of European integration itself, but certain characteristics of the
proposed union did reflect the federal approach. It was intended, for example, that a
new treaty would ratify an Act of Constitution as the legal basis of the union.17 Union
competence could be exclusive, concurrent or potential, and would be specified as
such in the treaty. The principle of subsidiarity would be relevant to concurrent
competence i.e. where both the union and the Member States would have
15 Kees Van Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, "The politics of subsidiarity in the European Union",
(1994) vol. 32:2 Journal ofCommon Market Studies, 215-236 at 216.
16 The relevant provisions of the Basic Law of Germany are Articles 72-74, which set out the
legislative competence of the Lander and Federation respectively; in particular, Article 72GG outlines
the application of the principle of subsidiarity.
17
cf. Toth, supra note 10, pp. 1088-9.
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competence to act but the union would act, in accordance with subsidiarity, where
collective action was deemed more efficient or appropriate in light of the objectives
to be achieved. It should be stressed, however, that whether or not an area of
competence was exclusive or concurrent would already have been clearly set out in
the proposed treaty, in line with a federal application of subsidiarity. Thus, competing
ideologies had been shrewdly incorporated into the Community perspective on
subsidiarity ab initio, confirming the flexibility already exhibited in the philosophical
and religious origins of the principle.
The evolution of subsidiarity in the Community context continued with the European
Parliament's Draft Treaty on European Union, in 1984.18 But the earlier emphasis on
its 'widening' capacity had rather subtly shifted towards its alternative 'limiting'
function, in respect of challenges to centralised policy-making. Once again, the Draft
Treaty viewed the proposed union as an entirely new legal entity, replacing the
existing Communities. It was envisaged that a constitutional act would set out
precisely the competence of the union and of its Member States. Once again,
competence was classified as either exclusive or concurrent, but the Draft Treaty did
not contain any 'lists' of powers, as envisaged in the 1975 Report. Instead, the nature
of competence was clearly and individually outlined for each area of legislative
activity identified in the Draft Treaty. The first explicit reference to subsidiarity is in
the Preamble, where it was noted that the institutions of the Union would be
attributed "...in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, with those powers
required to complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more successfully than
the states acting independently." Article 12 provided as follows:
Where this Treaty confers exclusive competence on the Union...national
authorities may only legislate to the extent laid down by the law of the
Union....The Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may be
undertaken more effectively in common than by the Member States acting
separately, in particular those whose execution requires action by the Union
because their dimension or effects extend beyond national frontiers. A law
which initiates or extends common action in a field where action has not been
taken hitherto by the Union or by the Communities must be adopted in
accordance with the procedure for organic laws.
18
Adopted 14 February 1984, [1984] OJ C-77/33.
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Thus, Article 12 codifed specific guidelines for the application of subsidiarity in the
new union, including the 'effectiveness' and 'dimension or effects' criteria. In many
ways, however, Article 12 raised more questions than it answered. Who exactly
would determine these criteria?19 Would the principle be justiciable?
Significantly, the fundamental 'close to the citizen' criterion was not prioritised in
this construction of subsidiarity. Sub-national authorities were not mentioned,
generating the assumption that in the new union, the entities 'closest' to citizens
were the Member States.
C. Theories ofEuropean Integration and the Idea ofFederalism
The 1984 Draft Treaty was quite a radical document which challenged the existing
structure of the European Communities in a fundamental way.20 The Member States
were neither prepared nor willing to contemplate such a drastic acceleration in the
evolution of European integration. But the introduction of the Draft Treaty, as well
as the accompanying debate and discussion, forced the contemplation of two issues:
first, what alternative form could intensified European integration take and, second,
how could growing concerns about centralisation, increasingly prevalent among
some Member States, be accommodated without thwarting this process of
integration? In this context, various theories have been developed to explain the
dynamic of European integration. The path from European Economic Community to
European Union is marked by a number of framework developments, most notably
the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union. The legal and
institutional changes implemented by these treaties reflect the various stages of
European integration. Notwithstanding the express commitment to pursuing an 'ever
closer union' in the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome, the forces of integration have
evolved somewhat independently of legitimising structural developments.
19
Cass, supra note 8, assumes that this function would have been within undertaken by the Council,
given the role attributed to the Council in Article 11, which deals with policy areas subject to
'common action'.
20 Particularly in terms of proposed institutional reform and the cession of national sovereignty: cf.
Everling, supra note 4, pp. 1053-1056.
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Significantly, theories of European integration have often been based on the same
underlying assumption as the principle of subsidiarity i.e. identifying the optimum
91
level of authority at which certain functions should be performed.
The momentum behind European integration was initially explained on the premise
of functionalism.22 This theory focuses on 'needs'; in particular, needs that transcend
national boundaries and which could, therefore, be provided for effectively by
establishing some form of joint government. In line with the inherent characteristics
of functionalism, the resulting government entity would be task-specific in the initial
stages but its structure would be potentially flexible, both in terms of membership
and assigned subject matter. But this concept of flexibility, central to functionalist
theory, did not correspond so well with the developing European Communities, in
that a loosely-based opt-out system would not have met the requirements of the
metamorphosis from economic to political organisation. The main contribution of
functionalism, then, was the promotion of the possibility of positive interdependency
between sovereign states, based on appreciation of the advantages of co-operation.
Critics of the theory were quick to point out, however, that co-operation did not
necessarily alleviate the strain of inter-state contact. It was argued that it was merely
the issues which had changed, from territorial disputes to trade, but not the
underlying political tensions.
Despite the shortcomings of functionalism as an explanatory framework, the reality
of intensified Community integration had become apparent. To redress the
theoretical deficit, the concept of neofunctionalism was developed. More normative
in character than its predecessor, neofunctionalism provided for a fixed supranational
authority and for appropriate central institutions. As has occurred in the European
21
cf. Martin Holland, The Community Experience, (London: Pinter, 1993), p. 14.
22
cf. David Mitrany, "The functional approach to world organisation" in C.A. Cosgrove and K.J.
Twitchett (eds.), The New International Actors: The United Nations and the European Economic
Community, (London: Macmillan, 1970), 65-75.
23 Holland, supra note 21, p. 15.
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Community, integration would begin in the economic sector, leading to the growth of
solidarity among the Member States. It was argued that this in turn would
automatically lead to intensified integration. Initially, the process would occur
without mass support, again emphasising the automatic or inevitable character of
integration, but, eventually, popular support would ensue. The central premise of
neofunctionalism is the idea of 'spillover': this means that integration in one sector,
such as the economic sector, will inevitably produce advantages and disadvantages in
other sectors. Centralised competence, corrective where appropriate, will then
inevitably 'spill over' into other policy spheres. It was noted in Chapter 1 that de
Witte uses neofunctionalism to explain early Community intervention in minority
language issues.24 In this way, the new Community competence in the fields of
culture and education, for example, which were eventually introduced by the TEU,
merely formalised the preceding occurrence of spillover. Once again, however, these
theoretical conjectures did not correspond with European integration in practice.
Essentially, neofunctionalism assumed that the spillover effect was absolutely
inevitable: the "...persistence of national self-interest..." was not taken into account.25
The unfulfilled potential of the pro-integration climate in the 1960s illustrates this
flaw. But for present purposes, the contemporary restatement of neofunctionalist
theory cannot be underestimated in the context of the politics of subsidiarity. As
noted earlier, the concepts of functionalism and neofunctionalism were similar to a
broad interpretation of subsidiarity, in that joint or collective authorities were seen as
the appropriate actors for dealing with policies having a transnational character.
European integration had become a practical reality. The idea of a 'federal' Europe
was being advanced, in terms of dividing powers and competence between the
Community and its Member States. Emiliou describes federalism as "...a mode of
political organisation that unites separate states or other polities within an
overarching political system [while allowing] each to maintain its own fundamental
political integrity."26 In addition, he notes that federalism strives to achieve the ideal
24
Chapter 1 supra, p. 32.
25 Holland, supra note 21, p. 17.
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of unity in diversity. Certain aspects of European integration were formulated along
these lines, including the eventual adoption of subsidiarity.27 But the notion of
'inevitability', the idea that Europe was ultimately heading towards the model of a
federal state with consequences for virtually every policy area, was unacceptable, in
varying degrees, to the majority of the Member States. The resulting reformulation of
neofunctionalist theory thus coincides to a large extent with the supremacy of a third
ideology of subsidiarity i.e. adapting subsidiarity as a counter-centralist theory,
usually associated with British Conservatism. This approach differs from that of the
German federalists in that it does not focus on sub-national authorities versus any
higher authority level, but on the sovereignty of Member States in the Community
institutional context. Any assumption of inevitable or automatic integration not
founded on a negotiated treaty framework is anathema to this third ideology. The
principle of subsidiarity reinforces the competence of Member States in their role as
authorities 'closer to the citizen' in the majority of policy areas. Community
intervention is justifiable only where efficiency and cross-boundary concerns clearly
merit collective action (essentially, measures based on the four freedoms of the
single market).
Thus, contemporary neofunctionalist theory accepts a more limited application of the
fundamental logic of spillover: it is acknowledged that collective action in one sector
will ordinarily affect the status quo in other policy areas. But instead of conceding
automatic corrective Community competence for these peripheral domains, there has
occurred instead "...a recognition that a prerequisite to any form of spillover
26 Nicholas Emiliou, "Subsidiarity: An effective barrier against 'enterprises of ambition'?", (1992) 17
European Law Review, 383-407 at 385.
27
cf. John Temple Lang, "European Community constitutional law: The division of powers between
the Community and Member States", (1988) vol. 39:2 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly, 209-234 at
209, on the similarities and differences between the Community and federal systems. Both share
judicial review of Member State actions, central authorities whose legislation applies directly to
citizens, supremacy of central legislation in cases of conflict and division of competence. The main
difference relates to legal basis; the Community is founded on a framework treaty while most federal
systems are based on written constitutions.
The incorporation of subsidiarity into the European framework is usually described within the context
of 'co-operative federalism': cf. Lane, supra note 4, p. 977; this concept is considered further infra.
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(economic or political) is a successful intergovernmental bargaining process."28
While the interrelated effects on various policy areas may themselves be considered
an automatic consequence of organised collective action, the acquisition of
centralised competence to deal with these effects is not. Rather, competence to act is
dependent on the formulation of an explicit legal basis. Spillover is no more than an
external catalyst in the initiation of negotiations, based on an express political will
that the Community should proceed towards intensified integration. In this context,
the principle of subsidiarity is biased in favour of individual Member State action in
any areas where the question of competence is unclear. Understanding these diverse
ideological bases for subsidiarity is a necessary background to an assessment of the
implementation of the principle in Community law, discussed infra. It can be noted
at this point, however, that there remains a certain degree of scepticism, indeed
cynicism, on the contribution of subsidiarity to European integration more
generally.29
D. The Codification ofSubsidiarity in Community Law
The framework documents discussed supra (1975 Commission Report, 1984 Draft
Treaty) have two features in common. First, they were never implemented; second,
their drafters had contemplated an entirely different model of integration than that
which has been achieved in practice. Thus, it is misleading to speak of the
codification of subsidiarity in Community law as an ongoing process that culminated
OA
with the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union. The history and
28
Holland, supra note 21, p. 18; reformulation of neofunctionalist theory is largely attributed to R.O.
Keohane and S. Hoffman; cf. "Community politics and institutional change", in W. Wallace (ed.), The
Dynamics ofEuropean Integration, (London: Pinter/RIIA, 1990), 276-300.
cf. also, David Mutimer, "1992 and the political integration of Europe: Neofunctionalism
reconsidered", (1989-1991) vol. 13:1 Journal ofEuropean Integration 75-101.
De Witte places relates this change in attitude directly to the subsequent promotion of identity 'as an
integrative factor': cf. Bruno de Witte, "Building Europe's image and identity", in A. Rijksbaron,
W.H. Roobol and M. Weisglas, Europe from a Cultural Perspective: Historiography and Perspective,
(The Hague: Nijgh en von Ditmar Universitair, 1987), 132-139 at 135.
29
cf. Toth, supra note 10, p. 1105; see also, (1993) vol. 30:2 Common Market Law Review, 241-245
at 243-4.
Grainne de Burca deals with another consequence of European integration, assessing the threat to
integration posed by questions over the legitimacy of the Union: cf. "The quest for legitimacy in the
European Union", (1996) vol. 59:3 Modern Law Review 349-376.
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ideologies of subsidiarity can inform us about the political environment in which its
role in EC law was conceived, but the principle has not actually been implemented
within the quasi-federal structure originally intended.
(i) The Single European Act
Although the word itself is not actually used, the first implicit application of
subsidiarity in Community law is Article 130r(4) EEC, introduced by the Single
European Act (SEA), which provides that "[t]he Community shall take action
relating to the environment to the extent to which the objectives referred to in [this
provision] can be attained better at Community level than at the level of the
individual Member States...." 31 Van Kersbergen and Verbeek argue that the
adoption of the SEA "...augmented the until then latent anxiety of several actors that
the process of completing the Common Market would inevitably lead to an
incremental widening of the powers of the European Commission."32 Consequently,
subsidiarity, although advanced by the German Lander as a federal concept, was
instead being promoted as a protective safeguard for national sovereignty. The notion
that subsidiarity could mean all things to all people had become entrenched in
Community relations. In particular, its inherent ambiguity and flexibility paved the
way for a lowest common denominator settlement in the 1992 Programme
negotiations. Ironically, in the specific context of environmental policy, the Member
States were well aware that collective action was both necessary and more efficient.
The primary concern raised was that the achievment of common standards could
weaken already existing domestic environmental policies.33 Thus, by limiting
Community competence to those objectives 'better attained' by collective action, the
Member States ensured that the implementation of more stringent national measures
30
e.g. Cass, supra note 8, especially pp. 1110-1128.
31 This paragraph has not been retained in Article 130r EC, as amended by the TEU, although the
phrase '[w]ithin their respective spheres of competence...' (Article 130r(5) EEC/Article 130r(4) EC)
does appear; it is generally assumed that the paragraph has been deleted because of the broader
application of subsidiarity in the new Article 3b EC, discussed infra.
32 Van Kersbergen and Verbeek, supra note 15, p. 219.
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was not precluded. This may have significant implications for Community language
policy, since many Member States have already adopted and implemented minority
language rights regimes.34
Subsidiarity became something of a consolation principle in the SEA negotiations, a
reassurance that Member State sovereignty was not being swallowed up by the
process of European integration. Yet the application of subsidiarity was linked to
environmental policy, an area where the benefits of collective action are patently
obvious. This demonstrates the political rather than practical character of the
principle in Community law from the outset. Furthermore, environmental policy is a
politically sensitive issue, which merits different levels of priority in the various
Member States. The association of subsidiarity with environmental policy thus
established a potentially ominous precedent of retaining Member State control over
controversial Community competences after the fact of their incorporation into the
treaty framework. This is particularly evident in the context of the Treaty on
European Union, discussed infra, since subsidiarity is especially relevant to new,
politically sensitive policy areas, such as education and culture.
As regards the practical implementation of subsidiarity, Article 130r(4) introduced
the 'better attainment test' i.e. justifying Community measures where objectives can
be better attained by collective action. Emiliou points out that the application of this
criterion is necessarily a subjective value judgment rather than an objective
process.35 Again, this emphasises the political and ideological character of
subsidiarity in Community law. In addition to the 'better attained' test, the
33 Denmark was particularly concerned about this issue.
34
cf. Chapter 4 infra, on the application of subsidiarity to EC cultural policy; Appendix I, re: Member
State constitutional provisions that deal with language policy. More generally, in the context of the
Maastricht Treaty, Lane, supra note 4, raises the possibility that (p. 970) "...community action would
be justified and lawful in some Member States who had showed themselves unable or disinclined to
comply with acceptable standards of...protection, but not in others which had not." Lane questions the
legitimacy of such a development, although Temple Lang suggests that since Community measures
may take regional differences into account, this could be translated as taking Member State differences
into account (John Temple Lang, "What powers should the European Community have?", (1995) vol.
1:1 European Public Law, 97-116 at 109.
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association of the principle with environmental policy implies a strong presumption
of a transnational or cross-boundary dimension before Community action can be
justified. Steiner considers it surprising that this requirement was not spelled out
explicitly in the provision itself.36
(ii) The Treaty on European Union
The Conclusions of the European Council Summit at Edinburgh (1992) refer to
subsidiarity as a "...basic principle of the European Union".37 The Preamble to the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) characterises the Union as "...[continuing] the
process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which
decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the
principle of subsidiarity...." This objective is reiterated in Article A TEU, while
Article B provides that "[t]he objectives of the Union shall be achieved as provided
in this Treaty and in accordance with the conditions and the timetable set out therein
while respecting the principle of subsidiarity as defined in Article 3b of the [EC
Treaty],
Article 3b EC, as amended by the TEU, is the key exponent of subsidiarity in
Community law and provides as follows:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the objectives of this Treaty.
Article 3b deals with the respective competence of the Community and the Member
States; it is unlikely that it applies in the Union context. Article B TEU was,
35 Emiliou, supra note 26, p. 395.
36 Jo Steiner, "Subsidiarity under the Maastricht Treaty", in David O'Keefe and Patrick Twomey
(eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, (London: Chancery, 1994), 49-64 at 52.
37
European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, (Edinburgh Summit, December 1992), (hereafter
'Edinburgh Conclusions'), Annex 1, Part A, Bull.EC 12-1992, p. 3.
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therefore, probably intended as a statement of principle rather than one of practice.38
Furthermore, Article L TEU provides that the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
does not extend to the Preamble or to Titles I, V and VI TEU. This means that the
references to subsidiarity in the TEU are not subject to judicial interpretation, again
supporting the conclusion that they are declarations of principle and not clear legal
statements. Bernard remarks, however, that the legal significance of constitutional
principles should not be underestimated, since they "...have the capacity to apply not
only directly when the legislation explicitly so provides but also indirectly by
incorporating themselves in the interpretation of other provisions."39 To assess the
political import of Articles A and B TEU, it is necessary to recall their ideological
background. As noted earlier, ensuring that decisions be taken as closely as possible
to the citizens was a particular concern of the German Lander; more generally, it is a
means of ensuring accountability to the citizen in the decision-making process.40 At
the TEU negotiations, both Germany and Belgium sought even stronger guarantees
to protect variances in national traditions, including a role for the Court of Justice in
deciding any disputes on the allocation of powers.41 This demand was strongly
opposed by Britain, on the grounds that the Member States alone had the right to
sanction or refute Community intervention. Peterson refers to Article A as a "...much
watered-down compromise..." to placate Germany and Belgium, by granting at least
nominal recognition of their systems of sub-national government.42 In real terms,
however, 'closer to the citizen' was taken to imply 'Member State' in the Union and
38 Toth, supra note 10, pp. 1086-7, argues that Article B TEU, and therefore Article 3b EC, may be
relevant to Common Foreign and Security Policy, where the Union has competence, but not to Justice
and Elome Affairs, where competence is exclusively intergovernmental. The Common Market Law
Review (1993), supra note 29, points out that Article B TEU may have implications for the application
of Article 3b EC to the ECSC and Euratom.
39 Nicolas Bernard, "The future of European economic law in light of the principle of subsidiarity",
(1996) vol. 33:4 Common Market Law Review, 633-666 at 634.
40
cf. Kieran Bradley and Alastair Sutton, "European Union and the Rule of Law", in Andrew Duff,
John Pinder and Roy Pryce (eds.), Maastricht and Beyond: Building the New Europe, (London:
Routledge, 1994), 229-266 at 234-5.
41 John Peterson, "Subsidiarity: A definition to suit any vision?" (1994) vol. 47:1 Parliamentary
Affairs, 116-132 at 120.
42 ibid.
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Community contexts, in line with the ideology of state sovereignty, advanced in
particular by Britain and Denmark. This interpretation is at variance with the
intentions of those who proposed the codification of subsidiarity in the first place, yet
had been anticipated and challenged by the Common Market Law Review in 1990:
In the discussions between Brussels and the capitals of the [Member States], the
question is usually whether a given matter should be governed by Community
or national legislation. It is always implicitly assumed in this respect that
governmental rules and regulations are in fact necessary. However, this is by no
means always clearly the case. It must first be asked whether a given matter
cannot be left to the private sphere i.e. to the individual, the family, firms, trade
• . 43
unions, associations and co-operatives.
This archetype of subsidiarity has been drawn upon from time to time, particularly in
relation to discussions on the European Social Charter.44 A more widespread
application of this interpretation would affect regional policy in particular, if regional
or local authorities were allocated competence to achieve Union objectives where
appropriate. The Committee of the Regions has called for "...an infranational model
of the European Union, in which the role of subnational and transnational interest
groups is as important as that of the nation states or of the supranational
institutions."45 The implementation of this recommendation would have obvious
implications for regional language groups. But there is a concurrent centralisation
tension within the Community that has predominated the sub-national aspect of the
subsidiarity debate. Member States have expressed fears that their competence is
being usurped by the centralising forces of European integration; they have sought,
therefore, to reaffirm their law-making role as the entities 'closest' to their citizens.46
Meanwhile, sub-national authorities are equally concerned about centralisation, but
as much in terms of national authorities as in the context of European integration. A
stronger provision on this aspect of subsidiarity could have tackled the grievances of
43
supra note 9, p. 182.
44
Steiner, supra note 36, p. 50, argues that the earliest manifestation of ensuring decisions be taken as
closely to the citizen as possible is the fact that the Treaty of Rome allowed derogation from the four
freedoms, based on public morality, policy, security and health.
45
Report of the Committee of the Regions (1995), quoted in de Burca, supra note 29, p. 368.
46
Temple Lang, supra note 34, p. 104, points out that subsidiarity has also been raised in the context
of larger/smaller Member States.
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sub-national authorities but it is unlikely that Article A will suffice.47 Moreover, the
inappropriateness at present of any Community interference with sub-national
administrative structures must be borne in mind.
Overall, it is unlikely that Article A TEU will have any considerable effect on
ensuring that decisions 'close to the citizen' should be taken by sub-national
authorities, as advocated by federal ideology. Instead, the phrase has, rightly or
wrongly, become equated with the competence concerns of the Member States. This
was recognised by the European Council at the Edinburgh Summit in unambiguous
terms: "[subsidiarity] contributes to the respect for the national identities of Member
States and safeguards their powers."48
3. ARTICLE 3b EC
A. Ideological Background
Article 3b reflects a deliberately intended bias towards the supremacy of Member
State decision-making where there is any uncertainty over EC/Member State
competence. But its wording is open to interpretation. The fact that specific criteria
are outlined, such as 'scale or effects', implies that the Community must justify any
intended action in an area where it does not have exclusive competence. In turn, this
creates a presumption that Member State competence should be assumed in the first
instance. But despite these underlying ideological intentions, it is argued infra that
Article 3b(2) may in fact require as well as permit Community intervention where
certain criteria are met. Schilling thus refers to subsidiarity as a double-edged sword,
47
Brittan, supra note 3, for example, regards the establishment of the Committee of the Regions
(Articles 198a-198c EC) as a 'welcome escape from national centralisation' (p. 574).
48
Edinburgh Conclusions, supra note 37, p. 1.
In the specific context ofminority languages, Temple summarises that "[a]lthough subsidiarity taken to
its logical conclusion might have helped some regional languages, the interpretation favoured by the
British Government (that is, the 'devolution' of power to Member State governments) and which is no
doubt supported by...other...governments, could have serious consequences for the languages spoken
in state.s...where the government is not particularly sympathetic to their lot." (Rosalind M. Temple,
"Great expectations? Hopes and fears about the implications of political developments in Western
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which has the capacity to "... prevent the higher and lower level from taking any
action in areas properly falling within each other's respective sphere of action."49
These ambiguities reinforce the perception of subsidiarity as an ideologically
interchangeable concept, with both centralising and decentralising potential. Emiliou
refers to both 'subsidiarity from above', meaning benefits for central institutions, and
the 'bottom-up approach', where central institutions are subsidiary to lower levels of
authority.50
These divergent perceptions of subsidiarity are even more apparent when legal and
political interpretations of the principle are contrasted. Essentially, politicians have
steadfastly promoted subsidiarity as a legal norm, while lawyers have been far less
convinced of its capacity as such. In the political context, subsidiarity has been
associated with Article F(l) TEU, as an additional safeguard for national identity.51
The difficulty with this approach is that it contradicts the very ethos of Community
intervention, which strives to transcend national boundaries. Obviously, collective
action should be undertaken taken only where warranted; subsidiarity has a clearly
feasible role in this context. But any artificial or regressive manipulation of concepts,
whether rules or principles, can only serve to weaken their effect, especially where
such orchestration is based primarily on an attempt to evade the legitimate effects of
Community law.52 As Lasok has warned, "...subsidiarity ...cannot be interpreted as a
signal to claw back those elements of the national sovereignty which already have
been or will be in the future given up in accordance with the Treaties."53
Europe for the future of France's regional languages", in M.M. Parry, W.V. Davies and R.A.M.
Temple, The Changing Voice ofEurope, (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1994), 191-211 at 204.
49
Schilling, supra note 1, p. 205 (emphasis added).
50 Emiliou, supra note 26, p. 384.
51
cf. Dashwood, supra note 1, p. 113 (footnote 1).
52
Note, for example, the tone of this extract from The Economist, (11 July 1992): "[t]he true worth of
the principle [of subsidiarity] will be known only once some busybody Directive has been challenged
in the European Court and the judges have ruled on where Brussels stops and nations are to be left
alone." (quoted in Emiliou, "Subsidiarity: Panacea or fig leaf?" in O'Keefe and Twomey (eds.), supra
note 36, 65-83 at 77.)
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B. Article 3b(l): The Attribution ofPowers 54
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
Article 3b(l) EC expresses one version of a circular argument. Alternatively, it could
be stated that if an objective has been assigned to the Community, it must have the
requisite power to achieve it. Thus, 'power' refers to a treaty-based sanction for
Community action. In practice, however, the attribution of powers is somewhat more
complicated. This can be ascribed to the nature of Community law generally and to
the diversity of substance in the treaty provisions, which are not drafted in as precise
a manner as those of, for example, federal constitutions.
Articles 3 and 3a EC set out lists of Community activities but these provisions are
not themselves legal bases for Community action; legal basis is ascertained from
subsequent, more detailed treaty provisions. Toth sets out the following general
principles for determining the nature of Community powers:
[T]he Treaty follows a system which is a purpose-oriented or purpose-bound
one: the Community's competences are linked to its tasks and objectives. In
conferring and exercising competences, the decisive consideration is: is a power
necessary to perform a task to achieve an objective for which the Community is
responsible? If the answer is "yes", the Community is deemed to have that
power.55
In practical terms, the Community institutions are required to assess draft legislative
measures against the limits of Community powers: "[t]he examination...should
establish the objective to be achieved and whether it can be justified in relation to an
objective of the Treaty and that the necessary legal basis for its adoption exists."56 In
accordance with Article 190 EC, measures adopted must set out "...the reasons on
53 Dominik Lasok, "Subsidiarity and the occupied field", (1992) 142 New Law Journal, 1228-1230 at
1229, referring to Case 24/83 Gewiese v. Mackenzie [1984] ECR 817.
54 The division of powers along exclusive and concurrent competence is discussed in Section C infra.
55
Toth, supra note 10, p. 1082.
56
Edinburgh Conclusions, supra note 37, p. 6.
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which they are based." The Court of Justice has the power to annul a measure where
an inadequate explanation of its legal basis has been given.
Two further Treaty provisions are relevant to the attribution of Community powers.
Article 5 EC provides that:
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks.
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of
the objectives of this Treaty.
Thus, Member States have a significant role to play in the implementation of
Community law. Basic duties that have been grounded in Article 5 include the
obligation on Member States to give full effect to Community law, to implement
Community objectives, to co-operate with Community institutions to this end and to
co-operate with the other Member States.57 The European Council has declared that
Member State duties under Article 5 EC cannot be called into question by the
CO
principle of subsidiarity. This means that even where Community action is
precluded by Article 3b(2), the Member States themselves are still required to fulfil
the Treaty obligation in question. The role of the Member States in the enforcement
of Community objectives relies particularly on the capacity of national courts to
administer Community law. Curtin has identified two principal advantages
pertaining to this devolution of authority to the Member States: first, it ensures
accessible remedies to individual citizens and second, "...it removes the possibility of
non-compliance since a state cannot defy its own courts."59
57
cf. John Temple Lang. "Community constitutional law: Article 5 EEC Treaty", (1990) vol. 27:4
Common Market Law Review 645-681.
58
Edinburgh Conclusions, supra note 37, p. 4; cf. also Bernard, supra note 39, p. 652.
59 Deirdre Curtin, "The constitutional structure of the Union: A Europe of bits and pieces", (1993) vol.
30:1 Common Market Law Review, 17-69 at 31.
Temple Lang, referring to Case 71/76 Thieffry v. Conseil de I'ordre des advocats d la cour de Paris,
[1977] ECR 765, points out that, in accordance with Article 5, Member States are bound to contribute
to the achievement of Treaty objectives even where Community law has made no special provision
thereafter (p. 657).
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Article 235 EC provides that:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of
the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community
and this Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, take the appropriate measures.
Article 235 refers only to powers required specifically for the achievement of the
common market. Moreover, it addresses the need to sanction additional Community
competence, while subsidiarity is concerned with the allocation of power to act
where competence already exists. The provision does, however, highlight the
procedures for the attribution of competence within the EC structure. Essentially, the
Member States retain the power of Treaty amendment and, in this way, govern the
direction of Community policy. In that context, the fears of certain Member States
that the Community, or perhaps more specifically, the Commission, has taken on a
policy-making life of its own seem unfounded. In practice, however, it is clear that
Community policies have often been developed on ambiguous legal bases,
legitimised by Treaty amendments 'after the fact'. Consequently, the initial impetus
of co-operation has been somewhat eroded and a feeling of competitiveness between
the Member States and their own dynamic creation has surfaced. Indeed, this tension
was primarily responsible for the inclusion of subsidiarity in the EC Treaty in the
first place.
C. Article 3b(2): The Principle ofSubsidiarity and the Division ofCompetence
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community.
This phrase generates an assumption that Community powers are distinguishable as
being either exclusive or non-exclusive/concurrent. But an explicit distinction to this
effect is not set out in any provision of the EC Treaty. The resulting debate on the
exact nature of Community competence is both persistent and conflicting.
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As noted earlier, the principle of subsidiarity is usually associated with allocating
competence in a federal system, where the division of powers is clearly outlined in a
written constitution. The desirability of adopting the federal system in the
Community context has been called into question since its rigidity might "...tie the
hands of the Community unduly."60 In the context of the original EEC Treaty, Toth
argues that "[t]he Treaty uses an entirely different method and terminology by either
imposing obligations on Member States directly or authorising the Council and the
Commission...to 'make regulations', 'issue directives' or 'take decisions' (i.e. legally
binding measures)."61 On this basis, he argues that subsidiarity cannot apply to any
Community competences granted by the EEC Treaty, which must, therefore, be
considered as exclusive:
During the whole time of their existence, the Communities have operated on the
basis that all the powers needed to carry out their tasks have been vested in the
institutions, while strictly defined implementing/management powers could be
delegated to the Member States. The principle of subsidiarity turns this logic
upside down. It creates a presumption that all powers other than exclusive
competences (which are nowhere defined) remain vested in the Member States
while the Community can exercise these powers only in certain limited
situations....This effectively relegates the Community to a 'subsidiary' (i.e.
subordinate) role, as is evident in the term itself.62
Toth points instead to Article 130r(4) EEC, introduced by the SEA, as an example of
a clear and intended application of the principle of subsidiarity; its wording, noted
supra, is not comparable to any provision of the origninal Treaty. He also reasons
that some of the new policy areas introduced by the TEU 64 may be subject to the
60
Temple Lang, supra note 34, p. 103; Peterson, supra note 41, p. 127, notes that in the more
traditional federal structures, such as Germany and the United States, "[t]he balance of power between
the states and the centre...has never been static, predetermined or uncontroversial...[B]oth countries
have been marked by far more concerns about the proper division of powers between the states and the
centre than exists in Europe today...."
61 Toth, supra note 10, p. 1081.
62 ibid. p. 1103.
63 ibid., p. 1092.
64i.e. education (Article 126 EC), vocational training (Article 127 EC), culture (Article 128 EC),
public health (Article 129 EC), consumer protection (Article 129a EC), trans-European networks
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application of subsidiarity, discussed further infra, given the detailed limitations on
the Community's capacity to act explicitly set out in each relevant provision.
Schilling, on the other hand, disputes these conclusions.65 His principal objection is
that this construction of exclusive competence would render Article 3b(2) virtually
meaningless. It is submitted, however, that Schilling's reasoning is in direct
contradiction with the wording of that provision itself - '[i]n areas which do not fall
within its exclusive competence' - which expressly acknowledges both the existence
of exclusive competence as well as the non-applicability of subsidiarity in that
domain. Subsidiarity neither extends nor restricts competence; rather, it determines
the distribution of functions. In reality, the primary concern has been to actually
define exclusive/concurrent competences so that the appropriate actor can be
determined either independently (exclusive competence) or by means of (concurrent
competence) the tests outlined in Article 3b(2). A related issue is the sphere of
exclusive Member State competence i.e. where matters are strictly internal and have
not been brought within Community competence, or where competence for
implementing a Community objective has been allocated expressly and exclusively
to the Member States. In this context, there are fears that the Community is
systematically eroding internal policy fields, coupled with hopes that subsidiarity
will somehow defend and preserve the realm of national competence.66
There is general agreement that core policy areas of EC law generate exclusive
Community competence, where the Member States have no power to act i.e.
common commercial policy, competition law as it relates to inter-state trade, the
common organisation of agricultural markets, transport policy and the conservation
f\l
of marine biological resources. Temple Lang has also included treaties on the
(Articles 129b-d EC), industry (Article 130 EC), economic and social cohesion (Articles 130a-e EC),
and research and technological development (Article 130f-p EC).
65
Schilling, supra note 1, p: 219.
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Schilling, supra note 1, has referred to subsidiarity as "...an additional exit possibility..." (p. 232).
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cf. paper from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament (October 1992), Bull.EC
10-1992, p. 120; Bernard, supra note 39, pp. 655-660.
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supply of nuclear materials and certain mergers.68 The basic justification for
attributing exclusive competence in all of these areas is that centralised responsibility
for collective action is essential for the implementation of common laws and
standards. Although not defined in the Treaty as such, the exclusive character of
Community competence is generally determined by the wording of the relevant
provisions and, more precisely, by the type of legal measures which the Community
institutions may adopt, where specified. This is somewhat narrower than Toth's
interpretation that all Community competences outlined in the EEC Treaty are
automatically exclusive.
The doctrine of exhaustiveness is also relevant to the determination of exlcusive
competence. It is a distinct concept but the effects of both principles are similar from
the Member State perspective. Exhaustiveness means that even where treaty
provisions have not implied exclusive Community competence, the Community
legislation actually enacted leaves no room for any further regulation, by either the
Member States or the Community.69 Exhaustiveness is not, therefore, concerned
with which level of authority may act: rather, it relates to the fact that, in practical
terms, neither level can act. Schilling argues that in the case of exhaustiveness,
• 70
subsidiarity can apply, since it is not exclusive competence in the 'technical sense'.
But it is difficult to understand the logic of this conclusion, since there can be no
further action to which the principle could be applied.
The phrase 'concurrent competence' is misleading as it implies that, in certain policy
areas, the Community and the Member States are free to act simultaneously and with
equal authority. Once again, this scenario is not set out in any treaty provisions. One
view is that concurrent powers are those powers conferred on the Community which
it has not yet exercised, thus creating a temporary or interim Member State
68
Temple Lang, supra note 34, p. 98.
69
cf. Case 237/82 Jongeneel Kaas, [1984] ECR 483 at 515-517, paras. 12-16 (opinion of the
Advocate General).
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competence. Once the Community acts, Member States lose their competence to act,
leading to the gradual expansion of exclusive Community competence.71 This is
called the doctrine of preemption or the principle of the occupied field. It is based on
the logic that if Member States could act unilaterally, this would derogate from the
primary objective of achieving a single market. Also relevant is the principle of effet
utile, based on Article 5 EC, which prevents Member States from adopting national
measures that interfere with the operation of Community law, preventing it from
having 'full effect' after it has been adopted.
But these interpretations are far from resolved. Temple Lang contends that "...apart
from a few cases where Community measures are intended to be exhaustive,
Community powers are still almost all concurrent."72 He further argues that
Community legislation in these areas does not deprive the Member States of
competence on the same subject matter. Where this construction leads to the
enactment of conflicting measures, it can be regulated by the doctrine of the
supremacy of EC law. Emiliou proposes a similar interpretation, arguing that
Member States may legislate in areas of concurrent competence where Community
powers exist but have not been exercised, or have been exercised in an incomplete
manner. Member State legislation must, however, be guided by the underlying
Community interest. Again, if the Community does eventually legislate in the area,
conflicting national laws will be displaced in accordance with the primacy of EC
law. Toth specifies that Member States are not really acting unilaterally in these
circumstances but are instead "...'trustees of the common interest' under Community
supervision."74 Steiner is critical, however, of the idea that the Community has
'potential' competence; she argues that this would "...allow whole areas of activity to
escape scrutiny under [Article 3b(2)] simply because the Community has potential
71
cf. Case 20/70 Commission v. Council [1971] ECR 263 at 275.
72
Temple Lang, supra note 34, p. 99.
73 Emiliou, supra note 26, p. 68.
74 Toth, supra note 10, p. 1084.
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competence in these areas...[undermining] the very purpose for which this provision
was intended."75 It is submitted, however, that this argument is fundamentally
flawed. Subsidiarity does not come into play until legislative action is at issue. Its
purpose is to determine which level of authority should undertake the
implementation of an established Community objective. Its function is thus entirely
different from any assessment of potential policy areas in the abstract.
Closely related to the principle of subsidiarity in its dynamic context is the idea of
co-operative federalism, a system where the attribution of powers is not "...confined
to mutually exclusive watertight compartments." This is perhaps the broadest
interpretation of competence division, where powers are determined informally on a
loosely based idea of consensual concurrent action; it contrasts sharply with the
treaty-based attribution of powers practised within the Community context at
present.
Prior to the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, an Interim Report on behalf of the
Committee for Institutional Affairs noted that "...clarity with regard to the division of
n • ... 77
competences...of the Union [is] dependent on subsidiarity." It would be more
correct, however, to say that the application of subsidiarity is dependent on clarity in
respect of competence division. And yet there exists considerable disagreement over
this fundamental point of Community law. The confusion has been exacerbated by
the fact that the Treaty does not give explicit guidance. In this situation, there exists a
real danger that subsidiarity could amount to nothing more than a counter-productive
quandary within competence delimitation. There is some support for the idea that
'concurrent Community competence' refers to certain new competences introduced
by the SEA and TEU that also require some level of Member State action. Dashwood
73 Steiner, supra note 36, p. 58.
76 Jose Palacio Gonzalez, "The principle of subsidiarity (A guide for lawyers with a particular
Community orientation)", (1995) 20 European Law Review, 355-370 at 358.
77 PE Doc. A3-163/90, 22 June 1990, para. 6.
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seems to be arguing, like many of the commentators already mentioned, that most
Community powers are concurrent in this sense:
In most policy areas, there is a subtle interplay between the powers of the
Community and those of the Member States. National powers remain intact,
except that, under the principle of the primacy of Community law, they must
not be used in ways that conflict with existing measures validly adopted under
the Treaty. For instance, there is an abundance of national legislation co¬
existing with Community legislation on the protection of the environment; and,
indeed, the Treaty expressly preserves the Member States' right to apply more
stringent environmental standards.78
Yet he does not address the qualification actually set out in this extract: in the case of
environmental law, the Treaty provides expressly for concurrent Member State
competence in Article 130r(4) EEC. In fact, the subsequent paragraph, Article
130r(5), begins with the phrase "[i]n their respective spheres of competence...."
These paragraphs were the first Treaty provisions to stipulate a concurrent
competence for Member States. Similar, and indeed more stringent, limitations can
be found in a number of the provisions imported by the TEU that outline new
Community competences, including Article 128 EC (cultural policy). Dashwood has
attempted to illustrate a rule by using a clear exception. But the enforcement and
implementation of Community law, tasks generally assumed by Member States, have
been confused with legislative competence; this idea is discussed further infra in the
context of the principle of proportionality.
The view that all Treaty competences are exclusive to the Community is, however,
equally untenable. The restrictive wording of the new TEU competences, for
example, could hardly be interpreted as precluding Member State competence once
the Community decided to act. In some of these provisions, the harmonisation of
laws has been specifically prohibited e.g. Article 128 EC, discussed in Chapter 4
infra. This further supports the view that the treaty provisions will indicate where
concurrent competence has been intended; subsidiarity applies to action undertaken
in connection with these policy areas only. In this regard, Weatherill has called for a
more flexible reformulation of the classic doctrine of preemption: "[i]n casting aside
78
Dashwood, supra note 1, p. 117.
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total harmonisation as a model which cannot reflect the diversity of interests in the
modern Community, one is welcoming flexibility and innovation and enshrining
greater sensitivity to national preferences."79 Whatever the merits of this proposal,
such developments could only be realised within a revised treaty framework, as has
occurred with both the SEA and TEU, rather than by an artificially manipulated and
indiscriminate application of the principle of subsidiarity.
D. Article 3b(3): The Principle ofProportionality
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty.
The principal concern here is to distinguish subsidiarity, which relates to the
allocation of powers, from the principle of proportionality, which concerns the
exercise of powers by the institutions. Proportionality applies across the entire range
of Community powers and is not confined, like subsidiarity, to concurrent
competence only. It is an established, objective assessment of whether measures
enacted are lawful or excessive, in accordance with other Treaty provisions or
80
principles. Subsidiarity, on the other hand, is a subjective judgment, in terms of
appropriateness and relative efficiency, on which level of authority should take the
action in the first place. Furthermore, proportionality is largely operative in the
sphere of Community/citizen relations, while subsidiarity pertains inherently to
relations between the Member States and the EC.
The European Council published guidelines, at the Edinburgh Summit, for the
application of proportionality in practice.81 It was stressed that burdens, whether
financial or administrative, associated with the implementation of Community law
79
Stephen Weatherill, "Beyond preemption? Shared competence and constitutional change in the
European Community", in O'Keefe and Twomey (eds.), supra note 36, 13-33 at 22.
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should be minimised, and must be proportionate to the objective to be achieved. In
particular, it was urged that Community measures should "...leave as much scope for
national decision as possible, consistent with securing the aim of the measure and
observing the requirements of the Treaty."82 This means that EC measures should,
where possible, leave discretion to the Member States by setting out alternative ways
in which the objectives can be achieved. Where Community law requires common
policies, minimum standards should be outlined but Member States should have the
freedom to adopt stricter national standards if they wish. The Council advocated the
use of directives over regulations, framework directives instead of detailed measures,
and non-binding measures, i.e. recommendations, where appropriate. The role of the
Community was characterised in terms of 'encouragement and 'co-ordination',
'complementing', 'supplementing' and 'supporting'.83
These guidelines demonstrate the fine line between proportionality and subsidiarity.
Toth goes so far as to state that the Council and Commission tend to confuse the two
04
principles. The distinction can be further explained by examining subsidiarity in
the specific context of directives. Article 189 EC provides that "[a] directive shall be
binding, as to the result to be achieved, but shall leave to national authorities the
choice of form and methods." In an explanatory statement on the Report of the
Committee for Institutional Affairs, the rapporteur observed that the principle of
subsidiarity was already reflected in practice by the Community's preference for
o c
legislating in the form of directives. But directives assign discretion to the Member
States only within the margins of selecting the method of implementation for a
Community objective; the decision to implement that objective has already been
mandated at EC level. Thus, actual legal competence remains with the Community
institutions. The Treaty allocates competence; where competence has been allocated
82 ibid., p. 8.
83 ibid., p. 9.
84 A.G. Toth, "A legal analysis of subsidiarity", in O'Keefe and Twomey (eds.), supra note 36, 37-48
at 38.
85 Extracts reproduced in Cass, supra note 8, p. 1124.
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to both the EC and the Member States, subsidiarity comes into play to establish
which level of authority should exercise its competence for any given situation.
Emiliou argues, however, that "[experience has...shown that this view is too
simplistic. Subsidiarity should also determine instruments through which
Community powers will be exercised."86 But he fails to elaborate on the nature or
substance of this 'experience'. It is far more logical that relevant Treaty provisions,
as well as the nature of the task at hand, should be the determining guide when
deciding which form of legal measure to adopt in particular circumstances, rather
than resorting to the intrinsic politics of subsidiarity.
E. The Application ofSubsidiarity in Practice
Subsidiarity is usually classified as a general principle of Community law, an
interpretation that is strengthened by its location in the Treaty alongside the
established principles of attribution of powers and proportionality. The implications
of this classification are considered infra, as is the ambiguity over its justiciability.
(i) Tests for the Allocation of Competence to the Community
Article 3b(2) provides that for any policy area, apart from areas of exclusive
competence, Community action is justifiable where "...the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, therefore, by
reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community." Everling notes that the original draft of Article 3b(2) was similar in
wording to the 'better attained' principle in Article 130r(4) EEC, but that "...because
this is always a valid assertion, as every problem has some connection with any
other, this clause would have had a centralising effect."87 He describes the adopted
wording as a compromise, which incorporates the additional criterion that the
objective cannot be sufficiently achieved at Member State level.
86
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It has been argued that the wording of the paragraph ('...therefore...by reason of...')
indicates that the 'sufficiently achieved' and 'scale or effects' criteria are
cumulative.88 This means that whether or not Community action is required by
reason of necessity must be established by first judging whether the objective can or
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States. If it cannot, then the 'scale or
effects' test comes into play. The 'better attainment' test in Article 130r(4) EEC has
been criticised for constituting a subjective judgment;89 in that context, it is difficult
to see how the phrase 'sufficiently achieved' can make any difference. In the current
political climate, the priorities of Member States and of the Community are often
perceived as competing interests. Conflicting views on whether stated objectives can
be 'sufficiently achieved' at one level of authority or the other are thus inevitable,
and far from objective. The application of the 'sufficiently achieved' test in the
specific context of language policy under Article 128 EC is addressed in Chapter 4
infra.
The phrase 'scale or effects' is usually taken to imply that an objective must have a
cross-border or transnational dimension before Community action can be justified.
But even then, it cannot be assumed that EC legislation is automatically warranted.90
It must first be shown that Member State action cannot 'sufficiently achieve' the
proposed objective. It is important to note that the phrase does not read 'has not
sufficiently achieved'. The fact that Member States have not already attained the
objective in question could not, therefore, be used to justify Community intervention,
so that potential as well as proven capacity can determine the necessity test from the
Member State perspective. Thus, even where an objective has a transnational
dimension, the tests outlined in Article 3b(2) produce a bias in favour of Member
State action. Emiliou supports this, surmising that "...when the effects of action at the
88
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national level are clearly more advantageous for the Member States or action at the
Union level is more advantageous for the Member States then the task in question
should not be given a dimension which extends beyond national frontiers."91 There
are fundamental difficulties, however, with this interpretation. As noted earlier, the
assumption that 'closer to the citizen' is analogous to the Member States can have
negative repercussions since the interests of national governments can often differ
enormously from the needs of minority and other sub-national groups; steering
attention away from the cross-border dimension of these concerns could actually
preclude necessary Community intervention, on the basis of a restrictive application
of Article 3b(2). Thus, it would be a mistake to analyse the 'scale or effects' tests in
terms such as those used by Emiliou ('given a dimension'); certain issues have a
transnational dimension and must be addressed from this perspective so that
appropriate and effective measures can be introduced and implemented. This echoes
arguments made in Chapter 1 supra, where it was stressed than only centralised
policy can redress the impact on language use patterns caused by centralisation itself.
The two strands of the Article 3b(2) test are, therefore, somewhat problematic on an
individual basis. This suggests that their cumulative effect will not always produce a
09
logical result, as submitted by Toth. ~ Using the example of the purity of bathing
waters in various Member States, he shows that there can be different answers to
both the 'sufficiently achieved' and 'scale or effects' tests when dealing with the
same issue. In the example he has selected, (i.e. the purity of bathing water at some
Scottish beaches), Toth shows that Community action is justifiable in terms of
effectiveness and enforcement, but that the scale of the problem in the broader
European context is negligible, which would recommend Member State action. He
questions the legitimacy of this contradictory result, asking if "...the principle of
subsidiarity [can] be applied when the conditions laid down for its application are
QT
fulfilled in one or some Member States, or only when they are fulfilled in all?" It
91
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was clear from the outset, therefore, that the actual implementation of the tests in
Article 3b(2) required additional consideration. At the official level, comprehensive
guidelines were issued by the European Council at the Edinburgh Summit
(December 1992), in an attempt to redress the deficit ensuing from the ambiguous
drafting of Article 3b. The issues raised therein are considered in detail in Chapter 4
infra, in the context of Article 128 EC.
(ii) Is Subsidiarity Justiciable? 94
As noted earlier, the location of Article 3b EC in Part I of the Treaty, alongside the
principles of proportionality and attribution of powers as well as Article 5, indicates
that subsidiarity is itself a fundamental principle of Community law. If subsidiarity is
justiciable, then the Court has jurisdiction to strike down a measure of Community
law on the grounds that the measure has infringed Article 3b(2). The European
Council guidelines state quite clearly that "...interpretation of the principle, as well as
review of compliance with it by the Community institutions are subject to control by
the Court of Justice, as far as matters falling within the [EC Treaty] are concerned."95
The principal objection to the justiciability of subsidiarity is that it would necessarily
involve the Court in political assessments, a function more correctly left to the other
Community institutions. Deciding whether or not Member States can 'sufficiently
achieve' a Community objective is an inherently ambiguous concept, which cannot
be decided entirely on empirical evidence. It is inevitable that competing interests
and values will be raised and debated. Concern has been expressed that decisions
based on political considerations rather than clear facts would damage the credibility
of the Court's authority in other policy areas. The House of Lords Select Committee
on the European Communities observed, in a 1990 Report, that subsidiarity should
94 Under Article L TEU, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the Preamble, Artice A or Article B
TEU, rendering these provisions non-justiciable. Constantinesco, supra note 6, p. 46, notes that the
issue of justiciability had also been raised regarding Article 12 of the Draft Treaty on European Union.
95
Edinburgh Conclusions, supra note 37, p. 4; the European Parliament has noted that "[jjudicial
guarantees must be given with regard to respect for the principle of subsidiarity." (Resolution on the
Principle of Subsidiarity, 12 July 1990 [1990] OJ C-231/163)
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influence those who take political decisions, but could not have a role in Court
procedures:
[Subsidiarity [cannot] be used as a precise measure against which to judge
legislation. The test of subsidiarity can never be wholly objective or consistent
over time - different people regard collective action as more effective than
individual action in different circumstances...[T]o leave legislation open to
annulment or revision by the European Court on such subjective grounds would
lead to immense confusion and uncertainty in Community law...The principle
[should] be kept clearly in the minds of those who formulate Community
legislation. But this should not be done so as to open the way to pointless
96
litigation after the Council or the Commission have acted.
Bernard notes that denying the justiciability of Article 3b(2) EC "...should appease
those who fear that the Court might become embroiled in political controversies
surrounding the application of subsidiarity, but it also means that subsidiarity on its
own cannot act as a bulwark to protect local values from interference by the
Q7
Community." Conversely, as is the case for some minority languages, accepting the
justiciability of subsidiarity as it is currently interpreted could actually prevent the
protection of local values by the Community, since 'closer to the citizen' has been
inherently equated with 'Member State'.
Some commentators have sought a more adaptable approach, in order to circumvent
the traditional constraints placed on the Court. Steiner argues that the Court is
"...immune from political pressures.,.[I]t is accustomed to applying general
principles of law which are often political in nature."98 This implies that the
credibility of the Court is being underestimated. In particular, it is arguable that the
political neuroses of the Member States with regard to subsidiarity have been
96 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Report on Economic & Monetary
and Political Union, Session 1989-90, 27th Report (London: HMSO, 1990), p. 55.
97
Bernard, supra note 39, p. 654.
98
Steiner, supra note 36, p. 62.
In the context of international agreements, Opinion 1/94 of the Court of Justice has been used as an
illustration of the Court's "...readiness to weigh up [the] issues with an appreciation of the political
realities...." (Harrison, supra note 88, p. 438); see also Emiliou, "The death of exclusive
competence?", (1996) vol. 21:4 European Law Review 294-311; N. Reich, "The 'November
Revolution' of the Court of Justice: Keck, Meng and Audi revisited", (1994) 31 Common Market Law
Review 459-471.
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attributed, erroneously, to the Court. Moreover, the fact that the Court "...is not
always comfortable for the Member States..." should be borne in mind." To
overcome the political motivations associated with the judicial review of
subsidiarity, Lasok identifies the challenges for the Court of Justice as follows:
It is erroneous to think that the Court's function is to protect the rights of
Member States or of the Community. It exists to see that in interpretation and
application of the Treaties the law is observed. Thus it must be neutral and
even-handed. Hitherto the Court has been acting as an instrument of integration,
albeit within the parameters of the Treaties, and there is no reason to suppose
that, after Maastricht, [it] will degenerate into a servant of either centralism or
100
state power.
While it is essential that the reputation of the Court is not sacrificed at the altar of
politicisation, it is equally important that subsidiarity is not applied erratically by the
other institutions, unchecked by the Court of Justice. It has been suggested that the
Court should confine itself to assessing Community measures in terms of 'manifest
error' or 'misuse of powers', in other words, a restricted form of judicial review.101
In the context of Article 3b(2), this means assessing the basic question of whether an
issue falls within exclusive Community competence or not.
In general terms, Toth identifies three conditions for the attribution of justiciability to
a principle of Community law: first, the Court must have jurisdiction to deal with the
issue; second, there must be a form of action whereby the issue can be brought
before the Court {i.e. admissibility); finally, the Court must have the requisite power
to determine the substance of the issue.102 In accordance with its status as a general
principle of EC law, the Court is deemed to have jurisdiction over the principle of
subsidiarity as outlined in Article 3b(2) EC. This jurisdiction relates only to matters
connected with the application and interpretation of the EC Treaty. As regards
admissibility, the European Parliament had sought the insertion of a new Article
172a EC, which would have enabled the institutions as well as the Member States
99
Brittan, supra note 1, p. 569.
100
Lasok, supra note 53, p. 1229.
101 Toth, supra note 10, p. 1102.
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"...after the definitive adoption of an act and before its entry into force, to request the
Court to verify...whether this act does not exceed the limits of the powers of the
Community."103 This proposal for a priori judicial review was not, however,
adopted.
Subsidiarity could be referred to in two existing procedures for judicial review i.e.
direct actions initiated in the Court and rulings on Article 177 EC referrals. A direct
action based on Article 173 EC involves the annulment of a Community measure,
usually one adopted by the Council, on the grounds that the measure exceeds the
Community's powers.104 It is especially likely that this action would be taken by a
Member State outvoted in the Council on a qualified majority voting issue. Other
possibilities include an action for damages under Articles 178 and 215(2) EC, which
are discussed infra in the context of retroactivity. An action may also be taken
against a Member State by the Commission (Article 169 EC) or by another Member
State (Article 170 EC), where the Court reviews national legislation in subject areas
that come within exclusive Community competence. A matter of some controversy is
whether legal consequences can be incurred where the Council has decided, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, that an issue should be dealt with by
Member State action. It is not clear whether the Member States are then legally
obliged to implement the Community objective under Article 5 EC. Weatherill has
asserted that the wider the Community competence, the more definite the impact of
Article 5 on Member State responsibility to take action.105 In contrast to the political
climate surrounding the introduction of Article 3b, this philosophy presumes shared
values and objectives. But can failure by the Member States to fulfil their obligations
in these circumstances generate legal consequences under Articles 169 or 170 EC?
Palacio Gonzalez disputes this, arguing that while Member States are free to act
102
Toth, "Is subsidiarity justiciable?", (1994) 19 European Law Review 268-285.
103 ibid., p. 273.
104
cfi Toth, ibid., pp. 274-5, on why acts of the Commission or Parliament are not generally subjected
to Article 173 EC actions.
105
Weatherill, supra note 79, p. 31.
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where the Community has not exercised its competence, it is untenable that
obligations should arise from Member State failure to act.106 But this interpretation
creates an unacceptable prejudice in favour of Member States, who appear free to
disregard accepted Community objectives after the fact of their formal inclusion in
the EC Treaty. Harrison does point out that since there can be no obligation on the
Community itself to act even where subsidiarity would justify action, then,
conversely, there can be no consequences for Member States in the same situation.107
Bernard, however, emphasises that "[a]t no point does Article 3b contemplate that
proposed action might not be met at all."108 This implies that the onus to act, if
removed from the Community, must surely be transferred to the Member States, but
Bernard rejects this conjecture, stating that it cannot be considered a legally
enforceable duty under Article 3b since that provision applies only to Community
and not to Member State action. His interpretation is open to challenge, however, on
the grounds that Article 3b(2) specifically calls Member State capacity into question
by virtue of the 'sufficiently achieved' test. Furthermore, even without legal
consequences, the legitimate quesitons raised dispel the misnomer that subsidiarity
can somehow let Member States off the hook in respect of Community objectives
that have already been ratified.
References under Article 177 EC may be relevant to subsidiarity in two ways. First,
where a private citizen is involved in litigation before a domestic court, the question
of whether the Community measure in question is valid may have to be determined,
in accordance with Article 3b, thus requiring the opinion of the Court of Justice.
Alternatively, national legislation may be called into question, to determine that its
subject matter does not fall within exclusive Community competence. In these
instances, the Court of Justice would be required to issue guidelines on the division
of powers generally and on the principle of subsidiarity.
106 Palacio Gonzalez, supra note 76, p. 365.
107
Harrison, supra note 88, p. 433.
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In genera] terms, substantive jurisdiction for judicial review is based on one
fundamental question: does the issue in question fall within exclusive Community
competence or not? This is a justiciable legal question, since Community
competence is conferred by the EC Treaty. While the conclusions of the European
Council on the application and interpretation of subsidiarity may be taken into
account by the Court of Justice, the Court is not under any legal obligation to adopt
these non-binding guidelines. It can look at the legal basis of the measure as well as
the statement of reasons given in the preamble which, in accordance with European
Council guidelines, justifies its adoption.109 If a matter is deemed not to be within
exclusive Community competence, however, the question becomes, can the objective
be better achieved at Community or Member State level? It is at this stage that
economic and political as well as legal criteria are involved in the application of
subsidiarity. Thus Toth concludes: "[t]he Court has only one power: to annul; but it
cannot substitute its own decision for the challenged act, nor vary or correct its
terms. By so doing...under the disguise of judicial review, it would assume the role
of the supreme legislature in the Community."110
Subsidiarity is also relevant to the supremacy of Community law, where there are
conflicting EC and national measures. This situation involves a determination of
which level of authority had competence to act in the first place. But once this has
been resolved, given that the subsidiarity does not call into question the powers
conferred on the Community by the EC Treaty, the European Council has concluded
that the principle of supremacy of EC law is not affected.111
108 Bernard, supra note 39, p. 652.
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Edinburgh Conclusions, supra note 37: this is discussed further in Chapter 4 infra.
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Toth, supra note 102, p. 283.
111
Edinburgh Conclusions, supra note 37, p. 3, para. 4.
From another perspective, Schilling, supra note 1, argues that subsidiarity does place certain
limitations on the supremacy of EC law; he notes that "...a uniform application of EC law throughout
the Community remains...a worthwhile effort...[but] the express sanctioning of the subsidiarity
principle in the TEU has pushed a different point of view to the fore, i.e. that matters should be dealt
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(iii) Is Subsidiarity Retrospective in Application?
In Annex 2 of the European Council Conclusions, the Commission reviewed "...all
proposals pending before the Council and Parliament in light of the subsidiarity
principle."112 In addition, the Commission identified a number of existing measures
that it intended to scrutinise in light of the renewed emphasis on the imposition of
minimum standards. This review of existing as well as proposed legislation, based
entirely on Article 3b EC, raises a potentially serious question in terms of
retroactivity. If subsidiarity is deemed retrospectively applicable, Community
measures that had been considered valid could be challenged, on the grounds that
Member State action would have 'sufficiently achieved' the objective in question.
Toth explores this possibility in the context of actions for damages under Articles
178 and 215(2) EC.113 The implementation of EC legislation sometimes requires
heavy financial expenditure on the part of the Member States. If measures are
repealed on the basis of subsidiarity, certain expenses will no longer have a valid
legal basis. This could, in turn, amount to grounds for claiming compensation.
Should this occur, the retroactivity of Article 3b(2) would have to be confirmed by
the Court of Justice. But where would a transfer of competence to the Member States
leave whole areas of law already developed and implemented at EC level? This
scenario would have grave consequences for legal certainty within the European
Community more generally. It is far more logical to consider subsidiarity in
connection with particular policies arising from the adoption of the Maastricht
Treaty, adding further support to the view that the principle will have its greatest
impact on the new areas of EC competence.
(iv) Subsidiarity and the Community Institutions: Practical Effects
The Edinburgh Summit Document outlines envisaged roles for all of the institutions
in the practical implementation of subsidiarity.114 The European Council foresaw a
with as closely as possible to the citizen. This point of view requires some restrictions to be put on
Community law supremacy." (p. 239)
112
Edinburgh Conclusions, supra note 37, Annex 2, p. 1.
113 Toth, supra note 102, p. 276.
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'crucial role' for the Commission in this context, in light of its power of initiative. In
particular, the Commission is required, in a specific recital, to justify in relation to
subsidiarity, each initiative taken. The Commission was also given the responsibility
of issuing an annual report on the application of Article 3b, for submission to the
European Council and the European Parliament. The Council is required to take a
decision on the compatibility of a measure with subsidiarity at the same time as its
substantive decision on the measure itself. The voting requirements applicable to the
substantive issue also apply to the decision on subsidiarity. Where appropriate, in
accordance with Articles 189b and 189c EC, the European Parliament will be
informed of the Council's position on subsidiarity in respect of any particular
measure.
In addition to the Commission's initial review of existing and proposed legislation,
Peterson has observed that the introduction of subsidiarity has had a continuing
impact on procedures in the Commission: it now attaches specific statements to its
proposals, to justify Community implementation of the proposed measure, in
accordance with Article 3b EC.115 At the 1993 Copenhagen Summit, the European
Council noted specifically that, on a practical level, it is the Commission that
determines whether proposals should be introduced in accordance with the
procedures outlined at Edinburgh.116 It is difficult to quantify the effect subsidiarity
has actually had on policy initiative in practice. It is often felt that the principle has
generated more hot air than anything else, and that its impact in reality is negligible.
But it is submitted that subsidiarity is sometimes employed superficially, to limit
otherwise justifiable EC action, without a substantive examination of whether its
application would, in fact, preclude Community intervention: this is discussed
further in Chapter 6 infra, given the self-censorship undertaken by the Commission
in respect of the ambit of its minority language initiatives.
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Peterson, supra note 41, p. 131.
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6. CONCLUSION
Article 3b has been associated with confusion far more than it has with clarity. It is
tempting to write it off as an ongoing storm in a political teacup, with little practical
relevance or effect.117 Perhaps the principal misconception with regard to
subsidiarity is that it could somehow have solved the political dilemma which led to
its introduction into EC law in the first place. But Toth points to the result of the
Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty as a firm rejection of this delusion.
The elastic concept of subsidiarity lends itself to multiple interpretations. The
holders of each particular view are wholly convinced that the principle will protect
their interests above all competing concerns. But it is exceptionally unwise to build a
defence on such a precarious foundation. In the light of the fundamental dispute over
exclusive and non-exclusive competences in the European context, "[t]he slavish
transposition into this system of the principle of subsidiarity...is a mistake which is
bound to cause insoluble conflicts and problems."119 Even the Commission has
acknowledged the obscurity of the doctrine, stating in plain terms that subsidiarity
may not work in practice simply because each Member State has its own entrenched
view of what the principle actually means.120 But the very fact of its existence in the
EC Treaty, and in particular its conceivable justiciability, indicates that its potential
effect cannot be ignored. Because of this, subsidiarity is something of a looming
spectre in contemporary EC law. This concern is particularly acute in the context of
minority language policy; given the enduring political sensitivity associated with
language issues, it is entirely possible that the manipulation of subsidiarity could
produce its first landmark significance at the expense of objectively justifiable
Community intervention in this sphere, discussed in Chapter 4 infra. But equally,
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Everling, supra note 5, at 1070, notes that the relevant provision in the German constitution "...a
similar clause, has proved to have hardly any practical meaning."
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Toth, supra note 10, p. 1104; the Common Market Law Review, supra note 29, p. 244, notes that
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subsidiarity can require co-ordinated policy-making in this domain; perhaps it is this
truth more than any other that haunts the Member States. What is clear, however, is
that the principle will only be applied usefully when it is not viewed as the weapon
of any level of authority, when the merits of each particular policy issue take
precedence over politics.
120
cf. de Burca, supra note 29, p. 266.
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CHAPTER 4
LANGUAGE AND COMMUNITY CULTURAL POLICY
1. INTRODUCTION
The fourth recital of the Preamble to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) outlines
the desire of the Member States to "...deepen the solidarity between their peoples
while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions." Article 3 EC sets out
functions for the Community, including, at paragraph (p), "...a contribution to
education and training of quality and to the flowering of cultures of the Member
States." Title EX or Article 128 EC (introduced by the TEU) substantiates the role of
the Community in cultural policy:
1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the
same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging co-operation
between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their
action in the following areas:
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of
the European peoples;
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
- non-commercial cultural exchanges;
- artistic and literary creation, including in the audio-visual sector.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster co-operation with third
countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture,
in particular the Council of Europe.
4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under
other provisions of this Treaty.
5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this
article, the Council:
- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189b and after
consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures,
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States.
The Council shall act unanimously throughout the procedures referred to in
Article 189b;
- acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt
recommendations.
There was no equivalent provision in the EEC Treaty but the adoption of Article 128
represents "...a codification of activities already pursued at least tangentially by the
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Community...."1 It can, therefore, be assumed that the provision was introduced to
clarify an existing but ambiguous policy direction. It has also been suggested that
Articles 3(p) and 128 EC should be read in light of Article F(l) TEU, which relates
to respect by the Union for the national identities of the Member States.2
The Treaty provisions listed above demonstrate an attempt by the Community to
balance its involvement in cultural affairs with the maintenance of an appropriate
level of autonomy for the Member States. In reality, this has not been achieved.
Article 128, for example, has been exceptionally badly formulated. The Member
States were especially concerned to establish the boundaries of EC competence, so
that the focus is placed squarely on what the Community cannot do rather than on
what it could do, or indeed, on what it has already achieved in this domain. At the
most basic level, culture is not actually defined. Lane observes succinctly that "...its
'flowering' [is] more botanical than justiciable...",3 leaving its interpretation obscure
and wholly dependent on subjective analyses. Curiously, Dashwood lauds the new
Treaty provisions, including Article 128, as examples of "...tight drafting [which]
would seem to reflect a lack of confidence in...institutional self-restraint...regrettably
but understandably....I believe it is a style friends of the Community should favour."
It is difficult to imagine, however, that 'friends' of the Community would welcome
an at once ambiguous and restrictive provision that reflects neither the policies
developed by the Community to date nor contemporary European cultural concerns.
The unfettered optimism displayed by proponents of an EC minority language policy,
in respect of the potential of Article 128 to bolster and legitimate their claims, seems
' Robert Lane, "New Community competences under the Maastricht Treaty", (1993) 30 Common
Market Law Review, 939-979 at 944.
2 AnneMarie Loman, Kamiel Mortelmans, Harry Post and Stewart Watson, Culture and Community
Law: Before and After Maastricht, (Deventer, Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1992),
(hereafter Loman et al), p. 190.
3 Lane, supra note 1, p. 953.
4 Alan Dashwood, "The limits of European Community powers", (1996) 21 European Law Review,
113-128 at 122.
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misplaced, at least from a superficial reading of the provision. An inherent tension is
reflected by the idea that the Community is seeking to foster a common European
consciousness to generate increased popular support for the development of the
European Union. But while referring to a certain extent to common cultural heritage
and history, to emphasise synthesis and unity, the Community has been careful to
foster concurrently an appreciation of and respect for diversity. This has both cultural
and political import. From the cultural perspective, the diverse cultures, traditions
and languages of Europe are a vital component of its driving cultural energy.
Ensuring that diversity can thrive in the throes of economic and political
centralisation is thus not only an interest but a responsibility for the Community, as
argued in Chapter 1 supra. In the political sense, guarantees of respect for diversity
have astute symbolic significance, as an additional reassurance that state sovereignty
is not being consumed by the European ideal. Again, this aspect of Article 128 is
particularly enhanced when read in conjunction with Article F(l) TEU. But these
seemingly polar ideals can actually be combined: there is nothing in either Article
128 EC or Article F(l) TEU to prevent the encouragement of a common
consciousness based on respect for diversity, on a common appreciation of
difference. 'Common' does not coincide intrinsically with assimilation. The
challenge now faced by the Community is the implementation of the objectives of
Article 128 EC in a way that respects the sovereignty of the Member States yet does
not compromise economic and political ambition to a degree of ineffectiveness. The
wording of Article 128 itself, however, may be a fundamental obstacle in this
context, exacerbated by the requirement of unanimous voting in the Council: these
issues are discussed in detail infra. Weatherill, however, takes a pragmatically
optimistic view: "...however anodyne the detailed provisions of the new titles
introduced by the TEU may appear, their real importance lies in their existence,
which generates obligations to pursue the policy sketched by the Treaty."5 It is on this
basis that Article 128 is analysed, so that its potential is not smothered by limitations,
5
Stephen Weatherill, Subsidiarity and Responsibility, (University of Nottingham, Research Paper,
1992), p. 5.
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which certainly exist, but which may not be inherently fatal to the development of an
effective Community cultural policy.
2. DEFINING CULTURE
As will become apparent, Community policy to date has been concentrated on what
might be termed the 'tangible' aspects of culture i.e. cultural property, such as art
treasures, archaeological heritage, literature and, more recently, the media,
particularly film and television. Any measures taken by the institutions in favour of
minority languages, described in Chapter 2 supra, have been largely divorced from
cultural policy per se. It must be established at the outset, then, that this distinction is
grounded in practice rather than philosophy or necessity: otherwise, Article 128 EC
would be innately irrelevant to language concerns
Surprisingly, McMahon, author of one of the few texts dealing primarily with EC
cultural policy, does not define the scope of the term itself.6 In contrast, Loman et al
put forward a broad interpretation of culture at the outset, as including:
...all activities which in the Member States are commonly considered as being a
legitimate object of their cultural policies, such as the promotion of the
contemporary arts (including film and audio-visual products, literature, dance
and ballet, music, architecture and drama), the preservation of the national
cultural heritage and the promotion of the national language and cultural
identity.7
In this definition, language concerns are included along with the more traditional,
tangible elements of cultural policy, but only in terms of promoting 'the national'
language and cultural identity, which could exclude minority languages. Church and
Phinnemore develop a similar, multifaceted definition of culture, which can "...mean
either the fine arts and literature or, as in the Community context, those wider
practices and patterns which help to define national identity."8 But this definition
6
Joseph A. McMahon, Education and Culture in European Community Law, (London; New Jersey:
The Athlone Press, 1995); c.f. also reviews by Julian Lonbay, (1996) vol. 21:1 European Law Review
88-89, and Catherine Seville, (1995) vol. 54:3 Cambridge Law Journal 635-637.
7 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. x of Preface (emphasis added).
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does not refer to just one 'national' language. The promotion of linguistic diversity
can constitute a central feature of a state's 'national' identity, as evidenced by the
relevant constitutional provisions of many EC Member States, listed in Appendix I.
The protection of culture on the basis of its embodiment of identity is further
advocated by Roberts, in the specific context of cultural goods.9 She argues that
cultural property should only be retained at national level in limited circumstances,
where the objects in question 'capture the spirit of the nation' or have an ability to
'capture and promote the identity of a culture'. Significantly, Roberts admits that
"[ojbjects rarely meet this definition."10 Language, on the other hand, is a clear
example of a concept that fulfils the conditions. Following on from this, di Lusignano
argues that regional languages exemplify regional cultures." This was recognised by
the Commission itself, in the context of mother tongue education for the children of
migrant workers, where it confirmed that "[t]he Commission justifies the teaching of
mother tongues to migrants as part of the TEU's guarantees of protection of national
identities, by extending the concept of national identity to include the cultural
identities of all citizens of a Member State."12 This express emphasis on pluralism in
the cultural context is another positive indicator of sympathy at Community level for
minority as well as national languages. Moreover, it further displaces the notion that
'national', in the context of culture, identity or language, must always be read
literally.
8 Clive H. Church and David Phinnemore, European Union and European Community: A Handbook
and Commentary on the Post-Maastricht Treaties, (Hemel-Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994),
p. 507; cf. also A. Forrest, "La dimension culturelle de la communaute europeene: Les ministres de la
culture explorent le terrain", (1987) 307 Revue du Marche Commun, 320-332 at 327.
Joseph H. Kaiser summarises that since "...Europe is rich and pluralistic in its culture, the culture of
the European policy should be pluralistic too, and the dimensions should be many." [from "Final
conclusions" in Jiirgen Schwarze and Henry G. Schermers (eds.), Structure and Dimensions of
European Community Policy, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988), 237-8 at 238.
9 Elizabeth L. Roberts, "Cultural policy in the European Community: A case against extensive national
retention", (1993) vol. 28:1 Texas Journal of International Law, 191-228 at 192 et seq.
10
ibid., p. 207.
" Livio Missir di Lusignano, "Communaute et culture", (1994) 376 Revue du Marche Commun, 181-
194 at 188.
12 Commission of the European Community, Report on the Education of Migrants' Children in the
European Union, COM (94) 80 Final (Brussels, 25 March 1994), p. 6.
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In arriving at their own interpretation of 'culture', Loman et al distinguish between
traditional and anthropological approaches. Prott is referred to as epitomising the
traditional position; he defines culture as "...the highest intellectual achievements of
human beings: the musical, philosophical, literary, artistic and architectural works,
techniques and rituals which have most inspired humanity and are seen by
communities as their best achievements."13 The society-based, anthropological
definition is typified by Guillaumin:
...the totality of the knowledge and practices, both intellectual and material, of
each of the particular groups of a society, and - at a certain level - of a society
itself as a whole. From food to dress, from household techniques to industrial
techniques, from forms of politeness to mass media, from work rhythm to the
learning of family rules, all human practices, all invented and manufactured
materials are concerned and constitute, in their relationships and totality,
'culture'.14
The preservation and promotion of minority languages fits more with this second
approach. It may be recalled, however, that Loman et al, while their interpretation is
based more on the traditional definition of culture, adapted that outlook to include an
express reference to language concerns. Thus, a pragmatic definition that is not tied
firmly to either the traditional or anthropological school appears to be the ideal
solution to the question of defining culture. And in the absence of express Treaty
guidance, flexibility and pragmatism can similarly form the basis of an appropriate
definition of culture for the purposes of Community law. A contemporary conception
of culture in the EC context has been expressed by O'Toole:
Culture is not merely about works of art, and it follows that the cultural
dimension of the European Community is about much more than aesthetics.
Culture is the ground on which people are empowered to participate in their
society. Culture is both the social contribution to the formation of the individual
person, and the collective tools - values, language, means of communication,
ideas of excellence, the imaginative sympathy by which one individual can
make sense of the experience of another individual - by which an individual can
contribute to society. The question of culture and the European Community is
13 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 1, referring to Lyndel V. Prott, "Cultural rights as peoples' rights in
international law", in James Crawford (ed.), The Rights of Peoples (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992),
93-106 at 94.
14 Loman et al, ibid., referring to C. Guillaumin, "Women and cultural values: Classes according to sex
and their relationship to culture in industrial society", (1979) Cultures 41.
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therefore intimately bound up with the question of democracy and the European
Community.15
Thus, language can clearly come within the remit of cultural policy, in both general
and EC contexts. But Community policy to date has not reflected this diversity of
philosophy. Following a summary of the measures developed by the institutions in
the field of culture, the potential inclusion of language into EC cultural policy is
assessed, in respect of the substantive provisions of Article 128 EC.
3. COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE FIELD OF CULTURE TO DATE
Given that the EEC Treaty did not contain any explicit reference to culture, it is not
surprising that direct action in this field before the introduction of Article 128 EC
was relatively piecemeal and arbitrary. The institutions were unsure of the parameters
of this fundamental yet uncharted policy area since, at that time, the Community was
clearly acting on the "...fringes of legal competence."16 The Member States,
undoubtedly influenced by the corrosive impact of European integration on other
fringe policy areas, were anxious to curb the extension of central authority and were
especially concerned about the impact of a Community cultural policy on their
national sovereignty. This politically charged atmosphere coloured the background of
the initial measures adopted towards the formation of an EC cultural policy.
17
A. Chronological Development ofEC Cultural Policy
Prior to the inauguration of the EEC, the General Report of the Hague Congress
(1948) confirmed that any model for European union would respect ideological
pluralism, cultural diversity and the liberty and rights of all human beings.18 This
15 Fintan O'Toole, "Culture and media policy", in Patrick Keatinge (ed.), Ireland and EC Membership
Evaluated, (London: Pinter, 1991), 270-276 at 270-1.
16
Seville, supra note 6, p. 636.
17 Since the Community did not generally include language issues in its cultural policy measures, this
section merely summarises the principal developments; for more detail on cultural policy in general,
cf. McMahon, supra note 6, Loman et al, supra note 2 and Roberts, supra note 9.
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philosophy, which foreshadows the presently evolving ideology of European unity,
reflected the principal concerns of post-war Europe, but its express realisation was
not of immediate concern to the architects of the then primarily economic treaties.
Nevertheless, McMahon traces the original basis for Community cultural policy to
Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome.19 This provision confirms that prohibitions or
restrictions on imports and exports may be justified on the grounds of protection of
'national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value'. These first
concessions to EC cultural policy are confined to the protection of cultural property.
But from early times, both the European Parliament and European Council envisaged
a broader role for the Community in cultural affairs.20 Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s,
cultural co-operation was seen as an aspect of political unity more generally, but
economic and other political concerns dominated, if not monopolised, the
Community agenda.
Eventually, the Commission codified the objectives of these general policy
statements in a series of official documents and declarations. The first of these,
Community Action in the Cultural Sector, was issued in 1977.21 The aspects of
cultural policy listed as coming within Community competence included free trade in
cultural goods, prevention of the theft of cultural goods, the preservation of
archaeological heritage, free movement and establishment for cultural workers,
taxation in the cultural sector and the harmonisation of copyright laws. Despite this
seemingly comprehensive range of issues, Massart-Pierard identifies the 1977
Communication as the first attempt by the Community to restrict the definition of
18
cf. Fran£oise Massart-Pierard, "Limites et enjeux d'une politique culturelle pour la communaute
europeene", (1986) 293 Revue du Marche Commun, 34-40 at 34.
19 McMahon, supra note 6, p. 12; in a different context, Article 131 EEC refers to 'cultural
development' in respect of associations with non-European countries. In contrast, Loman et al, supra
note 2, p. 1, state that there is no cultural object or purpose whatsoever in the Treaty of Rome.
20
cf., for example, Resolution of the European Parliament calling for a Community policy on culture
([1974] OJ C-62/5); statement issued by the Summit of Heads of State and Government at The Hague
in 1969, recognising the need to preserve Europe as 'an exceptional seat of development, culture and
progress' {cf. McMahon, supra note 6, p. 122).
21 EC Bulletin Supp. 6/77.
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culture; the scope of the 'cultural sector' was limited to persons and undertakings
involved in the production and distribution of cultural goods and services, thereby
already coming within general economic policy to a large extent.23 In this context,
McMahon notes that "...Community competence in the cultural sector was thus seen
as an extension of the economic and social provisions of the Treaty...."24 The
promotion of transnational co-operation between the Member States and the cultural
establishments therein, as well as potential co-operation with the Council of Europe,
was seen as the most appropriate function for the EC in the cultural sector.
A draft Council Resolution, based on these proposals from the Commission, was
drawn up but not adopted, notwithstanding support from both the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. Despite this setback, the
Commission went on to publish Stronger Community Action in the Cultural Sector in
1982.25 Again, the document focused on trade in cultural goods, free movement and
establishment for cultural workers, enlarging the cultural audience and the
conservation of archaeological heritage. Notwithstanding the title of the
communication, the Commission itself was careful to point out that the role of the
Community in cultural issues was a limited one:
There is no pretension to exert a direct influence on culture itself or to launch a
European cultural policy; what stronger Community action in the cultural sector
means in effect is linking its four constituents...more closely to the economic
and social roles which the Treaty assigns to the Community, to the resources -
mainly legislative - that it provides, and to various Community policies.26
But the 1982 document, in spite of its limited philosophy, did have important
practical consequences. McMahon notes that a series of informal meetings between
22 Massart-Pierard, supra note 18, p. 37.
23 The Document describes Community support for culture as "...gradually creating a more propitious
economic and social environment." (supra note 21, p. 5); culture as an element of economic policy in
general is discussed further in section B infra.
24
McMahon, supra note 6, p. 128.
25 EC Bulletin Supp. 6/82.
26 ibid., p. 32.
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the Ministers for Culture of the Member States began to take place in 1982, followed,
in 1984, by the first formal Council meeting of this kind. Furthermore, the
discussions at these meetings had evolved somewhat from the original view that
cultural policy was just a peripheral aspect of economic policy in general. In 1983, a
Solemn Declaration on European Identity, issued at the European Council meeting in
Stuttgart, had identified the need for widespread awareness of a 'common European
cultural heritage', to boost public affirmation of European unity.27 This text
introduced a new impetus for the pursuit of cultural co-operation, as an element of
the far broader attempt to legitimise intensifying economic and political union. The
formal Council meeting of the Ministers for Culture in 1984 was seen as a crucial
step in the implementation of the 1983 Declaration.
Language issues did merit some consideration at these meetings, usually in the
context of promoting language education and translation facilities. This conservative
theme may be contrasted with the increasing momentum in favour of minority
languages evident within the European Parliament at this time, detailed in Chapter 2
supra. It must be stressed, however, that consideration by the Council of any aspect
of cultural policy was still at a tentative stage. Legal competence and financial
difficulties were obvious restrictions, combined with the suspicions of Member
States who feared the seemingly inevitable inculcation of an assimilative
'Euroculture'. The decision of the European Court of Justice in Groener was
something of a mixed blessing in this context: the Court of Justice acknowledged
relative Member State autonomy in the determination of language policy, yet
affirmed its own jurisdiction to assess the resulting national policies for conformity
with the fundamental principles of Community law. 28
The growing significance of cultural issues within the EC was reflected by the
inclusion of the following provision in the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union:
27 Bull.EC 1983/6.
28 Case 379/87 Groener v. Minister for Education and the City of Dublin Vocational Education
Committee, [1989] 2 ECR 3967, analysed in Chapter 2 supra.
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1) The Union may take measures to:
- promote cultural and linguistic understanding between citizens of the Union;
- publicise the cultural life of the Union both at home and abroad;
- establish youth exchange programmes.
2) The European University Institute and the European Foundation shall
become establishments of the Union.
3) Laws shall lay down rules governing approximation of the laws of copyright
and the free movement of cultural goods.29
In the context of the scope of cultural policy, the drafters proceeded along much the
same lines as the Commission to that date, but cultural and linguistic issues were
expressly linked as a joint concern. The emphasis on 'mutual understanding' is
firmly rooted in the 'common cultural heritage' ideology that would, it was assumed,
promote integration and unity. This approach was confirmed by the 1985 Adonnino
Report on a 'People's Europe'.30 Grounded in similar terminology, and with the
added incentive of completing the internal market by 1992, A Fresh Boost for
Culture in the European Community was published by the Commission in 1987.31
Aside from reiterating most of the previous policy objectives, this communication
significantly strengthened the role of the Community in the audio-visual and
technological sectors. Efforts on behalf of the book sector were intensified, with
specific reference to minority languages regarding the translation of important
literary works.32 Once again, the Community styled itself as the co-ordinator of
national and regional cultural authorities.
In its final communication before the ratification of the TEU, New Prospects for
Community Cultural Action in 1992, the Commission urged that renewed
consideration be given to the role of the Community in cultural affairs, given the
'unprecedented opportunity for cultural co-operation and support' which existed at
29 [1984] OJ C-77/33.
30 Bull.EC Supp. 7/85; cf. p. 21, where it was noted that it is "...through action in the areas of culture
and communication, which are essential to European identity and the Community's image in the minds
of its people, that support for the advancement of Europe can and must be sought."
31 EC Bulletin Supp. 4/87.
32 This objective was supplemented by a separate Council Resolution - [1987] OJ C-309/3 - and deals
with translation of works both into and from minority languages.
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this time. Reflecting the ideology of Article 128 itself, the Commission directed its
attention towards three areas: a 'Community contribution to the flowering of culture
in the frontier-free area', promotion of the common cultural heritage and co¬
operation with non-Member countries and international organisations. The
Commission justified the retention of a restrictive cultural agenda on the basis of past
Community action, since it could not yet predict whether Article 128 would justify a
broadening of that agenda. At a formal Council meeting that same year, the Ministers
for Culture went further, however, stating expressly that the cultural agenda of the
Community was open to expansion.34 It was noted inter alia that future Community
programmes may specifically include "...increasing awareness of different cultures
and safeguarding the Community's linguistic diversity, as well as promoting respect
for shared values."35 In objective terms, the 'Community's linguistic diversity' must
include the substantial contribution of its minority languages, although this is not
stated explicitly. Whether this view is shared by the Council remains to be seen but
the claim is further substantiated by the Commission's report on Linguistic
Minorities in Countries belonging to the European Communities, published in
1986. The Commission advocated both the constitutional recognition of minority
languages at domestic level and the implementation of that status in a real and
practical sense. Despite this progressive theoretical approach, however, the
recommendations for Community action, issued at the conclusion of the Report,
focus on more traditionally acceptable activities such as support for study/research




35 ibid., para. 4.
36 Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, Linguistic Minorities in Countries belonging to the European
Community, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1986).
37 ibid., p. 234.
38 ibid., p. 235-240.
162
The absence of a provision on culture in the Single European Act illustrates the
ultimate hollowness behind the series of documents published by the Commission in
the 1980s, described by de Witte as follows:
[G[overnments like to adopt grandiose declarations on the imperative need of
promoting European identity. They also manage to agree on those
implementing measures that are at the same time highly symbolic and highly
innocuous. But when they are presented with more ambitious, and arguably
more effective, proposals which it is perfectly within their powers to adopt,
they decline to do so. The impression therefore prevails that the policy of
promoting European identity is no more than an effort to spread a favourable
image of Europe, without any substance backing it. Such a pretence is of
dubious value, and might even be counter-productive.39
The superficiality of Article 128 EC, discussed infra, has confirmed the validity of de
Witte's observations. This cautious evolution of cultural priorities within the
Community reflects the ongoing compromise between the forces of unity and
diversity. The significance attached to the common cultural heritage of Europe by the
Commission and Council, for example, did little to alleviate the misgivings of certain
Member States, who feared the promotion of assimilation in the absence of any co¬
ordinated response to the contrary from the institutions. The scant, albeit increasing,
references to respect for cultural diversity did not clarify its relationship to the
broader ambition of European integration. The separateness of the European
Parliament's campaign for minority language recognition illustrates pointedly the
lack of cohesion in Community policy. The construction of Community cultural
policy in this manner perpetuated rather than redressed the employment of a
restrictive interpretation of culture. Before outlining the implementation of the
Commission's publications, culture is considered in the broader context of
fundamental Community law.
B. The Application ofGeneral Community Law to Culture
It was noted that most measures taken by the EC in the cultural sphere were merely a
redirected application of the general rules and principles set out in the Treaty of
Rome. Because of this, Member State cultural policies, ostensibly immune from the
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realisation of the common market, have been affected "...more or less by
coincidence...", independently of the culture-oriented communications published by
the institutions.40 This section details some examples of these instances. Seville
argues, however, that "[a]t points of intersection, the economic dimensions tend to
take priority."41
De Witte outlines a number of cultural policy areas affected in a peripheral way by
the implementation of Community freedoms.42 He notes, for example, that the
abolition of customs duties applies equally to trade in cultural goods, that workers in
the cultural sector come within the rules on free movement, establishment and
provision of services, and that the cultural sector is not exempt from competition
rules.43 In addition, he stresses that Community law has not only abolished
restrictions in this field; it has also imposed positive obligations on Member States,
such as Article 48(2) of Regulation 574/72, which entitles migrant workers to receive
certain administrative documents in their own language. Similarly, Directive 77/486
requires that Member States should take appropriate measures to ensure that children
of migrant workers are educated in the languages of both the host state and the state
r • • 44of origin.
39 Bruno de Witte, "Building Europe's image and identity", in A. Rijksbaron, W.H. Roobol and M.
Weisglas (eds.), Europe from a Cultural Perspective, (The Hague: Nijgh en Van Ditmar Universitair,
1987), 132-139 at 137.
40 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. ix.
41
Seville, supra note 6, p. 637.
42 De Witte, "The scope of Community powers in education and culture in the light of subsequent
practice", in Roland Bieber and Georg Reiss (eds.), The Dynamics of European Law, (Baden-Baden:
Nomos, 1987), 261-278 at 264-5.
For more detail on the intersection of the Community freedoms with cultural issues, cf. Loman et al,
supra note 2, as follows: free movement of goods at 24-50; free movement of workers at 50-66;
freedom of establishment at 67-75; freedom to provide services at 75-90 and free movement of capital
at 90-93.
43
cf. also Loman et al, supra note 2, Chapter 3, which deals with restrictive agreements and practices,
dominant positions and merger control; note, however, Article 92(3)(d) EC, which sets out the special
position on state aid in the cultural context.
44 De Witte, supra note 42, argues that "...granting the right to mother-tongue education to children of
Community workers may well put under pressure those states that deny the same right to their own
national minorities." He observes that such policies have particular effect on regional-unilingual
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The provision of state aid is particularly relevant to the cultural sector. Although
subsidies of this nature are now condoned specifically by Article 92(3)(d) EC, both
individual governments and the EC itself have long granted financial aid to cultural
undertakings. In any event, it was argued in Chapter 1 supra that financial aid of this
kind is unlikely to affect the requisite criterion of trade between Member States. On
the particularly sensitive issue of state aid for the film and television industries,
Loman et al cite an approval by the Commission for aid granted by the British
Government for the production of programmes in the Welsh and Scots Gaelic
languages.45 Provision of state financial support for minority language initiatives,
such as the foundation of the Irish language Teilifis na Gaeilge television channel in
1996, is extremely important for the maintenance of both quality programming and
cultural diversity. In the context of the 1989 Council Directive on cross-boundary
broadcasting, the Commission reached a bilateral agreement with the French
Government in respect of its domestic quota on the broadcasting of French works.46
The Commission emphasised, however, that while the Community acknowledges the
role of television in the development of national linguistic policies, such policies
must remain within the limits of Community law and, in particular, must be in
proportion to the linguistic objective to be achieved. The bilateral agreement might
not, then, survive interpretation by the Court of Justice, since it is arguable that the
French language, in light of its prevalence and status in France, does not merit the
employment of such stringent protectionist policies.
Loman et al refer to a written question, put by several MEPs, to illustrate the
potential application of the public policy derogation from free movement to language
issues.47 The general principle is that freedom of movement should be restricted only
systems, e.g. Belgium. But Cullen notes that difficulties of implementation have rendered the Directive
virtually ineffective in practice: Holly Cullen, "From migrants to citizens? European Community
policy on intercultural education", (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 109-129
at 121-125.
45 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 138; [1992] OJ C-23/3; (1991) Europe No. 5530, 8/9 July, p. 13.
46 3 October 1989, [1989] OJ L-298/23; cf. Loman et al, ibid., p. 156-8.
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where the presence of an individual in the host state constitutes a genuine and
sufficiently serious threat to public policy. The background to the written question
illustrates, however, that these requirements are not always adhered to in practice. A
number of Irish citizens arriving in the United Kingdom had been threatened with
arrest under the British Anti-Terrorism Act if they refused to 'translate' their Irish-
language names into English but, following inquiries by the Commission, the United
Kingdom ensured that such incidents would not reoccur in the future.
The Groener decision is a clear example of how national policy measures pursuing
cultural objectives can be assessed for their compatibility with fundamental
Community principles (in this case, the free movement of workers). But, as discussed
in Chapter 2 supra, the Court of Justice did not apply a typically strict interpretation
to its analysis of cultural objectives as a derogation from Community freedoms. Lane
argues, however, that the justification of national cultural policy in Groener stands in
relative isolation from the main body of case-law, pointing out that "[njational
labelling rules, which may serve to protect linguistic interests, one of the most
fundamental aspects of culture, are rarely justified where they inhibit the free
movement of goods."48 He also lists a number of cases involving the audio-visual
sector, where limitations on Community law were not held to be justifiable on
grounds of the protection of cultural pluralism.49 Lane, in the context of broadcasting,
views the inclusion of cultural affairs within the jurisdiction of the Community, even
to the limited extent displayed before the adoption of the TEU, as inherently
detrimental.50 But it must be stressed once again that the Community dimension of
cultural issues is largely inevitable, due to the very fact of economic and political
47 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 63, referring to Written Question No. 138/88, [1990] OJ C-69/2.
48
Lane, supra note 1, p. 954, referring to Case 27/80 Fietje [1980] ECR 3839 and Case C-369/89
Piageme v. BUBA Pieters [1991] ECR 1-2971; John Usher, "Languages and the European Union", in
Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort (eds.), The Frontiers of Europe, (London: Pinter, 1998), 222-
234. The basic principle applied by the Court is that labels need not be in the official language of a
state, or in the language of a region, provided they are printed in a language which is 'easily
understood' by the consumers in that area: cf. Chapter 1 supra.
49 Lane, ibid., p. 955; cf. Council Directive 79/112 [1979] OJ L-33/1.
50 Lane, ibid.
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integration, and may prove crucial as a reparative dynamic. Moreover, the application
of proportionality and non-discrimination is widely practised in the broader human
rights context. In general terms, the debate on Community policy in the audio-visual
sector is a particularly heated one. Schilling focuses on the decision of the Court of
Justice in Vereniging Veronica 51, which stands in contrast to the earlier decisions
cited by Lane. Schilling argues that this case demonstrates the conflict between the
cultural aspects of television, which come within national interests, and the free
provision of services, such as advertising and copyright, falling under Community
competence. In this decision, however, the Court decided in favour of Dutch
legislation geared towards the foundation of a pluralist, non-commercial broadcasting
system, on the grounds that this objective was connected with freedom of expression,
a fundamental right protected by the Community legal order.52 The decisions referred
to by Lane pre-date Article 128 EC. Significantly, Lane does observe that the Court
made 'sympathetic noises' in these decisions; it is arguable, therefore, that lack of
competence rather than vision precluded a result more favourable to cultural
concerns. As discussed in Chapter 2, Groener related to the interpretation of existing
Community legislation (Regulation 1612/68) that expressly set out legitimate
exceptions to Community law, one of which related to language competence;
however unorthodox the Court's eventual decision, it was dealing with the
interpretation of a concrete provision as opposed to an abstract concept such as the
safeguarding of cultural pluralism. Since the ratification of the TEU, the Court of
Justice has a more definite legal basis upon which to ground its 'sympathetic noises';
the impact of these changes in practice, if any, is discussed in Chapter 6 infra.
C. Promotion of the Cultural Sector by the EC Institutions
The EC institutions have all participated, at one level or another, in supporting
cultural activities on a practical basis, in accordance with the official
51 Case 148/91, Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organistatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media [1993]
ECR 487; Theodor Schilling, "A new dimension of subsidiarity: Subsidiarity as a rule and a
principle", (1994) 14 Yearbook ofEuropean Law, 203-256 at 243 et seq.
52 Note, however, that Schilling, ibid., sees this reasoning as flawed, arguing that the connection with
the fundamental right in question was undefined and, therefore, inconclusive.
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communications outlined supra. Once again, the Commission, strongly supported by
the Parliament, initiated developments in this area.53 In 1988, it established the
Committee on Cultural Affairs, for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of
any actions to be decided upon by the Council. The Commission appointed a
Commissioner for Cultural Affairs and set up the Department of Cultural Affairs
within DGXXH, which deals with the audio-visual sector, information,
communication and culture. Rasmussen also highlights the role of the Commission in
initiating cultural policy outside the institutional framework, encouraging co¬
operation among the Member States and the various cultural institutions and
authorities.54 The Parliament established the Committee on Youth, Culture,
Education, the Media and Sport, as well as an Intergroup on Minority Languages. It
has also adopted a number of resolutions on cultural issues, not least those detailing
its extensive work on minority language issues throughout the 1980s and early 1990s,
discussed in Chapter 2 supra. McMahon suggests, however, that the Commission and
Parliament diverge on their respective interpretations of the future of cultural policy,
with the Commission taking the much more restrictive view.55 The related
application of subsidiarity to Article 128 EC is discussed infra.
The Council is generally regarded as having avoided genuine or substantive
commitment to the implementation of cultural objectives, despite continuing
perfunctory support for the work of the Commission. This is hardly surprising,
however, given doubts over legal competence, along with the defensive attitude of
most Member States towards their sovereignty in the cultural domain.
In what is generally regarded as a seriously underfunded sector at all levels - regional,
national and international - EC financial assistance for cultural activities has been
particularly welcome. A number of projects and initiatives have received support
53 McMahon, supra note 6, p. 156.
54 Hjalte Rasmussen, "Structures and dimensions of EC cultural policy: L'Europe des bonnes volontes
culturelles", in Schwarze and Schermers (eds.), supra note 8, 185-194 at 193.
55 McMahon, supra note 6, pp. 170-1.
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from the ESF, ERDF and the European Investment Bank. Community institutions
have also granted specific subsidies for cultural activities. Grants have been
allocated, for example, to a number of projects committed to the promotion of
minority languages and cultures, including:
• support granted to the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, (including
the maintenance of the Mercator language information network);
• pilot experiments in the field of education (e.g. teaching methods);
• projects aimed at promoting the use of information technology and the mass
media;
• translation of contemporary literary works both into and from minority languages;
• support for information centres on minority languages throughout the
Community.56
It must be remembered that expenditure on cultural projects was largely "...without
cn
proper legislative basis..." prior to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed,
the continued provision of monetary assistance for the European Bureau for Lesser
Used Languages rest on a precarious premise at present.58 But while financial aid and
subsidies are an essential and integral part of a successful cultural policy, they do not
amount to a complete or effective cultural policy per se; it is crucial that the broader
issue of ensuring respect for and accessibility to languages and cultures is both
considered and realised.
The role of the Court of Justice in the development of EC cultural policy is somewhat
more controversial. Prior to the codification of competence in Article 128 EC, the
identification of a legal basis for cultural policy was an obvious consideration. But
commentators are unanimous in their criticism of the Court's failure to address this
ambiguity. McMahon contrasts this lack of initiative with the Court's furtherance of
"...another nascent area of Community competence, namely education."59 As already
56
cf. Loman et al, supra note 2, pp. 164-167.
57 De Witte, supra note 42, p. 269.
58
cf. (1996) vol. 13:3 Contact 1; Chapter 6 infra.
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noted, the decisions of the Court on the labelling of foodstuffs do not correspond
with its stance in Groener, it has also been seen that there are contradictions within
its decisions on broadcasting policy. The Court declined repeatedly to pronounce on
the Community's cultural agenda, opting instead to deal with the policy or freedom
in question in that specific context only. The Advocates General have been somewhat
more forthcoming, however, in their acknowledgement of the impact of Community
law on the cultural sector.60 Initially, the Court was attempting to uphold an element
of cultural policy - the philosophy of cultural pluralism - without having any specific
Treaty provisions upon which to rely for support. Its distorted endorsement of a
dubious language/employment link in Groener proves illustrative. Whether the Court
has pronounced on language issues more openly following the ratification of Article
128 EC is examined in Chapter 6 infra.
De Witte commends the widespread participation of all institutions in the realisation
of cultural policy, suggesting that they 'build on each other's practice' and thus
generate mutual persuasion to act.61 But the fragmentary nature of EC cultural policy
to date, combined with problems of legal competence, Member State sensitivity and
resistance, and difficulties of implementation, has been far from effective. Issues
such as legal competence appear to have been redressed by Article 128 EC and are
examined in detail infra. Dondelinger believes, however, that the very genesis of
Community involvement in cultural affairs, notwithstanding the absence of an
impetus in the original EEC Treaty, must be viewed as a positive phenomenon that
can now evolve into a more organised, coherent policy.62 Whether that prophesy can
be realised remains to be seen.
4. ARTICLE 128 EC: AN APPRAISAL
59 McMahon, supra note 6, pp. 162-3.
60
cf. for example, the opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Groener, supra note 28, discussed in
Chapter 2 supra.
61 De Witte, supra note 42, p. 270.
62 Jean Dondelinger, "1992: Les relations de la communaute et de la culture", (1990) 334 Revue du
Marche Commun, 77-79 at 77.
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A. Introduction
The unfolding of EC cultural policy has been a conspicuously disjointed process. The
need for a cohesive, proactive policy is outlined by Mourik:
The preservation of the present pluriformity requires active measures on the
part of the governmental institutions involved. This would not be necessary if
cultural co-existence only had qualitative aspects. In that case, the various
cultural areas would equally fertilise, enrich, and thus preserve one another.
Unfortunately, there are also quantitative factors, and quite strong ones at that.
As a result, the large(r) cultural areas put a constant pressure on the small(er)
ones....This may perhaps hold most strongly for linguistically determined
products, but also to a considerable extent for other ones...Pluriformity should,
therefore, not only be stimulated as a creative power which benefits all
subcultures...but also as a principle of safeguarding...It must...be realised that
cultural co-operation in the EEC is diametrically opposed to the principles of
economic co-operation which form the basis of the EEC. [T]he latter are aimed
at the creation of a community, unification, while cultural co-operation in its
turn presupposes the independence of the co-operating partners.63
The dilemma projected by the legislative embodiment of a European cultural policy
is clearly expressed in this extract. Since the Member States have repeatedly insisted
that cultural sovereignty must be ensured, it might be assumed that they would, in
turn, be eager to promote cultural diversity. But cultural diversity inherently includes
minority cultures and languages in addition to national ones. This truth is not always
reflected in national cultural policies; the non-recognition of indigenous minority
languages in France, for example, is compounded by a vigorous programme of
protection for the French language itself.
Loman et al discuss the objectives of Article 128 EC.64 It aims to incorporate
multiple interests in its determination of the boundaries of Community competence
in cultural matters, from the perspective of preserving Member State autonomy to the
challenges posed by completion of the Internal Market and the possibility of the
expansion of the Union towards Eastern Europe.65 As noted at the beginning of this
63 M. Mourik, "European cultural co-operation", in Rijksbaron et al (eds.), supra note 39, 19-21 at 19-
20.
64 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. xi.
65
Dondelinger, supra note 62, p. 79.
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Chapter, Article 128 EC is typically regarded as having justified Community cultural
policy after the fact.
Various EC policies that have a consequential impact on the cultural sector, such as
taxation, continue to be enforced under general economic jurisdiction and not
specifically on the basis of Article 128, which focuses on 'pure' cultural issues.66
Temple observes that economic action in the cultural sector should not be
underestimated, using the specific context of minority languages as an example:
"...the EC can help [by] bringing economic assistance which may halt the drain of
speakers away from lesser-used language regions and [by facilitating] cultural links
which would (and already do) provide inspiration and support for the defenders of
f\7
the languages." She acknowledges, however, that economic intervention alone may
be seen as 'window dressing', which does not tackle core problems, as already
argued.
Education policy under Article 126 EC is not discussed in detail in this Chapter:
although similar to the development of cultural policy in many ways, it is a distinct
issue that receives ample commentary in many of the references already cited infra6*
The Commission, for example, deals with culture and education in two distinct
Directorates General, under the authority of two separate Commissioners; meetings
of the Council that deal with education and culture are also entirely distinct.69 The
following similarities are, however, highlighted. In practice, it is often difficult to
separate the two areas, as with, for example, Community programmes for language
education (e.g. LINGUA). Although activity in the education sphere preceded that in
66
cf. Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 193.
67 Rosalind M. Temple, "Great expectations? Hopes and fears about the implications of political
developments in Western Europe for the future of France's regional languages", in M.M. Parry, W.V.
Davies and R.A.M. Temple (eds.), The Changing Voices of Europe, (Cardiff: University of Wales
Press, 1994), 191-211 at 207.
68 In particular, McMahon, supra note 6, pp. 3-120; Lane, supra note 1, pp. 947-951.
69 Notwithstanding the fact that the Member State ministers often share both portfolios at domestic
level and, as a result, represent their states at both Council meetings.
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the cultural arena by almost a decade, both policies developed along a functional
basis. Both were originally thought to be outside the ambit of Community law. But
while the Court of Justice played a very significant role in the development of EC
education policy, it did not nurture Community cultural policy to the same extent.70
Both areas fundamentally reflect the identities of the Member States, which has led to
the curbing of Community ambition by new provisions in the EC Treaty.71 The
implementation of Article 126 is, however, governed by less draconian procedures
than those contained in Article 128(5), which require unanimous rather than qualified
majority voting. Another difference between the two provisions is that Article 126
does not contain a policy integration clause (Article 128(4)): thus, the Community is
not obliged to take educational interests into consideration when legislating in other
policy areas.
Article 128 EC reflects several strands of developed Community policy, such as its
function as co-ordinator, references to common cultural heritage and respect for the
role of other international organisations. The opening paragraphs of this Chapter are
recalled by referring to Lane, who remarks that Article 128 "...not only broadens
quantitatively and qualitatively the pantheon of Community competences; it also
confers upon them legitimacy, flesh, coherence, new direction - and not a little
confusion."72 He acknowledges that Community competence can now be regarded as
"...direct and active, as opposed to indirect and reactive."73 But Article 128 does not
reconcile the traditionally narrow construction of culture with the contemporary
requirement of the protection of cultures. Furthermore, the ethos of EC policy on
70 McMahon, supra note 6,. p. 158; on this basis, McMahon is far more optimistic about the future of
EC education policy than he is with regard to culture: cf. p. 174.
71 In this context, Scott has written that "[e]ducation is felt to be close to the core of national identity
and is sometimes a bastion of a particular language, culture or community." [Dermott Scott,
"Education", in Keatinge (ed.), supra note 15, 260-269 at 261]; he refers expressly to Danish
resistance to the evolution of Community education policy, and to the UK's reluctance to adopt the
LINGUA programme. In contrast, he refers to Groener, as a 'successful defence' of the right to attach
language requirements to teaching posts.
72
Lane, supra note 1, p. 944.
73 ibid., p. 952.
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culture will have to mark a radical departure from the more widespread idioms of
centralisation and homogenisation.74
By focusing on its shortcomings, it is too easy to lose sight of the undeniable
significance of Article 128's incorporation into the EC Treaty, despite the fact that
basic issues such as the scope of culture itself, the titles and portfolios of the
government ministers under whose administration cultural policy falls and the extent
and stringency of national cultural policies all differ fundamentally throughout the
Member States. The following paragraphs analyse the text of Article 128 EC to
ascertain its effectiveness as the foundation for EC cultural policy and, more
particularly, to assess whether or not the provision can encompass minority language
policy. The issues raised in respect of the individual subsections are then drawn
together, to present a more complete and coherent interpretation of the provision.
B. Article 128(1)
The Community shall contribute...
The role of the Community is classified as 'contributor' but already, drafting
ambiguities arise. Does the word 'contribute' restrict Community activity to policies
already enunciated, or to be enunciated, by the Member States? This interpretation
would preclude the formulation of initiatives at EC level, rendering the raison d'etre
of Article 128 entirely impotent. A Community 'contribution' must, therefore, be
interpreted in a manner that empowers the institutions to conceive activities in the
cultural sector above and beyond those already determined by the Member States.
Whatever the logistical problems, the majority of organisations and individuals
involved in the cultural and linguistic sectors welcome the involvement of the EC, as
discussed in Chapter 1 supra. This may seem unusual, given the resistance of
Member States, which is more generally documented; the identified perception of the
Member States as the opponents rather than defenders of sub-national cultural, and
particularly linguistic, concerns is especially relevant here.
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...to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States...
7*5
Despite criticism directed towards this wording, proponents of cultural and
linguistic diversity have professed an extraordinary degree of confidence in this (and
the succeeding) phrase. This can be demonstrated by considering the Preamble to the
1994 Killillea Resolution, discussed in Chapter 6 infra. The word 'flowering',
although it seems unusual, even eccentric, can be traced to discussions long
preceding the adoption of the TEU; it has its origins in the French term, epanouir,
which does indeed translate to 'flower or blossom' but can also be read as 'to open
up or open out'. It is particularly significant that the term 'culture' is written in its
plural form, quelling apprehension over the dominance of an assimilative cultural
absolutism within the EC. A key, if ostensibly superfluous, question is whether the
7f\
term 'culture' includes language. Various schools of thought on the definition of
culture were outlined supra', it was shown that language was an intrinsic component
of practically all variations on the concept. Moreover, in the absence of a precise
definition of culture in the Treaty itself, it is possible to embrace a pragmatic
approach. Documented institutional support for and involvement in language, and
particularly minority language, matters further confirm its place within the
Community concept of culture. Its exclusion from initial interpretations on the scope
of culture has been explained as a reflection of the situation regarding legal
competence rather than of the status or qualities of language itself. Moreover, the
Community gradually redressed this deficit as its cultural policy evolved, referring
increasingly to language concerns within the context of culture. Lane implicitly
supports this conclusion where he refers to language as "...one of the most
fundamental aspects of culture."77 Thus, language can safely be included as an aspect
of EC cultural policy grounded in Article 128; any limitations relate to the
implementation, rather than definitional scope, of the provision.
74
cf. O'Toole, supra note 15, p. 270.
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cf. opening paragraphs of this Chapter.
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...while respecting their national and regional diversity...
This phrase differs from the condition in Article 126 EC (education policy) that the
EC is committed to respect the 'cultural and linguistic diversity' of the Member
States. Lane argues that 'cultural and linguistic diversity' may not, then, be covered
by Article 128.78 This fear is unfounded. Article 128 deals specifically with culture:
respect for national and regional diversity must relate back directly to the subject
matter of the provision. Any other construction would be erroneous. Moreover, it has
been pointed out that Article 128 adopts the term 'cultures', reinforcing the notion of
pluralism and diversity. The express reference to 'regional' as well as 'national'
diversity provides an additional safeguard for minority cultures. This fact has been
ignored by commentators who regard Article 128 as a vehicle for respecting national
cultures and identities only.79 Finally, it has been shown that 'culture' necessarily
includes 'language': the wording of Article 128(1) might have been more
comprehensive if the words 'cultural and linguistic' had been employed explicitly,
but there is no reason to doubt their implication, given the context of the provision.
...and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
The preservation of diversity is not an exclusive objective; it rests alongside the
OA
concurrent promotion of a collective cultural identity. This is an ambiguous and
controversial aspect of EC cultural policy. It reflects the link between culture and
identity in a broad sense, as a proposed basis for the legitimacy of European union. In
this context, Wallace refers to "...the strength or weakness of shared values tipping
the scales between solidarity and disintegration...."81 The idea of common cultural
heritage is based on a tenuous notion of shared history, traditions and, it is argued, a
78 ibid., p. 953.
79
cf for example, Church and Phinnemore, supra note 8, pp. 82 and 203.
80
Roberts, supra note 9, p. 217, considers that 'common cultural heritage' goes beyond Europe and
includes the common heritage of all mankind, which "...extends beyond the borders of the internal
market." Rather confusingly, she goes on to deal specifically with common European heritage, without
addressing its relationship to the broader concept she had introduced (pp. 221-223).
81 William Wallace, "Introduction: The dynamics of European integration", in William Wallace (ed.),
The Dynamics ofEuropean Integration, (London; New York: Pinter, 1990), 1-24 at 16.
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broadly shared sense of culture. The European Foundation was set up for the explicit
purpose of "...fostering a common European identity which in turn would reinforce
the political solidarity among the Member States."82 Lane considers that the
'Television without Frontiers' Directive, based on promoting the transmission of
'European works', was grounded in this philosophy.83 The language used by
proponents of a European consciousness, based on and leading to shared loyalty,
reflects the implicitly mystic character of these concepts. Massart-Pierard, for
example, speaks of the destin commun of Community citizens.84 This is
unquestionably ironic, given that such symbolism is more usually associated with
nationalism, a philosophy denounced in the furtherance of European heritage and
identity. Thus, the traditional bases for the legitimisation of national political
structures have been modified to reflect collective rather than national identity, but
this merely reinforces rather than displaces the potency of nationalist philosophy.
Howe does not accept the fundamental premise of the 'common heritage' fable,
stating bluntly that "[i]n matters of ethnicity, culture and history, there is little, if
anything, uniquely European, and certainly nothing as compelling as that which
sustains existing national sentiment."85 He argues that policy-makers who advance
this illusion have themselves "...been equally cognisant of the futility in that
Q/r
approach." This is certainly feasible, since it is unlikely that Member State
resistance to a more elaborate cultural policy could have gone unnoticed. As a
philosophical compromise, Howe advocates the promotion of a 'future-oriented'
common identity, discussed in Chapter 1 supra. This, he argues, can transcend ethnic
and historical differences, forming a more successful basis for European identity than
the artificially constructed myth of a shared, past-rooted heritage. It also ties in with
82 De Witte, supra note 42, p. 277.
83
Lane, supra note 1, p. 955; Directive 89/552, [1989] OJ L-298/23.
84 Massart-Pierard, supra note 18, p. 34.
83 Paul Howe, "A community of Europeans: The requisite underpinnings", (1995) vol. 33:1 Journal of
Common Market Studies, 27-46 at 31.
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O'Toole's idea that in order to secure awareness and acceptance of a common
heritage, Member State citizens should have been accorded status as EC citizens
rather than EC consumers ab initio?1 Howe's thesis, as seen in Chapter 1, is not
without flaws. But, in the context of European identity, it offers a reasonable
alternative to the more implausible past-rooted hypotheses.88 Cultural policy would
be "...justified for its own cultural sake and not...as an instrument for promoting
European identity."89 Moreover, it accommodates the prosperity of cultural and
linguistic diversity: "[i]n uniting, Europe would be able to show the world that unity
and diversity are not in contrast, but constitute a dialectic polarity."90
The gestation of common European consciousness based on collective respect for
diversity can prevail far more successfully than any attempt to annihilate pluralism.
Political situations throughout the world demonstrate repeatedly that, as discussed in
Chapter 1, enforced assimilation has far graver consequences than sustained
diversity. Commentators generally point to the stability of the Swiss Confederation to
illustrate this truth. Recent constitutional developments in Switzerland confirm the
fundamental importance of accommodating diversity. In 1996, the Romantsch
language was recognised constitutionally as an official language for communications
between the Confederation and Romantsch citizens; it had been a national language
of the Confederation, but did not have official status. Furthermore, the Constitutional
amendment included express support for measures taken by the Cantons to safeguard
and promote Romantsch and Italian. Thus, the accommodation of diversity remains a
constitutional priority in what is generally considered to be a successful federal
union. A rich variety of cultures, including languages, is what is truly 'common' to
86 ibid.
87 O'Toole, supra note 15, p. 276.
88 Howe refers to the tenuous idea put forward by Anthony Smith, that a 'common cultural heritage'
could be built on the fact that most languages spoken in the Member States belong to the Indo-
European language family: supra note 85, p. 31.
89 De Witte, supra note 39, p. 138.
90 H. Brugmans, "Five starting-points" in Rijksbaron et al (eds.), supra note 39, 15-16 at 16.
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the heritage of Europe. Thus, cultural or linguistic homogeneity is neither desired by
the Community nor required by Article 128(1).
C. Article 128(2)
Action by the Community...
The word 'action' confirms a functional role for the EC in cultural matters, perhaps
even more so than the reference to a Community 'contribution' in Article 128(1). But
the spheres in which the Community may actually take action are more limited than
the general objectives outlined in Article 128(1), and are examined infra.
...shall be aimed at encouraging co-operation between Member States...
Lane describes the Community as a 'catalyst', propelling the Member States towards
the adoption of a 'Community orientation' in cultural matters.91 He argues that this is
precisely what the Community has been doing since the inception of its involvement
in cultural affairs. But this interpretation does not appreciate fully the significance of
having past practice codified in the EC Treaty. However unwelcome Community
'interference' may have seemed to the Member States, the encouragement of cultural
co-operation is now a fully legitimate Treaty objective, which can no longer be
challenged on grounds of lack of competence. Moreover, the possibility that Member
State co-operation may be, in fact, required by the principle of necessity, has been
highlighted in Chapter 3.
The involvement and commitment of the Member States will prove crucial to the
implementation of cultural policy, given the structure of Article 128 and the
application of subsidiarity. It is hoped, however, that the Community will adopt an
appropriately proactive approach. Otherwise, the already vast powers of the Member
States in this domain will nullify the concessions made at Maastricht towards the
acceptance of a role for the Community. It has been suggested that the Member
States "...are more committed to some aspects of Community activity in the field of
culture - for example, audio-visual services - than they are to others, such as the book
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92sector." Language is an inherent element of both examples given, demonstrating
once again its pervasiveness across the broad spectrum of the cultural domain.
Member State support for what could be considered more practical manifestations of
culture is highlighted by the examples listed. This support could have a positive
impact on language policies, given that everyday, and particularly technological,
applications of language confirm its significance as a 'living language' in a manner
not exhibited by artistic and literary works. However, it is also arguable that, more
cynically but perhaps realistically, the examples given stress the underlying economic
concerns of the Member States, on the premise that audio-visual products contribute
far more to the economy than books. Conversely, then, the role of the Community
may be especially meaningful if it succeeds in steering Member State attention
towards the more neglected aspects of cultural policy. In any event, it is clear that
where the Community exercises its role as external co-ordinator, it can provide a
necessary balance against Member State interests.
...and, if necessary...
This proviso is seen by Loman et al as a "...specific reminder of...the subsidiarity
principle."93 It has been shown that Article 3b(2) EC, analysed in Chapter 3 supra,
was clearly intended to apply to areas of shared Community/yMember State
competence. This section introduces the practical application of subsidiarity to the
specific domain of cultural policy, as envisaged by Article 128 EC. Article 3b(2)
does not create competence; it regulates the exercise of competence for Community
objectives already outlined in other provisions of the EC Treaty. What is at issue
here, then, is the determination of the appropriate actor for the implementation of
cultural policy, by reference to the principle of subsidiarity. As highlighted in
Chapter 1, the effects of Community law cannot be boxed neatly into separate
categories. In a dynamic entity, measures taken in one policy area necessarily impact
on seemingly unrelated issues. If, for example, measures related to the creation of the
91
Lane, supra note 1, p. 951.
92 McMahon, supra note 6, p. 164.
93 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 195.
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single market are within exclusive Community competence, are related aspects of
cultural policy beyond the scope of Article 3b(2)?94 Moreover, Article 128(4) states
expressly that the Community is required to take cultural aspects into account in its
action under other Treaty provisions. Thus, cultural policy is broader than Article 128
and the application of subsidiarity is more complicated as a result.
Everling argues that subsidiarity is reinforced by Article F(l) TEU (respect for
national identity), in that "...a sphere is left to the Member States and, in so far as
foreseen in their constitutions, also to their component states and regions, to legislate
for their own affairs in accordance with their actual traditions and social
characteristics."95 Ele concludes that the delimitation of Community competence in
education and culture is a specific example of this philosophy. But this interpretation
does not take into account the rights of sub-national groups that are not contained
within officially delimited regions or, more acutely, regions that do not have
administrative power within the state system; as noted by Temple Lang, "...Article 3b
does nothing to encourage devolution within Member States, and unfortunately it is
likely to be used by national governments to prevent the Community from
encouraging regional developments even across frontiers."96 In the context of
minority languages, for example, regional initiatives are often completely dependent
on legal sanction at the national level. Furthermore, only a meagre number of EC
Member States have signed the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional
or Minority Languages (1993), discussed in Chapter 5, despite the minimalist
guarantees for speakers and rudimental state obligations contained therein. But
despite the reservations of Member States, primarily related to sovereignty, and
notwithstanding legitimate concerns over Community intrusion into what are seen as
inherently national or regional matters, cultural policy is now a Treaty-based EC
94
cf. AG Toth, "The principle of subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty", (1992) vol. 29:6 Common
Market Law Review, 1079-1105 at 1093-5.
95 Ulrich Everling, "Reflections on the structure of the European Union", (1992) vol. 29:6 Common
Market Law Review, 1053-1077 at 1071.
96 John Temple Lang, "What powers should the European Community have?", (1995) vol. 1:1,
European Public Law, 97-116 at 105.
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objective. Subsidiarity cannot reverse this truth. Language may be a politically
sensitive issue, but it is also a cultural, sociological and economic one. EC policies
affect all of these domains and, consequently, they affect language. Individual state
language policies are not sufficient to check the sway of European integration.
Member States who insist that only national policy measures should be entertained
claim that to permit otherwise would constitute a threat to national identity. But two
basic facts are being ignored. First, national identity is subject to a far greater threat
by not adopting European measures to deal with the European dimension of language
displacement. Second, focusing on national identity can operate to the detriment of
minority cultures, and in particular to the rights of speakers of minority languages. It
was noted in Chapter 1 that minority language speakers generally place tremendous
faith in the capacity of the EC to achieve at the transnational level what cannot be
achieved domestically.97
A feature of the new EC competences is that any action which may be taken by the
Community is set out in exceptionally restrictive detail. The harmonisation of the
laws and regulations of Member States is explicitly prohibited. The role of the
Community is based on encouraging co-operation between Member States, adopting
incentive measures and recommendations, and developing minimum standards only
where absolutely necessary. Essentially, Community policy is visualised as
supplementary, which creates a significant bias in favour of national action in the
context of subsidiarity. Everling observes that while cultural policy might be pursued
QO
at EC level, cultural politics remain within the domain of the Member States. It is
arguable that the constraints placed on Community initiative by Article 128 render it
ineffective and entirely dependent on the goodwill of the national representatives at
the Council. But what is often overlooked is the value of adopting a minimum
97
cf. Jo Steiner, "Subsidiarity under the Maastricht Treaty", in David O'Keefe and Patrick M.
Twomey (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, (London: Chancery, 1995), 49-64 at 61, who
attributes inertia at the domestic level to a lack of political will on the part of national governments. As
a cautionary qualification, she argues that "...however desirable Community objectives may be, they,
like national objectives, can change over time. The individual's capacity to influence policy...is still
greater at the level of the state."
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Everling. supra note 95, p. 1068.
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standards approach: "[i]n casting aside total harmonisation as a model, which cannot
reflect the diversity of interests in the modern Community, one is welcoming
flexibility and innovation and enshrining greater sensitivity to national
preferences."99 Developing minimum standards ensures that policies can be
introduced to deal with areas that might not otherwise have been addressed, while the
inclusion of a non-preemption clause in directives allows Member States to adopt
stricter rules than the minimum standards set at EC level. Moreover, in accordance
with the principle of proportionality, the Edinburgh Summit Document calls for a
more general adoption of minimum standards across the range of Community
activity.100 This concept is further discussed in the context of Article 128(5) but it is
erroneous to conclude that the new Treaty competences have been specifically
afflicted with an impediment to their realisation in isolation from all other EC
objectives. Viewed from this perspective, Toth's pessimism seems misdirected where
he questions whether the new competences have been worth the 'price' paid, i.e. the
codification of subsidiarity.101 His remarks in a subsequent publication illustrate the
real danger in this context i.e. constraining the potential of EC cultural policy by the
misappropriation of Article 3b(2): "[rjegulating matters to Member State action
where Community action is required has serious constitutional implications for the
division of the exercise of competences and is just as contrary to the principle of
subsidiarity as taking Community action where the Member States should act."102 It
has been argued that, in the context Article 128(1), the role of the Community as co¬
ordinator does not necessarily imply that it must relinquish all powers of initiative.
Similarly, the restraints put in place by Articles 128(2) and 3(b) EC do not preclude
Community action automatically or in all circumstances. The substantive application
99
Weatherill, "Beyond preemption? Shared competence and constitutional change in the European
Community", in O'Keefe and Twomey (eds.), supra note 97, 13-33 at 22.
l00European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, (Edinburgh Summit, December 1992), (hereafter
'Edinburgh Conclusions'), Annex 1, Part A, Bull.EC 12-1992, pp. 8-9.
101 Toth, supra note 94, p. 1094.
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Toth, "Is subsidiarity justiciable?", (1994) 19 European Law Review, 268-285 at 275.
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of subsidiarity to Article 128 is undertaken infra, after consideration of the remaining
subsections of the provision.
...supporting and supplementing their action...
The remarks made supra in respect of the Community encouraging co-operation
among Member States apply equally to this subsection. But the word
'supplementing' introduces expressly the proactive role envisaged for the
Community in the cultural domain, potentially going beyond what has been achieved
by Member State action. This is arguably dependent on the existence of a Member
State initiative in the first place ('...supplementing their action...'). But once again,
this reading of Article 128 would render the provision wholly impotent, removing the
need for any Community input in the first place, and is, therefore, refuted.
...in the following areas...
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and
history of the European peoples;
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European
significance;
- non-commercial cultural exchanges;
- artistic and literary creation, including the audio-visual sector.
This subsection has the potential to severely stunt the development of EC cultural
policy. The express stipulation of areas for EC action may prevent the Community
from acting on any other aspects of culture. It is for this reason that reliance on
Article 128(1) without any reference to Article 128(2), as practised by many
supporters of minority languages, including the European Parliament (Chapter 6
infra), may be an overly confident aspiration. It is particularly worrying that in
Article 128(2), 'culture' is denoted in its singular form, with emphasis placed firmly
on shared heritage and identity. The topics listed are extraordinarily narrow in focus.
They emphasise the artistic dimension of culture, which is certainly worth protecting
and promoting, but not in isolation from aspects of culture in its broader sense, such
as language. Culture is categorised within the realm of exalted history rather than as a
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contemporary, living force. Even if language is an element of cultural heritage, in
terms of 'conservation and safeguarding', the proviso that this heritage must be of
'European significance' is open to differing interpretations. Under a narrow
construction, something might only be of 'European significance' based on sheer size
or pervasiveness throughout the Community. Alternatively, on a broader view,
diversity of languages could itself come within the concept of 'European
significance'. But this imaginative interpretation is unlikely to find favour within the
narrow remit preferred by the Member States in cultural matters.
Loman et al do not, however, hinge the entirety of Article 128 on this subsection.103
First, and perhaps most importantly, they cite Article 128(5), discussed infra, which
refers to implementation of the objectives of Article 128; Loman et al interpret
Article 128(1), not subsection (2), as containing those general objectives. It may be
argued equally that both subsections contain distinct Community objectives. Second,
they note the importance of 'mixed' cultural activities, provided for under Article
128(4) and explained infra. Finally, they argue that, in any event, Community action
in the cultural sphere is not restricted to that which may be taken under Article 128:
"...Article 3(p) EC in a general way states that one of the activities of the Community
will be to contribute to the flowering of cultures of the Member States. There is no
reason to hold that these activities are only restricted to those made possible under
Article 128 EC."104 Moreover, they argue that the exclusion of the majority of policy
areas from Article 128(2), such as the media, may ensure more comprehensive
action, independently of the restrictive methods of implementation outlined in Article
128(5) (discussed infra). In respect of the media, the audio-visual sector is mentioned
explicitly in Article 128(2), in the context of artistic and literary creation; whether
that term can encompass general media policy is open to interpretation by the
Member States, but ultimately by the Court of Justice. Loman et al conclude,
however, that notwithstanding the creation of Community competence in cultural
matters, Article 128 has enabled the Member States "...to draw the line there, in that
103 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 194.
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it can be seen as an attempt to block the more or less spontaneous further expansion
of Community law in this area...."105
Consideration of cultural policy outside the ambit of Article 128 merits discussion of
whether or not the Community has powers in the cultural sphere under Article 235
EC.106 It is arguable that culture falls outside the scope of Article 235, which is
concerned with measures deemed 'necessary in the course of the operation of the
common market'. But institutional practice has not always reflected this qualification
in a strictly literal sense.107 Moreover, it has been shown that the domains of culture
and economics cannot always be neatly dissociated. Rasmussen qualifies the
potential of Article 235, noting that its use would not be possible without the
attainment of consensus among the institutions and Member States on the
development of Community cultural policy, a requirement not accomplished in
practice.108 Repudiating these arguments, Dehousse points out that whatever scope
there may once have been for the employment of Article 235, it has been nullified by
the codification of express competence in Article 128 itself.109 But this cannot be
taken for granted. Loman et al argue that it is, in the first instance, the inclusion of
culture as a general objective in Article 3(p) EC which makes it possible for the
Community to act in. the cultural field using Article 235.110 If Article 128 is
interpreted narrowly, it is arguable that specific powers have not been provided in
104 ibid.
105 ibid., p. 195.
106 Article 235 EC provides: "[i]f action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty
has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the appropriate measures."
107
cf. De Witte, supra note 42, pp. 270-1, referring to Directive 79/409, on the protection of wild birds
and endangered species.
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Rasmussen, supra note 54, p. 186.
1<w Renaud Dehousse, "Community competences: Are there limits to growth?" in Renaud Dehousse
(ed.), Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union? (Miinchen: Law Books in Europe, 1994), 103-
125 at 106.
110 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 191 et seq.
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respect of a number of aspects of culture. But in direct contradiction to Dehousse,
they further assert that "[i]t is not necessary that these objectives are the general
objectives of [Articles 2 and 3 EC]; they may also be the specific objectives of
[Article 128]."'11 This fairly complex construction widens the scope of Article 128
considerably, but Article 235 can only come into play where there is an economic
dimension to cultural policy. In such instances, it could conceivably lead to the
evasion of the non-harmonisation proviso in Article 128(5) for mixed
cultural/economic activities but this will depend on the Community's interpretation
of mixed undertakings. Overall, it is submitted that the Article 235 question is a moot
point. It is unlikely that the Commission will resort to that provision to circumvent
the intransigence of the Member States, or indeed, of Article 128(5) itself.
Furthermore, any actions taken under Article 235 still require a unanimous Council
decision. The Community did take action on mixed cultural/economic issues prior to
the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty but without relying on Article 235 EEC. The
general provisions of Community law were simply applied to the cultural sector and
this practice is likely to continue, particularly in light of the policy integration clause
in Article 128(4). But it has already been seen that this method of developing a
cultural policy is far from ideal. In any event, Community law as it stood prior to the
Maastricht Treaty remains unaffected (Article M TEU). Thus, existing developments
in the cultural sphere, above and beyond those contained in Article 128(2), remain
valid. Moreover, even in the development of new cultural initiatives, the Member
States remain bound by the general principle of non-discrimination. This may have
particular significance for language rights in the context of fundamental rights and
citizenship, explored in Chapter 5 infra.
Article 128(2) is a remarkably disappointing provision, yet one which has attracted
scant attention from those who are satisfied to laud Article 128(1) in isolation. In
light of the functional origins of EC action in cultural matters, Article 128(2) is a
firm slap on the wrists for the institutions. The Community is restricted to
encouraging Member State co-operation by the first phrase of Article 128(2). It may
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only go further than this - 'supplementing' Member State action - in the areas listed
expressly and, in addition, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. The
ultimate fate of Community initiatives is then dependent on the disposition of the
Member States, acting through the Council. Given the independent commitment to
subsidiarity in Article 3b(2), which ensured Member State input in any event, the
prohibitive nature of Article 128(2) demonstrates further the depth of insecurity and
scepticism among the Member States. Neither Article 128(1) nor Article F TEU were
seen as sufficient guarantees against the anticipated evolution of the detested
'Euroculture'. But more intense Community action in the cultural sphere may not
have been harmful to cultural interests per se but would have shown up and tackled
the more undemocratic policies practised by some of the Member States, such as the
non-recognition, direct or indirect, of indigenous minority languages. The general
Community objective of contributing to cultural pluralism, set out in Article 128(1),
must, therefore, remain an independent purpose, as justified supra. Otherwise,
Article 128 could amount to nothing more than a waste of space in the EC Treaty.
D. Article 128(3)
The Community and the Member States shall foster co-operation with third
countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of culture,
in particular the Council of Europe.
This subsection reflects the trend of evolved practice, especially in relation to the
jurisdiction of the Council of Europe. The succession of Commission publications
dealing with culture all accorded precedence to the Council of Europe in the cultural
domain. Loman et al point out that Article 128(3), when read with Article 128(5),
does not confer a general power on the EC to enter into treaties with third countries
or international organisations, based on the limited range of legal instruments
available to the Community for the implementation of cultural policy.112 Since this
would render Article 128(3) virtually meaningless, however, they modify their
interpretation to suggest that "...although the Community does not possess an
111
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autonomous power in this regard, it will be able to conclude treaties in order to
achieve the limited set of objectives listed in Article 128(2) EC in co-operation with
the Member States."113 McMahon argues that Article 128(3) reveals yet another facet
of the Community's yielding to other international actors in the context of cultural
policy.114 He concludes that this will restrain Community participation to the more
symbolic, prestige-gaining cultural projects than to programmes of substance. In this
way, Community action is peripheral not only to that taken by the Member States, but
also to the accomplishments of other international organisations and, particularly, of
the Council of Europe. This submission merits consideration of the capacity of the
Council of Europe to develop an effective cultural policy where the EC cannot. This
question is considered in more depth in Chapter 5 infra, but it may be noted at this
stage that cultural policy is included explicitly in the Council's range of activities.115
Some commentators agree that the Council of Europe is the more appropriate forum
for the development of cultural policy.116 It would be a mistake, however, to become
overly optimistic about its potential in this arena. De Witte writes as follows about
the Council's attempts in the related province of education:
The Council's role in education has already been marginalised. The results
achieved in a few years within the European Community, on matters like the
recognition of diplomas, the equal treatment of foreign nationals, the mobility
of students and teachers, and international exchange programmes, are more
impressive than anything that has happened in thirty years of the Council of
Europe."7
These observations do not inspire confidence in the Council's ability to tackle the
even more politically sensitive issue of culture, a viewpoint reinforced by reference
to some of the Council's dealings with minority language rights. The decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in the Belgian Linguistics Case has been well
113 ibid.
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McMahon, supra note 6, p. 174.
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cf. Article 1(b) of its Statute.
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Yearbook ofEuropean Law, 313-338 at 331 et seq.
117 De Witte, "Cultural linkages" in Wallace (ed.), supra note 81, 192-210 at 203.
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documented due to the restrictive scope of the judgment delivered.118 The Council's
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages has granted a potentially
ineffectual degree of discretion to the state signatories regarding options for
implementation; notwithstanding the insubstantial obligations imposed therein, few
EC Member States have proceeded to sign the Charter.119 The respective
contributions made by both the Council and the EC are determined in more detail in
Chapter 5; but it is already far from self-evident that the EC should defer to the
Council of Europe in all matters cultural.
E. Article 128(4)
The Community and the Member States shall take cultural aspects into account
in its action under other provisions of this Treaty.
Policy areas can rarely be completely divorced from one another. It is fundamentally
important to recognise, as Article 128(4) has, that seemingly non-related measures
can have an impact on the cultural sector. Indeed, it is awareness of this fact that
originally led to tentative Community action in the cultural domain. To provide
formally for this truth demonstrates both maturity and pragmatism on the part of the
Community institutions. Article 128(4) confirms that EC cultural policy is broader
than Article 128. It may also be interpreted, of course, as yet another safeguard for
the interests of the Member States, but whatever the impetus behind its inception, it
represents the stimulus through which institutional sensitivity to the impact of
Community law on culture must be heightened. Lane, referring to Article 128(4) as
an 'integration clause', identifies the key question as "...how far the Court of Justice
will be prepared to limit the requirements of the internal market in the interests of
culture, however defined."120 He urges caution, stressing the relative inexperience of
both the Court and the political institutions in dealing with this complex,
118
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predominantly national, policy area, and highlighting the dangers of succumbing to
ideological rather than economic analysis. This argument is similar to those advanced
in Chapter 3 supra, in the context of the Court's (in)ability to interpret the principle
of subsidiarity. While they are certainly valid concerns, Lane underestimates the
capacity of the Court to deal with its new mandate, with which it has arguably been
dealing on a non-Treaty basis for some time, as in the Groener decision, for example.
Lane suggests that Article 128(4) is unlikely to be 'overly burdensome', citing the
relative ineffectiveness of a similar clause already operative in the field of
environmental law (Article 130r(2) EC).121 Loman et al distinguish the two clauses:
they read Article 130r(2) in conjunction with Article 100a(3), arguing that the
requirement therein of striving for a 'high level' of environmental protection
weakens the overall effect of the environmental policy integration clause.122
Furthermore, Article 130r(2) refers to 'other Community policies', but Article 128(4)
cites 'other Treaty provisions': whether this distinction has any intended practical
effect will depend on its subsequent interpretation by the Court of Justice.
Loman et al anticipate that Article 128(4) could have particular effect in the
linguistic domain, arguing that the provision "...does make it impossible to bypass or
dismiss 'cultural interests', such as pluralism...or the protection of the smaller
languages."123 Yet the danger that the institutions may side-step Article 128(4) is a
very real one. The role of both the Committee of Regions and European Parliament,
as conceived in Article 128(5), may be particularly relevant in this context. A similar
mechanism to that outlined in Article 128(4) has been proposed in respect of
administrative practice in Ireland: a political party policy document recommended
that, in order to implement more fully the constitutional status of the Irish language
as first official language of the State, a committee should be established to examine
121 ibid., p. 957; the provision itself states, inter alia, that "[environmental protection requirements
must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other Community policies."
A policy integration clause was not, however, included in the new EC Treaty Titles on public health,
consumer protection or education.
122 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 196.
123 ibid.
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all proposed legislation.124 The impact of the legislation on Irish language issues, or
indeed, the failure of the legislature to identify a potential impact, would then be
raised by the committee, who could also suggest appropriate amendments. This
procedure ensures assessment by an objective, external body, not actually immersed
in the enactment of the substantive elements of the legislation. This, in turn, means
that the committee would be more attuned to the language dimension, and would thus
identify potential concerns more readily. A similar model of implementation for
Article 128(4), involving the Committee of Regions or European Parliament, or both,
could be highly effective in the Community context and could secure an operative
rather than token execution of the provision. Raising the cultural agenda at the outset,
before the enactment of legislation, may prove particularly useful, given doubts
• • 19S
raised over the ultimate justiciability of this subsection. Given the clear wording of
Article 128(4), however, the institutions appear to be under a legal, justiciable duty to
take cultural considerations into account when legislating on any Treaty provision.
Article 128(4) does not mention any institution(s) specifically, but refers broadly to
'the Community'; this supports the involvement of both the European Parliament and
the Committee of the Regions. Furthermore, Article 198c EC stipulates generally that
the Committee may be consulted where either the Council or the Commission deems
it to be appropriate, over and above the specific Treaty provisions that require
consultation.
F. Article 128(5)
In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this
Article..,
As argued supra, this phrase refers to the broad objective of contributing to the
flowering of the cultures of the Member States, as set out in Article 128(1), as well as
to the specific objectives listed in Article 128(2).
124 Labour Party (Ireland), Our Story: Ar dTeanga, (Policy Document: Dublin, 1993), p. 19 para. (d).
125 Lane, supra note 1, p. 979; Georges Sp. Karydis, "Le juge communautaire et la preservation de
l'identite culturelle nationale", Illemes Journees d'Etudes Jean Monnet, 1-11 at 9 (footnote 39).
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...the Council - acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article
189b and after consulting with the Committee of the Regions...
Article 189b EC establishes the conciliation procedure, whereby the European
Parliament must approve the Council's common position before a proposed measure
may be adopted. In light of its established commitment to the promotion of minority
languages, the involvement of the European Parliament could be significant. Article
128(5) goes on to require, however, that the Council must act unanimously in respect
of the Article 189b procedure. Curtin regards this as a 'highly anomalous' exception
to the co-decision procedure, given the narrow legislative scope of Article 128 in the
first place. The requirement of unanimity in the Council could negate the likely
ambitions of the Parliament, especially in the context of minorities (discussed further
infra)', but recognition of a role for the Committee of the Regions confirms the
Community's support for regional, as well as national, diversity. As already
submitted, an additional and meaningful way for the Committee to fulfil its role
would be for it to participate in the implementation of Article 128(4).
...shall adopt incentive measures...
The character of incentive measures, first introduced by the TEU, is not defined in
the EC Treaty. The absence of a definition may yet need to be clarified by the Court
of Justice, so that the Council may know the extent of its powers under Article 128. It
is more or less agreed, however, that this legislative option best reflects the
Community's role as contributor to cultural policy in Article 128(1) and co-ordinator
of Member State co-operation (Article 128(2)), covering, for example, the provision
of financial assistance and the organisation of cultural events. Dashwood refers to the
ERASMUS programme as an example of an incentive measure.127 But he notes that
"...it is now clear, as it was not before, that Member States are under no obligation to
adapt their systems, so as to allow individuals and educational establishments to
126 Deirdre Curtin, "The constitutional structure of the Union: A Europe of bits and pieces", (1993)
vol. 30:1 Common Market Law Review, 17-69 at 37 (footnote 84); the requirement also applies to
Article 130(i) (research and technological development).
127
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enjoy the full advantage of Community programmes."128 This position is difficult to
reconcile with the obligation on Member States, under Article 5 EC, to implement
Community objectives. Although Article 128 leaves the power of initiative largely in
the hands of the Member States, and does not elaborate on any sort of
implementation time-frame, it unequivocally denotes cultural policy as a Community
objective. Thus, even at the level of incentive measures, the duties and obligations of
the Member States under Article 5 cannot be dismissed.
...excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member
States...
This subsection curbs the trend of past Community practice in certain aspects of the
cultural domain, since a number of directives, enacted in other policy areas have had
implications for the cultural sector (e.g. directives on VAT). Furthermore, the
Community has also issued directives on purely cultural issues (e.g. film,
architecture, broadcasting).129 Alongside the requirements of Community law, these
directives contained express references to the interests of the Member States in
preserving cultural diversity.130 It was argued supra that the exclusion of the media
from the list of objectives in Article 128(2) may allow the Community to continue
with some aspects of its harmonisation programme. It was acknowledged, however,
that there are also compelling arguments against this interpretation, since Article
128(2) does make express reference to 'the audio-visual sector'. Moreover, the
general objective of 'contribution to culture' in Article 128(1) would cover the
media. It is, therefore, difficult to see how any aspects of EC cultural policy remain
outside the narrow scope of Article 128(5), apart from mixed activities linked clearly
to economic concerns. Thus, while Community directives implemented to date are
128 ibid.
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unaffected by the Maastricht Treaty, it is not likely that similar harmonisation
programmes could be enacted in the future. For this reason, Loman et al conclude
that the most important contribution likely to be made in the future is the provision of
financial assistance for cultural activities and, on this basis, they urge that appropriate
funds are made available in the Community budgetary procedure.131
But while budgetary allocations are of fundamental importance to the cultural sector,
they are not the most important contribution that the Community can make. And,
ironically, while the intended purpose of the exclusion of harmonisation may have
been a concession to Member State disquietude, it is probably the most appropriate
setting in which to develop and implement a truly pluralist cultural policy.
Harmonisation of legislation eliminates national measures in conflict with EC law
and supplants a uniform Community regime. Given that cultural, linguistic and
administrative policies differ vastly throughout the Member States, the conception
and establishment of a homogenous cultural policy would be inherently misconstrued
and counterproductive.132 EC cultural policy cannot be guided by the economic
guidelines of standardisation and Europeanisation. The exclusion of harmonisation
from the cultural sphere ensures that this cannot happen. It is beyond dispute that the
Community can achieve pragmatic results in its role as co-ordinator of Member State
policies; it was argued, for example, that the EC achieved far more in the fields of
culture and education, even without direct legal basis, than the Council of Europe,
which has always had an express cultural remit. It is essential, however, that the
legislative limits of Article 128 are not misappropriated, which would render the
provision completely ineffective. The Community must continue to apply the
foresight and imagination that it has displayed habitually.
Lane summarises his concerns over a centralised cultural policy as follows:
deemed it necessary (Article 8); the decision on how far the Member States can go in this regard
would, however, rest ultimately with the Court.
131 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 197.
132
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The basic problem remains: culture is, and ought to be, national and sub-
national specific. Protecting a common Community cultural heritage...is well
and good, but the true threat to culture, felt especially keenly by the smaller
Member States and nations within Member States, comes not from outside the
Community but from within, from the 'Europeanisation' or homogenisation that
is a necessary product of the Treaty and the internal market. And to those
concerned to ensure cultural diversity within the Community against the
Community, the entrails are not good.133
Lane raises several valid points, but could turn to Article 128 to seek solutions. First,
it is certainly true that the smaller languages and cultures of the Community -
whether national or sub-national - are under threat from the very dynamics of the EC
itself: this was established in Chapter 1 supra. It is naive to assume, however, that
national or sub-national authorities can redress this force on their own.
'Europeanisation' is not necessarily a product of the Treaty; it arises from the reality
of accentuated cross-cultural interaction. But Article 128, by expressly excluding the
possibility of harmonisation, has safeguarded cultural diversity from the very real
threat identified by Lane. The policy integration clause in Article 128(4), if
implemented, will go some way towards ensuring that the same may be said of other
areas of Community policy, including instances where the EC seeks to extend its
powers under Article 235, discussed supra. In the context of nations within Member
States, who certainly are at risk 'especially keenly', these groups are not always
represented by formal sub-national government structures and thus have a reduced or
negligible say in how their cultural or linguistic present and future can be guaranteed.
The Community, which has explicitly recognised regional as well as national
cultures, could provide far more effective protection for such groups than has ever
been offered by some Member States. It has also been shown that the concept of
'common cultural heritage' is not particularly meaningful or forceful in actuality and
is unlikely to prevail over the Community's commitment to cultural pluralism and
diversity.
... - acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt
recommendations.
133 Lane, supra note 1, pp. 953-4.
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This phrase exemplifies the dual character of Article 128. It ensures that the
Community has a legislative mechanism at its disposal for the development of
cultural policy but, at the same time, it secures Member State supremacy in two
ways: first, recommendations are the weakest form of Community legislation and are
not legally binding and, second, unanimity is required in the Council. The latter
condition in particular demonstrates the intensity of Member State insecurity, given
the legal weakness of recommendations.134 As with the exclusion of harmonisation,
however, the unanimity requirement may yet produce positive effects, despite its
ideological background. It could, for example, constitute a protection mechanism for
smaller states, whose special needs in the cultural and linguistic sectors may not have
been considered adequately during the drafting process. Moreover, the 'moral' force
of recommendations should not be discounted, particularly once they have been
published in the wider public domain. The Commission has always been active in
determining Community cultural policy and it is hoped that this initiative will
continue. Commission initiatives since the adoption of Article 128 EC are considered
in Chapter 6 infra but "...if the Member States do not like the initiatives taken...they
have reserved ample powers to block the adoption of such measures, including the
right of veto for every single Member State."135 And while this may prove beneficial
to the preservation of cultural diversity, it could also reduce any progress made by the
Community to a complete stalemate. It is, therefore, particularly important that
cultural and linguistic groups continue to seek the support of all levels of authority,
regional, national and international.
De Witte has argued that "...one should...not attempt to merely prevent the
Community from entering the [cultural] field, but also to steer its policy in the
appropriate direction [since] both national and regional identities may sometimes
better be protected by closer formal interaction at the European level than by the
134 Dehousse writes that "[t]he coexistence within one single document of such contradictory intents
should not be viewed as an inconsistency, but rather as one more reflection of the clash between the
different versions of the Community's raison d'etre that permeated negotiations at the
intergovernmental conference." (Dehousse, supra note 109, p. 106).
135 Loman et al, supra note 2, p. 210.
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separate policies of each Member State"136 From this perspective, co-operative
participation is crucial, provided that each Member State is sincerely committed to
cultural diversity and does not use its power of veto as a defence mechanism against
objectively positive change. Given that some Member States deny recognition of or
subsequent support for the linguistic minorities within their territories, it may take
some time before any substantive progress is made. But Article 128 provides, for the
first time, a platform from which the EC can grapple more openly with that task.
5. SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION OF SUBSIDIARITY
It has always been recognised, not least by the EC itself, that implementation of
Article 3b(2) EC requires the determination of vague and ambiguous criteria. In
response, various guidelines that identify relevant considerations have been
published. This section details some of these proposed frameworks for the
substantive application of subsidiarity, anticipating their application to the
development of language policies under Article 128 EC. The overriding limitations
within Article 128 itself apply throughout: first, language policy is considered as an
element of the general cultural policy objective in Article 128(1) since Article 128(2)
has already been shown to be relatively obsolete in this context; second, the role of
the Community is limited to 'contributor' and, finally, only incentive measures and
recommendations may be enacted.
A. Early Guidelines: The Common Market Law Review
In 1990, before the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the editors of the Common
Market Law Review anticipated the formal introduction of the principle of
1 ^7
subsidiarity into Community law. Their analysis was based on the traditional,
ecclesiastical interpretation of subsidiarity, as well as Article 12 of the 1984 Draft
Treaty on European Union and Article 130r(4) EEC. Drawing from these sources, a
sequence for the application of subsidiarity was developed. The first step was the
136 De Witte, supra note 116, p. 205.
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determination of whether the objective in question should be dealt with by the private
or public sector. In accordance with theological doctrine, it was held that 'maximum
leeway' must be given to the private sphere; issues should be tackled by public
authorities only where absolutely necessary. Where the need for government action
was established, it was further required that the appropriate level of authority be
resolved: local, regional or central government within the state, Community
intervention where greater efficiency was at issue. If domestic action was selected,
the appropriate level of internal authority would be regulated in accordance with
national law only, without any Community interference. Finally, the intensity of
action required was to be established. It was concluded that, in accordance with
subsidiarity, any action at Community level should be minimal, leaving the
"...maximum amount of room to manoeuvre to the Member States."138
This approach is faithful to the original, ecclesiastical idea of subsidiarity. It does not
assume that official action is desirable. Even where that can be established, a broad
interpretation of 'official' is applied, identifying the many strands of administrative
government available. From the perspective of language policy, it is likely that
implementation of this approach would have been welcomed by minority language
groups, since it attributes to them a degree of responsibility for their own fate. In
practice, however, it has been more usual to supplant the role of national
governments or the EC instead of allocating competence to subsidiary groups and
regional bodies. Furthermore, action taken at regional level is usually ultimately
dependent on standards set at higher levels of authority. Where a national
government is hostile to minority language groups within its jurisdiction, it is
unlikely to grant far-reaching powers to regional bodies. It is in this context that the
Community may yet play an enabling role, establishing minimum, but effective,
policy guidelines that take due account of national and sub-national diversity; the
express recognition of regional as well as national cultures in Article 128(1) supports
this assertion. Focusing on incentive measures of this kind also fits with the
137 (1990) vol. 27:2 Common Market Law Review, 181-184.
138 ibid., p. 183.
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limitations detailed in Article 128(5). But, again, it must be borne in mind that these
comments were not based on Article 3b(2) EC and that the role of sub-national
authorities has been of far less significance in reality.
B. Official Guidelines: The Edinburgh Summit Document
Possible difficulties with the implementation of Article 3b(2) were anticipated at the
Lisbon Summit, in June 1992. The European Council called on the Commission and
Council to develop suitable procedures and to report at the Edinburgh European
Council Summit in December of that year. As noted in Chapter 3 supra, the
Edinburgh Conclusions set out the basic characteristics of subsidiarity, such as its
legal significance, justiciability and the role of the institutions. The idea of taking
decisions 'as closely as possible to the citizens' was mentioned briefly, in
conjunction with Article A TEU, but the Document focused almost exclusively on
the principles contained in Article 3b EC.
Dealing specifically with Article 3b(2), it was stated that the Council must be
satisfied that both aspects of the provision are fulfilled i.e. that 'the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member State action', and that
1 OQ
they can therefore be better achieved by the Community. In order to determine
precisely when Community intervention is justifiable, three alternative but
complementary criteria were outlined:
• the issue has transnational aspects that cannot be regulated satisfactorily by the
Member States, and/or,
• Member State action alone, or the absence of Community action, would conflict
with Treaty requirements or otherwise 'significantly damage' Member State
interests, and/or,
• the Council is satisfied that Community action would produce clear benefits, in
light of the scale or effects of the proposed action, compared to what could be
accomplished by Member State action alone.
139
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It was stipulated that the 'better achieved' test should be substantiated by qualitative
and, where possible, quantitative evidence. Finally, a preference for minimum
harmonisation was stressed.
It cannot be assumed that EC intervention is the automatic response to the perceived
inadequacy of Member State action. Article 3b(2) stipulates situations where the
Member States 'cannot' achieve the objective in question: past or present policy is
not, then, a sufficient measure of their potential capacity to act. This in itself creates a
significant presumption in favour of domestic action: to establish that a Member
State can or cannot achieve an objective is far more subjective and inherently less
quantifiable than assessing whether the objective has or has not been implemented
successfully to date. As a result, arguments stressing a Community solution to the
Community dimension of language shift, for example, would need to be advanced to
rebut the presumption in favour of Member State action. In this context, it was
established that the dynamic of European integration has affected and will continue
to affect language patterns throughout the Member States; it was also argued that
there is an economic as well as a moral significance to language issues. Quite apart
from the implications for fundamental rights and citizenship, the practical and
economic concerns underlined show that language concerns can no longer be
redressed sufficiently by national action alone.
The existence of minority language groups throughout the Member States satisfies
the requirement that a proposed measure must have a transnational aspect. It cannot,
of course, be assumed that cross-border concerns must be regulated by the
Community. But minority languages are rarely a priority on any domestic political
agenda. The various approaches adopted by the Member States suggest that there
exists a diversity of standards that cannot be surmounted in the absence of, at the
very least, Community co-ordination for the establishment of acceptable minimum
standards. Again, the indifference of the majority of Member States to the Council of
Europe's 1993 Charter, which focused on outlining entitlements for speakers yet
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ensured that ample discretion remained with the signatory states, supports this
contention.
While the cross-border dimension on its own can justify EC action, it is worth
considering the implications of the other criteria set out in the Document. The second
test is particularly ambiguous, containing two alternative yet distinct standards.
Community action is justifiable where its absence would either conflict with the
requirements of the Treaty or significantly damage Member State interests. Limited
minority language policies, based on co-ordination and co-operation, and within the
legislative remit of Article 128(5), can be grounded in Article 128(1);
implementation of these policies is, therefore, a Treaty requirement. An assessment
of whether the absence of a Community contribution contradicts this requirement is
necessarily connected with the 'sufficiently achieved by the Member States' criterion.
Although both tests are presented in an and/or formulation, it is difficult to see how
they can be separated, since absence of Community action contradicts a Treaty
requirement only where the Member States cannot achieve the relevant objective(s).
The second consideration, that of significant damage to Member State interests, is
even more elusive. At face value, it seems erroneous that Community action in
pursuance of an objective incorporated into the Treaty by the Member States
themselves would in turn be employed to damage Member State interests. Why
would the Member States sanction a Treaty objective without ever anticipating or
intending that Community action could be undertaken in consequence? This scenario
projects a deceptive image of the Community as an autonomous polity, entirely free
of restraints, such as the stringent unanimity requirement in Article 128(5). The
concept of 'significant damage' is grounded in the cautionary ideology of the
principle of subsidiarity itself. Its resolution involves a subjective, political
assessment which cannot be determined absolutely. A danger exists, therefore, that
otherwise legitimate Community action could be dismissed on this vague and
imprecise basis. This is particularly conceivable in sensitive policy spheres, such as
culture and language. A palpable degree of Member State hostility exists, sometimes
defensibly, towards Community intrusion into what are viewed as domestic concerns;
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this is especially evident where the issues are closely linked to national identity. But
Member States should not manipulate sovereignty concerns at the expense of
fundamental language rights, for example. It is arguable that all linguistic concerns
are domestic, that Community action in this field would significantly damage
Member State interests from the perspective of national identity or using the 'closer
to the citizen' criterion. The contrary view, stressing the Community dimension to
language concerns, has, however, been established and projects a far more realistic
view of contemporary circumstances.
The concerns raised above tie in, somewhat ironically, with the last test i.e. whether
the Council is satisfied that Community action would produce clear benefits in
consideration of scale and effects. Assessing benefits of this kind is where the
application of qualitative and quantitative analysis seems most feasible. But the
Council consists of Member State representatives. If a proposal is perceived to
damage Member State interests, it is unlikely that the Council will be prepared to
adopt it, whatever conclusions empirical analysis might produce. If one Member
State or a minority of Member States have an objection to proposed measures, they
lose out where qualified majority voting is practised. But in the context of Article
128, all Council decisions must be taken unanimously. This proviso should be
viewed an in-built safeguard, not as an incentive to misapply the subsidiarity tests.
The relationship between the three tests outlined is clearly an interdependent one;
their application in an 'and/or' formula is misleading since the issues cannot always
be addressed in isolation. By developing a sequence of questions, an impression that
the application of subsidiarity is a logical, step-by-step procedure has been created.
Specifying the desirability of using quantitative as well as qualitative analysis
compounds this illusion. But the answers to the questions posed are more likely to be
arrived at by political rather than practical reflections. Subsidiarity is not a
straightforward concept, especially where it has been adopted as an ambiguous
compromise between fundamentally contentious interests. Where subsidiarity is
applied on a recurring basis but not within a structure of clearly delimited
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competence, each and every application will have to be considered on its own facts.
That is not the problem here. In reality, it is likely that very little emphasis will be
placed on 'facts'. No attempt was made, for example, to define the key phrases, such
as 'sufficiently achieved', 'significant damage' or 'clear benefits', or to suggest the
issues that ought to be considered in these contexts. Overall, the scope for
subjectivity is remarkable. As a result, the European Council conclusions have
perpetuated rather than dispelled the obscurity of subsidiarity.
C. Elaboration of the EC Guidelines: Academic Commentary
In contrast to the relatively minimalist guidelines favoured by the European Council,
a detailed framework for the application of subsidiarity was developed subsequently
by Temple Lang.140 He does not really address the relative capacity of the Member
States to achieve Treaty objectives, focusing instead on an elaboration of the idea that
Community action is 'better' where it:
(1) can go further in the direction desired than national measures could go;
(2) is more efficient or effective;
(3) can do something which states could not achieve at all;
(4) is a necessary basis for common policies;
(5) provides co-ordination of otherwise uncoordinated national measures, where
lack of co-ordination would be undesirable;
(6) is needed to facilitate or make possible Community measures on some other
point, or to offset the inconvenient effects of Community measures in some way
{e.g. a cohesion fund is needed to offset ill effects on peripheral regions).141
These criteria elaborate on the meaning of 'better achieved'; some are
straightforwardly obvious, such as greater efficiency or effectiveness. The
requirement that Community action must be a 'necessary basis for common policies'
reinforces the idea that EC measures are not the automatic route for the
implementation of Treaty objectives. In the context of culture, encouraging co¬
ordination to the extent anticipated here may, however, contradict the express
prohibition on harmonisation in Article 128(5). In a specific sense, the absence of co¬
ordination is undesirable where even basic language rights are not recognised or
implemented; this interpretation is discussed in Chapter 5 infra in the specific
140
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context of fundamental rights and citizenship. Co-ordination can also be interpreted
broadly, as developed in the context of environmental policy, for example, where the
adoption of co-ordinated basic standards meant not only that the ensuing obligations
were not prohibitive from the Member State perspective, but also that national
measures detailing more intensive protection were entirely permissible. Finally, the
requirement that the EC must develop policies to offset the effects of Community law
on peripheral regions is particularly welcome from the perspective of minority
language policy.
Temple Lang proceeds to formulate eleven comprehensive questions to determine
whether Community or Member State action is required. He does not attempt to
evade the necessarily subjective nature of subsidiarity, stating plainly that the criteria
are of a practical and political rather than legal nature. These questions are now
considered individually in the context of language policy development.
(i) Is the scale of the problem so large that it needs to be tackled by the EC?
In political terms, language rights are rarely a priority, apart from situations that
degenerate to militant disruption. From a national perspective, the number of
speakers of a minority language can range from a limited scattering to millions. But
in aggregate terms, approximately fifty million European citizens speak a language
other than those officially recognised by the EC. In addition, the increasing utility of
just one or two languages across Europe has accentuated government concern in
respect of smaller official languages. It is arguable, therefore, that in the Community
context, the preservation ofminority and other languages is a 'large-scale' problem.
(ii) Is there a substantial impact on cross-border situations and policies?
No EC Member State is considered absolutely monolingual.142 Language issues do
have cross-border implications. The Court of Justice has assessed language policy
measures in various Member States, for example, in the context of free movement of
141 ibid., p. 110.
205
workers and discrimination against non-nationals.143 The role of the EC in foreign
language teaching programmes, and in education more generally, is also relevant
here, but it is conceded that this policy area may not be considered to be 'substantial'
except by those involved directly in the promotion of language education.
(iii) Would differences between Member States be inherently inconsistent with
the objective?
Article 128 EC provides that the Community must respect the national and regional
diversity of the Member States in the context of culture. In general terms, differences
between Member State policies may not only be legitimate but necessary to secure
the effective implementation of language rights: initiatives for Gaidhlig in Scotland,
for example, will hardly be comparable with those required for the Catalan language.
Significantly, the application of diverse solutions is enhanced by the exclusion of
harmonisation in Article 128(5). But the ideology of accepting differences between
Member States could inadvertently condone the absence of a basic standard of
respect for language rights in any one of them. The Treaty commitment to respect for
cultural diversity could provide redress in this context but, because of the bias
throughout Article 128 against far-reaching EC initiative, a reparative Community
language policy might be implemented more successfully within the ambit of
fundamental rights and citizenship, discussed in Chapter 5 infra.
(iv) How important economically is the distortion of competition, or the barrier
to trade or other problem, which it is intended to eliminate? Will its importance
increase or diminish?
While language issues do have an economic dimension, the impact on aggregate EC
trade, in a literal sense, is negligible. But the various impacts of trade laws are far
broader that those which can be denominated in monetary terms only. In any event,
the existing economic dimension of language policy is certain to increase rather than
diminish, in light of the accelerating spread of the languages of wider
142
cf. Alpha Connelly, "The European Convention on Human Rights and the protection of linguistic
minorities", (1993) vol. 2:2 Irish Journal ofEuropean Law 277-293.
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communication. This has two principal effects: first, an increased demand for
education services in the predominant languages and second, a counter-attempt to
promote all other languages, both official and non-official.
(v) What ill effects will result if no action is taken? Will the ill effects increase
over time if not prevented?
To date, the Community has not taken steps to actually implement various measures
in favour of minority languages proposed by the European Parliament. Recognition
of the value of minority languages is freely given, but this usually stops short of
considering the more substantive measures proposed. If this situation persists, the
preservation of linguistic diversity will be seriously threatened. The predominance of
one or two languages within the Community institutions and, increasingly, in
European society more generally, has accentuated nationalist tensions within the EC
power structure. This has often dissuaded Member States from approaching
European issues from a European perspective, who strive instead to cultivate a
separatist defence of national integrity. This has encouraged a culture of 'us and
them' in the Community/Member State context, which goes absolutely against the
impetus for supra-national co-operation in the first place. It is inevitable that these ill
effects, left unchecked, will increase rather than diminish over time. The
counterpromotion of an artificial common European identity, discussed supra, has
had little effect in reality and has even been questioned by its proponents. Any
continued or perceived promotion of assimilation will threaten the foundations of
European integration in a more critical way than appreciation of diversity ever could.
(vi) Can the objective be achieved by minimum standards or by mutual
recognition rather than by comprehensive rules?
(vii) Is a regulation or a directive more appropriate?
These issues relate more to the principle of proportionality but do raise important
considerations for the application of subsidiarity. It is peculiar that Temple Lang
refers only to regulations and directives, since most of the Treaty provisions to which
143
e.g. Case 137/84 Ministere Public v. Mutsch [19851 ECR 2681; Groener, supra note 28.
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subsidiarity applies do not permit the adoption of these legislative acts in the first
place. Article 128(5) excludes the harmonisation of rules in the sphere of cultural
policy and specifies recommendations as the appropriate act of implementation. The
trend towards adopting,minimum standards for non-exclusive policies more generally
is, however, becoming increasingly evident. Ultimately, the Court of Justice may
determine whether Article 128's guiding principles of 'co-operation' and
'contribution' can encompass the introduction of minimum standards by the EC; in
the meantime, this initiative rests, in practical terms, within the discretion of the
Member States, acting through the Council. As noted supra, the adoption of
minimum standards allows more stringent measures to be sanctioned at national
level. It is a system that has been readily applied to environmental protection and
may yet prove advantageous for language policy, since the needs of language groups
across Europe are as diverse as the languages themselves. But 'minimum standards'
should never be equated with minimum effectiveness or enforcement. In the context
of international protection for fundamental rights more generally, a parallel dilemma
exists. Where the protection of rights varies in different countries, finding a common
standard can be a politically contentious struggle; this is exacerbated when the rights
in question are considered not to be as 'fundamental' as others. The debate on the
implementation of economic and social rights is particularly illustrative. As a
compromise, minimum standards are applied, along with an aspiration that they will
be implemented gradually and in consideration of practical exigencies. It is generally
maintained that settling for minimum standards ensures that rights are being
protected at some level rather than not being protected at all. The most common
enforcement mechanism applied is the procedure of state reporting, but its
effectiveness is widely criticised, since it leaves an unacceptable level of discretion to
states and does not provide independent redress for the individual.144 It is
unfortunately significant that, in the context of language policy, most European states
are not yet prepared to accept even discretionary obligations outlined in the Council
of Europe's Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. EC cultural policy
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formulators cannot succumb to this apathy. Minimum standards can work, but only
where accompanied by a commitment to maximum effectiveness. In view of the
structure of Article 128 and the application of subsidiarity, however, this
commitment must be made by the Member States themselves.
(viii) Can the objective be achieved by providing funds rather than by rule
making, or by co-ordination of national policies rather than by a Community
measure?
Moneys allocated to language groups can be used in numerous ways: funding co¬
ordinating bodies, setting up and maintaining minority language education structures,
developing enterprise in associated regions, as well as encouraging and sponsoring
cultural activities and exchanges through the medium of the language(s) in question.
Church and Phinnemore warn that the lack of available Community funds may
seriously impede any attempted progress in the formation of EC cultural policy.145
But providing funds will not address issues such as the relationship between speakers
of minority languages and public bodies, whether national or supra-national, or the
determination and implementation of the language rights. Thus, while the provision
of funds is necessary, it is not sufficient.
The second phrase is fairly elusive since it is difficult to see how national policies
can be co-ordinated without a Community impetus. It has already been shown that
the Council of Europe has not had much success in this particular undertaking.
Moreover, Article 128(5) explicitly commits the EC to adopting 'incentive measures'
in the cultural field. The primary advantage of Community measures is objective,
external supervision for methods of implementation and enforcement.
(ix) If the aim can be achieved in several different ways, could the Community
measure allow Member States to choose one of several options?
144 A.H. Robertson and J.G. Merrills, Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of the
International Protection ofHuman Rights, 3rd ed., (Manchester : Manchester University Press, 1992),
pp. 41-50.
145 Church and Phinnemore, supra note 8, p. 205.
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In reality, an EC minority language policy would only be effective if framed in this
manner, for several reasons. At present, national regimes for the protection of
language rights vary considerably across the Community. But, as noted, different
language groups have very different needs; attempts to achieve absolute uniformity
would be entirely futile. In any event, Article 128 EC prohibits the harmonisation of
national laws. From the political perspective, it is unlikely that the Member States
would concede to implementing a European policy without having a number of
choices or options but again, the danger exists that political compromises and the
enjoyment of inordinate discretion could lead to ineffectiveness: this mindset cannot
be allowed to prevail.
(x) Would Community measures to achieve the aim in question be an objectively
reasonable quid pro quo for a significant number of Member States to seek in
response to some other Community measures?
Decision-making in the Council is necessarily political, since the Member State
representatives are considering national as well as Community interests. It is
inevitable that political bargaining sometimes secures support for or rejection of
proposed measures, often on a quid pro quo basis. It not really clear, however, why
Temple Lang has drawn subsidiarity into this process; the association of subsidiarity
with the political dimension of Community law to this extent is contextually
misplaced and can only serve to further diminish its legitimacy in practice.
(xi) If a Community measure were adopted, should it contain provisions for the
special problems of particular regions?
In the context of minority languages, this is inevitable and is expressly recognised in
Article 128(1) itself. But caution must be taken not to classify language rights
inherently as 'special problems', or to associate minority languages exclusively with
the regions. The Irish language, for example, is spoken primarily in designated,
geographically scattered regions, but is also spoken in a number of urban settings, not
necessarily proximate to the Gaeltachtai.
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The preceding paragraphs identify specific questions that can arise when justifying
Community intervention on the basis of subsidiarity. There are no exact rules or
procedures; indeed, Community measures are typically framed to deal with diverse
circumstances. In addition, their impact on national law varies greatly, in terms of
both practical effect and political significance. Temple Lang has at least grappled
with criteria that may be determining factors in the practical application of the
European Council guidelines. It is patently obvious that subsidiarity is an obscure and
subjective concept, capable of manipulation by both the Community and the Member
States. Its denomination as a political weapon has potentially serious consequences
for acutely sensitive policy areas, including culture and language. It is conceivable
that subsidiarity could' thwart the implementation of basic language rights, such as
those envisaged by the European Parliament. But it is not acceptable that an
indeterminate allusion to its sweeping omnipotence be deemed sufficient to abandon
this objective, discussed further in Chapter 6 infra. Restrictions and difficulties have
been identified, but clear possibilities for Community action in the cultural, and
especially linguistic, sector, have also been shown to conform with both the express
limitations of Article 128 and the application of the principle of subsidiarity: the role
of the Community in minority language issues can be justified by at least eight of the
preceding eleven questions.
6. CONCLUSION
Article 128 EC reflects the ideological cross-roads reached at the Maastricht
negotiations and confers mixed blessings on the Community institutions. Article
128(2) is a limited provision that does not encompass the development of language
policy. In respect of the sectors listed expressly, it is unlikely that past harmonisation
programmes can be further developed but measures enacted prior to ratification of
the TEU are unaffected. Article 128(1) contains an independent objective,
committing the Community to contributing to cultural diversity in general terms. The
concurrent obligation to promote common European heritage can be interpreted in a
broader context and does not conflict with the ambition of safeguarding cultural
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pluralism. Language policy, including minority language concerns, falls within the
ambit of Article 128(1). There are, however, limitations to be considered: the
Community may 'contribute' to the 'flowering of cultures' but only through enacting
incentive measures and recommendations, the latter requiring a unanimous Council
decision. Notwithstanding the ideological background, the employment of these
legislative instruments is fortuitous, in that it provides a platform for sanctioning
programmes concentrated on the maintenance of pluralism. In light of the diversity of
cultures and languages throughout the Community, harmonisation would have been
unacceptable. Significantly, and in contradiction to the stance adopted by some of the
institutions, the principle of subsidiarity does not necessarily introduce additional
constraints; EC language policy initiatives can sometimes be required as a result of
rather than in contradiction to Article 3b(2) EC. The role of international
organisations, particularly the Council of Europe, is unlikely to develop policies that
surpass those already implemented by the Community. This can be explained largely
by Member State apathy, even antipathy, illustrated by the poor response to the
Council's Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The policy integration clause
in Article 128(4) may influence the evolution of Community law more generally, but
only if draft legislative measures are examined deliberately from this perspective,
preferably by the European Parliament or the Committee of the Regions. It was also
noted that cultural policy is not confined within the dimensions of Article 128 where
there are significant economic considerations; it is unlikely that Article 235 will be
employed successfully in this context, however, since the Community has
traditionally dealt with mixed activities by applying the fundamental principles of
Treaty-based EC law.
Exercise of the inordinate discretion accorded to the Member States is what will yet
determine the effectiveness of Article 128. It is hoped that legitimate national
sovereignty concerns will not impede the implementation of a democratic language
policy, both within the Community and throughout the Member States themselves;
but more particularly, obstinacy should not masquerade as the defence of sovereignty
against unwanted, though justifiable, centralisation. The application of subsidiarity
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and the limitations contained in Article 128(5), bolstered by Article F(l) TEU,
provide more than adequate protection against genuinely intrusive Community
action.
The moral force of Community incentives should not be discounted. The Resolutions
on minority languages, published by the European Parliament in the 1980s and early
1990s, for example, were not legally binding, but they did generate considerable
awareness of the democratic deficit pertaining to non-recognition and non-
implementation of language rights. Building on this awareness in a direct way is not
really possible under Article 128 without a fundamental shift in Member State
attitudes towards linguistic minorities. Significant but relatively benign measures,
such as the provision of financial aid for language programmes, are wholly justifiable
under Article 128 but the provision is a prime example of giving with one hand yet
taking away with the other. Its adoption is an inherently beneficial progression but it
is unlikely to support the modification of deficient national measures towards more
effective standards. It is for this reason that language policy is further considered
within the context of fundamental rights and citizenship, in Chapter 5 infra.
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CHAPTER 5
LANGUAGE RIGHTS AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE EC
CONTEXT
1. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of a fundamental rights jurisdiction in the European Union is a
controversial cornerstone in the evolution of the Union itself, permeating debates on
democracy, legitimacy and citizenship. But the nature and scope of this jurisdiction
are uncertain. In the context of language rights, this chapter analyses the existing and
potential roles of the Community in the fundamental rights domain, not only from the
traditional perspective of political astuteness but concentrating on the individual as
beneficiary throughout the Member States. It is first established that language rights
can be legitimately categorised as 'fundamental' rights.
2. LANGUAGE RIGHTS AS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Writing in the Canadian context, Reaume comments that "[ljanguage policy making
has for too long been conducted solely as an aspect of power politics. The result has
been a singular inattention to the development of a principled theoretical grounding
as an important aspect of human rights."1 The underlying question is whether a right
to use a particular language, for either official or non-official purposes, is a
fundamental human right, as opposed to an administrative or legal claim. In addition,
even if language rights are accepted as fundamental rights, does a negative rights
approach, e.g. non-discrimination clauses, provide adequate protection or is the
creation and implementation of a positive linguistic choice regime also necessary?
1 Denise G. Reaume, "The constitutional protection of language: Survival or security?", in David
Schneiderman (ed.), Language and the State: The Law and Politic of Identity, (Quebec: Les Editions
Yvon Blais, 1989), 37-57 at 57.
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Classification of language rights as fundamental rights hinges on whether or not the
term 'fundamental' can encompass degrees of rights i.e. that some rights are,
legitimately, more fundamental than others. This construct allows for a priority of
rights, from abolishing the death penalty to securing due process, to the enjoyment of
social and cultural rights. Fundamental rights theories do not, and should not,
presuppose that all rights are inherently equal in priority. But this does not mean that
norms of lower priority do not actually constitute rights in themselves. Rights of all
degrees evolve from the common aims of the eradication of suppression and the
achievement of justice. In this context, Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson note that
"[ojften individuals and groups are treated unjustly and suppressed by means of
language."2 They identify, therefore, the need to "...formulate, codify and implement
minimal standards for the enjoyment of linguistic human rights [as] an integral part
of international and national law."
A. Historical Background to the Protection ofLanguage Rights
Contemporary human rights law, which envisages participating states surrendering a
degree of national sovereignty, stands in marked contrast to the original inter-state
system. Significantly, language .rights, in the context of minority rights more
generally, constitute one of the three sources of international human rights law, along
with humanitarian intervention and the abolition of slavery.4 Protection of minority
rights derived initially from tolerance of religious diversity, followed by the granting
of rights to religious freedom. These principles were expanded to include other
minority concerns, such as national origin. Throughout the nineteenth century,
however, very few countries gave legislative consideration to the protection of
minorities within their territories.5 A number of inter-state treaties on minority
2 Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson, "Introduction", in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson
(eds.), Linguistic Human Rights: Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination, (Berlin; New York: Mouton
de Gruyter, 1994), 1-22 at 2.
3 ibid.
4
cf. A.H. Robertson and J.G. Merrills, Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of the
International Protection ofHuman Rights, 3rd ed., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992),
p.19.
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protection were concluded at this time, primarily in an effort to quell potentially
unsettling nationalism among minority groups and based on fears of secession. But
the treaty system is generally considered to have been unsatisfactory, the resulting
discontent and strife leading to "...the shot at Sarajevo which helped launch World
War I...."6
The redrawing of national boundaries after the First World War meant that national
minorities were often displaced on the 'wrong' side of the new state frontiers. This
was of considerable importance at both domestic and international levels, not
because of a desire to develop tenets of human rights law, but because of the need to
establish and maintain political stability. A more elaborate inter-state treaty system
was devised, under the supervision of the League of Nations, whereby states
undertook to ensure that members of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities enjoyed
civil and political rights on an equal footing with the rest of the population. But the
demise of the League itself necessarily resulted in the demise of the minorities
treaties. It is generally acknowledged that the system was not a satisfactory one in
practice, but a number of striking theoretical innovations remain acutely relevant to
the contemporary protection of fundamental rights generally and to language rights in
particular. The Permanent Court of International Justice issued a number of advisory
opinions on minority rights, stressing that equality in law was futile without a
commitment on the part of state authorities to the realisation of equality in fact.7 In
the context of language rights, it was intended that the right to speak a particular
language should be enforced irrespective of whether or not an individual understood
the official language of the state, with any related costs borne by the state. O Riagain
and Nic Shuibhne point out that "...subsequent international instruments, such as the
European Convention on Human Rights, limit the introduction of an interpreter in
5
Capotorti, as Special Rapporteur for the United Nations, notes that some countries - Austria,
Switzerland, Hungary and Belgium - made some provision for minorities, particularly in respect of the
official use of languages: cf. Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights ofPersons belonging to Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities (hereafter 'Capotorti Report'), (New York: United Nations, 1979),
p. 3, para. 18.
6 J.A. Sigler, Minority Rights: A Comparative Analysis, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 72.
7
cf. in particular, the Minority Schools in Albania Case, (1935) [PCIJ] Ser. A/B, No. 64.
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criminal proceedings, for example, to situations where the accused does not
understand the language of the proceedings."8 Thus, the protection of language rights
was relegated to lower priority on the human rights agenda with the passage of time,
in contrast to its original significance in the formation of the principle that a state's
treatment of its nationals was no longer a strictly domestic matter.
Ironically, this change in attitude towards minority rights can be linked to the
foundation of the United Nations and the Council of Europe. In the aftermath of the
Second World War, the international community was determined to ensure that
recently witnessed human rights atrocities would never happen again. In accordance
with the dignity and equality of all human beings, human rights protection was
generalised and universalised. This meant that special protection for minority groups
was no longer a priority. Consequentially, as discussed infra, neither universal nor
regional human rights instruments drafted at this time contain provisions that deal
expressly with minority rights. Another difference is that the League of Nations
sought to contribute to political stability by according rights to displaced minority
groups, but thinking at the time of the foundation of the UN considered minority
rights themselves as a threat to national unity and, therefore, to economic and
political stability. In recent years, the grim reality of the international community's
neglect of minority rights has manifested itself in the violent breakdown of
multiethnic states, forcing minority issues back on the international political agenda.
As stressed in Chapter 1, extreme minority-based conflicts represent the most
publicised but least common minority situations and usually result from denial rather
than implementation of minority rights. Language rights represent the lower end of
the minority rights spectrum, in contrast to the violence and persecution sometimes
associated with other minority claims. But this does not displace their legitimacy in
the domain of the realisation of justice. To examine the role of the EC in the
protection of language rights, it is first necessary to establish a theoretical framework
8
Padraig O Riagain and Niamh Nic Shuibhne, "Minority language rights", (1997) 17 Annual Review
ofApplied Linguistics, 11-29 at 16.
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within which claims based on language choice can be justifiably termed fundamental
rights.
B. Contemporary Theories on Language Rights as Fundamental Rights
The following sections clarify the scope of language rights in the context of this
thesis and introduce incidental terminology. As stated in Chapter 1 supra, this study
is confined to the official use of language, which relates to choice of language for
administrative purposes, for the business of government, whether dealing with a state
or with an entity such as the EC. It includes choice of language in the courts and
communications with state authorities or EC institutions. As explained in Chapter 1,
however, examination of this domain of language use necessitates consideration of
the broader environment of language behaviour and policy, which incorporates
social, cultural, political and economic planning and development. O Riagain and
Nic Shuibhne note that "[cjonceptually, the question of minority language rights can
be located within the classic debates about the balancing of liberal freedom with the
demands of a capitalist economy, of equity and efficiency."9
(i) Definitions and Terminology
There is no universally recognised definition of a 'minority' in human rights theory.10
A number of criteria of assessment, both objective and subjective, are usually
applied, however, in any attempt to define a minority group. Objective criteria
include the existence of a distinct group, its relative numerical constitution and the
existence of a non-dominant position (usually referring to a political context). On the
other hand, subjective criteria deal with the group's self-perception as a minority,
based on concepts like a shared sense of community and a desire, whether explicit or
implicit, to preserve or maintain the distinguishing characteristics of the group, such
as religious beliefs, ethnic customs, traditions or a distinct language. The typical
responses to minority rights claims, within states, international human rights
9 ibid., p. 12.
10
cf. Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Status and Use of the Irish Language in the Legal System,
(unpublished LL.M. Thesis, National University of Ireland, Galway, 1995), Chapter 4.
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instruments and institutional bodies such as the EC, have been charted by Skutnabb-
Kangas and Phillipson; they range from the assimilation-oriented extreme of
prohibition, through to toleration, non-discrimination, permission and, finally, the
maintenance-oriented policy of promotion."
In the specific context of minority languages, it is necessary to establish which
languages should be protected in any political situation. Reaume considers that the
allocation of government support should be determined not on grounds of the size or
critical mass of a language group alone, but also incorporating the criterion of
viability; using this formulation, she refers to "...currently viable language
communities, each able to sustain for its members a reasonably full cultural life."12
She further qualifies this condition by adding that "[t]he argument that a language
group deserves special protection is not based on the fact that other groups have it,
but that this group needs it and can make use of it."13 The size of a language group
does not necessarily condition the existence of language rights but affects instead
their implementation in practical terms: this issue is considered further infra in the
context of group rights. Addressing the specific criteria enunciated by Reaume,
MacMillan counterargues that the very fact that certain members of society are
necessarily excluded from the domain of minority language rights, given that only
individuals in particular social contexts can claim them, violates the condition of
universality which is, he argues, a central premise of fundamental human rights.14
But using this logic to detract from the status of language rights as fundamental rights
is not a valid argument. Tourists and immigrants can be excluded from the
implementation of other fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, for example. In
terms of social context, a worker does not have the right to claim concurrent social
11
Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, "Linguistic human rights, past and present", in Skutnabb-Kangas
and Phillipson (eds.), supra note 2, 71-110 at 79-80.
12
Reaume, supra note 1, p. 54.
13 ibid.., p. 56.
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welfare benefit. Moreover, in the specific context of minority language rights,
individuals who speak majority languages already have the right to use their language
for official purposes. Minority language rights strive to redress an imbalance rather
than to create any privilege.
Another aspect of determining which minority languages engender language rights is
whether protection covers native languages on the basis of natural justice principles
only or includes native languages, and possibly acquired languages, on the basis of
the right to choice of language. The principles of natural justice refer to basic
language rights acquired by virtue of not understanding a certain language or
languages. Interpreters would only be introduced into court proceedings, for example,
where the accused or a witness does not understand the language through which the
proceedings are being conducted; it would be unjust that the rights to liberty or
property of an accused could be determined where s/he was not be able to follow the
proceedings. The provisions for appointment of interpreters in the European
Convention on Human Rights, for example, are based on the natural justice criterion
and are discussed further infra. In contemporary life, however, it is becoming
increasingly rare that speakers of minority languages are not additionally competent
in one or more languages of wider communication. Thus, the broader question of
allowing individuals to use the language of their choice in a majority/minority
language situation arises. Using this principle, it is irrelevant that the individual
seeking to use a minority language for official purposes is competent to use the
majority language through which a court or other authority normally functions. The
right to choice of language fully accommodates the preference of the individual, with
any costs of interpretation or translation falling on the state or international entity
involved. Whether this right to choice of language is a fundamental right is discussed
in the following section. It may be pointed out at this stage, however, that a further
contention exists within the linguistic choice thesis itself i.e. whether the right to
choice of language should exist to protect mother tongues only or should also cover
14 C. Michael MacMillan, "Linking theory to practice: Comments on the 'Constitutional protection of
language'", in Schneiderman (ed.), supra note 1, 59-68 at 61-2; MacMillan cites the exclusion of
tourists and immigrants as examples.
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languages acquired voluntarily. MacMillan, for example, restricts the definition of
language rights to "...a right to one's mother tongue or native language...not simply a
right to speak a language per se but rather the language of one's heritage."15 It must
be acknowledged that the vast majority of those who wish to avail of the right to
speak a minority language are native speakers of the particular language in question.
But it is arguable that the language choice concept should not exclude those who
have acquired a minority language at a later stage in their lives and choose
voluntarily to communicate through the medium of that language where possible.
The Canadian Supreme Court pronounced on this question in Attorney General of
Quebec v. Nancy Forget, stating clearly that "[t]he concept of language is not limited
to the mother tongue but also includes the language of use or habitual
communication....There is no reason to adopt a narrow interpretation which does not
take into account the possibility that the mother tongue and the language of use may
differ."16 Piatt compares language choice to choice of religion, which is also mutable
yet steadfastly protected.17
(ii) Theoretical Framework to justify Language Rights as Fundamental Rights
Declarations on the value of linguistic diversity are reaffirmed continuously within a
wide variety of perspectives and theories - cultural, historical, anthropological and
sociological. Advancing these arguments to the legal realm of fundamental rights has
been described as "...an attempt to harness fundamental principles and practices from
the field of human rights to the task of rectifying some linguistic wrongs...."18 In one
of the few studies examining this possibility, Green outlines the key questions as
follows: "[a]re language rights legal rights only, justiciable in court but without
deeper moral foundation? Or are they on a footing with the more familiar
15 ibid., p. 61.
16 [1988] 2 SCR 90 at 100.
17 Bill Piatt, "Toward domestic recognition of a human right to language", (1986) 23 Houston Law
Review, 885-906 at 901.
18
Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, "Linguistic rights and wrongs", (1995) vol. 16:4 Applied
Linguistics, 483-504 at 483.
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fundamental rights...? If so, [a]re they perhaps derivatively related to other
fundamental rights, for example, freedom of expression?"19 The primary advantage
of establishing that language rights are fundamental rights, as opposed to legal claims
not rooted in principle but in the realm of social organisation, is that if a right is
grounded in moral considerations, its status is higher than that of a principle based in
the discretionary arena of administrative policy. Thus, its recognition and
implementation would not be dependent on the potentially inconstant will of policy
makers.20 The significance of this distinction cannot be overstated, given the
resistance often encountered towards the implementation of linguistic choice,
discussed in Chapter 1 supra. Placed in this context, arguments advanced in favour
of dispensing with "...argumentation in the moral order that could have been better
spent trying to achieve political results directly..."21 are unrealistic, as they
presuppose a (frequently elusive) supportive political environment. Rickard
elaborates on this submission as follows:
[If] protection...is a mere policy option to be adopted or not, depending on the
social climate of the day, it is itself subject to the very conditions that generate
and entrench minority disadvantage. The democratic processes that guide
policy are essentially majoritarian in nature, and there is no assurance that
mainstream interests will not dominate in those decisions. Policies that
advantage minorities at the apparent expense of the majority are likely to be
unpopular and have low priority...A regime of protection...would [need] to be
deep enough to extend into the basic institutional structure where the problem
has its roots.22
Green applies theories based on the correlativity of rights and duties, developed
principally by Joseph Raz, as a starting point for the classification of language rights
as fundamental rights.23 Raz outlines the basic idea that a legal right is a fundamental
19 Leslie Green, "Are language rights fundamental?", (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal, 639-669
at 640.
20
cf. Maurice Rickard, "Liberalism, multiculturalism and minority protection", (1994) vol. 20:2 Social
Theory and Practice, 143-170 at 154: "[T]his strategy would render minority protection an optional
and discretionary thing. It would not be morally required, and its implementation would be subject to
the to-and-fro of day-to-day politics, policy and legislation."
21 Alfred P. Rubin, "Are human rights legal?", in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds.), The
Protection ofMinorities and Human Rights, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), 33-58 at 55-6.
22 Rickard, supra note 20, p. 154/6.
222
right only where it protects some moral right.24 Using variable concepts like natural
law to establish what constitutes a moral right is no longer the prevalent approach
adopted by legal theorists: as Green states bluntly, "[w]e need not seek timeless,
transcendental proofs of the existence of fundamental rights, and it is just as well
since we will not find them."25 The alternative legal basis provided by Raz has
gained some credence in contemporary theory i.e. a moral right to 'x' exists if and
only if some person's interest is sufficient reason for holding others, whether private
individuals or collective entities such as governments, to be under a duty to provide
or secure 'x'. The concept of 'duty' places fundamental rights beyond often
discretionary administrative or policy decisions. Turi introduces a further element
into the right/duty thesis, referring to duties as obligations that can ground the
operation of legal sanctions when duties or obligations are breached.26 Freeman adds
that Raz's construction does not preclude the recognition of collective rights as
fundamental rights in certain instances.27
On the basis that language claims are legal rights, which is the interpretation beyond
which many theorists, governments and other entities will not concede, Green applies
the general principles set out by Raz to the specific domain of minority language
rights, to promote their status to fundamental rights. At the outset, he notes that the
application of Raz's theory does not require that all fundamental rights are equal or
even of great importance: "[tjhus, one source of scepticism about language rights is
immediately defused."28 It is imperative, however, that interests in language are
justified as moral interests, to authorise placing a correlative duty on others,
particularly governments and other executive and legislative institutions. Green
23
Green, supra note 19, p. 647 et seq.
24
cf. for example, Joseph Raz, "Multiculturalism: A liberal perspective", (1994) Dissent 67-79.
25 Green, supra note 19, p. 648.
26
Joseph G. Turi, "Typology of language legislation", in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (eds.),
supra note 2, 111 -119 at 116.
27 Michael Freeman, "Are there collective human rights?", (1995) 43 Political Studies, 25-40 at 30;
the controversial issue of individual versus collective rights is addressed infra.
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classifies interests in language as falling within two main categories, linguistic
survival and linguistic security. Linguistic survival is the broader of the two concepts,
referring to the survival of language groups over time. Thus, it relates to a goal of
indefinite scope, in terms of both ambition and time, which seeks to combat the
extinction of a particular language or languages. It is usually based on a desire for
continuity, linguistic continuity specifically and cultural continuity more generally.
Green defines linguistic survival as an abstract, aesthetic concept, which "...evinces a
concern for languages as things in themselves rather than for their speakers."29
Similarly, Reaume asserts that "[i]t is not languages that have rights, but people."30
She refines the notion of linguistic survival even further, arguing that its success is
contingent upon the language group maintaining a politically sovereign territorial
base.31
Two arguments advanced in the context of minority languages relate to the theme of
linguistic survival. First, it is constantly argued that linguistic diversity is a valuable
attribute, both for individual speakers and for its contribution to the "...rich texture of
•39
human society." Second, the historical circumstances that have impacted on the
status or use of a language are often recited to justify the contemporary and future
allocation of resources for the maintenance, or even revival, of that language. It is
important to stress that neither Green nor Reaume seek to detract from the legitimacy
of these arguments as absolutely valid concerns in themselves. They do not, however,
accept that reasoning founded on linguistic survival can justify sufficiently the
classification of language rights as fundamental human rights. As Reaume surmises:
[t]he interest in linguistic continuity would undoubtedly be sufficient to
motivate people to teach their children their language and participate in cultural
events which help improve the chances that the language will survive. But I am
28 Green, supra note 19, p. 647.
29 ibid., p. 656.
10
Reaume, supra note 1, p. 39.
31 ibid., p. 39 et seq.
32 ibid., p. 41.
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doubtful that it is sufficiently strong to justify imposing duties on others who
may have different and competing cultural ambitions....33
While accepting the essence of these arguments, particularly in respect of attempting
justification on historical bases, interests based on the inherent value of linguistic
diversity, and the resultant duties placed on governments and other entities, cannot be
discounted so readily: this argument was set out in detail in Chapter 1 supra.
An alternative interest in language is the achievement of linguistic security, a present-
oriented concept based on the premise "...that one may use one's language with
dignity."34 As well as an individual interest in language, linguistic security also
encompasses a social interest, based on interactions through a shared linguistic
medium that represent an expression of the speaker's identity as a member of a
language community. Social and individual considerations are interrelated, since
linguistic security strives to ensure that "...speaking a certain language should not be
"3 C
a ground of social liability." Language interests in communication and identity are
grounded in the present, in contrast to the future, and also historically, oriented goals
of language survival.36 Applying the correlative rights/duties thesis to linguistic
security, Green legitimates both the negative, tolerance-based principle of non¬
discrimination and the positive duty of proactive protection, to ensure that language
use is facilitated effectively for both private and public functions. He asserts that
"[t]he duties which this places on governments may make little difference to the
long-term prospects of survival, but they will make an immediate and palpable
difference to linguistic security."37 Reaffirming the view that minority language
33 ibid., p. 44.
34
Green, supra note 19, p. 658.
35 ibid.
36 Brett argues, however, that the notions of survival and security cannot be separated so definitely,
suggesting that a perceived threat to the future survival of a language constitutes a threat that affects
present speakers, and thus impinges on their linguistic security: Nathan Brett, "Language laws and
collective rights", (1991) vol. 4:2 Canadian Journal ofLaw and Jurisprudence, 347-360 at 351.
37
Green, supra note 19, p. 663.
225
rights are not special privileges, Reaume describes speakers of majority languages as
already having "...de facto linguistic security."38
A fundamental difference between survival and security is that linguistic security
places responsibility for the fate of minority languages on, in the first instance, the
speakers. In this context, Raz declares that "...public policies can only serve to
facilitate developments desired by the population, not to force cultural activities
down the throats of an indifferent population."39 But, "...[while] the ultimate fate of a
language community is up to its members...they should be protected from unfair or
coercive pressures distorting normal practices of language use and transmission."40
This justifies the imposition of correlative duties on governments and other entities in
respect of minority languages that cannot compete equally on an open linguistic
market. And, in the particular context of the distortion of normal language practices,
the effects of EC integration on language use and transmission generate
corresponding responsibilities towards language, and especially minority language,
communities. Obviously, the attainment of linguistic security in the present will
impact on a language group's long term survival, but language interests must be
grounded in the present at first instance, to give rise to corresponding duties of
implementation. MacMillan has expressed doubts about the validity of language
rights as fundamental rights, based primarily on the absence of universality, as
discussed supra', but he also questions the appropriateness of placing correlative
obligations on governments.41 He has reservations, for example, in respect of hiring
bilingual staff to provide bilingual or unilingual services. But such policies are
commonplace in a number of EC Member States, and indeed EC institutions, and,
significantly, have been challenged before but upheld by the European Court of
Justice.42
38
Reaume, supra note 1, p. 46.
39
Raz, supra note 24, p. 78.
40
Reaume, ibid., p. 47.
41 MacMillan, supra note 14, p. 61 et seq.
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The interest of linguistic security satisfies the criteria for determining fundamental
rights as moral rights, in the sense that the right to choice of language justifies
placing duties and obligations on others, particularly governments and other
collective entities. The central premise of linguistic security is dignity, related to
identity and individual choice. On this basis, language rights share a common
foundation with the vast majority of more widely acknowledged fundamental rights,
which are also based on the dignity and equality of all individuals.
The fundamental right to choice of language is inherently linked to minority rights, a
controversial and unsettled province of human rights law. It is not within the scope of
this thesis to analyse minority rights theory in depth, but it is necessary to elucidate
an interpretation of two concepts in particular: first, whether language rights are
attributed to individuals only or can also be enjoyed by groups and, second, the
nature of the duties imposed, in the negative/positive rights context.
(iii) Group/Collective Rights
This is one of the most controversial aspects of contemporary human rights theory.
Under classic, liberal-democratic theory, fundamental rights inhere naturally and
equally in every individual by virtue of his/her humanity. By focusing on individuals
as the bearers of rights, the protection of groups per se is excluded, beyond the rights
of each member of the group. It is not collective rights and duties as they apply to
associations and corporations that have engendered debate; rather, it is the specific
concept of collective human rights. The principal objections to collective human
rights can be summarised as follows: the promotion of group rights would be used to
justify the denial of individual human rights; they would constitute a threat to
national stability, leading to secession and other forms of autonomy; there would be
attempted justifications of cultural or religious practices that are generally regarded
as unacceptable, such as the Hindu caste system; states could not afford to bear the
costs of providing special facilities for minority groups, and positive action in favour
42
cf. for example, Case 379/87 Groener v. Minister for Education and the Dublin Vocational
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of minorities would constitute discrimination against the remainder of the
population.43 The primary justification for restricting minority rights to individuals is
to avoid the 'institutionalisation of minorities'.44 This means that every member of a
minority group should have a choice as to whether s/he wishes to remain in the
distinctive group or assimilate into the majority population. There also exists an
underlying belief that individual human rights automatically cover any rights relevant
to groups and minorities, but this assumption has been dramatically disproved by
contemporary political events across the globe. Moreover, notwithstanding the very
real concerns raised, it is significant that most of the arguments listed were once used
to thwart the development of fundamental rights in general.
As noted supra, Raz's theory of fundamental rights can apply equally to groups; it is
arguable that a group interest is sufficient to place others under a correlative duty.
Rather than viewing the harmonisation of individual and group rights as an attempt to
reconcile two inherently discordant concepts, contemporary theorists strive to stress
their compatibility. Freeman asserts that "[collective human rights are rights the
bearers of which are collectivities, which are not reducible to but are consistent with
individual human rights...."45 The 'group' aspect of fundamental rights is often
related to implementation rather than origin. In the specific context of language
rights, Reaume places group rights within the social dimension of language
practices.46 To distinguish the implementation of rights from the controversial
question of who actually bears them, she writes that "...the group protected by
[language] rights requires a community [large enough to warrant them], yet it is
possible, for enforcement purposes, legally to define the right-holder in
Education Committee, [1989] ECR 3967, discussed in Chapter 2 supra.
43
cf. Gillian Triggs, "The rights of peoples and individual rights: Conflict or harmony?", in James
Crawford (ed.), The Rights ofPeoples, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 141-157.
44
Capotorti, "The protection of minorities under multilateral agreements on human rights", (1976) 2
Italian Yearbook of International Law, 3-32 at 19.
43
Freeman, supra note 27, p. 38.
46
Reaume, supra note 1, pp. 48-50.
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individualistic terms."47 Using this definition, correlative duties are justified by the
combined strength of minority language speakers as a group, yet this does not in any
way diminish the fundamental language rights that each speaker enjoys as an
individual and not only by virtue of his/her membership of the group. This
construction is highly beneficial in that it gives to the language group the extended
benefits of claiming rights as a collectivity, yet avoids the difficult and controversial
theoretical debate surrounding the origins of the rights. Thus, Freeman talks about
collective rights occupying a 'third space', "...recognising the value of both
individual autonomy and collective solidarity, reconciling liberal universalism and
cultural pluralism."48
A related question is whether language rights apply irrespective of geographical
location, based on the personality principle, or should correspond to a specific
geographical area (the territorial principle), as practised in e.g. Belgium. Grin
outlines the main features of both in the context of individual and group rights:
The personality principle is generally regarded as offering better safeguards to
individuals, whose language rights are not subject to geographical restrictions,
while the territorial principle is usually seen as a better protection for collective
rights, because it is considered more conducive to the maintenance of
linguistically homogenous settings in which a group's language and culture can
thrive.49
But strict or absolute compliance with the territorial principle goes against the grain
of minority language rights, by compelling linguistic choices on individuals. Once
again, it is preferable to regard personality/territorial policy choices in terms of the
extent to which services should be provided rather than in the context of actually
granting language rights in the first place.
(iv) The Nature of the Duties Imposed: Negative versus Positive Rights
47 ibid., p. 49.
48
Freeman, supra note 27, p. 40.
49
Frangois Grin, "Combining immigrant and autochthonous language rights: A territorial approach",
in Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (eds.), supra note 2, 31-48 at 35.
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One of the questions posed supra asked whether choices related to language use are
covered automatically by the ingredients of democracy e.g. freedom of expression,
natural justice and the requirements of the rule of law. Green points out that these
principles govern language use under normal conditions only, "...where there is no
need for distinctive rights protecting interests in a particular language."50 'Normal
conditions' can be taken to imply the use of majority languages, where the language
rights of speakers can typically be taken for granted. The situation is quite different,
however, for speakers of a minority language, who cannot use that language in the
same range of domains or outlets as their counterpart majority language speakers.
This is where the implementation of minority language rights arises. It has been
established supra that (minority) language rights constitute fundamental rights, in the
sense that they are capable of imposing a correlative duty on others, including
governing entities. This section considers the nature of the duties that can be
imposed, across the broad spectrum from reactive tolerance to proactive promotion.
Tolerance is the most basic manifestation of minority language rights, "...[extending]
just barely beyond what civility already requires."51 On its own, a policy focused
solely on tolerance cannot achieve substantive equality between speakers of majority
and minority languages, but it is a prerequisite to the implementation of a successful
language policy regime. It draws from democratic principles such as freedom of
expression and communication, non-discrimination and, as outlined earlier, the
principles of natural justice. Tolerance is associated primarily with the private or
non-official use of languages; it prescribes, for example, against prohibiting language
groups from organising their own cultural events or educational structures.
To implement substantive language rights, it is necessary to go beyond creating a
climate of tolerance and non-discrimination. This involves the adoption of positive
measures designed to place speakers of majority and minority languages on an equal
footing so far as possible, in respect of the public or official use of languages.
50 Green, supra note 19, p. 641.
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Governments usually formulate such measures within the framework of an official
languages regime, grounded in constitutional or legislative provisions, or involving
both; examples include providing for language choice beyond the requirements of
natural justice in the courts, government services, legislature, state education
facilities, etc. The imposition of language duties in the public sphere is justified by
Reaume, on the basis that policy formulation on the official use of languages is
firmly within the control of the government itself.52 Conversely, participation in
political institutions is an essential feature of all democratic communities; inclusive
participation by all citizens, irrespective of choices made on issues such as language,
must be secured. Thus, it is not enough "...to refrain from interfering with the
language use of the minority." Kymlicka is particularly critical of any application of
non-discrimination that does not involve the adoption of complementary positive
measures, arguing that "...the ideal of benign neglect is not in fact benign....[Tjrue
equality requires not identical treatment, but rather differential treatment in order to
accommodate differential needs."54 This extract introduces the controversial debate
over the legitimacy of affirmative action programmes, which have increasingly
become subject to criticism and derision, particularly in the United States. The
primary objection to affirmative action policy is that it amounts to discrimination
against a contemporary majority for historical offences against various minority
groups. But minority language rights do not demand the creation of special
privileges; they strive to achieve the enjoyment of the same rights already taken for
granted by speakers of majority languages. Using a historical or future oriented
justification for language rights has already been called into question; emphasis was
placed instead on the linguistic security of contemporary speakers. Moreover, it was
stressed that the primary responsibility for the viability of a language group lies with
the members of the group themselves. Government policy can facilitate language
51 ibid., p. 660.
52 Reaume, supra note 1, p. 53.
53 ibid., p. 54.
54 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory ofMinority Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1995), pp. 110-3.
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choices but should not seek to impose them arbitrarily. In this context, it was argued
that the implementation of language rights should not involve the involuntary
imposition of language choices on unwilling citizens.55 What remains paramount is
the effective implementation of language rights, a difficulty associated with most
fundamental rights concerns. Any abstract declaration of fundamental rights without
a commitment to their implementation is a meaningless exercise; similarly, non¬
discrimination clauses adopted without the introduction of policies to actively
eliminate existing discrimination and to facilitate substantive equality, which may
involve differential treatment, will remain a hollow ideal.
3. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The inclusion of minority language policy in the EC's jurisdiction on cultural
matters, formalised by Article 128 EC, was discussed in Chapter 4 supra. Measures
adopted in that context can subsidise, facilitate and perhaps even promote minority
languages as constituents of the broad cultural texture of the Member States. It was
argued, however, that "[cjulture is not merely about works of art, and it follows that
the cultural dimension of the EC is about much more than aesthetics."56 But while
the definition of culture in the abstract was shown to be broad and inclusive, the
cultural jurisdiction granted to the EC displays neither characteristic. Furthermore,
policies grounded in Article 128 are unlikely to proceed beyond the aesthetic
dimension of culture without a fundamental change in the perspectives of the
Member States on the role of the EC in this domain. The cultural aspect of language
policy is both valid in itself and vital to the maintenance and flourishing of any
language group. But bracketing language issues into a narrow cultural perspective
will not redress the practical difficulties faced by speakers of minority languages on a
daily basis due to the restricted domains in which they may use their languages.
Zuanelli distinguishes between the rights of languages, which include guarantees on
55
cf. Reaume, supra note 1, p. 54 et seq.
36 Fintan O'Toole, "Culture and media policy", in Patrick Keatinge (ed.), Ireland and EC Membership
Evaluated, (London: Pinter, 1991), 270-276 at 270.
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education and cultural concerns, and language rights, the fundamental rights of
speakers to use their languages for other purposes.57 Language policy in the cultural
realm can provide for the rights of languages, for linguistic survival, but it cannot
accommodate the fundamental right of minority language speakers to linguistic
security.
The gradual recognition and protection of fundamental rights by the EC institutions
can be placed in the context of an awareness by the international community more
generally of the limits on government powers. EC fundamental rights jurisdiction
does not just guide the institutions, however, but may also impinge upon the Member
States when they are administering Community law or restricting Community
freedoms on grounds of public policy.58 Yet, despite the seemingly extensive
protection of human rights at national and international levels, Clapham has
remarked that "...the legal landscape is presently littered with craters so that citizens
may often find themselves without adequate legal protection...."59 In respect of
minorities, the trend in international forums has changed noticeably in recent times,
with renewed interest in minority rights as an independent concern, complementary
to but distinct from traditionally protected fundamental rights. Language rights have
been raised both as a subset of minority rights and as an autonomous category of
duty-imposing rights. Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson note that "[substantial efforts
are currently underway in many supranational forums to produce declarations,
conventions and charters which can promote respect for the rights of minority
language speakers."60 But most difficulties exist in the realm of implementation
rather than declaration. At first glance, the EC is a most unlikely advocate of any
57 Elisabetta Zuanelli, "Italian in the European Community: An educational perspective on the national
language and new language minorities", in Florian Coulmas (ed.), A Language Policy for the
European Community: Prospects and Quandaries, (Berlin; New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991),
291-300 at 297.
58
cf. Manfred A. Dauses, "The protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order", (1985)
European Law Review, 398-419 at 418.
59 Andrew Clapham, "A human rights policy for the European Community", (1990) 10 Yearbook of
European Law, 309-366 at 344.
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fundamental rights that are not linked directly to the implementation of some
Community policy; possibilities for the protection of language rights by the EC lie
more in the projected future development of fundamental rights and citizenship than
within these regimes as they presently exist. It will become clear, however, that
reform of the role played by the EC in both domains is widely sought in any case.
A. The 'Distillation ofa Rights Jurisprudence' 61
The protection of fundamental rights by the EC constitutes the fulfilment of a
historical ambition rather than a contemporary innovation. Proposals for the creation
of a European organisation to regulate political as well as economic activities fell by
the wayside in the early 1950s, as states were not yet prepared to cede national
sovereignty to such an extent.62 Fundamental rights did not feature explicitly in the
Treaty of Rome, but this was not surprising given the "...sober, utilitarian
considerations..." of the original EEC and the fragility of inter-state relations at that
time.64 O'Leary adds that the original contracting parties to the EEC Treaty could not
have been aware of the potential implications of evolving Community law on
fundamental rights.65 It is widely acknowledged that judicial activism within the
European Court of Justice was primarily responsible for introducing fundamental
rights norms into the EC arena. Initially, the Court resisted arguments based on
human rights principles.66 This led to tensions between the EEC and some Member
60
Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, supra note 11, p. 72.
61 Patrick M. Twomey, "The European Union: Three pillars without a human rights foundation", in
David O'Keefe and Patrick M. Twomey, (eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, (London:
Chancery, 1995), 121-132 at 124.
62 The Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) was signed in 1952; proposals for
the creation of the European Political Community (EPC), a transnational organisation with policies of
considerably broad application, were put forward in 1953. The EDC Treaty was not, however, ratified,
leading to the abortion of contingent plans for the EPC also.
63 Dauses identifies a number of quasi-rights provisions, however, such as the prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality [Article 7 EEC] and the principle of equal pay for equal work
irrespective of gender [Article 119 EEC]: supra note 58, pp. 398-9.
64 ibid., p. 399.
65 Siofra O'Leary, "Accession by the EC to the ECHR: The Opinion of the European Court of Justice",
(1996) 4 European Human Rights Law Review, 362-377 at 363.
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States, who were concerned that a legal system which was establishing supremacy
over domestic law was not accountable in terms of fundamental rights. The response
of the ECJ is well documented. In the landmark decision in Stauder v. City of Ulm67,
the judgment referred tersely (obiter dictum) to "...the fundamental human rights
enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court."68
The Court did not elaborate on either the nature or scope of these rights at that time
but proceeded tenuously, in a series of subsequent judgments, to weave a more
complete rights jurisprudence. It was confirmed that an independent rights protection
regime existed in the Community legal order, drawn from and inspired by the
protection of rights as a feature of the common constitutional traditions of the
Member States,69 as well as the fundamental rights protected by international treaties,
with particular emphasis on the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).70 It
was established beyond doubt that Community measures contravening fundamental
rights would be struck down. The Court has always made clear that the Community
rights regime is an autonomous legal order, going beyond automatic deference to
either national constitutional law or the ECHR. It was established from the outset that
the rights protected "...must also be consistent with the framework of the structure
and objectives of the Community...", so long as the substance of the right in question
is not impaired.71 The Court's jurisprudence was endorsed by a Joint Declaration of
the Parliament, Council and Commission, issued on 5 April 1977.72
66 Case 1/58 Stork v. High Authority [1959] ECR 17; Cases 36-38, 40/ 59 Geitling v. High Authority
of the ECSC [1960] ECR 523; Case 40/64 Sgarlata v. Commission of the EEC [1965] ECR 215.
67 Case 29/69, [1969] ECR 419.
68
ibid., p. 419, para. 7.
69 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125.
70
cf Case 4/73 No Id v. Commission [1974] ECR 491; Case 44/79 Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz
[1979] ECR 3727.
71
Dauses, supra note 58, p. 401.
72 [1977] OJ C-103.
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Dauses notes that, initially, the Court focused on economic and social rights, "[i]n
view of the predominantly economic nature of the objectives of the Community."73 A
broader regime has evolved, however, in keeping with the gradual extension of
Community competence and the enlargement of Treaty objectives.74 A number of
writers have been sceptical of the Court's reliance on general Community objectives
to counterbalance fundamental rights recognised by the Member States.75 The
delimitation of competence between the Community and the Member States in the
fundamental rights domain is discussed in more detail infra but it is interesting to
note the pragmatic view outlined by Phelan, who observes that "[wjhen numerous
judges from [the diverse] legal systems [of the Member States],..are obliged to decide
cases in widely disparate fields under a new and complex legal system which each
Member State, in addition to private parties, is trying to influence in its own favour,
it is not surprising that they should give general objectives such prominence."76
The Preamble to the Single European Act refers to both the ECHR and the European
Social Charter, but a more definite legal basis for action in the human rights sphere
was not established until the enactment of the Treaty on European Union. Article
F(2) TEU confirms that the Union must respect fundamental rights derived from the
sources already outlined by the Court of Justice; but the Court does not have
jurisdiction over the implementation of this obligation. Fundamental rights protected
by the Community do, however, remain within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Krogsgaard notes that Article F(2) did not merit high priority on the Maastricht
agenda.77 This is not surprising, given that the new provision added little to the
73
Dauses, supra note 58, p. 402.
74 O'Neill lists a number of political rights now protected by the Court, including the rights to privacy,
freedom of expression, fair hearing and due process: Michael O'Neill, "Fundamental rights and the
European Union", in Gerard Quinn (ed.), Irish Yearbook ofHuman Rights, (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet
and Maxwell, 1995), 67-95 at 68-9.
75
cf. in particular, Jason Coppel and Aidan O'Neill, "The European Court of Justice: Taking rights
seriously?", (1992) 29 Common Market Law Review 669-692.
76 Diarmuid Rossa Phelan, "Right to life of the unborn v. promotion of trade in services: The ECJ and
the normative shaping of the European Union", (1992) vol. 55:5 Modern Law Review, 670-689 at 686.
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existing acquis communautaire\ the already troubled negotiations avoided the
controversial question of EC enforcement of Member State fundamental rights duties
beyond the implementation of Community law. The Amsterdam Treaty consolidates
the existing regime of protection and introduces a number of further initiatives,
including a procedure for suspension of a Member State in cases of serious and
persistent breaches of fundamental rights and the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice in fundamental rights issues.78 Article 6a( 13), which creates
competence for the EC to combat discrimination in a number of guises does not,
however, include linguistic discrimination. This is both surprising and disappointing,
in light of the supposed commitment of the EC to linguistic pluralism and the
existence of other international standards on language rights, discussed infra.19
After setting out a number of rights and correlative duties that exist at national level
on
only, Clapham categorises the fundamental rights recognised by the Community to
date: first, rights at national level in respect of the application of Community law,
second, rights in the context of action by Community institutions or agents and,
finally, rights granted by the Community itself, such as social rights and citizenship
rights.81 But these rights have never been enumerated precisely in the Treaties, or in
any other legal instruments; the controversies that usually surround jurisprudential
developments grounded in judicial activism and discretion have also, therefore, beset
the Court's formulation of the obligations on the EC and its Member States. The
following sections discuss these uncertainties, in the context of the sources of rights
protected in the Community legal order.
77 Lars Bondo Krogsgaard, "Fundamental rights in the EC after Maastricht", (1993) Legal Issues of
European Integration, 99-113 at 105.
78
cf. Anthony Whelan, "Fundamental rights", in Ben Tonra (ed.), Amsterdam: What the Treaty
Means, (Dublin: Institute of European Affairs, 1997), 147-158.
79 ibid., pp. 155-6.
80
e.g. Cases 60, 61/84 Cinetheque v. Federation Nationale des Cinemas Frangais [1985] ECR 2605,
where the ECJ noted that it had no power to assess the compatibility of domestic law with the ECHR
in an area that fell solely within national jurisdiction.
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B. Fundamental Rights drawn from International Treaties
In Nold v. Commission, the Court of Justice declared that "...international treaties for
the protection of human rights, on which the Member States have collaborated or of
which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within
the framework of Community law."82 In reality, the international instrument to which
the Court refers almost exclusively is the ECHR, although instruments of universal
application have also been mentioned in some judgments.83 The absence of
references to other international treaties is purely a matter of practice; the Court is not
legally precluded from referring to such treaties to derive inspiration in future cases
where appropriate. It remains open to the Court to refer to Article 27 of the UN
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, which sets out
specific minority rights, discussed infra. O'Neill notes that international treaties in
general are not referred to in Article F(2) TEU, which mentions the ECHR
exclusively.84 But this oversight affects fundamental rights within the Union only and
does not disturb the acquis communautaire on rights protected by the Community.
The ECHR was first mentioned specifically by the Court in Rutili*5 Dauses
distinguishes between the "...suprapositive principles of law incorporated in the
Convention...", which constitute an independent source of law that takes precedence
over even primary Community law, and the Convention itself as the embodiment of
those principles, which is subordinate to the EC Treaties.86 This distinction has
enabled the Court of Justice to sometimes go beyond the protection given to certain
rights by the Convention, where the Court interprets fundamental rights principles as
distinct from interpreting or being bound by the substantive provisions of the
81
Clapham, supra note 59, pp. 317-8.
82 Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491 at 507.
83 O'Neill, supra note 74, cites Case 374/87 Orkem v. Commission [1989] ECR 3283, where the Court
referred to Article 14(3)(g) of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (re: the
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Convention itself. Clapham is critical of this development, arguing that "[i]f...the
Court of Justice is serious about protecting human rights in the Community legal
order then it should show more deference to the Strasbourg case-law."87 But it is
widely recognised in international human rights law generally that treaty provisions
represent a compromise, mirroring the level of agreement achieved among often
divided negotiating parties; any measures that give additional protection for
fundamental rights are not only valid but welcomed. In an ECJ case dealing with
language rights in criminal proceedings, discussed in Chapter 2 supra, Advocate
General Lenz set out the position of the EC on this illusory conflict as follows: "[i]t
is not contrary to the ECHR for Community law to grant more extensive protection to
individual rights. Indeed, the Court has held that Community law takes precedence
over other agreements concluded within the framework of the Council of Europe in
o o
so far as it is more favourable to individuals.'''' The continuing controversy that
characterises the relationship between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts
suggests that it is one of divisive, counterproductive tension. It is difficult to assess,
however, what the situation is in reality or the extent to which the difficulties are
perpetuated by competing academic perspectives.
The Court of Justice's recent opinion on whether or not the EC can accede to the
ECHR thwarted the momentum of arguments long advanced in favour of accession.
The Court held that accession would only be possible following a Treaty amendment,
given the constitutional significance attached to entering a "...distinct international
institutional system".89 Although the Commission did not favour accession initially,90
its perspective changed gradually to that of actively recommending that the
86
Dauses, supra note 58, p. 412.
87
Clapham, supra note 59, p. 338.
88
Opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Case 137/84 Ministere Public v. Mutsch [1985] ECR 2681 at
2690, citing Case 187/73 Callemeyn v. Belgium [1974] ECR 553 (emphasis added).
89
Opinion 2/94, 28 March 1996, [1996] ECR 1-1759.
90
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Community should ratify the Convention. In a 1979 memorandum, the Commission
stressed that accession would portray a favourable image of the Community and
acknowledged that it would ensure consistent and harmonious interpretation of the
ECHR.91 Clapham is critical, however, of the Commission's failure to examine the
question from the perspective of fundamental rights protection for individual
citizens, dismissing the Commission's reasoning as based largely on self-interest in
the Community context.92 The Commission's stance has, however, evolved over the
years: it argued in 1990, for example, that accession to the Convention would redress
an imbalance, in that the EC institutions were not subject to the control mechanism
of the Council of Europe, and would constitute an additional guarantee that human
rights were being respected in the Community.93 O'Leary summarises the advantages
of accession, on the bases of democracy, legitimacy, valuable symbolism,
consistency in interpretation of the Convention and broadening the ambit of EC
fundamental rights protection beyond the limited scope of the application of
Community law.94 She does, however, identify some problematic aspects of
accession, particularly that the ECHR provides only a basic, minimum standard of
protection.95 She argues in response that the Convention is not a static but an
evolving instrument that has been interpreted by the European Court of Human
Rights accordingly: this issue is addressed infra in the specific context of language
rights under the Convention. O'Leary also points out that the ECHR should be
viewed as "...the safety net but not the standard setter..."; she argues that should the
Community accede, the Union, as distinct from the Community, could still
supplement and improve on areas falling outside the remit of the Convention. But it
is difficult to gauge why O'Leary has distinguished between the Community and the
Union in this context. As already outlined, there is nothing to prevent any party to the
91 6724/76 Bull. Supp. 2/79; cf. also Clapham, supra note 59, p. 361.
92 ibid., pp. 361-2.
93 Commission Communication on Accession to the ECHR, [1990] Bull.EC 11/1990.
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Convention, whether a State or the Community if it should ever accede, from
introducing measures that strive to implement greater protection that that offered by
the Convention: the standards set by any international instrument are the lowest
common denominator, and not the last word, on the acceptable standards of rights
protection.
The current position, then, is that the Court of Justice may draw inspiration from
international treaties when developing the fundamental rights jurisdiction of the
Community. It has not relied extensively on any instrument other than the ECHR,
although this situation has resulted from practice rather than any legal prohibition.
The Court has, on occasion, applied fundamental rights principles in a manner that
appears inconsistent with their codification in the relevant Convention provisions,
but this approach is only adopted to grant more extensive protection than that
provided for in the Convention itself. While this has caused tension in terms of
consistency of interpretation, it is typically beneficial for individuals. Whether or not
international instruments provide sufficiently for language rights, and whether their
application can be related to the scope of Community law, is assessed briefly infra.
C. Provision for Language Rights in International Treaties
(i) The United Nations 96
As noted earlier, the United Nations approached human rights from the perspective
of universal application, based on the dignity and equality of each individual person,
in contrast to the protection of minority groups that had been undertaken by the
League of Nations. From the outset, however, all UN rights instruments protected
language in their non-discrimination clauses e.g. Article 1(3) of the UN Charter
(1945), Article 2 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR - 1948) and
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted in 1966 and operative ten years later. The UDHR provisions on equality
before the law (Article 7), freedom of expression (Article 19), education (Article 26)
and freedom of participation in cultural life (Article 27) are also relevant to language
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issues. In addition, the UN Commission on Human Rights established the Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities in
Q7
1946. The principal protective mechanism for minority rights is contained in
Article 27 ICCPR, which provides that "[i]n those states in which ethnic, religious or
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."
Article 27 represents a hybrid of group and individual rights, in that the rights are
bestowed on individuals but 'in community' with other group members. The
provision has also been interpreted as placing reciprocal duties of implementation on
states.98 The ICCPR provides for both individual petition (based on an Optional
Protocol to the Covenant) and state reporting, although it is widely acknowledged
that neither mechanism can protect individual rights very effectively: the former is
dependant on the relevant state having acceded to the Protocol, while the latter relies
on a state's own representations of the domestic human rights situation.
Overall, protection of individual rights by the UN, particularly a lower priority
fundamental right such as the right to choice of language, is seen as a fairly remote
possibility, given the multitude and extent of human rights atrocities with which the
UN Human Rights Committee is preoccupied on an ongoing basis. But the increasing
concern of the international community over minority rights violations was
confirmed by the UN General Assembly's Declaration on the Rights of Persons
belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, in 1992." In
particular, the Declaration refers expressly, in Article 1(2), to the positive obligation
on states to provide legislatively and otherwise for the promotion of ethnic, cultural,
96 For a more detailed description, cf. Nic Shuibhne, supra note 10, Chapter 4.
97
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religious and linguistic identities. In addition, the Declaration is framed in more
positive terms than Article 27 ICCPR, employing the phrase 'has the right' instead of
'shall not be denied the right'. The work of the UN in the realm of establishing norms
and standards for international human rights law cannot be overestimated. The pace
of its evolution may not yet correspond with the needs of the international
community but the system continues to develop, challenging the traditional shelter of
state sovereignty. To increase its effectiveness as an institution, the UN must develop
its role in the implementation and enforcement of human rights law rather than
concentrating on its traditional function as standard setter. Otherwise, non-binding
instruments such as the 1992 Declaration will amount to nothing more than a
collection of hollow aspirations. The UN has begun to grapple tentatively with the
enduring question of minority rights in a contemporary context. This alone should
signal to states, other political entities and individuals that minority rights matter. As
a subset of minority rights, language rights, as fundamental rights, also warrant the
imposition of effective obligations and duties on governing entities. The EC could
draw from this distinct ethos where necessary; but the omission of language from the
new non-discrimination clause contrasts bleakly with the standards developed by the
UN.
(ii) The Council of Europe
The extent to which states have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Council of
Europe illustrates the success of regional human rights action; it does not set out to
thwart principles established on the basis of universalism, but seeks to apply and
build on these standards, given that the states involved are more likely to have
confidence in an organisation founded by a group of like-minded states, relative to
the immense diversity of state actors in the universal international arena. Regional
organisations are also more accessible to individuals who seek to enforce
international standards against their own states. The success of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as an enforceable source of fundamental
rights and freedoms is unparalleled in the international community, attributable
largely to the acceptance by all signatory states of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
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European Court of Human Rights. As discussed supra, the Court of Justice of the EC
has drawn extensively on the provisions of the ECHR in establishing its own
fundamental rights jurisprudence, but has not confined itself absolutely to either the
provisions themselves or their interpretation by the Court of Human Rights.
Nonetheless, the provisions of the ECHR clearly establish the basic level of rights
protection that the Court of Justice will consider.
In contrast to the initiatives on fundamental rights generally, the protection of
language rights in the ECHR is essentially disappointing. It can be divided into two
main areas, the use of language in the courts and the principle of non-discrimination.
Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention relate to the deprivation of personal liberty and
the right to a fair trial respectively. Both provide for information to be delivered in a
language understood by a person charged with a criminal offence; in addition, Article
6 stipulates that the free assistance of an interpreter is to be provided if the accused
cannot understand or speak the language used in court proceedings.100 But these
provisions are grounded firmly in the restrictive principles of natural justice, relating
only to instances where an individual cannot understand the language used by
official authorities; they do not introduce any right to choice of language. The
European Commission on Human Rights has refused relief to parties who understood
the language used in domestic courts, for example, yet sought to have interpreters
appointed so that they could speak another language of their choice, as members of
minority language groups based in the states in question.101
Article 14 ECHR outlines a general prohibition on various forms of discriminatory
treatment, including discrimination based on language. The provision is not,
however, an independent guarantee of non-discrimination: its application is restricted
to the contexts of other rights protected specifically by the Convention. Examples of
rights that may be relevant to language choice include freedom of expression (Article
100 Similar rights can be found in Article 14(3)(a) and (f) of the ICCPR.
244
10) and the right not to be denied education, set out in Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the
Convention. Although the Commission on Human Rights has acknowledged the
validity of cultural and linguistic pluralism in the context of the media,102 it decided
in 1965 that Article 10 does not entitle individual citizens to communicate with
public authorities in the language of their choice.103
The most comprehensive discussion of linguistic minorities by the Court of Human
Rights is contained in the complex Belgian Linguistics Case, decided in 1968.104 The
decision examined regional policies on the provision of state education, relating
specifically to extensive legislative provisions made for unilingual regions. The
Court held that unilingual policy measures were not discriminatory, notwithstanding
the claims of minority language speakers who had sought to compel the Belgian state
to provide education through the medium of French in officially delimited Dutch-
speaking regions. Both the Court and the Commission interpreted Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1 narrowly, stating that it did not contain any provision dealing with
languages of instruction and that only instruction in the national language(s) of a state
was relevant to ensuring implementation of a genuine right to education.105 In a
subsequent decision, the Commission reiterated that the Convention does not contain
any provisions that grant rights explicitly to speakers of minority languages.106 The
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evolving interpretation of the Convention is not, however, hinged exclusively to early
decisions of the Court and Commission. Two dynamic principles are relevant in this
context. First, the Court of Human Rights has held repeatedly, since its decision in
Marcht (1979), that despite the negative formulation of rights and freedoms therein,
the Convention does place a positive obligation on states to remove any obstacles to
the exercise of those rights.107 The Court has thus developed an effective recognition
of positive rights notwithstanding the limiting phraseology of the Convention itself.
Second, the Court has veered towards an evolutive, teleological interpretation of the
Convention, reading its provisions in the context of evolving European standards.108
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick describe the nature of and limitations to this
interpretative approach:
[T]he Convention will not be interpreted to reflect change so as to introduce
into it a right that was not intended to be included when the Convention was
drafted...In this way, a line is sought to be drawn between judicial
interpretation, which is permissible, and judicial legislation, which is not.
[W]ith this distinction in mind, the Court tends to emphasise incremental, rather
than sudden change. However, as in national law, the line between judicial
interpretation and legislation can be a difficult one to draw....Decisions can be
seen either as judicial creativity that move the Convention into distinct areas
beyond its intended domain or as the elaboration of rights that are already
protected.109
Given repeated declarations by the Commission on Human Rights that there is no
right to choice of language in the Convention, it is unlikely that the right could be
introduced judicially. But the existence of an evolving European standard on
minority language rights can be traced to the development of an autonomous
instrument by the Council of Europe i.e. the European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages. Growing awareness within the European Parliament in the early
1980s of the need for effective action in support of minority languages directly
inspired the Council of Europe to address this specific domain of fundamental rights
at that time. Following a public hearing to consider the need for the adoption of a
107
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legal instrument to defend and promote the rights of minority language speakers, the
text of the draft Charter was completed by March 1988. The Charter was adopted by
the Committee of Ministers on 22 June 1992 and opened for signature on 5
November 1993. State response has, however, been disappointing: to date, it has
been ratified by only eight states.110 The Charter is framed in terms of state
obligations rather than legally enforceable individual rights, which may have
inadvertently contributed to the subsequent, and continuing, reluctance of states to
adopt and implement it. The apathetic reaction to the Charter is frustrating, however,
given the discretion accorded to states when selecting the degree of obligation to be
assumed, as well as the numerous qualifications attached to most of the provisions
more generally e.g. the requirement that the number of speakers must be 'sufficient':
the Charter itself does not, however, provide any objective criteria for determining
when the number of speakers is sufficient, thereby allocating even more discretion to
states.
Any instrument designed to apply to a number of diverse language groups must
necessarily be sufficiently flexible, so that each state can adapt its obligations to the
needs of each language group. But the format of the Charter, in seeking to
accomplish this difficult but essential task, has diluted state obligations to an
unacceptable extent. The Charter is designed in a 'pick and choose' format; a state
must choose at least three provisions each from Articles 8 (education) and 12
(cultural activities and facilities), and one provision each from Articles 9 (judicial
authorities), 10 (administrative authorities), 11 (media) and 13 (cultural and social
life). By design, therefore, obligations that require more substantive administrative
and monetary input on the part of signatory states have been relegated to the latter
grouping. Furthermore, a state can choose the most innocuous sub-paragraph over
more comprehensive measures at its own discretion. This weakens the position of
individual minority language speakers considerably: states could legitimately comply
with obligations assumed under the Charter yet to such a minimal degree as to render
the obligations ineffectual in practice. For example, states are required to adopt only
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one sub-paragraph from Article 10(1), which deals with the use of regional or
minority languages in both oral and written dealings with public authorities. Options
within the provision range from publishing official texts and documents in minority
language versions, a potentially comprehensive requirement, to allowing an
individual to use the minority language version of his/her name, which is little more
than an expression of bare civility. Furthermore, an overall qualification of 'as far as
this is reasonably possible' has been attached to Article 10(1). Essentially, effective
implementation of the Charter depends ultimately on the goodwill of the state parties.
The problem with this approach is that, generally, states that possess the requisite
goodwill towards speakers of minority languages have already adopted measures
similar to and even beyond those listed in the Charter. A state that has consciously
refused to provide for minority language use in public domains is unlikely to select
the more comprehensive obligations, that is, of course, if it even agrees to ratify the
Charter in the first place. Thus, the Council must undertake the onerous task of
encouraging flexibility while preventing abuse of the same concept.
Implementation of the Charter is supervised by a system of periodic state reports.
International instruments that introduce relatively new or controversial rights usually
adopt this mechanism to reduce counterproductive pressures on reluctant signatories,
in order that state responsibilities might be realised progressively. As an enforcement
mechanism, however, state reporting is not particularly effective, as its fails to
incorporate a redress mechanism for the individual citizen.1" Connelly argues that
the establishment of complaints procedures, whether based on inter-state or
individual petition, would have strengthened the position of minority language
speakers to a far greater extent.112
The Charter must be interpreted as a beginning rather than an end. Skutnabb-Kangas
and Phillipson recognise the dilemma that must have faced the drafters of the Charter
110 i.e. Croatia, Finland, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
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but warn against complacency in the context of implementation and enforcement:
"[w]hile the Charter demonstrates how difficult it is to write binding formulations
that are sensitive to local conditions, it permits a reluctant state to meet the
requirements in a minimalist way which it can legitimate by claiming that a provision
was not 'possible' or...numbers were not 'sufficient'...."113 If the Charter can succeed
in persuading states traditionally opposed to the recognition of language rights to
enact even minimal safeguards for the speakers of minority languages, it will have
achieved a significant breakthrough. For the meantime, the potentially fatal
confidence in state discretion can be interpreted more favourably as the incorporation
of flexibility.114 But the Council must continue to strive towards conferring
enforceable language rights on individuals as a corollary of its work in the domain of
state duty. Significantly, the Charter is not confined to situations where speakers do
not speak or understand the national or official language(s) of the state signatories. It
has, therefore, clearly surpassed the natural justice ethos underlying the language
provisions of the ECHR and is firmly attuned to the realities of contemporary
language acquisition and use, grounded in considerations of language choice.
Consequently, the language choice doctrine should also be taken into account by the
EC regarding any potential development of language rights in the Community
context.
D. FundamentalRights drawn from Common Constitutional Traditions
All EC Member States guarantee the protection of fundamental rights at national
level.115 The Court of Justice can draw from the principles enshrined in national
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constitutions but will interpret and prioritise them in the context of Treaty objectives
where necessary. In this way, the supremacy of EC law is not infringed. Usher
explains this position, writing that "...the legality of a Community measure can never
be judged in the light of national law but fundamental principles of national legal
systems 'contribute to forming that philosophical, political and legal substratum
common to the Member States from which through the case-law an unwritten
Community law emerges'."116 Dauses outlines the main difficulty with this source of
rights, i.e. presupposing a 'common' standard in the first place, which implies that:
...all Member States are in agreement, at least in essence, in acknowledging a
given number of unassailable fundamental and human rights...[But] although all
the Member States are conscious of certain intellectual and political
traditions...nevertheless, regardless of that common historical heritage, they go
their own ways as regards method, structure, normative rank and definition of
the scope of individual guarantees.117
He notes that this is especially true for social and economic rights, rendering
constitutional provisions particularly problematic as a source of fundamental rights in
the context of Community law. This interpretation applies equally to domestic
provisions that outline language rights, discussed infra.
It is not realistic to expect identical protective mechanisms throughout the Member
States, given the nature of constitutions, which "...are not mere copies of a
universalist ideal [but] also reflect the idiosyncratic choices and preferences of the
constituents [as] the highest legal expression of the country's value system."118 This
becomes problematic, however, when particular rights are either protected weakly by,
or excluded altogether from, one or a number of constitutions. Reconciling the
varying standards of protection that can be guaranteed in respect of any given
fundamental right has long been an issue of controversy in the Court's case-law and
in related academic commentary. A Commission communication issued in 1976
116 John A. Usher, "Principles derived from private law and the European Court of Justice", (1993) 1
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recommended that where standards of protection differed in Member State
constitutions, the constitutional provision which offered the greatest level of
protection for the individual should be drawn from as the basis in EC law of any
fundamental right.119 Dauses is critical of this approach, however, arguing that
linking the protection of fundamental rights in the Community to Member State laws
in this way challenges the legitimacy of the autonomous Community legal order.120
Attempting to extract a common position from discordant provisions also presents
the converse danger that the Court might implement what it has gleaned to be the
lowest standard of protection. Krogsgaard considers that, in practice, the
jurisprudence of the Court has fluctuated between these approaches.121
A related issue is the number of constitutions that must provide for a fundamental
right before it will be applied in the Community context. Advocate General Warner,
in the IRCA decision, considered that protection of a fundamental right in just one
Member State constitution was sufficient to trigger its incorporation into Community
law.122 Coppel and O'Neill point out that this position was ignored in subsequent
decisions of the Court; Weiler and Lockhart assert that it was rejected implicitly in
Hauer, where the view that infringement of fundamental rights in the Community
context can only be assessed by reference to Community, not national, law was
reaffirmed.123 The anomalous reliance by the Court on the often diverse Member
State understandings of various rights, as a source of inspiration for uniform
118 Bruno de Witte, "Community law and national constitutional values", (1991-2) Legal Issues of
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Community interpretation, seems, in this context, potentially ineffective and
politically divisive, given the inevitable selection process that will ensue.
The conflicts that have arisen between Community and Member State interpretations
often reflect the collision of moral and economic values. Clapham argues that the
Community should be tolerant of moral diversity among its Member States, warning
that if the Court began to address sensitive issues like divorce and abortion, "...rights
might no longer be handy tools for integration but vehicles of division and
disintegration."124 Absolute harmonisation of moral values is both unwise and
unnecessary. But the acceptance by states of certain minimum moral standards has
been the raison d'etre of all international human rights instruments. It is, therefore,
unrealistic to expect that the EC should accept anything less in its fundamental rights
regime. A particular problem within the EC context is that the Court has traditionally
pre-empted the political process, developing fundamental rights theory and practice
for the Community before these developments were formally accepted by the
Member States, as political architects of the EC. The resulting suspicion was
heightened further over the years, as the Court began to probe Member State actions
that were arguably linked only tenuously to the application of Community law.
The perceived subordination of fundamental constitutional values has sparked
virulent debate among academic commentators, most notably the accusation that the
Court of Justice does not take its fundamental rights jurisdiction seriously.125 The
various interpretations of the decision in S.P.U.C. v. Grogan 126 demonstrate the
particular controversy surrounding the Court's attempt to balance conflicting
concerns in cases of derogation from the Treaty provisions.127 But this debate reflects
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the broader controversy over EC/Member State competence boundaries, complicated
by the overt clash of values as well as legal and political structures. Phelan
recommends modification of the "...exceptionless supremacy doctrine...", giving
precedence to adjudications by national constitutional courts on "...basic principles
concerning life, liberty, religion and the family..." while maintaining the supremacy
of EC law for economic and social rights.128 He considers that this teleological
approach conforms especially well with the principle of subsidiarity, enshrined in the
EC Treaty and analysed in Chapter 3 supra. It does not, however, overcome the
critical point raised in Chapter 3, that the Member States flinch consistently from the
very entity they themselves have created and over which they maintain executive
control. It is nonsensical that the Member States transfer competences to the EC and
yet recoil from their subsequent implementation. It was acknowledged that the
process of integration has often superseded its political codification but it must be
remembered that the political map of the Community remains in the hands of the
Member States. The EC does not control its own destiny. Fishman stresses this truth,
stating that "[sjuprastate organisations...are originally and basically the creatures of
states. As such, these organisations are rarely, if ever, strong enough to impose their
own will on the strongest of their own creators."129 The gulf that exists between
according competences to the EC and accepting their implementation at supra¬
national level reflects a far broader Member State uneasiness. These tensions are
particularly exacerbated in the fundamental rights domain, given the clash of deeply
rooted national values with fledgling Community versions, the contingent threat to
national sovereignty, the uncertain scope of fundamental rights within the
Community legal order and the inevitable reaction of mainly civil law Member States
to what has amounted to far-reaching judicial activism, more usually associated with
the common law tradition. Weiler and Lockhart argue, however, that "...human rights
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issues do not necessarily pit the Community against Member States: human rights
issues typically will pit the individual against public authorities [rendering] artificial
in many instances the notions ofMember States v. Community institutions."130
Language rights empower the individual against public authorities in exactly the
sense discussed by Weiler and Lockhart. But the political resistance usually evident
in the context of modifying EC language policy is especially ironic, given that
language rights encapsulate diversity rather than harmonisation. It was shown in
Chapter 1 supra that Member States have expressed genuine concerns in respect of
the harmonising effect of intensifying European integration. It was argued that
policies based on recognition of the value of diversity, particularly in respect of
languages, were needed to counteract that momentum. Granting language rights at
EC level, however, necessarily calls domestic policies into question, in that the EC
could potentially force a Member States to focus on and change how it treats its
citizens in respect of choice of language. This perceived 'interference' by the
Community would most likely be viewed as an unwelcome challenge to national
sovereignty, quite apart from the promotion of individual rights. Thus, it is arguable
that, from the political perspective, Member States are not concerned primarily with
furthering the interests of the individual, but are resistant to obligations under which
they might yet be placed, in a manner similar to earlier distrust of EC involvement in
the social rights sphere. The development of diversity-based rights could, therefore,
become an unfortunate casualty of a broader reluctance to submit to EC jurisdiction
at the controversial fringes of the fundamental rights domain. In Chapter 2 supra, it
was argued that the weakly reasoned decision in Groener was, in reality, a veiled
promotion of diversity, since the Court did not have an appropriate Treaty provision,
such as Article 128 EC, to draw from at that time. The Court formed a highly
questionable connection between teachers and language behaviour to uphold Irish
Government language policy, which suggests that the Court of Justice is in favour of
maintaining linguistic diversity within the Community. It was acknowledged,
however, that decisions relating to labelling of consumer products often appear to
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conflict with the promotion of regional languages. It is strange that a Court which has
at times gone out of its way to promote linguistic diversity would not have taken this
factor into consideration in other cases that raised language issues, discussed in
Chapter 1 supra. This anomaly demonstrates even further the need for explicit
clarification of the Community's stance on language policy as a fundamental rights
issue.
To alleviate Member State discomfort with judicial activism and to strengthen the
position of the individual, it has been often been suggested that the Community
should draw up a catalogue of enumerated fundamental rights. This might settle
Member State anxieties to a greater extent, but would also, more importantly, provide
clarity for individuals as to what level of protection for which rights can reasonably
be expected from the EC. Dauses has raised concern, however, that the attainment of
consensus on the content of any catalogue is unlikely, given the inherently
controversial nature of economic and social rights; he warns against accepting the
lowest common denominator of agreement as a compromise.131 This, he argues,
would devalue the efficacy of the existing system developed by the Court of Justice.
Clapham advances similar arguments, advocating that the perspective that should be
considered in determining the content of an express declaration of rights is that of the
1 ^9
victim. The difficulties associated with achieving consensus cannot be
underestimated but nor should they be overstated. The Court of Justice already
undertakes to divine both the content and extent of fundamental rights within the
Community legal order from a diverse and, as outlined, problematic range of sources.
The results of this process have at times aggrieved the Member States, who might
actually welcome the chance to determine these issues at the political level instead.
Moreover, the ratification of every international fundamental rights instrument has
been preceded by political negotiations, usually between states far more diverse than
130 Weiler and Lockhart, supra note 123, p. 621.
131 Dauses, supra note 58, p. 416.
132
Clapham, supra note 59, p. 366.
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the Member States of the EC. It may, therefore, be premature to discount their ability
to negotiate a meaningful fundamental rights catalogue for the Community.
Other possible actions include improving the locus standi of individuals for EC law
purposes, extending justiciable fundamental rights protection to all policy areas
covered by the Union and improving EC/Council of Europe co-operation.133 As it
stands, the fundamental rights jurisdiction of the Community is characterised by
uncertainty. Tackling these issues directly would constitute a marked challenge to the
political sensitivities of the Member States. De Burca stresses, however, that any
attempt to eschew political controversy could damage the legitimacy of the
Community and the Court in the long run, as it would merely perpetuate
contemporary incoherence.134 The way in which Community competence in the
fundamental rights domain evolves in the future is of crucial importance in contexts
such as language rights, which are not usually linked to the more traditional
applications of EC law. Potential developments are assessed infra in two contexts:
first, dealing with the EC as an entity, which also encompasses the development of
existing citizenship rights and, second, the possibility that the EC may yet influence
the protection of fundamental rights in the Member States in a broader sense.
Overall, the Court cannot succumb deferentially to the controversies of the political
arena. The broader issue of competence delimitation is essentially a Member State
concern: it is the Member States, as architects of the Community's constitutional
structure, that can limit or extend Community powers, including those of the Court.
What must concern and motivate the EC in respect of fundamental rights protection
are the concerns of the individuals throughout the Community.
E. Language Rights in the Member State Constitutions
The constitutional provisions enacted by the Member States in respect of minority
languages are listed in Appendix I. The various degrees of protection evident can be
considered within the Skutnabb-Kangas/Phillipson paradigm of state responses to
133
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minority language group needs, set out at the beginning of this Chapter. These range
from tolerance (essentially, tolerance of the private use of the language but no
provision for official use e.g. France) to non-discrimination/permission (e.g. Italy, the
United Kingdom in respect of Welsh) and maintenance-oriented promotion (e.g.
Ireland, Spain).135 Significantly, Capotorti, as UN Special Rapporteur, declared that
international protection of minority rights is not contingent on their domestic
136
recognition. Thus, while the EC may draw from domestic provisions on language
rights, the absence of such provisions is not inherently fatal to the development of
Community policies. Notwithstanding the diversity of the measures listed, the vast
majority of Member States have made some provision for the recognition of
linguistic minorities based within their territories. Fishman observes that the number
of languages officially recognised world-wide has risen from thirty to three hundred
in the twentieth century alone, ironically, alongside the rapid spread of English as a
world-wide lingua franca for "...econotechnical, political, diplomatic, educational
1 37
and touristic purposes...."
The study of domestic provisions on language rights is an essential prerequisite to the
formation of successful international measures, particularly given the diversity of
language groups affected, in turn requiring diverse regimes of protection, as
discussed supra in the context of the Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.
Furthermore, securing the implementation of domestic measures is essential to the
134 De Burca, supra note 127, p. 294.
13:1 The original model of state response to language policy was developed by Ostrower i.e. (1) legal
equality of national languages for all practical and official purposes; (2) legal equality of all national
languages, some of which are designated as official; (3) formal equality of national languages
conditioned upon doctrinal considerations and changing official policies; (4) supremacy of the
language of the dominant national grouping, the official state language, within a system of
constitutional protection of linguistic minorities; (5) recognition of a foreign language as an auxiliary
official language and (6) designation of one or more native tongues as the official form of state
expression: Alexander Ostrower, Language, Law and Diplomacy, (Philadelphia, Oxford: University
Press, 1965), p. 597.
136
Capotorti Report, supra note 5, p. 121, para. 61.
137 Joshua A. Fishman, Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective, (Clevedon:
Multilingual Matters Ltd., 1989), p. 220.
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enforcement of effective, relevant language rights, since their exercise in the context
of the official use of language is usually confined to communications with national
authorities. The development of language rights for citizens dealing with the EC is,
however, a legitimate objective, discussed infra. In addition, international action can
influence internal state practice in a positive sense, persuading states to undertake
obligations that they would not have assumed independently. Diverse societies that
have incorporated the reality of difference into their constitutional and legislative
structures (e.g. Switzerland) represent the relative success in practice of the unity in
diversity ideal, towards which the EC now strives, far more than societies that
maintain an artificial policy of homogenous national unity (for example, cf. Chapter 1
supra on the 'English-only' controversy in the United States).
4. LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND THE EVOLVING PERSPECTIVE ON EC
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION
The phrase 'fundamental rights' embodies an array of rights, duties and protection
mechanisms, varying in both content and degree. Clapham advocates that the EC
must adopt this wide vision of fundamental rights, asserting that the Community's
traditional concentration on a limited range of rights is no longer sufficient.138 The
diverse commentary discussed throughout this Chapter converges on this point,
arguing that the motivation behind EC involvement should be reassessed in terms of
the rights of individuals. It is also feared that, at present, balancing fundamental
rights with the objectives of the Community can result in the demotion of both
international and domestic standards and values. It was shown in Chapter 2 supra
that the Community has long been aware of the rights and needs of speakers of
minority languages, largely due to the work of the European Parliament. The Court
has also recognised that national policies aimed at the protection and promotion of
minority languages are potentially compatible with EC law.
138
Clapham, supra note 59, p. 310.
The EC institutions have made concerted efforts in recent years to demystify the
Community, stressing its relevance to every individual citizen, projecting an image of
accessibility and striving to emphasise the wide-ranging benefits of EC membership.
It is difficult, however, to avoid the cynical proposition that these declarations
amount to little more than hollow rhetoric, a demystification in form rather than one
of tangible substance. If the Community fails to evolve in accordance with the image
it has designed for itself, there will be a high price to pay in terms of legitimacy and
credibility. The pragmatic contribution that the EC can make to fundamental rights
protection is, therefore, crucial and is now assessed in the context of language rights.
There are two relevant domains for potential action, policies for the Community as an
entity and Community influence on Member State practice.
A. Language Rights when Dealing with the Community as an Entity
The Amsterdam Treaty proposes that Article 8d EC should be amended, to formalise
constitutionally the principle that when a citizen of the Union writes to any of the
institutions in any of the official languages listed in Article 248 EC (as well as Irish),
s/he is entitled to receive an answer in the same language. This procedure exemplifies
how EC language policy relates directly to individual citizens as well as to the
internal administration of the Community. It relates to the broader domain of the
official use of languages, which covers communications, both written and oral, with
public authorities or institutions, including the courts and the civil service. The
concession made to EU citizens is, therefore, fairly narrow when considered in this
broader context. Moreover, although based on the premise of linguistic choice for the
citizen, over fifty million EU citizens have been excluded, as speakers of languages
other than the official languages of the Community. The revocation of this illiberal
facet of citizen/Community relations would constitute an innovative development of
the EC fundamental rights regime. It reflects a victim/beneficiary oriented motivation
for fundamental rights protection, confirming that the EC has a proactive mandate
apart from its incidental, reactive concentration on rights connected solely to the
implementation of fundamental Community law. Furthermore, an inclusive language
policy consolidates the language rights protected by many national and international
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legal instruments. The Court of Justice has long recognised the limitations of existing
fundamental rights instruments, such as the ECHR, and has stated its intention of
going further where the EC could offer greater protection for individuals. A re¬
examination of citizenship rights from the perspective of language use would mark a
definitive step in this direction.
The official use of language is discussed by Reaume in the context of the linguistic
security thesis.139 She considers, on the one hand, that most people rarely, if ever,
come into contact with a court or legislature; this can be applied equally to the low
probability that citizens will contact any of the EC institutions or be involved directly
in EC litigation.140 Viewed in these terms, based solely on the frequency of
occurrence or usage, Reaume concludes that the inability to carry out such functions
in one's own language is hardly a threat to linguistic security. But in the context of
language rights as fundamental rights, the official use of language has far broader
implications. It is a domain over which the governments of states, or the institutions
of other entities, have absolute authority, where they can implement the principle of
linguistic choice to both practical and symbolic effect. De Witte expresses the
argument in bald financial terms, arguing that the provision from public money of
official services in the majority language means that "...the money of the members of
a linguistic minority contributes to providing a service which is culturally optimal for
the majority alone."141 Significantly, a considerable proportion of the Court of
Justice's case-law relates to administrative and procedural issues, demonstrating the
practical relevance of the official sphere to litigants.142
139
Reaume, supra note 1, pp. 51-4.
140 As outlined in Chapter 1 supra, for court proceedings in a Member State which are being
conducted through the medium of a language other than those recognised by the EC's official
languages regime (or Irish), a reference made to the ECJ under Article 177 EC must be translated into
one of the official Community languages, notwithstanding the language of the case.
141 Bruno de Witte, "Le principe d'egalite et la pluralite linguistique", in Henri Giordan (ed.), Les
Minorites en Europe: Droits Linguistiques et Droits de I'Homme, (Paris: Editions Kime, 1992), 52-64
at 57-8.
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The rules and procedures governing language use for communication with the
Community institutions, both oral and written, should be extended to apply equally to
speakers of minority languages, as an expression of respect by the EC for
fundamental language rights. This proposition is a practical manifestation of the
theoretical issues set out in Chapter 1 supra. A more streamlined language policy was
recommended for the internal administration of the institutions, on the basis that
effectiveness and efficiency can be hampered by linguistic complexity; moreover,
those working in the administrative system have essentially chosen that function,
aware of any linguistic requirements imposed at the appointment stage. Amendments
to the present languages regime would, however, have to be strictly limited to
internal communications and, furthermore, provision should be made for situations
where individuals require interpretation and/or translation facilities. Procedures of
external application, such as the translation of EC legislation into all of the official
languages, would not be affected. The language rights of individual citizens cannot,
however, be compromised on the basis of efficiency. In any event, the relative
infrequency of communications between citizens and the EC institutions would not
generate prohibitive costs; furthermore, translation and interpretation could be
undertaken by associate service providers, instead of requiring personnel for every
minority language on stand-by in a centralised office. Not every minority language
spoken in the EC Member States would qualify for inclusion into the scheme e.g.
languages with a prohibitively low number of speakers could be legitimately
excluded. But clear and objective guidelines would have to be devised. The European
Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, for example, is ideally placed to undertake this
task, on a consultative basis with the language communities themselves. Fishman
sets out the acceptability of limits in any linguistic regime, but he also expresses
concern that "[tjhose who wield greater power are particularly likely to have a
disproportionate say in the establishing of such limits."143
142
cf. Dauses, supra note 58, pp. 403-4.
143 Fishman, supra note 129, p. 51.
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An inclusive right to choice of language may be implied, albeit accidentally, into a
Regulation on migrant workers. Article 48(1) of Regulation 574/72 provides that a
claimant for certain social security benefits is entitled to have any decisions of the
authorities, both Community and national, notified to him "...in his own language...":
significantly, there is no express restriction to the official Community languages.144 It
is arguable, therefore, that a migrant worker who speaks a minority language is
entitled to receive notice in that language, given the absence of any requirement to
the contrary. De Witte points out that the application of this EC procedure would in
turn affect practices in the public authorities of Member States.145 But the enjoyment
of administrative language rights should not be dependent on exercising the right to
mobility; nor should it be limited to the application of a specific regulation.
It is particularly appropriate that the EC, in the context of Article 8d, has considered
language rights within the remit of citizenship. The definition of citizenship can vary,
depending on the nature of the political entity in question, but its central theme
relates almost invariably to the role, based on both rights and duties, of the individual
within a polity. PreuB outlines the historical development of citizenship, tracing its
evolution from the passive submission of governed citizens to the more inclusive
version within democratic theory, developed in the last two hundred years.146 The
concept of European citizenship can be traced from early discussions in the
Tindemans Report on European Union to its eventual formulation in Article 8 EC,
introduced by the TEU.147 The general view among academic commentators is that
Article 8 grouped together a number of existing, movement-oriented rights but did
not introduce anything particularly new into the Community legal order. This seems
144
[1972] OJ L-74/1 (emphasis added).
145 De Witte, "The scope of Community powers in education and culture in the light of subsequent
practice", in Roland Bieber and Georg Ress (eds.), Die Dynamik des Europdischen
Gem.einschaftsrech.ts, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987), 261-278 at 266.
146 Ulrich K. PreuB, "Problems of a concept of European citizenship", (1995) vol. 1:3 European Law
Journal, 267-281 at 268-9.
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to have been recognised by the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty themselves, given
the dynamic nature of Article 8e, which empowers the Council to strengthen, but not
detract from, the rights laid down in the provision.148 One feature of citizenship that
is not linked inherently to free movement is the right of citizens to petition either the
European Parliament (Article 8d) or the Ombudsman established by Article 138e.
The European Parliament has, however, submitted to the individual's right to petition
since 1953, on its own initiative. The proposed Amsterdam Treaty amendments to
Article 8 make clear the already implicit understanding that EU citizenship is
complementary to, and in no way supersedes, national citizenship. European
citizenship is, therefore, widely viewed as a symbolic gesture rather than a
substantive embodiment of fundamental rights in a broader sense, a strategic
enhancement of the legitimacy of the European Union rather than of the rights of the
individual citizens concerned.149
A model of European citizenship that incorporates fundamental rights is far more
desirable. The protection of language rights, including minority language rights,
within a reformed framework is particularly advocated and is legitimated infra. But
an ongoing debate in the context of citizenship and rights must first be addressed i.e.
whether according rights to citizens can be justified given the resultant exclusion of
non-national residents. This applies to citizenship rights in particular but also to the
enjoyment of fundamental rights in general. It relates equally to state citizenship but
is examined here in the context of the EC. It centres on a perceived shift from
humanity to nationality as the basis of individual rights.150 Closa argues that
citizenship and fundamental rights were not conjoined in the TEU for precisely this
147 Carlos Closa, "The concept of citizenship in the Treaty on European Union", (1992) 29 Common
Market Law Review, 1137-1169 at 1141-1153; David O'Keefe, "Union citizenship", in O'Keefe and
Twomey (eds.), supra note 61, 87-107 at 87-89.
148 Jessurun d'Oliveira, however, views this dynamic process as a front for lack of coherence within
the citizenship provisions: Hans Ulrich Jessurun d'Oliveira, "European citizenship: Its meaning, its
potential", in Renaud Dehousse (ed.), Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union?, (Munich:
Law Books in Europe, 1994), 126-148.
149
cf. Grainne de Burca, "The quest for legitimacy in the European Union", (1996) vol. 59:3 Modern
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reason, so that third country nationals resident in the Member States could still
benefit from the Community's fundamental rights regime.151 However, concerns
expressed at the reservation of rights and privileges for citizens as a class do not take
into account either the universalism of inherently 'human' rights or the legitimacy of
recognising degrees of fundamental rights. The fact that "...citizenship should trigger
the obtaining of some rights which are not enjoyed by everyone (that is, by any
person simply as a human being)..."152 is widely recognised and does not in any way
diminish the universalisation of human rights e.g. the rights to life and liberty. What
is essential is that rights accorded to citizens should only come from a limited
catalogue of procedural or administrative rights. The enjoyment of language rights
provides a clear example of how additional benefits granted to citizens are a
legitimate expression of their distinct relationship with both Member States and the
EC: language rights granted on the premise of linguistic choice can be justified on the
basis of that relationship, while the universal principles of language rights based on
natural justice still ensure a basic level of protection for third country nationals where
required.
The development of citizenship to accommodate diversity is advocated strongly by
Jessurun d'Oliveira:
It is a clear indication of a phenomenon which is also to be observed in the
component parts of the European Community: that the Member States have to a
large extent become multicultural and multiethnic societies which may be
bound together not by a set of common values, but the development of a
competence to deal with their differences; indeed the re-definition of political
institutions in Europe reflects this mutation. It is this competence to deal with
differences which may be the nucleus of modern active citizenship, and
150 O'Neill, supra note 74, p. 86.
151 Closa, supra note 147, pp. 1153-1157; O'Leary argues, however, that while third country nationals
are not excluded from the application of Article F(2) TEU in theory, they are excluded in practice,
given that fundamental rights in Community law are only protected as "...by-products of the four
freedoms": O'Leary, "The relationship between Community citizenship and the protection of
fundamental rights in Community law", (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review, 519-554 at 530. This
statement presupposes, however, that EC law itself is confined to the four freedoms, not taking other
fundamental principles into account e.g. equal pay for equal work in the context of gender.
152 Koen Lenaerts, "Fundamental rights to be included in a Community catalogue", (1991) vol. 16:5
European Law Review, 367-390 at 384.
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European citizenship may be useful as a laboratory for this procedural concept
of proto-cosmopolitan citizenship.153
The imminent expansion of the European Union, incorporating the newly emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe, recasts this projected development as an absolutely
necessary inevitability rather than a merely desirable aspiration. The need for
reformation of the Community legal order in this way reflects the concurrent
reconstitution of democratic theory to encompass the needs of minorities, discussed
in Chapter 1, in view of the fact that traditional liberal democratic structures "...treat
minorities as sets of outvoted individuals."154 Contemporary awareness by governing
entities of the need for representation of all individuals, and perhaps some groups, is
replacing the simplistic 'majority rules' tenet of liberal democratic theory. This is
further reflected by the gradual displacement of a benign concept of tolerance in
favour of a proactive approach to non-discrimination, involving the implementation
of corrective policies where appropriate. The nation-state model of governance has
been gradually eroded but not because of the rejection of nationalist philosophy in a
broad sense, as predicted by proponents of European integration. In fact, phenomena
such as attachment and identity, usually associated with nationalism, are more rather
than less prevalent in contemporary society. What has been displaced is the primacy
of the nation-state as the polity best positioned to embody attachment and identity.
Nation-states have been shown to encapsulate a largely artificial sense of
homogeneity. The success of future models for political entities is dependent on their
ability to channel and accommodate diversity.
Any polity based on representation and participation will have to incorporate
fundamental rights in general and may justifiably develop certain rights dependent on
citizenship, to maximise protection for the individual (and possibly groups) against
governing institutions. The denial of fundamental rights is a denial of the dignity and
humanity of the individuals concerned. The denial of fundamental rights based on
citizenship is a denial of effective participation and representation. This applies
153 Jessurun d'Oliveira, supra note 148, pp. 147-8.
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equally to language rights, particularly minority language rights, because "[w]hen a
substantial minority of a population is denied full effective citizenship because of the
language they speak, then language and language rights matter."155 This principle has
been recognised within Community quarters for some time. The Intergroup on
Minority Languages in the European Parliament succeeded, for example, in having a
reference to lesser used languages included in the Parliament's Report on Union
Citizenship, prepared for the Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference.156 The
tentative recognition of language rights in the proposed amendment to Article 8d EC
demonstrates continuing awareness of effective participation by the EC. It is also
evident, from the Draft Text on Union Citizenship submitted by the Commission
prior to the Maastricht IGC, that the Community is aware of how much further it will
need to go in the future. The Commission proposed the inclusion of the following
article into the TEU: "[ejvery Union citizen shall have the right to cultural expression
and the obligation to respect cultural expression by others."157 The explanatory
memorandum accompanying the draft article stated that the right to cultural
expression was a corollary of the new Community competence in the field of culture,
outlined in Article 128 EC, and was grounded in the dignity and diversity of
individuals. O'Keefe has also interpreted citizenship as encompassing rights based on
culture, as well as consumer, education, health and environmental rights, in line with
other constitutional developments in the Maastricht Treaty.158 An open-ended
provision such as that proposed by the Commission could easily be interpreted as
placing reciprocal duties on the Community, however, imposing obligations for
which the Member States were probably not ready at that time. But the concept of
respect for diversity has taken firm root in the interim; it is unrealistic to allow the
Community to continue to express ideals that are not followed through with
definitive action. The Amsterdam Treaty mechanism for responding to citizen
154 Freeman, supra note 27,.p. 26.
155 O Riagain and Nic Shuibhne, supra note 8, p. 12.
156
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157 Bull. EC Supp. 2/91, 85-88 at 86.
158 O'Keefe, supra note 147, p. 90.
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communications, although limited to official Community languages, does at least
signal that the EC is prepared to explore ways in which its established commitment
to linguistic diversity can be implemented in practice. Again, the sensibilities of
Member States, compounded by disinclination within some of the EC institutions,
are often prohibitive to further policy development, as discussed further in the next
section. But Marias predicts that rights such as the seemingly abandoned right to
cultural expression could well be realised in the future, as the dynamic concept of
Union citizenship evolves in accordance with the evolution of the contemporary
political reality.159 O'Leary considers that the future of citizenship is largely
dependant on the establishment of an effective relationship between citizenship and
fundamental rights, not based on the present understandings of either concept but on
an advocated development of both.160
In summary, the EC must consider fundamental rights in a broader context than the
conditional link to the application of Community law. Rights that relate to its
administration as an entity are an obvious starting point; their implementation would
serve a dual purpose; first, examining the protection of rights from the perspective of
the requirements of individuals and, second, redressing the democratic and
legitimacy deficits faced by the EC as an international legal order. Amendment of the
proposed Article 8d to cover communications in minority as well as official
Community languages is a pragmatic and symbolic possibility for the substantive
implementation of what have remained theoretical ideals to date. It would not place
undue demands on resources, particularly in the context of a reformed EC language
policy more generally, but would amount to a remarkable step in the recognition of
minority language rights as fundamental rights. It also accords well with the general
principles of citizenship, in its dynamic, evolving sense, in the context of
contemporary political theory on effective participation. But the EC may have even
greater influence as a catalyst for change at Member State level, discussed infra.
159
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B. EC Influence on Member State Policies: 'Aspiration Rights'
The complex relationship between the EC and its Member States has been
interwoven with specific language-related questions throughout this thesis. From
subsidiarity and competence division to EC protection for fundamental rights, the
schizophrenic reactions of the Member States, as both donors and subjects of
Community powers, have at times been exposed as unfounded and
counterproductive. This section, however, seeks to examine the positive aspects of
this interrelationship. The realisation of minority language rights at Member State
level is often characterised by disappointment, from the perspective of minority
language speakers. The preceding section discussed how the EC can implement
inclusive language rights in the context of citizen/Community relations, but Argemi
has stressed that the realisation of language rights at inter-state level in the absence of
effective domestic policies would be "...a dishonest display."161 But is Member State
reluctance to provide for the rights of linguistic minorities a matter of any concern for
the Community? It was shown that the Council of Europe has had tremendous
difficulty in securing state support for the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages. In this context, it seems unlikely that the EC could induce such a
contentious inroad into national sovereignty where the Council of Europe could not.
Moreover, the Court of Justice can only review Member State acts on fundamental
rights grounds where the Member State has acted in the implementation of EC law.
The principle of non-interference by the Community in the internal treatment by
Member States of their nationals, apart from limited circumstances related to the
principle of reverse discrimination, is also relevant. In Mutsch, discussed in Chapter
2 supra, the Belgian authorities were required to grant to a non-national the same
language rights provided for nationals, but the Court did not have jurisdiction to
demand, for example, that the authorities apply more extensive rights than those
already enacted by the domestic legislature. The possibilities for EC involvement in
this aspect of fundamental rights are, therefore, presented in terms of potential rather
161 Aureli Argemi, "European recognition for Catalan", (1991) vol. 8:1 Contact 6.
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than existing competence and would require explicit constitutional change to become
effective.
The framework for EC rights protection devised by Lenaerts is used as a theoretical
basis for this section; it is grounded in the thesis that "[t]he central protection of
fundamental rights in a composite legal order should shield the citizens not only in
their relationship with the institutions of that legal order itself, but also in their
relationship with its component entities." Lenaerts first asserts that the application
of the ECHR in areas of residual Member State power should be guaranteed, free
from EC interference. The EC would claim "...some specific responsibilities for the
protection of fundamental rights which are not enumerated in the ECHR, even if
those rights somehow related to the residual powers of the Member States."163 It is
acknowledged, however, that this could only take place as a result of "...a deliberate
political choice during the process of making or amending the Community
constitution."164 For this reason, the advocated development of EC competence is
purely an aspiration, forming the outer layer of the concentric circles framework
developed by Lenaerts. The nucleus of rights protection is constituted by
implementation of the ECHR, leading outwards, on the concentric circles model, to
general principles of law, fundamental rights based on Union citizenship and, finally,
aspirational fundamental rights, particularly social and cultural rights.165
Fundamental rights drawn from the ECHR and from general principles of law already
form the basis of the existing jurisprudence on rights protection within the EC legal
order. Lenaerts stresses that the integrity of the ECHR system must be guaranteed,
but he also acknowledges the aim of guaranteeing higher standards of protection
where possible.
162 Lenaerts, supra note 152, p. 368.
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Turning to aspiration rights, Lenaerts groups together rights related to culture, social
and economic policy, the environment and consumer issues, on the basis that their
enumeration is meaningless without proactive intervention by public authorities.166
He then argues that effective protection of rights within this category requires the
express division of competence among competing public authorities since, in the
EC/Member State context, "...silence about the respective responsibilities of the
Community and the Member States...leads to a black hole in the Community's
constitution."167 In Chapter 4, it was shown that Article 128 EC sheds little light on
EC competence in the field of culture. A proposed amendment to Article 128(4) in
the Amsterdam Treaty makes explicit, however, the implied role of the EC in the
maintenance rather than suppression of the diversity of cultures. It can be assumed
that this applies equally to minority cultures, in the absence of any indication to the
contrary and aggregating the promotion of minority languages by the European
Parliament and the Court of Justice. But the fact remains that the limited possibilities
for Community action under Article 128 EC do not correspond with the needs of
minority language speakers in the context of the corollary duties of public authorities.
The primary responsibility for implementing the rights of minority language speakers
lies with national authorities, who control policy for the administration of domestic
courts, civil service authorities, education systems, etc. Lenaerts combines this
responsibility with the development of a new competence for the EC, as "..the
supervisory structure for the protection of fundamental rights in areas which
substantively continue to belong to the sphere of powers of the Member States (and
without the Community itself having any specific normative power in this
respect)."168 This latter aspect of aspirational rights should appease Member States
who are reluctant to accept any role for the Community in such matters. It also
conforms with Article 128 EC, which envisages the EC as co-ordinator rather than
lawmaker. The fact that substantive policies would not necessarily emanate from
166 ibid., p. 386.
167 ibid.
centralised institutions also avoids the controversial balancing by the Court of Justice
of an EC minority language policy per se against competing domestic provisions.
Clapham elaborates on the possibilities for practical implementation, referring to
"...imaginative solutions such as Community-wide collective agreements...and
provisions which are adaptable to the various different legal systems...[that] go
beyond attempts to harmonise or searches for convergence."169 Non-harmonisation
accommodates fully the very different needs of different language groups. Moreover,
Member States would not be able to plead the erosion of cultural diversity in an
attempt to evade consequential responsibilities. Zuanelli recommends that
"[interventions at the international level should define a threshold for these rights to
be freely fostered and implemented by each country in accordance with its linguistic
policy.170 This relates back to the idea of developing minimum standards, discussed
supra and in Chapter 4. But the EC would have to incorporate a protection
mechanism for individuals into its role as supervisor of Member State initiatives. The
level of discretion granted to states by the Council of Europe's Charter for Regional
or Minority Languages arguably renders the Charter potentially ineffective from the
perspective of the fundamental rights of speakers. This reflects the double-standard
irony identified in Chapter 1 supra, summarised by Fishman: "[s]tates are not slow to
apply to languages lower in the pecking order than the state-languages per se the very
same notions of limits that the state languages are so unwilling to apply to
themselves vis-a-vis the EC organisations' operations."171
Member State resistance may be overcome as part of a broader reform of EC
language policy, when the full implications of inclusive linguistic diversity will have
to be faced directly. But the role of the EC as supervisor of aspirational rights holds
much potential from the perspective of individuals, given that primary responsibility
is correctly placed on national authorities but alongside a complementary supra-state
168 ibid., p. 389.
169
Clapham, supra note 59, p. 365.
170 Zuanelli, supra note 57, p. 297.
171 Fishman, supra note 129, p. 55.
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redress mechanism. Rights protected in this way would include those not protected
by the ECHR, as well as more extensive protection for those already included therein.
But realisation of this aspirational domain of fundamental rights will require changes
not only in the constitutional structure of the Community but in its political culture as
well as in the attitudes of the Member States. The achievement of these preconditions
may not be quite so unrealistic as it seems, however, given that a similar role for the
Community, albeit outside the fundamental rights domain, was envisaged and
codified in Article 128 EC, discussed in Chapter 4 supra.
5. CONCLUSION
Clapham writes that "[o]ne cannot simply dismiss the concerns of states over the
future of their language...as disguised protectionism. More satisfactory answers and
attention could be given to such questions if the impoverished status of human rights
in the Community legal order were improved."172 Language rights are legitimate
fundamental rights that impose enforceable correlative duties on public authorities.
The protection of language rights can be derived from international instruments and
constitutional provisions, both recognised as sources of fundamental rights by the
Court of Justice, but the implementation of an effective right to choice of language
for official purposes often remains elusive. The EC has a definite role to play in the
development of language rights protection, in terms of its own status as a governing
entity and in the context of its potential influence on the formation and
implementation of Member State policy. Awareness of minority language rights has
clearly informed the EC institutions for some time but this awareness must be
translated into substantive results. In this way, the declared commitment to the
protection of the individual, above and beyond existing standards, will be realised
considerably, breathing life into the all too vacuous domain of political promises.
172
Clapham, supra note 59, p. 359.
CHAPTER 6
EVOLUTION OF EC MINORITY LANGUAGE POLICY:
POST-MAASTRICHT AND AMSTERDAM
1. INTRODUCTION
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 explored changes in EC/Member State competence, cultural
policy and the protection of fundamental rights by the Community, brought about by
the Treaty on European Union and, more recently, proposed by the Amsterdam
Treaty. The impact of these amendments on the capacity of the EC to participate in
the formation and implementation of minority language policy was assessed and the
following preliminary conclusions were drawn:
• the codification of subsidiarity in the EC Treaty reflects fundamental Member
State concerns in respect of the constantly eroding borders between EC and
Member State competence; it was argued, however, that even under a restrictive
interpretation of subsidiarity, there are certain instances where the EC is the most
appropriate actor in the language policy context, to redress the impact on language
use of intensified European integration.
• Article 128 EC does not have the potential to justify a substantial EC minority
language policy; its structure reflects a more limited, literal definition of culture;
the cultural aspect of language is, however, a necessary component of any
language policy, in the context of negative language rights based on tolerance and
non-discrimination; Article 128 did, at least, place cultural issues, which are
highly sensitive from the political perspective, firmly on the Community agenda;
the ethos of the general objective outlined in Article 128(1) could yet be drawn
upon independently of the other, more restrictive sections of the provision;
significantly, the provision focuses on diversity of cultures, an aspect strengthened
expressly by the Amsterdam Treaty.
• the protection of language rights as fundamental rights must feature in any future
development of EC language policy; the initiation of policies for the Community
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as a public entity, in respect of citizenship rights, and externally, in terms of
influencing Member State policies, was advocated and justified.
In Chapter 2 supra, dealing with the pre-Maastricht era, it was argued that the
Community institutions, while sympathetic, did not have the requisite legal
competence to act decisively on minority language issues. The current position,
summarised above, is radically different. This Chapter looks at how the institutions
have addressed minority language questions in light of changed competence and an
evolved political climate, examining whether any of the possibilities outlined above
have been taken on board.
2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INSTITUTIONS: THE PARLIAMENT AND
THE COMMISSION
A. Killilea Report (1994)
Resolution on Linguistic and CulturalMinorities in the European Community1
In Chapter 2, the European Parliament emerged as the institutional champion of
minority language rights. This work was consolidated further by the adoption of the
Killilea Report on 9 February 1994.
(i) Background
Prior to the enactment of the Treaty on European Union, the Parliament's Committee
on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media commissioned Mark Killilea MEP to
prepare a report on minority languages. Mr. Killilea advanced three reasons as to why
another report on lesser used languages was necessary: first, the resurgence of
smaller nations and repressed communities in central and eastern Europe; second, the
adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, which included a new Community competence in
cultural affairs and, third, the adoption of the Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages by the Council of Europe.2 As with the Commission's report in 1986, a
questionnaire format was devised; information was received not only from Member
State governments but also from regional and local authorities, research institutes and
1
[1994] OJ C-061/110; text in Appendix II.
2
(1994) vol. 11:1 Contact, 1 -4 at 2.
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language associations.. The Report was adopted by the European Parliament by a
virtually unanimous majority on 9 February 1994.3
(ii) Content and Commentary
The lengthy Preamble recalls the Arfe and Kuijpers Resolutions, as well as referring
to interim developments in the Council of Europe and OSCE on minority language
protection. Paragraph A does not draw on Article 128 EC as a legal basis per se\
rather, it speaks of the Parliament's taking 'encouragement' from the commitment to
national and regional diversity therein. This commitment is later rephrased, however,
as a Community responsibility (paragraph G). The Preamble goes on to set out the
role of the EC in terms far stronger than those employed in any of the previous
resolutions. In paragraph L, the Parliament restates the importance of financial
contributions from the Community, but it refers also to legal protection at the supra¬
national level. Paragraph N represents an effort to placate political sensibilities while
outlining Member State responsibilities, recognising that 'while the duty of every
Member State government to protect and promote its official language(s) must be
fully respected, it must not be exercised to the detriment of the lesser used languages
and the people for whom they are the natural cultural vehicle'.4
Minority languages are placed within the context of 'European linguistic culture'
(paragraphs B and E), thus implicitly classifying language as an element of culture
and moving away from traditionally restrictive interpretations of the concept. The
Parliament constructs a pragmatic justification for language policy, in line with
arguments advanced in Chapter 1 supra, arguing that 'European integration must
make the use of the most widespread languages as a way of communicating across
the present internal borders compatible with protecting and safeguarding the less
3 The total number of votes cast was 325, which broke down as 318 in favour, one against and six
abstentions; Donall O Riagain, Secretary General of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages,
noted, however, that "[t]he size of the majority should not belie the fact that there had been stiff
opposition to the report at various stages." (Contact, ibid., p. 2).
4
Interestingly, the vote against the Resolution and the majority of abstaining votes were cast by French
MEP's: as outlined in Appendix I, policies to promote the French language do operate to the detriment
of France's minority languages, which are not officially recognised at domestic level.
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widespread languages in regional or transregional contexts' (paragraph K). In this
context, the Parliament drew expressly from the process of democratisation in central
and eastern Europe, where cultural and linguistic rights have acute significance,
given the political history of these nations. Overall, the Preamble does not really
attempt to establish EC competence in language policy development directly; but the
Resolution goes further, in terms of philosophical basis and the explicit allocation of
responsibility to both the Community and its Member States, than any of its
predecessors.
The main body of the Resolution commences with a call for full implementation of
the Arfe and Kuijpers Resolutions; it proceeds to restate the need for official and
practical recognition of minority languages by the Member States, in the domains of
education, justice and public administration, the media and other sectors of public
and cultural life (Article 4). The Parliament declares support for the Council of
Europe's Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Article 6) and calls on EC
Member States to ratify the Charter 'as a matter of urgency...choosing at all times to
apply those paragraphs best suited to the needs and aspirations of the linguistic
communities in question' (Article 7). It was seen in Chapter 5 supra that state
response to the Charter has been disappointing: only seven EC Member States have
signed the Charter while only three of those States to date have proceeded to
ratification.5 It is significant that the Parliament urged signatory states to apply the
provisions most suited to the needs of language communities. It was argued in
Chapter 5 that the Charter is overly state-oriented; if the Community can succeed in
persuading states to consider the needs of language communities in the first instance,
rather than state priorities and resources, it could contribute significantly to the
effective implementation of the Charter. In Article 10, the Parliament calls on the
Commission to take a number of positive steps; essentially, this section restates
similar provisions from the earlier resolutions, including the far-reaching request that
the Commission take the needs of minority language speakers into account when
5 The Charter has been signed by Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Spain, and ratified by Finland, Germany and the Netherlands.
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working out Community policy generally. This conforms with the policy integration
clause set out in Article 128(4) EC, discussed in Chapter 4 supra. Articles 10(c) and
(d) reflect technological innovations since the earlier resolutions, calling on the
Commission to provide assistance for minority language projects in the context of
digital television. Article 11(g) calls on the Commission to 'encourage the
publication of the Treaties...and other basic provisions and information on the
European Community and its activities in the Union's lesser used languages'. This
measure relates to general reformation of EC language policy, proposed in Chapter 1
supra, which advocates the implementation in practice of a distinction between
working and official languages that accommodates minority languages.
In one sense, in its reiteration of established goals and policies, the Killilea Report
did not contribute anything new to the earlier resolutions. This might be considered
disappointing, in view of the fact that it was the first Resolution grounded in the
extended competences of the amended EC Treaty. But two points should be noted.
First, preparation of the Report coincided with preparation of the Charter by the
Council of Europe; Mr. Killilea decided that some of the more detailed proposals
should be omitted from his Report and that the Parliament should instead use this
opportunity to fully support the work of the Council.6 Second, while the Resolution
did not contain many innovative or detailed recommendations for that reason, the
tone of the Preamble is quite different from the pre-Maastricht initiatives. The
objective of Community/Member State cooperation for the overall best interests of
linguistic minorities has been stated more clearly than in any previous text. This
concept of power-sharing is compatible with the objectives of Article 128 EC, with
the principle of subsidiarity, now enshrined in the EC Treaty and with which the
Parliament must have striven to conform, and with the evolving culture of shared
competence more generally. As emphasised throughout this thesis, however, the
success of the power-sharing structure is largely dependent on the Member States.
B. Communication from the Commission (1995)
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Calls for Proposals for European Commission Backing involving Actions in
favour of Promoting and Safeguarding Regional or Minority Languages and
Cultures 7
This Communication provides insight into whether or not the Commission has been
receptive to the initiatives of the European Parliament. The Commission confirmed at
the outset that it is the institution responsible for the implementation of any action in
favour of regional or minority languages, which are defined as 'autochthonous
languages traditionally spoken by part of the population of a European Union
Member State [excluding] both immigrants' languages and artificially created
languages'. The Commission stated adamantly that '[considering the competences of
the Member States and in respect of the principle of subsidiarity, any activity with a
political or statutory impact will be excluded'. This brief, disappointing interpretation
shuts off a range of EC action ab initio. The Commission is restricted by the
prohibition against harmonisation in Article 128 EC, for example; furthermore, the
introduction of measures with direct statutory effect would contravene the limited
legal measures set out in Article 128(5). But language policy is far broader than
Article 128. Moreover, it was argued in Chapters 3 and 4 supra that the principle of
subsidiarity may actually require rather than prevent Community action on minority
languages, particularly in respect of the impact of the EC itself on language use,
discussed in Chapter 1. It is also difficult to isolate action having 'political' effect. It
is rarely possible to contain competences along definite or absolute
Community/Member State lines. It would be possible to interpret the 'political effect'
concept very broadly in order to oppose, for political reasons, even objectively
innocuous measures. Neither did the Commission appear to consider policies that
relate to the Community itself as a public entity, such as the accommodation of
minority language rights in its own dealings with EU citizens, as proposed in Chapter
5 supra, or the translation of the Treaties into minority languages, as recommended
by the Killilea Report. The cautious approach adopted by the Commission fits with
6
supra note 2, p. 1.
7
[1990] OJ C-322/34, 2 December 1995.
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the 'self-censorship' thesis put forward by Philip, who suggests that the Commission
"...has been chastened by the difficulty of getting public approval of the [Maastricht]
Treaty and is signaling that it intends to exercise its rights of initiative more
modestly...even if the scope of the Community's competence has been significantly
o
widened." Seven years later, however, the Commission continues to confine itself to
an extremely narrow range of initiatives in the field of culture.9 The Commission
identifies projects in education, the media and culture as the priority areas for its
allocation of financial assistance. These aspects of language planning are essential in
any language policy but they also compound a limited, traditional interpretation of
culture and do not address issues such as fundamental rights or even non¬
discrimination. The Commission has referred tentatively to minority language rights
as an aspect of inclusive citizenship.10 It does not, however, intend to reflect this
interpretation in the Treaty: it was shown in Chapter 5, for example, that the language
rights granted to citizens of the EU in Article 8d EC are confined to the official EC
languages only. Overall, the Commission has failed to grapple with the underlying
premise of the equality of all language speakers; ironically, this goal is clearly
evident in the Parliament resolutions from which the Commission has openly drawn
its inspiration. In particular, the full potential of the changes in legal competence
brought about by the Treaty on European Union have not been explored, indicating
deference to Member State sensitivities. This is a prime yet unfortunate example of
how the Commission can hide behind the subjective shield of subsidiarity without
actually exploring its full implications in objective, qualitative terms.
At present, the future allocation of finance for even culturally-rooted language
projects is at risk. Budget line B3-1006, dedicated to the provision of funds for these
and other minority language initiatives e.g. funding the European Bureau for Lesser
8 Alan Butt Philip, "Old policies, new competencies" in Andrew Duff, John Pinder and Roy Pryce,
Maastricht and Beyond: Building the New Europe, (London: Routledge, 1994), 123-139 at 129.
9
cf. Joachin Fronia (DGXXII), "The future role of the European Commission in respect of lesser used
languages", (paper presented at International Conference on Language Legislation, Dublin, 14-17
October 1998; publication of proceedings forthcoming, 1999).
10 ibid.
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Used Languages, was established in 1982, as a direct consequence of the first Arfe
Resolution. It was not, however, authorised by a legislative act; at the time, there
were no relevant Treaty Provisions upon which the Commission could base the
allocation. The security of this arrangement has never been taken for granted; the
reduction of the budget line for the first time in 1997 was considered to highlight its
precarious foundation.11 The most serious threat to its continued existence has been
brought about, however, by the recent decision in United Kingdom and ors v.
Commission, where the Court of Justice held that every significant EC expenditure
must be grounded in the prior adoption of a legislative act.12 A representative of
DGXXH has predicted recently that while the discretionary budget line on minority
languages is, therefore, currently endangered, it should be reinstated correctly in
i o
2000, in accordance with the Court's decision. It is obviously a priority that these
arrangements for the allocation of finance are enacted on a solid footing as soon as
possible; but the Commission must then face up to the broader, illusory constraints it
has placed on its own power of initiative in respect of EC minority language policy
more generally. In the context of shared competence, accentuated by the fact that
competence is not delimited expressly, the Commission is more or less pitted against
the Member States, given that it is the Community's executive institution, duly
accorded the power of initiative. In politically sensitive domains, the Commission is
likely to play down this initiative, so as not to transgress Member State relations.
This may be advisable in a political sense, but it necessarily curtails policy
development in whatever the area concerned, on far from objectively justifiable
grounds.
C. Euromosaic - Reportfor the European Commission (1996)
11
cf. (1997) vol. 14:1 Contact 6-7.
12 Case C-106/96 United Kingdom and ors v. Commission (Judgment of the Court, 12 May 1998); the
Court did not, however, provide guidelines on what constitutes a 'significant' Community expenditure.
13 Fronia, supra note 9.
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The Production and Reproduction of the Minority Language Groups in the
European Union 14
(i) Background
Euromosaic was prepared by four selected language centers on behalf of DGXXEL It
collects "...the necessary background information on each of these linguistic
communities that will facilitate applying the resources that are devoted to them...."15
The report is based on the premise that EC support for minority languages is "...a
direct result of increasing demands from the European Parliament and other
organisations which point to the need for public authorities to actively compensate
for the negative effects of economic and political integration."16 Empirical analysis
was undertaken to ascertain the potential for the production and reproduction of
various language groups, as opposed to their languages per se, "...when confronted
by an accelerated economic restructuring process."17 The ethos of the report is thus
firmly rooted in the concept of linguistic security. The employment of social sciences
theory and methodology distinguishes the report from the resolutions of the
Parliament.
(ii) Findings and Commentary
Euromosaic is the first Community publication to grapple directly with the economic
dimension of language- policy. The Report first provides a comprehensive account of
the methodology deployed in the study and proceeds to analyse the data collected.
The results are placed in the context of emerging social and political discourses i.e.
the contemporary, neo-liberal shift in emphasis from financial to human capital, the
role of diversity in economic development, and the nature and process of European
integration itself. It is concluded that language groups are centrally involved in these
14
European Commission, Euromosaic: The Production and Reproduction of the Minority Language
Groups in the European Union, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European
Communities, 1996).
15 ibid., Executive Summary, para. 1.
16 ibid.
17 ibid., para. 7.
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discourses and that "...a reevaluation of their importance is already in place, albeit
that it has yet to feed through into a self-evident social policy."18 In particular, the
authors note that the data collected "...highlights the shift in thinking about the value
of diversity for economic development and European integration. It argues that
language is a central component of diversity, and that if diversity is the cornerstone
of innovative development then attention must be given to sustaining the existing
pool of diversity within the EU."19 Significantly, the Report identifies that "...those
language groups which are in a position to sustain themselves are those which
receive considerable state support which activates and promotes the production and
reproduction processes operating within civil society.,.[T]he demographic size of a
language group is no guarantee of the group's viability capacity, with the existence of
some of Europe's largest language groups being threatened."20
The authors argue that the need for a programme of action to promote minority
language groups, as a source of diversity that derives from language and culture,
cannot be over-emphasised:
In many respects this is not a new insight, with one after another of the various
reports presented to the Commission making similar suggestions. What is
different in this Report is that whereas previous suggestions have conceived of
minority language groups in emotive terms associated with the 'traditional'
activities which are the emotional converse of rational 'modernity', concerned
with the poetic, the literary or the musical, but never with the economic and the
political, our argument involves the need to develop such action, not for the
benefit of the various language groups as a European heritage, but for the
economic advantage of the entire Community.21
In Chapter 1 supra, it was argued that the heritage aspect of culture, and its
contribution to diversity, should not be discounted merely because of the invocation
of emotive discourse. It was stressed, however, in Chapter 4, that policies focused




ibid., para. 10 (Executive Summary).
20 ibid., para. 8/9.
21 ibid., p. 60.
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difficulties faced by speakers of minority languages; furthermore, the heritage
dimension is not, as established in Chapter 5, a legitimate moral basis for language
rights as fundamental rights. What is abundantly clear is that the Commission must
continue but also move beyond its sponsorship of education and socialisation
projects, and move towards pro-active planning rather than non-directional
intervention.22 The study confirms the shift in contemporary political thought, which
has begun to accommodate provision for diverse social groups in its philosophies.
The role of the EC in this process is derived as follows:
[HJistory tells us that the goal of the state has nearly always involved the
integration of civil society through homogenisation of cultural and linguistic
elements. It is our claim that the future, in contrast, must involve a reorientation
of that integration within the context of diversity and that the emergence of the
23
supra-state affords an important opportunity to realise this goal."
Euromosaic is the most theoretically sophisticated study on minority languages
undertaken to date. Its empirical, scientific approach contrasts sharply with those
initiated by the Parliament, but all of these studies have contributed in different ways
to the body of data now gathered by the Community institutions. If the Commission
takes on board the recommendations made to it, in the context of a broader
understanding of subsidiarity as well as the Community's contribution to the
achievement of fundamental rights, then there is every reason to hope that a more
effective and influential language policy, taking full account of the situation of
minority languages, may yet emanate from the European Community. The evolution
of political culture, as opposed to political theory, is a notoriously slow process. But,
in light of monetary union and intensifying integration more generally, the
Commission must now strive to embrace and implement the theoretical projections
directed towards it, as the EC institution with power of initiative.
3. JURISPRUDENCE
22 ibid., pp. 60-1.
A. Commission v. Luxembourg 24
(i) Facts and Judgment of the Court
The maintenance of a nationality requirement for access to civil service positions in
Luxembourg, in the public sectors of research, teaching, health, inland transport,
posts and telecommunications, and utilities, was challenged by the Commission on
the basis of Community law on the free movement of workers.25 The initiation of
these proceedings marked the culmination of almost three years of communication
with the Luxembourg Government in respect of its policy; in fact, the lengthy
duration of this pre-litigation procedure was one of the main reasons why the
Government's preliminary argument of inadmissibility failed in the Court of
Justice. The Court's decision and the Opinion of Advocate General Leger focused
primarily on the interpretation of the public service exception in Article 48(4) EC.
The Court's existing case-law on strict and uniform interpretation of this derogation
was confirmed: only civil service posts that necessitate a special relationship of
allegiance with the state in question, or functions intended to safeguard the general
interests of the state, can be considered to come within the ambit of Article 48(4).27
Aside from arguments based on the interpretation of the public service exception, the
Luxembourg Government raised the question of the protection of its national identity
and argued as follows, in the specific context of teachers:28
23 ibid., p. 13.
24 Case C-473/93 Commission v. Luxembourg [1995] ECR 1-3207.
25
i.e. Article 48 EC; Articles 1 and 7 of Regulation (EEC) No. 1612/68 [OJ Special English Edition
(II) 475]; the Commission acted in accordance with Communication 88/C 72/02 [[1988] OJ C72/2] on
the elimination of restrictions on grounds of nationality that hinder access of workers from other
Member States to certain posts in the public service.
26
Judgment of the Court, supra note 24, p. 3254, paras. 17-24; the other reason for the failure of the
inadmissibility contention was that the Luxembourg Government had been allowed four months to
comply with the Commission's reasoned opinions, more than twice the time period usually allowed by
the Commission.
27 ibid., p. 3255, para. 26 et seq., especially para. 31.
28 Other issues raised included the special demographic position of Luxembourg and the application of
other international instruments, such as the European Convention on Establishment (1955).
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[T]he fact that teachers have Luxembourg nationality guarantees that traditional
values are passed on and, for a small country, it is essential in order to
safeguard national identity...[I]t is difficult to imagine that a primary school
teacher coming from abroad would be sufficiently familiar with the atmosphere
in which Luxembourg children have spent the first few years of their life, that
he would know the national customs, songs, poems and all the other elements
forming part of the national psychological outlook which play a role in teaching
at that level. Even in secondary education, a teacher's work cannot be regarded
simply as an economic activity whereby knowledge is imparted in return for
29
remuneration. The transmission of natural culture continues at that level too.
This extract is reminiscent of the arguments made, and accepted, in the Groener
decision, discussed in Chapter 2 supra, on the nature of the teaching function.30 The
Luxembourg Government went further in this case, however, extending the reasoning
developed in the context of language policy to a more abstract concept of identity,
based on nationality. The Court did not, however, accept the extended argument, but
it did confirm the legitimacy of employing language policies in this context. It first
referred to earlier case-law, confirming that teaching positions do not come within
the public service exception in Article 48(4) EC.31 The Court continued as follows:
This conclusion cannot be shaken by considerations relating to the preservation
of national identity in a demographic situation as specific as that prevailing
in...Luxembourg. Whilst the preservation of the Member States' national
identities is a legitimate aim respected by the Community legal order (as is
indeed acknowledged in Article F(l) of the Treaty on European Union), the
interest pleaded by the Grand Duchy can, even in such particularly sensitive
areas as education, still be effectively safeguarded otherwise than by a general
exclusion of nationals from other Member States. As the Advocate General
points out...nationals of other Member States must, like Luxembourg nationals,
still fulfill all the conditions required for recruitment, in particular those
relating to training, experience and language knowledge. Consequently, the
protection of national identity cannot justify exclusion of nationals of other
Member States from all the posts in an area such as education, with the
exception of those involving direct or indirect participation in the exercise of
powers conferred by public law and duties designed to safeguard the general
32
interests of the State or other public authorities.
29
supra note 24, p. 3232, para. 130.
30 Case C-379/87 Groener v. Ministerfor Education and the Dublin Vocational Education Committee
[1989] ECR 3967.
31
Judgment of the Court, supra note 24, p. 3257, para. 33, referring to Case 66/85 Lawrie-Blum
[1986] ECR 2121 and Case 33/88 Allue and Coonan [1989] ECR 1591.
32 ibid., p. 3258, paras. 35-6.
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The legislation implementing the policies of the Luxembourg Government was,
therefore, found to contravene Article 48 EC and Article 1 of Regulation 1612/68.
(ii) Commentary
The decision in this case confirms the Court's position in Groener, i.e. Member
States may impose a linguistic competence requirement as a precondition to
employment, so long as the linguistic knowledge required relates to the nature of the
post to be filled, the policy applies to nationals as well as non-nationals and it is
proportionate in respect of the aim to be achieved. Advocate General Leger discussed
this element of the protection of identity in his Opinion, stating, for example, that
"...access to posts which by their nature involve contact with the public may be in
particular made subject to conditions regarding the knowledge of [official
languages]."33 The Advocate General proceeds, however, to adopt quite a peculiar
reasoning, stating that "[i]n my view, the linguistic requirements to which access to
numerous posts in the sectors concerned may be lawfully made subject should
therefore in most cases allow only citizens born or long established in Luxembourg
to respond to offers of employment or to participate in competitions conducted for
recruitment purposes."34 This ambiguous paragraph could conceivably be interpreted
as some sort of consolation for the Luxembourg Government, that its language
policies might have the indirect effect of achieving what its original nationality
requirement could not be allowed to continue overtly. This goes absolutely against
the principle that both direct and indirect discrimination are prohibited by
Community law. It also contrasts sharply with the decision in Groener, where it was
considered essential that, to justify the Irish Government's language policy, the
required standard of competence must be attainable for non-nationals. The paragraph
quoted is, therefore, a particularly curious and, indeed, careless statement. Neither the
Advocate General nor the Court discussed language as a distinct marker of identity in
any detail; the distinction between language and the other elements of identity put
33
Opinion of the Advocate General, ibid., p. 3243, para. 204.
34 ibid., p. 3244, para. 207.
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forward by the Luxembourg Government was not, for example, explained. This is
regrettable, given that language was effectively singled out as a legitimate basis for
differentiation within certain parameters, such as proportionality. The particular
status of Luxembourgish as a national but de facto minority language was not,
however, commented upon.35
B. Criminal Proceedings against Bickel and Franz 36
(i) Facts
The facts of this case resemble the earlier decision of the Court in Mutsch, discussed
in Chapter 2 supra, but with one fundamental difference. The defendants are
Austrian and German nationals respectively, both of whom were charged with
criminal offences while visiting a region of Italy (Bolzano) where the German and
Italian languages have the same official status. One practical effect of this language
policy is that Italian citizens who are residents of the region, but not Italian citizens
generally, have the right to choose either Italian or German as the language of the
case for criminal proceedings. The present case concerns whether a similar right
extends to the defendants under Community law. In both cases, pre-trial documents,
such as summonses and adjournment orders, were issued in Italian. Both defendants
declared that they did not have any knowledge of the Italian language and requested
that the actual proceedings take place in German. In Mutsch, the defendant had been
resident as a migrant worker in Belgium and it was decided that the right to choose
the language of court proceedings, already granted to citizens of the region in
Belgium, should be extended to migrant workers on the same conditions, under the
ambit of its constituting a 'social advantage' (Regulation 1612/68). But neither
defendant in the present case could claim status as a migrant worker: both were
merely passing through the region at the time of the alleged commission of the
offences. The following question was, therefore, referred to the Court of Justice in
respect of both cases:
35
Luxembourgish is a national but not official language of the Grand Duchy: cf. Appendix I.
36 Case C-274/96, Criminal Proceedings against Bickel and Franz, Opinion of Advocate General
Jacobs, 19 March 1998; Judgment of the Court, 24 November 1998 (not yet reported).
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Do the principle of non-discrimination as laid down in the first paragraph of
Article 6, the right of movement and residence for citizens of the Union as laid
down in Article 8a and the freedom to provide services as laid down in Article
59 of the Treaty require that a citizen of the Union who is a national of a
Member State and is present in another Member State be granted the right to
call for criminal proceedings against him to be conducted in another language
where nationals of that State in the same circumstances enjoy such a right?37
Interestingly, the referring court itself submitted that all Community citizens should
be entitled to have criminal and civil proceedings conducted through German if they
so wish, on the grounds that not to grant such a right would amount to "...a manifest
breach of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality...."38 The
Advocate General identified two issues to be decided: "...first, whether the choice of
language in the criminal proceedings before the referring court comes within the
scope of the Treaty; and secondly, whether the Italian rules, if construed so as to deny
[the defendants] the right to use German, would entail discrimination on grounds of
nationality." He distinguished the Court's earlier decision in Mutsch, where
language rights were conferred on non-nationals as a corollary of their status as
migrant workers, rather than in the general contexts of freedom of movement and
European citizenship per se.
(ii) Judgment of the Court
The Court held that "...exercise of the right to move...freely in another Member State
is enhanced if the citizens of the Union are able to use a given language to
communicate with the administrative and judicial authorities of a State on the same
footing as its nationals."40 The Court acknowledged that establishing the rules of
criminal procedure is generally within Member State competence, but stated that the
fundamental principle of non-discrimination (Article 6 EC) and the overriding
Community freedoms set legitimate limits to such internal legislative procedures.
The contention of the Italian Government that the aim of the rules was to protect the
37
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, para. 8
38 ibid., para. 9.
39 ibid., para. 10.
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ethno-cultural minority residing in Bolzano was rejected. The Court confirmed that
the protection of such a minority was a legitimate aim, but held that "...[i]t does not
appear...that that aim would be undermined if the rules in issue were extended to
cover German-speaking nationals of other Member States exercising their right to
freedom of movement."41 The Court did not, however, elaborate on this statement.
(iii) Commentary
The Court delivered a judgment of fundamental significance to minority language
groups yet, once again, the philosophical basis for its decision can best be derived by
considering the Opinion of the Advocate General. In the first instance, Advocate
General Jacobs did not take the application of Article 6 EC quite so much for
granted. In order for Article 6 to apply in the present case, the alleged discrimination
would have to be seen as coming 'within the scope of application of the Treaty'.
Having established only tenuous connections between the alleged offences and
Community law, 42 the Advocate General introduced instead the general principle
that "...criminal proceedings against a Community citizen based on alleged facts
which occurred while that citizen exercised his right to free movement come within
the scope of application of the Treaty and are therefore subject to the prohibition of
discrimination on grounds of nationality."43 He stressed that the extension of non¬
discrimination to cover criminal proceedings, arising in the course of the exercise of
free movement, was particularly appropriate in light of the concept of EU
citizenship.44 He declared that it was still open to Member States to justify
advantages reserved to nationals on grounds unrelated to nationality, but that it was
becoming "...increasingly difficult to see why Community law should accept any type
of difference in treatment which is based purely on nationality, except in so far as the
40




Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, paras. 13-16.
43 ibid., para. 15, relying on Case 186/87 Cowan v. Tresor Public [1989] ECR 195.
44 The Advocate General made some strong remarks on the fundamental nature of Union citizenship
and on the relevance of non-discrimination to citizenship; cf. paras. 23-24.
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essential characteristics of nationality are at stake, such as access to a limited range of
posts in the public service or the exercise of certain political rights."45 This
perspective reflects the Court's earlier decision in Commission v. Luxembourg,
discussed supra.
Having established that non-discrimination on grounds of nationality applied to the
circumstances of the case, the Advocate General went on to consider whether the
Italian legislation discriminated against the two defendants. The Italian Government
argued that the particular provision in question was not discriminatory on grounds of
nationality, pointing out that even an Italian national not resident in Bolzano would
not have been afforded the right to use German. It was also argued that the rule came
within the scope of the protection of linguistic minorities and not the rules of
criminal defence. In this context, the Government pointed out that the linguistic
aspect of the rules of defence is already covered by the European Convention on
Human Rights, discussed in Chapter 5 supra. The Government considered the
legislation as a form of special constitutional protection, relating the right to use
German in Bolzano to language choice rather than language competence. The
Advocate General dismissed these arguments, however, on what can only be deemed
pragmatic grounds:
The argument advanced by the Commission and the Italian Government that
Italian nationals not resident in Bolzano cannot choose German either is beside
the point. Being Italian-speakers, the overwhelming majority of Italian
residents will have no practical interest in choosing German. In other words,
German and Austrian visitors are without exception denied an advantage
granted to most Italian residents who actually want that advantage.,.[T[he
advantage in the present case, although regional in form, is in reality directed at
46
a general category of residents, namely German-speakers.
This goes beyond the Court's decision in Mutsch, where it was made clear that the
rights accorded to the defendant were the same as those granted to Belgian citizens.
The theme of citizenship is far more European in the present case: the Advocate
General established a linguistic connection between groups of EU citizens that
45 ibid., para. 27.
46 ibid., paras. 37-8.
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transcends national borders and, in fact, distinguishes them from other nationals of
the host Member State. Following on from this, he considers whether the rule can be
justified objectively on grounds other than nationality. He dismissed the possibility of
justification on administrative grounds, pointing to the argument advanced by the
defence that the appointment of an interpreter so that the proceedings could take
place in Italian would lead to extra costs.47 The Advocate General then considered
the suggestion that the Italian legislation was justified on the grounds of the
protection of a linguistic minority:
[It is not] possible, as the Italian Government suggests, to justify the rule on the
ground that its purpose is to protect the German-speaking minority in Bolzano.
I fully accept that the rule in question serves the wholly legitimate aim of
protecting a Member State's linguistic minority, an aim unrelated to
nationality. The difficulty, however, is that the exclusivity of the rule, that is to
say, the denial of the advantage to visitors from other Member States, is neither
a necessary nor an appropriate means of achieving that aim. In other words the
rule is disproportionate. Refusing the use of German to visitors does not in any
way serve that aim. If anything, it has the reverse effect: it reinforces Italian as
the principal language even in the predominantly German-speaking region of
Bolzano.48
It is significant that the Advocate General based his decision on transnational
considerations, in terms of the German language and European citizens, rather than
national policy.49 This is a remarkable advance from Mutsch. The decision of the
Court ultimately supports this contention but was not framed in such explicit,
progressive language. This is, in itself, disappointing, in light of the evolving and
relatively consistent approach adopted by the Court over the past decade towards
Member State minority language policies. The main difficulty lies in the perception
that, in the absence of philosophical arguments, the decisions of the Court are
concerned with fundamental Community principles over and above considerations of
linguistic identity. What is often ignored in this context is that the limitations
47
ibid., para. 40; the Court also alluded briefly to this consideration, at. para. 30 of its judgment.
48
ibid., para. 41 (emphasis added).
49 Some commentators, arguing from the perspective of the strict application of territorial language
policy principles, consider that the decision in this case has permitted the invasion of regionally
defined linguistic regions: cf. for example, Karl Reiner, "Human rights and the protection of minorities
in the independent province of Bolzano-Bozen", (paper presented at the International Conference on
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established by the Court, primarily considerations of non-discrimination and
proportionality, are fundamental principles applied across the human rights law
spectrum. But it must, perhaps, be enough for now to acknowledge that the results, if
not the rhetoric, are clearly consistent with the best interests of the minority language
group in any given case. This jurisprudence contributes significantly to the evolution
of an inclusive and meaningful construction of European citizenship, based implicitly
on the protection of fundamental rights.
4. CONCLUSION
The communications and case-law discussed in this Chapter indicate more the
disclosure of, rather than change in, the attitude of the EC institutions towards the
protection of linguistic diversity. In particular, the Euromosaic report and the
Advocate General's Opinion in Bickel and Franz demonstrate that the institutions are
keenly aware of the importance of maintaining linguistic diversity, for a variety of
reasons. In light of these theoretical advances, the embryonic policies of the past will
no longer suffice. This realisation has not, however, been arrived at unanimously.
The restrictive approach adopted by the Commission and the relatively clumsy
reasoning of the Court and Advocate General in Commission v. Luxembourg exhibit
lingering uncertainties, traceable in particular to the ongoing battle between
Community and Member State competence. The evolution of Community thinking
is, however, clearly visible, when contrasted with earlier, almost disguised, attempts
made by the Court in Mutsch and Groener to contribute to the establishment of a
Community perspective on minority language protection. It is possible, therefore, to
be cautiously optimistic that the Community, led by the Court and the Parliament,
has begun to develop an effective role for its institutions; the looming threat still
evident, however, is that their attempts might still be fatally frustrated by even the
threat of political mutiny.
Language Legislation, Dublin, 14-17 October 1998, publication of proceedings forthcoming, 1999);
but these arguments essentially reflect territorial rather than linguistic integrity.
292
CONCLUSION
The European Community has committed itself to the preservation of cultural
diversity, a value ostensibly promoted by its constituent Member States. The EC
institutions have recognised language as a fundamental aspect of culture. In the
context of diversity, they have designed initiatives, and legitimated those undertaken
by Member States, in favour of regional and minority languages. Certainly, a lot has
been achieved. But there is a naive assumption that maintaining the existing ethos is
somehow enough and that languages will basically sort themselves out in accordance
with natural evolutionary trends.
A distorted linguistic environment has been created as a result of European
integration, in that the relative utility of many European languages has been
diminished by the spread of the languages of wider communication. The already
precarious position of minority languages has been particularly affected. Language
has an economic dimension but it is not an inherently economic concept. This does
not, however, mean that the forces of economic integration have no impact on
language use. The opposite has been shown to be true. Only the Community can
tackle effectively the widespread and disruptive influence of intensifying integration
on language patterns throughout the Member States. The implementation of
counterbalancing EC policies is not just a goodwill gesture. It is a responsibility. If
the Community portrays itself as a political entity that protects fundamental rights,
cultural diversity and citizenship, then it must ensure that this benevolent image is a
real one and not a manufactured ploy to gain credence and legitimacy. The fate of
minority languages lies ultimately in the hands of their speakers: no-one is asking the
EC to save minority languages single-handedly. Public authorities should not strive
to fabricate the structures of linguistic behaviour, but societal conditions should be
favourable to the exercise of fundamental language rights based on linguistic choice.
When language domains are distorted by external forces, public authorities must
attempt to redress the resulting imbalances. The EC, as a governing public authority,
cannot side-step this responsibility.
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The competences introduced by the Treaty on European Union are usually classified
as 'new'. But almost seven years have passed. Why is EC competence in cultural
matters still regarded as uncertain? Its contribution to cultural diversity is an explicit,
Treaty-based Community objective. The principle of subsidiarity is often perceived
as the death-knell in this context. But what effect does it really have in practice? At
least in the domain of language policy, the Commission has precluded itself from
exploring a wide range of substantive policy developments based on competence in
cultural affairs and on the more political bases of fundamental rights and citizenship,
by subscribing to a sweeping assumption that initiatives in these domains are
prohibited by subsidiarity. This thesis shows that they are not. When subjected to
scrutiny, the uncertainties attached to competence in the cultural and linguistic
domains materialise in the political realm far more than in the legal one.
The tenuous relationship between the EC and its Member States is highlighted at
several points throughout this thesis. It can only be said to reflect a certain
immaturity on both sides. The Member States fear the implications of EC action on
shared policy areas, notwithstanding the fact that it is they themselves that have
caused these competences to be incorporated into the Treaty. The EC is not some
abstract, autonomous entity that somehow divined these powers by and for itself. The
transfer of power to the Community is essentially negated, however, by attaching
artificial restrictions on its ability to develop and implement related policies. But it is
more damaging, in the. long term, to create the illusion of shared competence than to
actually exercise it. Subsidiarity, despite its ideological background in the EC
context, is not sustainable as one of these illusory restrictions. Subsidiarity could
actually work. In light of the imminent devolution of power to Northern Ireland,
Scotland and Wales, for example, subsidiarity may yet have to work, in accordance
with its inherent rather than ascribed character; sub-national groups often bypass
Member States where it is perceived that supra-national entities can serve their needs
more efficiently and objectively. The Member States cite their commitment to
cultural and linguistic diversity to resist any amendments to the official languages
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regime presently operated by the Community. But, ironically, over-zealous
promotion of national languages has been shown to operate against non-official
languages, in clear contravention of the ethos of diversity. The Member States
support European Parliament Resolutions on minority languages, but these
instruments have no legal effect; more specifically, they do not place the Member
States under any correlative legal duties of implementation. The Court of Justice has
been criticised, on the other hand, for assessing Member State language policies
against fundamental Community principles such as non-discrimination and
proportionality, notwithstanding the fact that the application of these standards is
common practice, both nationally and internationally, or that the Court has
consistently delivered judgments that place the interests of languages and their
speakers in clear priority.
The hushed, almost mystic, character of subsidiarity that has been encouraged by the
EC institutions, especially the Commission, is equally damaging. It may well be part
of a political game, to reassure the Member States that primary power in the areas of
shared competence remains with them. But this causes the institutions to surrender
powers they actually, legitimately have. This practice might soothe political tensions
from time to time but, in the long run, it erodes the need for supra-national
government in the first place. For how long can the primacy of national powers be
contained within the so-called peripheral competences? The damaging consequences
of clawing back powers retroactively cannot be ignored.
The present EC official languages regime does not really serve anyone efficiently,
apart from bolstering the supremacy of state sovereignty. An operative distinction
between official and working languages is both justified and necessary. A reformed
language policy must, however, be inclusive. Over fifty million EU citizens speak
languages other than those recognised officially by the Community. These minority
languages contribute equally to the linguistic diversity allegedly valued by Member
States and Community alike. Primary responsibility for the implementation of
effective language rights lies with the Member States, who have had varying degrees
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of success in the formulation of appropriate policies on minority languages. But the
Community has distinct responsibilities also. First, in the context of languages
generally, the EC must face up to the corrosive effect of economic and political
integration on language shift throughout the Community. This applies equally to the
smaller official languages but more acutely to minority languages, which are not
recognised at all in the Community context. This responsibility will intensify as
monetary union becomes a reality. Second, the present cultural initiatives supervised
by the Commission must be broadened in scope. Projects on the aesthetic dimension
of language are crucially important, but they are not enough. More effective
initiatives on the public or official as well as cultural use of language have been
advocated by the European Parliament in its various resolutions on minority
languages. The Member States have already supported these measures through the
support of their democratically elected representatives in the Parliament. It would be
politically damaging for them to withdraw that support, should the Commission and
Council actually decide to follow through in this context.
In the specific domain of the official use of language, there are two additional ways
that the EC can evolve its language policy, neither of which falls foul of an objective
assessment of subsidiarity. It can enhance the development of inclusive citizenship
rights by providing for a language choice regime, including both official and non-
official languages, in its dealings with EU citizens. Second, in accordance with the
evolving culture of non-harmonisation and minimum standards, the Community can
strive to secure the implementation of effective language rights in the Member States,
taking on a coordinating and supervisory role. If the EC is truly committed to
protecting the individual in the fundamental rights context, it must adapt and apply a
broader perspective, not concentrating solely on rights that are connected to
economic policy. The Community encompasses a lot more than economics and this
should be acknowledged and reflected accordingly.
Notwithstanding the priority of monetary union, the EC continues to affect seemingly
non-related aspects of everyday life. These so-called peripheral policy areas are far
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from peripheral to the citizens of the EU, who deserve to have their priorities secured
within the supra-national structure that effectively governs them yet still seems too
remote. Culture cannot be ignored. The protection of fundamental rights must be
consolidated. Language cannot be excluded from either context. At present, the
evolution of EC language policy is being thwarted; it is a pawn in a subtle political
battle of sovereignty, with subsidiarity as the chief weapon deployed, ironically, by
both sides. The involvement of the European Community in minority language issues
is not primarily, therefore, a question of competence; it is more a question of
willingness, on all sides.
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APPENDIX I
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE EC MEMBER
STATES
1. AUSTRIA
Minority language communities: Croat, Czech, Hungarian, Slovak, Slovenian and
Rom.
Constitution ofthe Austrian Republic (1929/modified 1970)
Article 8
Without prejudice to the rights provided by federal law for linguistic minorities,
German is the official language of the Republic.
Austria has signed the European Charterfor Regional orMinority Languages.
2. BELGIUM
Minority language communities: Dutch, French and German.
Co-ordinated Constitution of the Belgian Kingdom (1831/modified 1980; 1989)
Article 3b
Belgium comprises four linguistic regions: the French language region, the Dutch
language region, the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital, and the German language
region.
Every commune in the Kingdom belongs to one of these linguistic regions.
The boundaries of the four regions may only be altered or amended by an act of
Parliament passed on a majority vote in each linguistic group of each of the Houses,
on condition that the majority of the members of each group are present and that the
total voters in favour within two linguistic groups attain two thirds of the votes cast.
Article 3c
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Belgium comprises three communities: the French community, the Flemish
community, and the German-speaking community.
Each community enjoys the powers invested in it by the Constitution or such
legislation as shall be enacted in terms thereof.
Article 23
The use of the languages spoken in Belgium is optional; it may only be regulated by
law and only in the case of acts by public authorities and of legal matters.
Article 32b
For those cases prescribed in the Constitution, the elected members of each House
are divided into a French language group and a Dutch language group in such manner
as is laid down by law.
Article 38b
Except in the case of budgets and laws requiring a special majority, a reasoned
motion signed by at least three quarters of the members of one of the linguistic
groups and introduced after the report has been tabled and before the final voting in
public session may declare that the provisions of a draft or proposed bill which it
specifies are of such a nature as to have a serious effect on relations between the
communities.
In such cases, parliamentary procedure is suspended and the motion is referred back
to the Cabinet which, within a period of thirty days, gives its reasoned findings on the
motion and invites the House to reach a decision either on those findings or on the
draft or proposed bill in such form as it may have been amended.
This procedure may only be applied once by the members of a linguistic group in
respect of one and the same draft or proposed bill.
Article 59b
1. There is a Council and an Executive for the French Community and a Council and
an Executive for the Flemish Community whose composition and functioning are
determined by law. Representatives of both Councils are elected. ...
3. Furthermore, the Community Councils, each in its own sphere, shall determine by
decree, to the exclusion of the Legislative, the use of languages for:
(1) administrative matters;
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(2) the education provided in establishments which are set up, subsidised or
recognised by the public authorities;
(3) industrial relations between employers and their staff together with such
business instruments and documents as are laid down by the law and
regulations.
4. Such decrees...shall have the force of law respectively in the French language
region and in the Dutch language region and also in respect of institutions established
in the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital which, by virtue of their activities must be
considered as belonging exclusively to one or other of the Communities.
Such decrees...shall have the force of law respectively in the French language region
and in the Dutch language region except as regards:
- such communes or groups of communes which are adjacent to another
linguistic region where the law lays down or permits the use of a language
other than that of the region in which they are located;
- departments whose activities extend beyond the linguistic region in which
they are established;
- national and international institutions referred to in legislation whose
activity is common to more than one community. ...
Article 59c
There is a council and an executive for the German language community whose
composition and functioning are determined by law....Its decrees shall have the force
of law in the German language region. ...
Article 86b
With the possible exception of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet comprises an equal
number of French-speaking and Dutch-speaking ministers.
Article 108c
2. For those cases laid down in the Constitution and by legislation, the members of
the urban area council are divided into a French language group and a Dutch
language group in the manner prescribed by law. ...
4. In the urban area there is a French committee for culture and a Dutch committee
for culture which are composed of an equal number of members elected respectively
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by the French language group and by the Dutch language group in the urban area
council.
Each has the same powers in respect of its community as the other organising
authorities:
(1) in pre-schooling, post-educational and cultural matters;
(2) in education.
Article 140
The text of the Constitution is drawn up in French and in Dutch.
3. DENMARK
Minority Language Community: German.
No constitutional provisions dealing with language.
Denmark has signed the European Charterfor Regional orMinority Languages.
4. FINLAND
Minority Language Communities: Swedish and Lapp.
Constitution of the Finnish Republic (1919)
Article 14
Finnish and Swedish shall be the national languages of the Republic.
The right of Finnish citizens to use their mother tongue, whether Finnish or Swedish,
before the courts and the administrative authorities, and to obtain from them
documents in these languages, shall be guaranteed by law; care shall be taken that the
rights of the Finnish speaking population and the rights of the Swedish speaking
population of the country shall be promoted by the state upon an identical basis.
The state shall provide for the intellectual and economic needs of the Finnish
speaking and the Swedish speaking populations upon a similar basis.
Article 22
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Laws and decrees as well as bills submitted by the Government to Parliament and the
replies, recommendations, and other documents addressed by Parliament to the
Government shall be drawn up in the Finnish and Swedish languages.
Article 50
For the purpose of general administration Finland shall remain divided into
provinces, circuits and communes. ...
In redrawing the boundaries of the administrative districts, it is to be observed that
these shall, as far as circumstances permit, be so constituted as to contain populations
speaking only one language, Finnish or Swedish, or to make the language minorities
as small as possible.
Article 75
Every Finnish citizen must take part in, or make his contribution torn the defence of
the country as prescribed by law.
Every conscript, unless he otherwise desires, shall if possible be enrolled in a military
unit of which the rank and file speak his own mother tongue (Finnish or Swedish)
and shall receive his training in that language. Finnish shall be the language of
command of the Armed Forces.
Finland has signed and ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages.
5. FRANCE
Minority language Communities: German/Alsatian, Basque, Breton, Catalan,
Corsican, Francique/Luxembourgish, Dutch/Flemish and Occitan.
Constitution of the French Republic (1958/modified 1992)
Article 2
The language of the Republic is French.
This provision has been implemented by legislative acts, e.g. Constitutional Law No.
94-665 (4 August 1994) re: the use of the French Language, which recognise and
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promote the French language only, to the exclusion ofall other languages spoken in
the Republic.
6. GERMANY
Minority Language Communities: Danish, Frisian, Sorb and Romanes.
Basic Law ofGermany (1949/amended 1990)
Article 3
No one may be prejudiced or favoured because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his
language, his homeland and origin, his faith or his religious or political opinions.
Germany has signed and ratified the European Charter for Regional or Minority
Languages.
7. GREECE
Minority Language Communities: Albanian/Arvanite, Aroumanian, Pomak, Slav-
Macedonian and Turkish.
Constitution of the Greek Republic (1975)
Article 3
The text of the Holy scripture shall be maintained unaltered. Official translation of
the text into any other form of language, without prior sanction by the Autocephalous
Church of Greece and the Great Church of Christ in Constantinople is prohibited.
Article 5
All persons living within the Greek territory shall enjoy full protection of their life,
their honour and freedom, irrespective of nationality, race or language and of




Minority Language Community: Irish/Gaeilge
The Irish Constitution (1937)
Article 8
1. The Irish language as the national language is the first official language.
2. The English language is recognised as a second official language.
3. Provision may, however, be made by law for the exclusive use of either of the said
languages for any one or more official purposes, either throughout the State or in any
part thereof.
Article 25.4.3°
Every bill shall be signed by the President in the text in which it was passed...by both
Houses of the Oireachtas, and if a bill is so passed...in both the official languages,
the President shall sign the text of the bill in each of those languages.
Article 25.4.4°
Where the President signs the text of a bill in one only of the official languages, an
official translation shall be issued in the other official language.
Article 25.4.6°
In case of conflict between the texts of a law enrolled under this section in both the
official languages, the text in the national language shall prevail.
Article 25.5.4°
In case of conflict between the texts of any copy of this Constitution...the text in the
national language shall'prevail.
A comprehensive Language Act will be introduced in 1999.
9. ITALY
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Minority Language Communities: Albanian/Arberishtja Catalan, Croat,
French/Francoprovengal, Friulan, German (and variants), Greek, Ladin, Occitan,
Roma, Sard and Slovenian.
Constitution of the Italian Republic (1948)
Article 3
All citizens are invested with equal social status and are equal before the law, without
prejudice as to sex, race, language, religion, political opinions and personal or social
conditions.
Article 6
The Republic shall safeguard linguistic minorities by means of special provisions.
Recognition and status, ofminority languages vary from region to region within Italy.
10. LUXEMBOURG
Minority Language Community: Luxembourgish (Letzebuergesch).
Constitution of the Grand Duchy ofLuxembourg (1868)
Article 29
The law will determine the use of languages in administrative and judicial matters.
The Law on the Linguistic Regime (24 February 1984) establishes that
Luxembourgish is the national language of Luxembourg, French is the legislative
language and French, German and Luxembourgish may be used in administrative
and judicial matters.
Luxembourg has signed the European Charterfor Regional orMinority Languages.
11. THE NETHERLANDS
Minority Language Community: Frisian.
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No Constitutional Provisions dealing with language.
The Netherlands has signed and ratified the European Charter for Regional or
Minority Languages.
12. PORTUGAL
No indigenous minority language communities.
Constitution ofthe Republic ofPortugal (1976/amended 1987)
Article 13
No one may be privileged, benefited, damaged, deprived of any right or exempt from
any responsibility by virtue of influence, sex, race, language, territory of origin,
religion, political or ideological convictions, education, economic or social status.
Article 74
3. In the implementation of an educational policy, the state is obliged...
(h) to provide instruction in the Portuguese language and access to
Portuguese culture to the children of immigrants.
13. SPAIN
Minority Language Communities: Aragonese, Aranese, Asturian, Basque, Catalan
and Galician.
Constitution of the Kingdom ofSpain (1978)
Article 3
1. Castilian is the official Spanish language of the state. All Spaniards have the duty
to know it and the right to use it.
2. The other languages of Spain will also be official in the respective autonomous
communities, in accordance with their statutes.
3. The richness of the linguistic modalities of Spain is a cultural patrimony which
will be the object of special respect and protection.
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Article 148
The Autonomous Communities may assume jurisdiction in the following matters...
(17) assistance to culture, research and, as the case may be, for the teaching of
the language of the Autonomous Community.
The respective Statutes ofAutonomy for the Basque Country, Catalonia and Gallicia
were enacted in 1979.
14. SWEDEN
Minority Language Communities: Finnish and Lapp.
Constitution of the Swedish Republic (1975)
Article 8
In the exercise of their functions the courts and administrative authorities shall
maintain objectivity and impartiality. They may not without legal grounds treat
persons differently by reason of their personal conditions such as faith, opinions,
race, skin colour, origin, sex, age, nationality, language, social status, or financial
circumstances.
15. THE UNITED KINGDOM
Minority Language Communities: Cornish, Gaidhlig, Irish, Scots and Welsh.
The United Kingdom does not have a written constitution.
The Welsh Language Act was enacted in 1993.
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APPENDIX II
TEXT OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
1. Arfe Resolution (1981)
Resolution on a Community Charter ofRegional Languages and Cultures and on
a Charter ofRights ofEthnic Minorities
16 October 1981, [1984] OJ C-287/106.
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
• having regard to the resurgence of special movements by ethnic and linguistic
minorities aimed at bringing about a deeper understanding and recognition of
their historical identity,
• recognising the revival of regional languages and cultures associated with these
movements as a source of enrichment for European civilisation and as an
indication of its vitality,
• having regard to the declarations of principle made by the most representative
and authoritative international organisations, from the UN to the Council of
Europe, and to the most recent and widely accepted political, legal and
anthropological theories,
• referring to Resolution No 1 of the Oslo Conference (1976) of the European
Ministers responsible for cultural affairs,
• considering that all governments in the Community have acknowledged in
principle the right of such groups to freely express themselves and their culture
and have, in most cases, drawn up legislation in this specific field and begun co¬
ordinated programmes of action,
• considering that a cultural identity is today one of the most important non-
material psychological needs,
• considering that autonomy must not be regarded as an alternative to the
integration of peoples and different traditions, but as a means of guiding the
process necessary for increasing intercommunication,
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• considering therefore that linguistic and cultural heritage cannot be safeguarded
unless the right conditions are created for their cultural and economic
development,
• determined to bring about a closer union among the peoples of Europe and to
preserve their living languages, drawing on their diversity in order to enrich and
diversify their common cultural heritage,
• having regard to motions for resolutions Docs. 1-371/79, 1-436/79 and 1-790/79,
• having regard to the report of the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education,
Information and Sport and to the opinion of the Committee on Regional Policy
and Regional Planning (Doc. 1-965/80),
1. Requests National Governments and regional and local authorities, despite the
wide differences in their situations and having due regard to the degree of
independence which they enjoy, to implement a policy in this field inspired by and
designed to achieve the same objectives, and calls on them:
(a) in the field of education:
• to allow and promote the teaching of regional languages and cultures in official
curricula right through from nursery school to university;
• to allow and provide for, in response to needs expressed by the population,
teaching in schools of all levels and grades to be carried out in regional
languages, with particular emphasis being placed on nursery school teaching so
as to ensure that the child is able to speak its mother tongue;
• to allow teaching of the literature and history of the communities concerned to be
included in all curricula;
(b) in the field of mass communications:
• to allow and take steps to ensure access to local radio and television in a way that
guarantees consistent and effective community communication and to encourage
the training of specialist regional presenters;
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• to ensure that minority groups receive organisational and financial assistance for
their cultural events equivalent to that received by the majority groups;
(c) in the field of public life and social affairs:
• to assign in accordance with the Bordeaux declaration of the Council of Europe
Conference of Local Authorities, a direct responsibility to the local authorities in
this manner;
• to promote as far as possible a correspondence between cultural regions and the
geographical boundaries of the local authorities;
• to ensure that individuals are allowed to use their own language in the field of
public life and social affairs in their dealings with official bodies and in the
courts;
2. Requests the Commission to provide, as soon as possible, recent, accurate and
comparable data on the attitudes and behaviour of the public in the Member States
towards regional languages and cultures in their various countries;
3. Calls on the Commission to set up pilot projects in the language teaching sector to
try out methods of multilingual education capable of ensuring both the survival of the
individual cultures and their openness to the outside world;
4. Recommends that the Regional Fund provide financial assistance for projects
designed to support regional and folk cultures and calls upon the Commission to
include measures in its educational and cultural programmes to promote a European
cultural policy which takes account of the aspirations and expectations of all its
ethnic and linguistic minorities who are looking towards Europe and its institutions
with confidence and hope;
5. Recommends that the Regional Fund should contribute to the financing of regional
economic projects since the cultural identity of a region can only exist if the
population are able to live and work in their own area;
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6. Calls on the Commission to review all Community legislation or practices which
discriminate against minority languages;
7. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the
Commission, to the governments and regional authorities of the Member States and
to the Council of Europe.
2. Arfe Resolution (2) (1983)
Resolution on Measures in favour ofMinority Languages and Cultures
11 February 1983, [1983] OJ C-68/103
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT,
• Considering that some 30 million Community citizens have as their mother
tongue a regional language or a little-spoken language,
• Aware of the resurgence of special movements by ethnic and linguistic minorities
aimed at bringing about a deeper understanding and recognition of their historical
identity,
• Having regard to its own resolution of 16 October 1981 on the subject,
1. Calls on the Commission:
• to continue to intensify its efforts in this area, particularly in relation to
establishing pilot projects and studies,
• to review all Community and national legislation and practices which
discriminate against minority languages, and prepare appropriate Community
instruments for ending such discrimination,
• to report to Parliament by the end of 1983 on the outcome of action taken on the
two points above;
2. Calls on the Commission to report to Parliament on the practical measures taken or
due to be taken in the near future to encourage regional and folk cultures and cultural
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policy in the context of media and culture programmes and to finance regional
economic projects under the Regional Fund within the meaning of paragraphs 4 and
5 of the resolution of 16 October 1981;
3. Calls on the Council to ensure that the principles of Parliament's resolution are
respected in practice;
4. Believes that Parliament should continue to monitor progress in this area at
Community level, and that the appropriate parliamentary committees should hold a
joint meeting to consider how best this should be done;
5. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, Council,
Council of Europe and.the governments of the Member States.
3. Kuijpers Resolution (1987)
Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities in
the European Community
30 October 1987, Doc. A 2-150/87
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
• having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Columbu and others on
linguistic rights in Northern Catalonia (Doc. 2-1259/84),
• having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Kuijpers and Mr.
Vandemeulebroucke on the protection and promotion of regional languages and
cultures in the Community (Doc. B2-76/85),
• having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Rossetti and others on the
recognition of the rights of minorities and the full recognition of their cultures
(Doc. B2-321/85),
• having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Vandemeulebroucke and Mr.
Kuijpers on the Commission's failure to implement the European Parliament's
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resolution on a Community charter of regional languages and cultures and a
charter of rights of ethnic minorities (Doc. B2-1514/85),
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Kuijpers and Mr.
Vandemeulebroucke on the recognition of free radio stations (Doc. B2-1532/85),
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Vandemeulebroucke and
others on a Frisian television service in Friesland (Doc. B2-31/86),
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Kuijpers and Mr.
Vandemeulebroucke on the projected withdrawal of the grant from the
Netherlands Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs for the Association
for the Promotion of Standard Dutch and the detrimental consequences thereof
for transfrontier co-operation in the field of culture (Doc. B2-890/86),
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Columbu and others on the
establishment of institutes for the study of minority languages (Doc. B2-
1015/86),
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Rubert de Ventos on the
obstacles to the use of Catalan in the universities and on television (Doc. B2-
1323/86),
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Mizzau and others on support
for institutions and associations for the study of minority languages (Doc. B2-
1346/86),
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Kuijpers and others on the
integration of the bilingual Basque-French schools run by the SEASKA
association (Doc. B2-149/87),
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr. Colom i Naval on improving
the position ofminority languages within the EEC (Doc. B2-291/87),
having regard to the Committee on Youth, Culture, Education, Information and
Sport and the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights
(Doc. A2-150/87),
having regard to its resolution of 16 October 1981 on a Community charter of
regional languages and cultures and on a charter of rights of ethnic minorities and
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its resolution of 11 February 1983 on measures in favour of minority languages
and cultures,
• having regard to the basic principles regarding rights of minorities formulated
and approved by the United Nations and the Council of Europe,
• regretting that so far, the Commission has not put forward any proposals to
implement the above-mentioned resolutions which deal comprehensively with the
problems of ethnic, linguistic and cultural minorities in the Community,
• whereas there are still many obstacles to the full development of the specific
cultural and social identity among the national and linguistic minorities, and
whereas attitudes towards these minorities and their problems frequently reveal a
lack of appreciation and understanding and, in some cases, are based on
discrimination,
• having regard to the final declaration of the European Community and its
resolution of 13 April 1984 on the role of the regions in the construction of a
democratic Europe and the outcome of the Conference of the Regions, in which it
is noted that strengthening the autonomy of the regions in the Community and the
creation of a politically more unified European Community represent two
complementary and convergent aspects of a political development which is
essential to cope effectively with the future tasks of the Community,
• noting that regional economic conditions determine the prospects for the
expression and development of the local culture so that appropriate measures
should therefore be worked out within a balanced European regional policy that
starts from a regional basis and is designed to counteract the exodus from
outlying regions to the centre,
1. Calls for the principles and proposals set out in its above-mentioned resolutions of
16 October 1981 and 11 February 1983 to be fully applied;
2. Points out once again the need for the Member States to recognise their linguistic
minorities in their laws and thus to create the basic condition for the preservation and
development of regional and minority cultures and languages;
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3. Calls on the Member States whose Constitutions already contain general principles
concerning the protection of minorities to make timely provision on the basis of
organic laws, for the implementation of those principles;
4. Supports the Council of Europe's efforts to draw up a European Charter of
regional and minority languages;
5. Recommends to the Member States that they carry out educational measures
including:
• arranging for pre-school to university education and continuing education to be
officially conducted in the regional and minority languages in the language areas
concerned, on an equal footing with instruction in the national languages,
• officially recognising courses, classes and schools set up by associations which
are authorised to teach, under the regulations in force in the country concerned,
and which use a regional or minority language as the general teaching language,
• giving particular attention to the training of teaching staff in the regional or
minority languages and making available the educational resources required to
accomplish these measures,
• promoting information on educational opportunities in the regional and minority
languages,
• making provision for the equivalence of diplomas, certificates, other
qualifications and evidence of professional skills so that members of regional or
minority groups in one Member State may have easier access to the labour market
in culturally related communities in other Member States;
6. Recommends to the Member States that they carry out administrative and legal
measures including:
• providing a direct legal basis for the use of regional and minority languages, in
the first instance in the local authorities of area where a minority group does
exist,
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• reviewing national provisions and practices that discriminate against minority
languages, as called for in Parliament's resolution of 16 January 1986 on the rise
of fascism and racism in Europe,
• requiring decentralised central government services also to use national, regional
and minority languages in the areas concerned,
• officially recognising surnames and place names expressed in a regional or
minority language,
• accepting place names and indications on electoral lists in a regional or minority
language;
7. Recommends to the Member States that they take measures in respect of the mass
media, including:
• granting and making possible access to local, regional and central public and
commercial broadcasting systems in such a way as to guarantee the continuity
and effectiveness of broadcasts in regional and minority languages,
• ensuring that minority groups obtain organisational and financial support for their
programmes commensurate with that available to the majority,
• support for the training of journalists and media staff required to implement these
measures,
• putting the latest technology to the service of the regional and minority
languages,
• taking account of the extra costs entailed by provision for special scripts, such as
Cyrillic, Hebrew, Greek, etc.;
8. Recommends to the Member States that they take measures in respect of the
cultural infrastructure including:
• ensuring that representatives of groups that use regional or minority languages are
able to participate directly in cultural facilities and activities,
• the creation of foundations and institutes for the study of regional and minority
languages, one of whose tasks would be to set up the educational machinery for
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the introduction of regional and minority languages in schools and draw up a
"general inventory" of the regional and minority language concerned,
• the development of dubbing and subtitling techniques to encourage audio-visual
productions in the regional and minority languages,
• provision of the necessary material and financial support for the implementation
of these measures;
9. Recommends to the. Member States that they take social and economic measures
including:
• providing for the use of the regional and minority languages in public concerns
(postal service, etc.),
• recognition of the use of the regional and minority languages in the payments
sector (giro cheques and banking),
• providing for consumer information and product labelling in regional and
minority languages,
• providing for the use of regional languages for road and other public signs and
street names;
10. Recommends to the Member States that they take measures in respect of the
regional and minority languages that are used in several Member States, particularly
in frontier areas, including:
• providing for the appropriate cross-frontier co-operation machinery for cultural
and linguistic policy,
• promotion of cross-frontier co-operation in accordance with the European Outline
Convention on Transfrontier Co-operation between Communities or Territorial
Authorities;
11. Calls on the Member States to encourage and support the European Bureau for
Lesser Used Languages and its national committees in each of the Member States;
12. Calls on the Commission to:
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• do all it can within its terms of reference to implement the measures set out in
paragraphs 5 to 10,
• take account of the languages and cultures of regional and ethnic minorities in the
Community when working out the various areas of Community policy,
particularly with regard to Community measures in the field of cultural and
educational policy,
• accord the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages official consultative
status,
• make provision for a system of mutual study visits to increase mutual knowledge
of minorities,
• reserve the necessary broadcasting time for minority cultures in European
television,
• give the necessary attention to linguistic minorities in the Community's
information publications;
13. Calls on the Council and Commission to continue their support and
encouragement for the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages by
• ensuring adequate budgetary resources and the reinstatement of a separate budget
line,
• proposing the necessary budget funds for the implementation of the measures set
out above,
• allocating ERDF and ESF funds for programmes and projects on behalf of
regional and popular cultures,
• reporting annually to Parliament on the situation of the Community's regional
and minority languages and measures taken in this connection by the Member
States and the Community;
14. Stresses its determination to ensure that adequate provision is made for action in
favour of minority languages and that at least 1 million ECU is entered in the 1998
budget;
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15. Stresses categorically that the recommendations contained in this resolution are
not to be interpreted or implemented in such a way as to jeopardise the territorial
integrity or public order of the Member States;
16. Instructs its appropriate committee to draw up separate reports on the languages
and cultures of non-permanent Community citizens, Community citizens living in
another Member State from that from which they come, migrants and overseas
minorities and points out that each of these groups share many of the disadvantages
of speakers of lesser used languages and that their specific problems deserve detailed
and separate treatment;
17. Decides that the Intergroup on Lesser Used Languages shall be granted full status
as an official Intergroup of the European Parliament;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council,
the national and regional governments of the Member States, the Consultative
Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Standing Conference of Local and
Regional Authorities of Europe.
4. Killilea Resolution (1994)
Resolution on Linguistic and CulturalMinorities in the European Community
9 February 1994, [1994] OJ C-061/110
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
• having regard to its resolution of 16 October 1981 on a Community charter of
regional languages and cultures and a charter of rights for ethnic minorities,
• having regard to its resolution of 11 February 1983 on measures in favour of
minority languages and cultures,
• having regard to its resolution of 30 October 1987 on the languages and cultures
of regional and ethnic minorities in the European Community,
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having regard to its resolution of 21 January 1993 on the Commission
communication to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and
Social Committee entitled "New Prospects for Community cultural action",
having regard to the motions for resolutions by:
Mr Hume and others on the minority languages (B3-0016/90);
Mr. Gangoiti Liaguno on the promotion and use of regional and/or minority
languages (B3-2113/90);
Mr Bandres Molet on granting broadcasting licences to Basque-language
radio stations (B30523/91);
Mrs Van Hemeldonck on the signing of the European Charter of regional and
minority languages (B3-1351/92);
having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages,
accorded the legal form of a European Convention by the Council of Europe, and
opened for signature on 5 November 1992,
having regard to the final document of the Copenhagen meeting of the CSCE
Conference on the' Human Dimension of the CSCE (5-29 June 1990) and in
particular to Chapter IV of that document,
having regard to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (CSCE) adopted in Paris
on 21 November 1991,
having regard to rule 148 of its Rules of Procedure,
having regard to the report of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and
the Media and the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens'
Rights (A3-0042/94),
encouraged by the commitment, contained in Article 128 of the EC Treaty, to the
Community contributing to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States
while respecting their national and regional diversity,
declaring the need for a European linguistic culture and recognising that its scope
also includes protection of the linguistic heritage, the overcoming of the language
barrier, the promotion of lesser-used languages and the safeguarding of minority
languages,
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encouraged by the process of democratisation in central and eastern Europe and
in particular by the determination of recently democratised peoples to promote
their own languages and cultures,
whereas all peoples have the right to respect for their language ad culture and
must therefore have the necessary legal means to protect and promote them,
whereas the linguistic diversity of the European Union is a key element in the
Union's cultural wealth,
whereas the protection and promotion of the Union's linguistic diversity is a key
factor in the creation of a peaceful and democratic Europe,
whereas the Community has a responsibility to support the Member States in
developing their cultures and protecting national and regional diversity, including
the diversity of indigenous regional and minority languages,
whereas the Community should encourage action by the Member States in cases
where the protection of such languages and cultures is inadequate or non-existent,
whereas the Community also has a duty in its relations with the governments of
associated and third countries to draw attention to the rights of minorities and, if
necessary, to support governments in finding ways of ensuring that these rights
are safeguarded; whereas it must also condemn any deliberate denial of these
rights,
whereas the linguistic diversity of the European Union is a reflection of its
cultural diversity and too often goes unrecognised,
whereas language is an essential means of communication in the European Union
now being created and whereas European integration must make the use of the
most widespread languages as a way of communicating across the present
internal borders compatible with protecting and safeguarding the less widespread
languages in regional or transregional contexts,
whereas the minority languages and cultures are also an integral part of the
Union's culture and European heritage and whereas, from this point of view, the
Community should provide them with legal protection and the appropriate
financial resources to this end,
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• whereas many lesser used languages are endangered, with a rapid drop in the
number of speakers, and whereas this threatens the well-being of specific
population groups and greatly diminishes Europe's creative potential as a whole,
• whereas, while the duty of every Member State government to protect and
promote its official languages must be fully respected, it must not be exercised to
the detriment of the lesser used languages and the people for whom they are the
natural cultural vehicle,
• whereas, however, the term "minority languages and cultures" may embrace
phenomena of differing characteristics and dimensions according to the Member
State in question and may be understood as referring to certain languages which
are already official in some Member States but which do not receive adequate
dissemination or identical status in the neighbouring Member State or another
Member State,
1. Calls for the principles and proposals set out in its afforementioned resolutions of
16 October 1981, 11 February 1983 and 30 October 1987 to be fully applied;
2. Points out again the need for Member States to recognise their linguistic minorities
and to make the necessary legal and administrative provisions for them to create the
basic conditions for the preservation and development of these languages;
3. Believes, furthermore, that all minority languages and cultures should also be
protected by appropriate legal statute in the Member States;
4. Considers that this legal statute should at least cover the use and encouragement of
such languages and cultures in the spheres of education, justice and public
administration, the media, toponymies and other sectors of public and cultural life
without prejudice to the use of the most widespread languages, when required to
ensure ease of communication within each of the Member States or in the Union as a
whole;
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5. Points out that the fact that a proportion of the citizens of a state use a language of
have a culture which is different from the dominant one in that state or form the
dominant one in a part of region of that state should not give rise to discrimination of
any kind or, in particular, to any form of social marginalisation that would impede
their access to, or continuance in, employment;
6. Supports the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, accorded the
legal form of a European Convention as an effective yet flexible instrument for the
protection ad promotion of lesser used languages;
7. Calls on the Member State governments which have not yet done so as a matter of
urgency to sign and their parliaments to ratify the Convention choosing at all times to
apply those paragraphs best suited to the needs and aspirations of the linguistic
communities in question;
8. Calls on the Member State governments and on the local and regional authorities
to encourage and support specialised associations, in particular the Member State
Committees of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages so that the
responsibilities of citizens and their organisations for the development of their
language can be realised;
9. Urges the Member States and the relevant regions and local authorities to examine
the possibility of concluding agreements to create trans-frontier linguistic institutions
for any minority languages or cultures existing in two neighbouring countries or in
several Member States simultaneously;
10. Calls on the Commission to:
(a) contribute, within its field of competence, to the implementation of the initiatives
undertaken by Member States in this area;
(b) take account of the lesser used languages and their attendant cultures when
working out various areas of Community policy, and make equivalent provision for
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the needs of speakers of lesser used languages, alongside the needs of speakers of the
majority languages, in all educational and cultural programmes, e.g. YOUTH FOR
EUROPE, ERASMUS, TEMPUS, European Dimension, Platform Europe, MEDIA,
schemes for the translation of contemporary literary work;
(c) encourage the use of lesser used languages in the Community's audio-visual
policy, for instance in respect of High Definition television and assist lesser used
language producers and broadcasters to produce new programmes in 16:9 format;
(d) ensure that modern digital telecommunications technology, which allows for the
compressing of satellite and cable broadcast transmissions, is used for carrying a
greater number of minority languages;
(e) put in place as quickly as possible a programme inspired by LINGUA for lesser
used languages such as the Mercator education network;
(f) facilitate the immediate publication, after corrections and additions, of the
scientific map of lesser used language communities in the EC, prepared by the
European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages;
(g) encourage the publication of the Treaties of the European Communities and other
basic provisions and information on the European Community and its activities in the
Union's lesser used languages;
11. Calls on the Council and Commission to:
(a) continue their support and encouragement for European organisations
representing the lesser used languages, particularly the European Bureau for Lesser
Used Languages, and to provide them with the necessary resources;
(b) ensure that adequate budgetary provision is made for the Community's
programmes in favour of lesser used languages and their attendant cultures and
propose a multiannual action programme in this field;
(c) take due account of the linguistic and cultural heritage of regions in the
development of regional policy and in the allocation of funds from the ERDF by
supporting integrated regional development projects which include measures to
support regional languages and cultures, as well as in the development of social
policy and in the allocation of funds from the ESF;
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(d) take due account of the needs of speakers of lesser used languages in the countries
of central and eastern Europe, when developing EC programmes for economic and
social reconstruction, and in particular the PHARE programme;
(e) encourage the translation of books and literary works and the subtitling of films
between minority languages or into Community languages;
(f) ensure that in encouraging minority languages, the European Community does not
do so to the detriment of the main relevant national language and must, in turn,
ensure that this in no way affects the teaching of that main language in schools;
12. Calls for the languages spoken on overseas territories belonging to the Member
States to enjoy the same rights and provisions as mainland languages;
13. In relation to non-territorial autochthonous languages (e.g. the Roma and Sinti
languages and Yiddish) calls on all relevant bodies to apply mutatis mutandis the
recommendations set out in this resolution;
14. Stresses that the recommendations contained in this resolution are not such as to
jeopardise the territorial integrity or public order of the Member States and
furthermore, are not to be interpreted as implying the right to enter into any activity
or carry out any action which contravenes the objectives of the United Nations or any
other obligation laid down in international law;
15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council,
the central and regional governments of the Member States, the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the Standing Conference of Local and Regional
Authorities of Europe, the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the
United Nations and UNESCO.
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